EUDO Brussels. Florence Codecision Transformed Comitology Transformed. Adrienne Héritier EUI/RSCAS

Transcription

1 EUDO Brussels Codecision Transformed Comitology Transformed Adrienne Héritier EUI/RSCAS Florence

2 Puzzle: Empowerment of EP under Maastricht Treaty Co-equal legislator with Council Enhancing democracy in EU 2

3 BUT Transformation of codecision to fast-track legislation Increasing seclusion of co-decision: Trialogues Early agreements or fast-track legislation 3

4 Transformation of codecision: TABLE Source: European Parliament s 2009 Activity Report Year Number of concluded files Percentage of files concluded at 1 st reading Percentage of files concluded at 2 nd reading Percentage of files concluded at 3rd reading

5 1 Why this institutional change? 2 Who wins, who loses redress of lost power? 5

6 Based on Farrell and Héritier 2003 GOVERNANCE; 2004 CPS Héritier 2007 OUP Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli and Koop 2011 (CPS) Héritier and Reh 2011 (submitted to WEP) Héritier JCMS Anniversary Issue

7 Maastricht Treaty introduces codecision Early agreements emerge Amsterdam Treaty Formalized conclusion at 1st reading Extended co-decision; Council s right to resubmit its position in case of failed conciliation abolished 7

8 Nice Treaty Further extension of co-decision Lisbon Treaty Further extension of co-decision: normal legislative procedure 8

9 Theoretical explanation 1 Whid did change happen? Assumptions: Actors boundedly rational Actors seek to increase their institutional power to influence policy outcomes Transaction costs Contracts incomplete Council, EP, Commission unified actors 9

10 Theories of institutional change a) Institutional design: bargaining of institutional change : New formal rules b) Interstitial institutional change: Formal rules = incomplete contracts Are transformed in course of application Give rise to new (informal) rule 10

11 Fast track legislation = First step: informal rule arising in application of formal rule = interstitial change Second step: informal rule is formalized Alternatively, incomplete institutional rule is re-negotiated at formal level, but higher transaction costs 11

12 Why did informal rule emerge? Functionalist political transaction cost saving argument Codecision all the way to conciliation: high transaction costs therefore introduction of trialogues Early agreements at first reading under simple majority Before Council adopts formal Common position Before EP provides formal Opinion Simultaneity of decision-making of Council and EP Trilogues: Small circle of actors : Presidency, COREPER, Rapporteur, Commission 12

13 Early agreements help save transaction costs of negotiation, allow to faster adopt legislation With enlargement of 2004 more members with diverse preferences more negotiaton costs..more early agreements 13

14 Hence H1 With an increase of negotiating actors with diverse preferences, there will be an increase in early agreements Empirical indicators: pre- and post 2004 enlargement 14

15 Data set: All codecision process 5th and 6th EP 1999 July 2009 July EU Legislative Observatory 797 procedures concluded at first reading or early second reading = empirical indicator dependent variable 15

16 H2 With an increase in overall number of legislative files, there will be an increase in early agreements Number of on-going proceedings H3 With an increase in complex files, there will be an increase in early agreements Number of recitals in file; number of committee opinions 16

17 Theory of power based distributive bargaining: After conclusion of (incomplete) contract, actors seek to widen their power during application of contract bargaining over specifics of contract. lead to transformation of contract 17

18 Outcome determined by bargaining weight of players Bargaining weight or power is determined On players - patience /time horizon H4 If file reflects priority of Council Presidency, it will be decided as an early agreement Preference for file figures in Council Presidency Programme 18

19 Control variables - anticipating 2004 elections - policy distance between rapporteur and party representing minister of her country in Council - EP committee - type of policy 19

20 Binary logistic regressions predicting probability of early agreement given specific values of explanatory variable. B coefficients and since non-linear relationship between dep and ind variables.also odds ratios 20

21 Findings H1 enlargement confirmed H2 workload confirmed H3 complexity: number of committees confirmed Functionalist transaction cost saving argument supported 21

22 H4 Presidency preferences disconfirmed Smaller likeliness to be early agreement if in Presidency programme

23 2 Who wins, who loses? Council: Presidency benefits, national parliaments lose Parliament: Rapporteurs win Large political groups (coordinators) win Small political groups lose Normal committee member loses Plenary loses 23

24 EP: Redressing loss by institutional change Debate within EP: Early agreements danger for democratic legitimation of EP Democratic debate in plenary threatened 24

