BEYOND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

Transcription

1 BEYOND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq February 2015 Introduction Mercy Corps provides conflict and negotiation training in Kawergosk Refugee Camp, Iraq Cassandra Nelson/Mercy Corps Given the complex nature of the crisis in Iraq, humanitarian interventions alone will not build stability. If the Obama Administration and the US Congress continue to take a narrow and predominantly short-term approach to addressing humanitarian needs in Iraq, the cycle of violence will surely continue and most likely escalate. Interventions that only address the symptoms of the conflict have the real potential to do more harm than good by creating dependencies and sidelining the voices of Iraq s fledgling civil society and government stakeholders, both local and central. This includes government bodies like the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Non- Governmental Organization (NGO) Directorate, Reconciliation Committee at the Prime Minister s office, provincial councils and the Iraqi Civil Society Committee, which are seeking to lead reconciliation efforts and address the underlying drivers of the conflict: poor governance and political grievances. This policy brief outlines the need for increased investments in programming that targets the root causes of the crisis. It highlights the need for a holistic approach to assistance in Iraq that addresses needs throughout the country through work with grassroots organizations including in areas where needs are great, but access is increasingly difficult for international actors. It also argues for an approach that avoids segmenting aid or favoring particular regions or demographics in Iraq, which in some cases inadvertently fuels sectarianism. This brief also discusses the emerging and potentially catalytic role of local stakeholders both civil society and government -- in the humanitarian response and what is expected to be a protracted recovery process. It suggests ways to harness and transition towards new models of citizen-government engagement that go beyond immediate emergency relief efforts and take steps towards building a more solid foundation for Iraqi led peace building, return of displaced populations and eventual reconciliation. Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 1

2 Overview Stoked by political rivalries and limited opportunities for reconciliation, sectarian tensions in Iraq have grown increasingly violent since Meanwhile, the civil war in Syria has spilled over the border turning ethnic tensions into open hostilities, causing a major humanitarian crisis inside Iraq. In 2014 alone, fighting in Iraq has displaced an estimated 2 million people, compounding an already existing humanitarian emergency involving 220,000 registered Syrian refugees, 1 in addition to more than a million Iraqis who have been displaced since the sectarian conflict. Frustration and a lack of confidence by Iraqis in their political institutions underpin the instability and violence that is driving this latest cycle of displacement. Notably, the crisis in Anbar province began in January 2014 with peaceful, citizen-led demonstrations against the central government that highlighted anger over the lack of basic public services. Over the past year, extremist militant groups the most high profile being the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which has taken control of huge swaths of land in Iraq have exploited these unaddressed grievances, the marked absence of an inclusive, transparent and participatory system of governance and the insufficient capacity of local institutions to prevent violence. Fueled by unresolved political disputes that have exacerbated sectarianism across the country, terrorism has reemerged as a major threat to Iraqi livelihoods and stability as well as to the national security interests of the United States and its allies. All 18 governorates many of which are conflict affected are hosting displaced families from every ethnic and religious group. 2 At present, the highest populations of IDPs reside in Anbar, Dohuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah Governorates. Displaced Iraqis throughout the country continue to face a number of acute needs, and require food, water, shelter, non-food items, health care and cash assistance. Secondary and tertiary displacement is common often in rapid succession. The population influx has increasingly strained basic services as host communities struggle to absorb greater numbers. Many families are now occupying communal spaces such as mosques, churches and schools, or living in unfinished buildings and empty shops that are unsuitable for human habitation. Those living in rented accommodations are frequently sharing crowded spaces with multiple families. The camps that do exist are at maximum capacity and are considered a last resort for displaced families. As Iraqi governance institutions are nascent and weakened by decades of conflict, they are ill-equipped to deal with the magnitude of the crisis. Similarly, Iraqi civil society albeit stronger now than it has been in decades lacks the capacity to effectively serve as a watchdog for government response efforts and has limited ability to respond directly to needs at scale. Local stakeholders are concerned that, while donors are engaged now on the humanitarian response, they may not engage over the long-term given competing global needs and donor fatigue in Iraq. Building the dual capacity of civil society actors to hold the government accountable while also delivering services has been a central component of Mercy Corps programming focus in Iraq since We are now working in all 18 governorates on civil society strengthening, conflict mitigation programming or humanitarian response efforts reaching more than 250,000 IDPs, Syrian refugees and vulnerable host community members. In our work through the USAID-funded Broadening Participation through Civil Society (BPCS) program, we have established partnerships with 104 civil society partners, investing in institutional strengthening, and providing funding and technical assistance for targeted activities such as elections monitoring, policy advocacy and 1 UNHCR, Iraq: 10,000 displaced from Christian communities near Mosul, June 27, (accessed July 28, 2014) and IDMC, 12/ International Organization for Migration, Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 2

