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1 External Document Links Relay Misoperations Reliability Indicators Dashboard Misoperations Template: Misoperations Template Q&A Document: 1 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

2 Protection System Misoperation Identification and Correction NERC Industry Webinar, December 1, a.m. 1 p.m.

3 Anti-Trust Notice It is NERC s policy and practice to obey the antitrust laws and to avoid all conduct that unreasonably restrains competition. This policy requires the avoidance of any conduct that violates, or that might appear to violate, the antitrust laws. Among other things, the antitrust laws forbid any agreement between or among competitors regarding: prices, availability of service, product design, terms of sale, division of markets, allocation of customers, or any other activity that unreasonably restrains competition. 3 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

4 Public Meeting Notice Participants are reminded that this meeting is public. Notice of the meeting was posted on the NERC website and widely distributed. The notice included the number for dial-in participation. Participants should keep in mind that the audience may include members of the press and representatives of various governmental authorities, in addition to the expected participation by industry stakeholders. 4 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

5 Misoperations Data Reporting and Overview Joe Spencer, Chair, ERO-RAPA Manager of Planning and Engineering, SERC Reliability Corporation NERC Industry Webinar, December 1, 2011

6 Background Protection Systems Misoperations identified as #1 NERC reliability issue in 2010 Data collected under NERC standards PRC-003 and 004 Significant regional differences existed in analysis and collection of misops. Difficult to Tracking/trend misops on the NERC-wide level 6 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

7 Background (2) NERC Planning Committee (PC) approves misops metric in 2009 (ALR 4.1) Focus on misops to operations ratio Options for consistent reporting assessed Near term solution Regions align misops reporting procedures (via ERO-RAPA and NERC SPCS). Consistent categories, cause codes and reporting frequencies developed Misops template developed 7 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

8 Background (3) Long term solution Use NERC-wide standard development process (Project ) Voluntary regional reporting in 2011Q1 and 2011Q2, mandatory for 2011Q3. Preliminary NERC wide and regional data available on NERC website TADs data to be leveraged for ALR 4.1 calculation 8 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

9 Next Presenter 9 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

10 2Q2011 Misoperation Results John A. Seidel, Vice Chair, ERO-RAPA Senior Mgr, Event Analysis and Reliability Improvement, Midwest Reliability Organization NERC Industry Webinar, December 1, 2011

11 2Q2011 Misoperations Summary Statistics Total REs Providing Data 8 Total Mis-operations 812 Unnecessary Trip 95% (771) Slow or Failure to Trip 5% (41) TADS Reportable 21% (173) TADS Reportable with Event ID Left Blank or Unavailable 36% (63) 11 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

12 by Category Misoperations by Region and Category in 2011Q2 600 Unnecessary Trip during Fault 500 Unnecessary Trip without Fault Misoperation Count Failure to Trip Slow Trip NERC FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC Region and Category 12 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

13 by Category (2) Misoperations by Category and Region in 2011Q FRCC MRO Regional Entity Misoperation Count NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC NERC NERC Misoperation Count 0 Unnecessary Trip during Fault Unnecessary Trip without Fault Failure to Trip Slow Trip 0 Category and Region 13 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

14 by Cause Misoperations by Region and Cause Code in 2011Q2 300 Incorrect setting, logic or design errors 250 Relay Failures/Malfunctions Misoperation Count Communication Failures Unknown/Unexplainable As-left Personnel Error AC System DC System 50 0 NERC FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC Region and Cause Code 14 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

15 Misoperations by Cause Code and Region in 2011Q2 by Cause (2) FRCC Regional Entity Misoperation Count MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC NERC NERC Misoperation Count Cause Code and Region 15 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

16 by Voltage Class Misoperations by Region and Voltage in 2011Q kv 199 kv Misoperation Count kv 299 kv 300 kv 399 kv 400 kv 599 kv 600 kv 799 kv Other NERC FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC Region and Voltage 16 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

17 by Voltage Class (2) Misoperations by Region and Voltage in 2011Q Regional Entity Misoperation Count FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC NERC NERC Entity Misoperation Count kv 199 kv 200 kv 299 kv 300 kv 399 kv 400 kv 599 kv 600 kv 799 kv Other Voltage and Region 0 17 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

18 by Relay Technology Misoperations by Region and Relay Technology in 2011Q2 (Only Incorrect setting and Relay Failures/Malfunctions Causes) 300 Microprocessor 250 Electromechanical Misoperation Count Solid State Other 50 0 NERC FRCC MRO NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC Region and Relay Technology 18 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