25 What is at issue? Rules governing early agreements: Who is negotiating for EP? Mandate to the rapporteur? Substantive or procedural mandate? Reporting back to committee? Cooling off period? 25

26 Actors preferences Leadership EP:Restrictive rules Small political groups : Restrictive rules Large political groups: Flexible rules Rapporteurs: Flexible rules Constitutional Affairs committee: Flexible rules 26

27 Theory and Hypotheses Given actors assumed preferences about desirability of institutional reform Systematic variation of two environmental conditions: 1) low vs high number of early agreements (EA) 2) existence vs absence of overall reform programme 27

28 1) Steep increase of EA H1 A steep increase in the number of early agreements will lead to an institutional reform providing for more stringent rules of fast-track legislation Causal mechanism pressure from losers inside Parliament pressure from outside actors not able to follow codecision process anymore 28

29 2) Existence of overall parliamentary reform agenda Gives political momentum to individual reform, i.e. early agreements H2 The existence of an overall parliamentary reform agenda will lead to an institutional reform including elements of a strict regulation of fast-track legislation 29

30 Two causal mechanisms 2a Rational Choice Institutionalism higher saliency pressure to succeed package deals and issue linkages 30

31 2b Strategic Normative Framing overall reform agenda allows to frame institutional change as re-establishing core parliamentary norms normative frame can mobilise actors beyond losers and can pressure winners into accepting reform 31

32 . Empirical Assessment H1 A steep increase in the number of early agreements will lead to an institutional reform providing for more stringent rules of FTL Comparison of a period of moderate increase with a period of steep increase, controlling for overall reform

33 Empirical data does not support expectation with low level of EA, lenient reform proposals but with steeply increasing number of EA in spite of several attempts at reform - non-binding and vague restrictions - even encouragement of EA 33

34 H2 The existence of an overall parliamentary reform agenda will lead to an institutional reform including elements of a strict regulation of FTL Comparison of two periods of steep increase, one combined with the presence of overall reform

35 Empirical evidence confirms our expectations in part outcome = Code of Conduct formally binding, included in EP s Rules of Procedure however many vague terms open for re-negotiation 35

36 Causal mechanisms 2a RCI = political momentum of overall reform/pressure to succeed package deals and issue linkages considerable empirical evidence very contested negotiations in reform group and constitutional affairs committee package deal struck; something had to be adopted 36

37 2b Overall reform allows for mobilization of normative concerns that overcome opposition of winners considerable empirical evidence for normative concerns inside and outside EP Working Party provides momentum to frame reform around core parliamentary norms yet no broad public debate in plenary before adoption of the Code of Conduct plus compromise character of the Code indicates that normative frame could not fully overcome opposition 37

38 Conclusion Resistance of winners of shift of decision-making power partially overcome - If a stark increase in fast-track legislation as a necessary condition - If a macro reform agenda lending impetus to reform of individual reform issues 38

39 Comitology Adrienne Héritier, Catherine Moury, Carina Bischoff, Carl-Fredrik Bergström OUP forthcoming

40 Data Entire population of EU laws /08 Eurlex 40

41 Regulations and Directives passed Regulations Legislated 19,6% Delegated 80,4% Directives Legislated 60% Delegated 40%% All Legislated 22,8% Delegated 77,2% 41

42 Regulations and directives in force (Sept.2008) Regulations Legislated: 18,3% Delegated : 80,4% Directives: Legislated: 56,4% Delegated: 43,6% All Legislated: 25,9% Delegated: 74,1% 42

43 Data base Eur-lex and Pre-lex on-line catalogues, full text of all Commission proposals and parliamentary amendments that have been made since 1994, fourteen years (up to the end of 2008). Pre-lex all parliamentary reports (in full text) based on this proposal. 43

44 EP in comitology contest for power H 1: With increasing legislative competences of the Parliament under codecision, the Commission will be more inclined to propose delegation to comitology. Confirmed 44

45 H 2: With increasing legislative competences of the Parliament under codecision, the Council will be inclined to delegate more to comitology. Confirmed 45

46 H 3: The increase in delegation accepted by the Council will be accompanied by an increase in the use of the regulatory committee. Confirmed 46

47 H 4: With the introduction of codecision, the Parliament will seek to veto delegation and press for legislation only. Disconfirmed But EP restricts scope of delegation 47