3 humanitarian response efforts. This network of local actors has broad reach throughout the country, including in places inaccessible to international actors due to insecurity or insufficient local knowledge. As such, civil society has the potential to become a multiplier in both the long-term efforts to stabilize Iraq, as well as the immediate humanitarian response. Our current emergency response efforts are demonstrating this potential by leveraging partnerships with civil society to meet the needs of all conflict-affected populations: refugees from Syria, internally displaced Iraqis, and host communities. Leveraging Civil Society for a Stable Iraq In recent years, a portion of US assistance to Iraq has focused on increasing the political engagement of citizens by supporting democratic institutions, enhancing local government capacity and supporting the growth of a capable and independent civil society. Through these efforts, civil society is gradually strengthening its voice, channeling popular concerns to the central and local government and offering an alternative outlet for expression and reform that has had success even in the midst of a civil war. The Ajial Association for Intelligence and Innovation (AAICD) in Diyala, for example, recently concluded an advocacy campaign to improve access to water across five districts. As a result, the Diyala Provincial Council agreed to continue the dialogue to create an open process for prioritizing water projects in the province, and notably agreed to include representation of women one fifth of the total consultation groups in the annual public meetings held in each district. Previously, no women had been able to participate in the process. AAICD persuaded the government to deliver drinking water to the Al-Bawia area in Baquba city center, an area that had not received water for the past two years. And, the Association successfully brought a water project in Hamrin - approved three years ago, but pending a green light for implementation - to the attention of local officials. Another notable example of civil society engagement is the Iraqi Center for Negotiation Skills and Conflict Management, an NGO established in 2010 with Mercy Corps support and the goal of reducing violence across Iraq and the Middle East region. The Center trains local leaders and community members in interest-based The Iraqi Center for Negotiation Skills and Conflict Management With a history extending back to 2006, the Iraqi Center for Negotiation skills was formally established in 2010 and registered in 2013 with the aim of reducing violence across Iraq and the region. The Center trains local leaders and community members in interest-based negotiation and supports a nationwide volunteer network of 350 Iraqi men and women from a broad range of sectarian and ethnic backgrounds and includes tribal elders, religious leaders, government officials, politicians, members of parliament and civil society representatives. This network works across regional, political and sectarian lines to resolve major disputes, including tribal conflicts over land and disputes between citizens and government officials over services and elections. Over the past eight years, the network has solved thousands of disputes. In response to the current IDP and refugee crises, the Center mobilized a range of activities addressing 100 cases in Iraq and remotely in Syria over the past year alone. Responses have ranged from awareness campaigns aimed at mitigating tensions between host communities and IDPs to negotiations with the central government to allow IDP families to secure identity cards and continue receiving payment of government salaries in locations falling outside their designated home residence. The Center has also worked with Yazidi religious leaders in Sulaymaniyah to erase the stigma of sexual violence and promote the acceptance of kidnapped Yazidi women upon their return. The network s diversity, its ability to solve problems and the willingness of participants to put aside differences offers an example of community-based and community-owned leadership that is primed and ready to be leveraged on a national scale. Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 3