19 by Relay Technology (2) Misoperations by Relay Technology and Region in 2011Q2 (Only Incorrect setting and Relay Failures/Malfunctions Causes) FRCC 50 MRO 250 Regional Entity Misoperation Count NPCC RFC SERC SPP RE TRE WECC NERC NERC Misoperation Count Microprocessor Electromechanical Solid State Other 0 Relay Technology and Region 19 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

20 Top Cause/Relay Technology Misoperations by Relay Technology in 2011Q2 (Only Incorrect Setting/Logic/Design Error Cause) Microprocessor, 213, 75% Electromechanical, 48, 17% Solid State, 11, 4% Other, 10, 4% 20 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

21 Initial Observations Data quality appears consistent across all 8 regions. Highest cause Incorrect settings/design error. Mostly associated with microprocessor relays and their complexity. Microprocessor relay make up a large % of the overall population of BES relays. 70% of misops occur on transmission facilities operating between 100 kv to 200 kv. Shows the need for collection of TADs outage data down to 100 kv- to enable Metric ALR-4-1, Mis-operations Rate, to include entire BES. 21 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

22 Next Steps 2011 third quarter data is due November 30, Once sufficient data is collected (possibly 3-4 quarters minimum), NERC staff and the Regions can begin to identify certain areas/causes that entities may explore within their own companies Ultimately, the goal is to help Entities reduce the number of misops. Tie-in to System Events: How misops contribute to system events will be able to be better tracked with the advent of the NERC EAWG and the established event categories and reporting forms. How often misops (as well as other causes) contribute to system events will be an important focus in the future Will be included in the annual State of Reliability reports. 22 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

23 Next Presenter 23 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

24 Misoperation Template Annual Review Andrew Slone Reliability Performance Analysis Engineer, NERC NERC Industry Webinar, December 1, 2011

25 Misoperations Template Relay Misoperations Reported on Common Template Common Reporting Template Benefits: Lessens Burden on Entities Spanning Multiple Regional Entities Increases Efficiency in Sending PRC-004 Data to NERC Reduces NERC-wide Aggregation Time for NERC Staff Misoperations Template: Misoperations Template Q&A Document: 25 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

26 Misop Template Comments Sixteen (16) Comments Received as of 12/1/2011 Misoperation Template Comments Cover: Sudden Pressure Relay Misoperation Reporting Status o Currently, report as per Regional Entity procedures Corrective Action Plan Clarifications TADS Linkage Comments o Remove automatically generated TADS Cause Code column o TADS data should only be reported if a misoperation itself is TADS reportable Formatting and Administrative Comments 26 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

27 Misop Template Comments/Slow Trips A Particular Focus on Slow to Trip Misoperations Comments on Slow to Trip Misoperations Meaning of essential to transmission system performance Determining essential to transmission system performance Clarification on boundary between Slow to Trip and Failure to Trip Should all Slow to Trip misoperations be reported or only Slow to Trip misops that impact the Bulk Electric System? 27 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

28 Additional Misop Template Comments Additional Comments are Welcome Comments Taken on an On-going Basis Comments Responded/Reviewed at Annual Review Please Send Comments to: Andrew Slone, 28 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

29 Next Presenter 29 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

30 Project Protection System Misoperations Standard Drafting Team Art Buanno, Senior Consultant ReliabilityFirst Corporation NERC Industry Webinar, December 1, 2011

31 Rapid Development Team Efforts Combined PRC-003 & PRC-004 Changed to a Results-Based Standard Placed time restrictions on actions Rewrote Misoperation definition due to: Ambiguity of language Align with Causes of Misoperation 31 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

32 Standard Drafting Team Efforts Responding to industry comments Revising definition and standard based on comments Definition changes: Added clause excluding operations during maintenance & testing Included concepts from Guidelines & Technical Basis section Added language for a slow trip other than Fault Standard changes: Divided the requirement into several requirements Revised timeframes for identifying causes & determining CAPs or action plans Improvements to allow for changes in CAP & subsequent development of CAP 32 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

33 Next Presenter 33 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

34 NERC Industry Webinar Protection System Misoperation Identification and Correction

35 Misoperation Management Key Ingredients 1. Management Support/Culture of Compliance 2. Formal Procedure 3. Corporate Tools 4. Assigned Responsibility 5. Progress Review 6. Training/Mentoring 7. Human Performance Improvement 35

36 Cooperation Between Departments Compliance Administration OPERATIONS (Transmission Control Center) SYSTEM PROTECTION (Subject Matter Expert) CONTROL SYSTEMS (Maintenance) PRC-004 COMPLIANCE/AUDITS DATA SUBMITTAL EVIDENCE 36

37 Formal Procedure 37

38 Corporate Tools 38

39 Corporate Tool - DEETS LINKED TO EMS LOGS/TIMESTAMPS BREAKER OPERATIONS SYSTEM OPERATORS ADD RELAY TARGETING INFO SYSTEM PROTECTION DOCUMENTS: ANALYSIS CORRECT OR MISOPERATION INVESTIGATION / CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN CREATES AUDIT TRAIL RUN REPORTS 39

40 Corporate Tool - DEETS 40

41 Assign Responsibility Weekly rotation Gather data Solicit help/advice Follow up Document Progress Review Weekly review of Engineering Status Monthly review of Open Follow Up with Control Systems 41

42 Training/Mentoring INVESTMENT IN CO-OP /INTERN PROGRAM ON THE JOB TRAINING ASSIGN CAPITAL PROJECTS SELF STUDY SYMMETRICAL COMPONENTS MENTOR AS NEEDED USE OF FEEDBACK FORMS FOR RELAY SETTINGS PERFORMANCE GOALS THAT SUPPORT QUALITY ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUTAGE REVIEW 42

43 Human Performance Improvement Identify and analyze Human Error Events and other unexplained operating events that appear to need additional investigation and follow-up, and for each of these events: Identify the Contributing Causes. Communicate the Lessons Learned during the analysis throughout the effected organization(s). Champion the development & implementation of measures to prevent the occurrence of future Events from similar causes. Track and report the number of Human Error Events. 43

44 Contact information: (513)

45 Next Presenter 45 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

46 Managing Misoperations Kristian Koellner, PE LCRA Transmission Services System Protection NERC Protection System Misoperation Webinar December 1, 2011

47 Topics Intro to LCRA Transmission Services Proactive efforts Setting Standards & Issuing Process Voltage Class Coordination Studies Short Circuit Modeling Corporate Culture Reactive efforts Misoperation Review Misoperation performance 47

48 LCRA Transmission Services >800 miles of 345kV, >2400 miles of 138kV, >600 miles of 69kV 48

49 Relay Setting Standards Standardized method for implementing R&C designs Setting standards must complement design (print) standards Twenty-nine standards documents, ranging from capacitors to DFRs to underfrequency to reclosing 49

50 Settings Issuing Process All settings undergo peer review & approval All settings issued electronically via document management system Electronic setting file issued when possible As-left settings provided by relay technicians and reviewed SubWAN remote access available for spot-checking 50

51 Voltage Class Coordination Studies 345kV system once every 2 years 138kV system once every 3 years 69kV system once every 5 years Study scope & guidelines: Phase distance verification (settings vs. model) Ground distance verification (settings vs. model) DCB scheme verification (blocking vs. tripping elements) K-factors (settings vs. model) Ground time verification (as backup and as primary) Ground instantaneous (verify proper reach per latest standard) SOTF (proper pickup, voltage supervise if necessary) Include all lines and autotransformers Consider secondary setting updates SER, ER, PMU for example 51

52 Short Circuit Modeling ERCOT-wide Short Circuit Case One CY and four FY cases built annually by ERCOT System Protection Working Group Multi-pass, collaborative approach Cases include extensive mutual coupling within model 52

53 Short Circuit Model Validation Ground fault duty from near terminal is within 4% Model: 7,699 A Relay: 7,416 A 53

54 Corporate Culture Continuous Process Improvement Preventing Reoccurrence Reducing Unknowns Corporate Misoperation Trending, Reporting, & Key Performance Indicators Transmission system availability, Line fault index, and Misoperation rate Emphasis on technical training If you re gonna make one change 54

55 Misoperation Review Responsibility shared between System Protection group and Asset Performance and Reliability group All faults at 69kV and above are reviewed for appropriate operation Weekly Fault Review Rotation Events categorized by location, cause, voltage class, etc Automated reminder for open investigations Reported quarterly to TRE 55

56 Misoperation Review Database 56

57 Historical Performance % % 9.74% % 8.46% 8.20% 9.39% 10.00% % 6.00% % % 0 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY % Misoperation Percentage, all voltage classes, all causes # of Misoperations, all voltage classes, all causes (includes reclosing misoperations) 57

58 A Future Effort Tie Line Review Checklist 58

59 Thank-you for your time 59

60 Question and Answer Session 60 RELIABILITY ACCOUNTABILITY

WECC Board of Directors. Standards. Approved Regional Criteria (if any) NA. Final. Final

WECC Board of Directors. Standards. Approved Regional Criteria (if any) NA. Final. Final Document name Category Document date Adopted/approved by Date adopted/approved Custodian (entity responsible for maintenance and upkeep) Stored/filed Previous name/number Analysis, Reporting, and Mitigation