4 negotiation and supports a nationwide volunteer network of 350 Iraqi men and women from a broad range of sectarian and ethnic backgrounds. Its membership includes tribal elders, religious leaders, government officials, politicians, members of parliament and civil society representatives. Over the past four years, the Center has directly mediated 1,054 documented conflicts and many more informally. In only a short time period, the Center has already established itself as a leader in conflict mitigation in Iraq and in the region, fielding requests from a broad range of actors including the Iraqi Ministry of Youth and Sports, Badra Construction Company in Wasit, Iraq and Libyan non-profit, Darajat Training Center. Even during the most violent episodes in Iraq s recent history, Mercy Corps has seen examples of Iraqi civil society making positive inroads in improving local, district and provincial level governance in Iraq. Citizens across the country have advocated peacefully for solutions on a range of issues, from the lack of basic services such as electricity and water, to more fundamental issues of protection of minority rights, participation in municipal decision-making, decentralization, anti-corruption and access to jobs, healthcare and education. Success stories have included cases such as civil society-led public demonstrations that derailed plans for greater retirement benefits for Parliamentarians in February 2014, broadly seen as an abuse of power. Civil society organizations (CSOs) and activists are often at the center of these activities suggesting that issues of importance can and are being resolved using constructive, democratic means. CSOs also made progress at the national and regional levels in influencing the NGO laws in Baghdad in 2010 and in Erbil in 2011, considered among the most open in the region. CSOs are creating a useful model for democratic engagement by developing coalitions across sectarian, ethnic and religious lines, proving that internal divisions or positions related to sensitive issues of identity can be overcome in order to resolve shared concerns and interests. 3 At a time of growing mistrust and sectarian strife, local CSOs with support from Mercy Corps and local communities are also increasingly playing a role as front line responders to the humanitarian crisis, particularly in distributing humanitarian supplies, conducting assessments and coordinating information on the ground. A Local civil society remains vibrant in the face of conflict Effective and engaged civil society organizations are helping mend fences between Iraqi citizens and government at all levels, even in the face of intense conflict, according to new research on Mercy Corps local civil society partners in Iraq. Findings from an August 2014 survey reveal an active, committed civil society with the majority of organizations continuing their work despite displacement issues. CSOs are stepping up their local presence and increasing activities in response to the conflict; 86% of organizations surveyed recently by Mercy Corps say they are implementing programs to respond directly to growing humanitarian needs. Civil society groups have organized spontaneous, self-funded peace conferences with government agencies to seek immediate, grassroots solutions, issued statements calling for peace and reconciliation among neighbors and mobilized donation drives and distribution of non-food items (NFIs) for the most vulnerable. One BPCS partner, Al Raja and Al Salam, meaning Peace and Hope, has mobilized private sector donors to furnish, winterize and shelter 500 Christian families in a once abandoned hotel in the mixed minority enclave of Erbil. In this time of crisis, a quarter of CSOs have tapped into existing networks and alliances established by Mercy Corps BPCS program and are mobilizing to form new networks as violence escalates. The resilience of Iraqi civil society, despite the uptick in violence, demonstrates that past investments in democracy and governance programs have not only helped promote long-term stability, but have also bolstered the ability of CSOs to respond to the risks and shocks of the current crisis. 3 Mercy Corps, Bridging the Gap: Evidence on the Links between Civil Society and Good Governance in Iraq, June Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 4

5 number of Iraqi CSOS are launching advocacy efforts targeting provincial authorities to increase transparency and accountability in the budgeting process, with the particular aim of increasing citizen voice into decisions on public service provision investments. Groups are also working to link newly established provincial IDP committees (organized by the local government as a crisis coordination mechanism) to a growing network of community action centers. And, looking into the future with past experience in Iraq as a guide, some believe that conflict mediation actors could also play a critical role in reconciliation in particular, mitigating and defusing potential acts of retribution against those that supported ISIL and other militant groups. Recently, there has been a greater focus on Governorate Emergency Cells (GECs), which formed in each governorate prior to the crisis and maintain their own budget to manage provincial response to disasters and crises. The GECs coordinate with relevant ministries and most recently have begun communicating with the United Nations (UN) to coordinate the humanitarian response. Yet, despite numerous efforts from a coalition of Iraqi and Kurdish NGOs to connect with the GECs, the cells have not prioritized engagement or information sharing with Iraqi NGOs, representing a missed opportunity. A formalized role for citizen-government engagement around the response would carve out more space for the next round of national engagement that needs to happen around reconciliation and peace building, as well as better coordination and accountability around the current response efforts. Emerging civil society groups are vulnerable as both the government and citizens alike are trying to understand this relatively new sector. Despite years of work on a wide range of topics, their future value is at risk of being judged by communities vis-à-vis the successes or failures of their responses to the humanitarian crisis, which is overshadowing other sectors of engagement. A recent survey conducted by Mercy Corps in 17 governorates revealed that citizens have an increasingly positive view of Arbat Refugee Camp, Sulimaniyeh, Iraq Essam Al-Sudani/Mercy Corps civil society, but have high expectations in their ability to provide aid, resolve issues related to security and government services and hold the Iraqi government accountable. 4 If left unchecked, the spiraling needs of displaced populations, high expectations of the local community and increasing demands of the international community has the potential to quickly overwhelm actors who are unprepared to assume greater responsibilities, while managing expectations. Adding to this strain is the fact that many civil society responders have themselves been displaced, and are operating and providing services in regions with which they are unfamiliar, taking significant personal risks to deliver assistance in conflict areas. ISIL, for example, has executed NGO leaders, destroyed their offices and banned operations. 5 Recognizing the risks that prematurely large, top-down investments can bring, the UN and international NGOs must employ a stewardship lens and consider the long-term impact of their partnership arrangements on Iraqi civil society. Today, CSOs are once again in high demand as local implementing partners, particularly for the 4 Mercy Corps, Citizens Attitudes Toward Civil Society in Iraq: A Public Opinion Survey, Midline Survey Report, December The survey, conducted as part of the USAID-funded Broadening Participation through Civil Society (BPCS) program covered 17 provinces and involved 5,232 citizens. 5 Huffington Post, Islamic State Militants Execute Female Iraqi Human Rights Activist, September 25, (accessed February 10, 2015) Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 5

6 humanitarian response. On the one hand, there are many new opportunities for funding partnerships and learning, yet on the other hand, some organizations risk being overwhelmed and overburdened by a sudden influx of resources without the internal systems or technical expertise necessary to manage them. To address emerging needs, local groups have indicated that they need support in building the critical but often overlooked skills needed for effective and accountable humanitarian response. These skills include emergency response best practices, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, as well as negotiation and mediation training. Importantly, even while many local civil society organizations may shift toward a humanitarian response role, we have heard from our Iraqi partners that they do not want to be contractors or used to access short-term humanitarian funding alone. However, they are eager to work toward building a solid foundation to enhance Iraq s future stability and expedite its recovery, take on a partnership role in design and planning of programs and to develop as institutions in their own right. Our experience has found that capacity strengthening and partnerships with civil society can bridge these challenges by cultivating an increased focus on shared goals and strategic alignment around priorities both immediate and long-term. And even in the face of an overwhelming focus by all actors on humanitarian response efforts, Mercy Corps has also noted continued Iraqi and Kurdish government and community interest in policy issues that are unrelated to the crisis, demonstrating that Iraqis are thinking beyond the immediate crisis. Through our policy and advocacy work with 20 civil society organizations across the country, we are already observing increased openness and responsiveness of government (particularly at the local and provincial levels) to civil society demands, as well as greater interest and involvement of the community. This year, the Civil Society Initiative (CSI) in Sulaymaniyah, for instance, developed and analyzed 530 responses from a survey on women s rights in the private sector the results of which prompted four members of the Kurdish Parliament to sign an agreement to support a law to protect the rights of working women. Today these four Members of Parliament are collecting ten additional signatures of support from fellow Parliamentarians and have asked the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to pass a draft of the new labor law. These mark tangible steps forward in building healthy relationships between citizens and government that can serve as the foundation of a strong society and stable democracy. A New Approach to Humanitarian Assistance Despite the progress made to date, the US Government s commitment to programs that strengthen Iraqi civil society, cultivate reconciliation, and promote good governance are scaling back. 6 The fiscal year (FY) 2014 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budget for Iraq was almost zeroed out, as was President Obama s FY15 budget request, which included only $22.5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the State Department to spend towards paving the way for long-term political stability. This was a 69 percent reduction in the actual funding from However, thanks to Congressional leadership, this trend was reversed in the FY 2015 omnibus spending bill with $50 million appropriated for ESF in Iraq. Secretary Kerry, in remarks in January 2015, indicative of a positive trend, also indicated US support for Iraqi-led stabilization with a particular focus on areas liberated from ISIL. 7 Still of urgent concern, though, is the fact that the USAID Mission is currently on a schedule to, in effect, shutter its doors in September 2015, maintaining only a bare-bones presence to respond to technical assistance 6 This is despite the Obama Administration s September 2014 Presidential Memorandum renewing the US government commitment to the Stand with Civil Society global call to action, an initiative launched in 2013 to support, defend, and sustain civil society amid a rising tide of restrictions on its operations globally. 6 7 Remarks of John Kerry, Secretary of State, Joint Press Availability with UK Foreign Secretary Hammond and Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi, London, United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, January 22, See: Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 6

7 requests made and paid for by the Iraqi government. And while the oil wealth of Iraq should pay for major infrastructure as well as social services, the US and other donors must recognize that the Iraqi government has not, and will not, adequately invest in civil society groups that foster reconciliation programming or promote good governance with the competing priorities that are arising from the latest rounds of violence highlighting a major gap. Falling global oil prices are compounding this issue. With this scale back of USAID funding and staff, the only dedicated peacebuilding and reconciliation presence for the US would be through the State Department s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL). While DRL supports critical programming in the democracy and human rights sectors, its scope will also be limited. By design it will not have the cadre of development staff or personnel experience necessary to support civil society, conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs that accompany a full USAID Mission presence. In the absence of dedicated funding streams for conflict mitigation, reconciliation, civil society and good governance, efforts to stabilize Iraq through military interventions and humanitarian assistance alone will likely fall flat. Addressing the insecurity challenges in Iraq today requires a longer horizon and a focus on programs that promote more efficient and effective goals. For example, even during the emergency humanitarian response phase the UN and NGOs should seek to build a more cohesive and sustainable network of local actors through joint planning and involvement of Iraqi institutions and CSOs in assessing needs and delivering aid. Moreover, there is an opportunity to harness and expand new engagement between civil society, provincial and central government and the private sector in responding to the emergency situation a process that is already underway in the Kurdish Region with oil companies investing in response efforts. Putting these systems into place now will help create sustainable tracks for Iraq to incrementally scale up and invest its own resources in the response. Mercy Corps provides job training for refugees in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq Cassandra Nelson/Mercy Corps While the US has been generous in its humanitarian funding to date, channeling $208 million to date in FY14 funding, the bulk of these resources have gone to support UN efforts. 8 In turn, the majority of grants from the UN to international and local implementing partners are short-term programs lasting just 3 to 6 months. This makes it difficult for humanitarian programs to integrate emergency response efforts with the urgently needed programs necessary to address the multi-sectoral and interconnected root causes of sectarian conflict and fragility. Other donors are also focusing too narrowly on the short-term; for example, the $500 million contribution by Saudi Arabia in June 2014 towards the UN s appeal for Iraq focused on meeting emergency humanitarian needs. This money is not tied to programming that addresses the root causes of violence nor does it enhance the role of Iraqi response systems or actors. Alongside longer funding horizons, an integrated nationwide response framework is of paramount importance to ensure that future planning is inclusive, coordinated and that humanitarian aid is commensurate to levels of need. To date, the bulk of assistance has gone to the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI), which is comparatively easier to access, with limited investments in other regions. For example, according to a recent NCCI/SNAP assessment, Anbar has the lowest amount of funding per IDP at only $3 per person, although it is increasingly one of the 8 See the USAID Iraq Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2 from November 21, 2014 available online at: Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 7

8 most affected and contested governorates. 9 This inadvertently plays into rivalries over resources and takes a segmented, rather than holistic, approach to addressing needs in Iraq. Recommendations While recognizing the critical importance of emergency response and lifesaving interventions, whenever possible, we must orient relief programs toward measurable impacts that simultaneously advance peace and reconciliation goals in order to shore up a solid foundation for Iraq s long-term stability. Outlined below are five key areas for investment moving forward: Support Iraq in meeting the rapidly growing humanitarian needs while also investing in programming to prepare Iraq today for a more stable future. In FY16, maintain strong support for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) accounts at $2.5 billion for IDA and $3.3 billion for MRA, consistent with needs. Continue to support robust Economic Support Funds for Iraq at or above the President s request of $72.5 million to fund governance, education, civil society and conflict management programming alongside humanitarian assistance programs. Ensure the US Government s long-term strategy in Iraq has a good governance and conflict mitigation lens by keeping the USAID Mission open and fully staffed. Significantly expand US assistance beyond the autonomous Kurdish region which currently hosts 47 percent of internally displaced Iraqis, yet receives the vast majority of funding in order to support all conflictaffected populations across the country and defuse potential rivalries over resources. The key to the success of a comprehensive approach to need is engaging with a range of Iraqi frontline responders. Especially in areas where the UN and international humanitarian agencies cannot operate securely, the US government must prioritize funding mechanisms that allow for scaling up engagement with and capacity strengthening support for existing networks of local NGOs or other well-established Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to deliver assistance to conflict-affected populations where they are currently living and mitigate movement into already crowded, overtaxed cities. Work with the newly elected governments in Baghdad, the Kurdish region and provinces to be responsive to the needs of conflict-affected Iraqi and Syrian people. At the same time, push for the adoption of a national approach to align and better integrate needs assessments, coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance. Enhance central government coordination and shore up civil society engagement. Iraq's central government has just created a High National Committee in Baghdad to respond to the emergency, while the Kurdish Regional Government has created its own Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) in Erbil. And while both committees were designed to better coordinate, strategize and plan with the UN, they are not coordinated with one another and they do not include representation from implementing partners both international NGOs and local NGOs which are interacting with communities all over the country. Support local mechanisms (e.g. emerging provincial IDP committees, civic participation hubs or Conflict Management Groups) to empower communities and create localized response plans that can roll up into 9 ACAPS, NCCI/SNAP Funding Tracking Analysis IDP response June to September 2014, October 7, (accessed February 10, 2015) Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 8

9 central planning efforts. As these mechanisms are established, fund efforts to link them with local and international civil society to encourage greater accountability and coordination of assistance efforts. Include financing for host communities as part of the UN humanitarian appeal as a way to empower local communities in identifying and responding to emerging needs, including the tensions that may arise between host and displaced populations competing for limited services and resources. In order to defuse potential conflicts in already fragile communities, adopt a more holistic relief to resilience approach to programs even in short-term emergency response efforts. Require all US government-supported humanitarian response plans to demonstrate how relief efforts will complement or feed into greater local peace building and build national Iraqi response systems. For example, build on OMB, State and USAID s existing efforts on budget planning around Relief to Development Transitions (R2DT) and require USAID s or State Department s Iraq Mission to include a resilience and conflict prevention lens in future budget submissions. Push for civil society representation in local emergency response cells planning mechanisms established at the governorate level to deal with the influx of IDPs and refugees and shift them away from reactive crisis response alone, and towards proactive longer term planning horizons that can advance resilience to reoccurring shocks and conflict. Mainstream use of procurement mechanisms, such as conflict modifiers, into all new USG funded Economic Support Funds so that longer-term programs can also easily pivot to immediately respond to emergencies, including displacement, conflict, and reintegration of returning IDPs. Prioritize investments in Iraqi-led social cohesion and reconciliation programs. The US must not wait for bigger conflicts to erupt inside camps or in urban host communities before it integrates a conflict mitigation approach in order to build social cohesion into its emergency response programming. The sudden mass displacements of tens of thousands of ethnically and religious diverse Iraqis including: Sunni, Shia, Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis combined with refugees from Syria has the real potential to disrupt the delicate equilibrium that exists within current community structures. Mercy Corps-trained leaders in conflict resolution led negotiations between protesters, and local government to help the people of Basra get more electricity during the height of the summer heat, Basra, Iraq /Mercy Corps Even after ISIL has been forced to retreat from Iraq, another crisis will begin. If history is any guide, that would be when retributions against those who supported IS, directly or indirectly, could begin. To break this cycle of violence, a proactive reconciliation strategy is essential now to get ahead of calls for revenge and prevent additional bloodshed. The US can do this through tangible support to local communities, and by encouraging public leadership on reconciliation by Iraqi leaders, including through the Reconciliation Committee at the Prime Minister s office. Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 9

10 The US and other donors must recognize that the Iraqi government has just announced its national budget is overspent, and until a new budget is approved, the Iraqi government has indicated that it will not invest in anything other than the expenses of running the government. Without international support, prior investments in reconciliation programming, human resource development, policy improvements, and responsive civil society have the potential for derailment. MOVING FORWARD The escalating violence of recent months reminds us that the international community needs to aggressively invest in conflict mitigation, reconciliation and good governance as part of a long-term vision for Iraq s stability. Following the establishment of a new government in Baghdad in September 2014, this is an especially critical time for the central government to respond positively to demands for political inclusivity. If the donor community does not quickly support a more inclusive Iraq, the country will likely continue to remain unstable and susceptible to violence. In addition to seeking a political resolution to resolving the core issues that enabled the civil war, the international community must advance local peacebuilding efforts by supporting civil society groups that are slowly but surely changing Iraq s political and social landscape. We are already seeing evidence of small advocacy wins at the local level thanks to the efforts of civil society, and community members are starting to pay attention to this growing power. Humanitarian response efforts that utilize a relief to resilience approach, coupled with international support for local civil society, have the potential to bolster local response capacities to immediate needs, as well as to build the capabilities of local organizations to promote resilience to future conflict. Yet at the very moment that Iraq s fledgling civil society is beginning to gain traction, funding for high-impact programming that builds this capacity is at risk. Now is not the time to scale back assistance and in particular, to withdraw support to emerging civil society actors. Efforts to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of civil society organizations can help improve important governance outcomes such as peacebuilding, political efficacy, government responsiveness and legitimacy. Building stability in Iraq is not only important for the Iraqi people, but also for US national security and that of its allies in the region and beyond. Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 10

11 45 SW Ankeny Street Portland, Oregon mercycorps.org CONTACT KARI DIENER Deputy Director Policy & Advocacy Beyond Humanitarian Relief: Strengthening the Foundation for a More Stable Iraq MERCY CORPS 11