A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia

Transcription

1 Electoral Studies 22 (2003) A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia Allen Hicken a,, Yuko Kasuya b a Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Suite #213, 611 Church St, Ann Arbor, MI , USA b Graduate School of International Relations & Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, CA, USA Abstract In 1997 an economic crisis swept through much of Asia. In addition to the various proximal causes of the crises, e.g. overvalued exchange rates, lax banking regulations, etc., political structures have received much attention. Some claim that problems in countries political structures set the stage for the crisis. Others argue that governments responses to the crisis were helped or hindered by existing political institutions. However, research on the consequences of Asian political institutions is hampered by a lack of basic information on the different constitutional and electoral frameworks around the region. This article is an attempt to help fill this void by providing a description of the constitutional structures and electoral systems of 17 Asian-Pacific countries since Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Electoral systems; Constitutions; Plurality; Proportional representation; Mixed systems; Asia 1. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to provide a succinct summary of the political institutions of Asia. Asia is home to an amazing variety of regimes and institutions including monarchies, socialist systems and long-established democracies. In addition, many of the countries in the region are new democracies, having undertaken Corresponding author. Tel.: ; fax: addresses: ahicken@umich.edu (A. Hicken); ykasuya@ucsd.edu (Y. Kasuya) /02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. doi: /s (01)

2 122 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) a transition to democracy within the last two decades as elected legislatures have replaced authoritarian leaders or powerful bureaucracies. This has spurred an interest in the strengths and weaknesses of particular democratic institutional arrangements among those who study the region. The recent Asian economic crisis has also contributed to this growing interest in institutions. Policymakers, political reformers and international actors (such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) are beginning to recognize that the constitutional structure and electoral system a country adopts can have important implications for democratic stability, economic growth and social welfare. Unfortunately, research on the political institutions of Asia has thus far lagged behind the need for such information. Indeed, Asian democracies or semi-democracies (with the exception of Japan) have rarely been included in large comparative studies of institutions. We seek to fill this void. This paper is modeled on several studies of comparative institutions in Western or Latin American democracies (e.g. Jones, 1995; Lijphart, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). 1 The lack of concise comparative descriptions of the electoral systems and constitutional structures of Asia does not imply that country-focused scholars are unaware or uninterested in the subject. Quite the contrary, there are numerous case studies which explore the political institutions of particular countries in great detail, and we made grateful use of such work during the research for this paper. What has been lacking, however, are works that put the institutions of a given country in a broader comparative context. In the pages that follow we place these country-specific data in that comparative context while using terminology common to other studies of constitutional structures and electoral systems. We hope that this information will be of use to institutional scholars, policymakers and political reformers. This paper is simply a description of the various constitutional and electoral systems across the region. We do not discuss the origins of the political institutions in a given country, nor do we attempt to assess the quality or effectiveness of these institutions. We also do not review the pros and cons of particular institutional arrangements. Finally, we do not include information on different party systems across the region. 2 Data for a total of 17 countries in East, South and Southeast Asia are presented in the paper. 3 Following the convention used by Jones (1995), Powell (1982) and others, only systems that were independent and had elected governments for a minimum of five years are included. We have intentionally made an effort to include regimes that are typically excluded from comparative institutional studies because they are not considered fully democratic. We include in our study any regime that has held regular elections for at least five years, in which opposition parties were 1 We are especially indebted to Mark Jones 1995 article on the institutions of Latin America which motivated us to do something similar for Asia. 2 A project is being designed to collect party system information and we hope to include it in future work. 3 We also chose to include Papua New Guinea due to its close proximity to the region, even though it is generally not considered part of Asia.

3 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) allowed to participate. Unlike most comparative studies of democratic institutions, we do not require that those elections be completely open and competitive. While most of the regimes included in the following tables meet the openness and competitiveness criteria we also include systems such as Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea which have held regular elections, but which, during certain periods, have fallen short in terms of the competitiveness or openness of those elections. As a rule of thumb we excluded regimes that held elections for only a minority of the legislative seats. 4 We have attempted to catalogue every regime in Asia that met our criteria between the years 1945 and In some countries there were significant changes to the electoral laws and/or political institutions during the period. Where there are changes in the variables listed in a given table over time, such changes are noted by dividing the country into multiple time periods, e.g. Cambodia I ( ), ( ) and Cambodia II (1998 ) (Table 1). In order to keep the tables from becoming overly complex, multiple country periods do not carry over from table to table. For example, Table 1 contains Cambodia I and Cambodia II, reflecting a change in the number of legislative chambers over time. Table 3, by contrast, has only one listing for Cambodia since the variables relating to the head of state did not change. 2. Constitutional structure Table 1 contains three different ways to classify constitutional structures across Asia. The first and most obvious is the distinction between a presidential and parliamentary form of government. Presidential systems are those in which an executive (a) is elected by a popular vote, (b) holds office for a fixed term (i.e. is not dependent on parliamentary confidence), (c) selects and directs the cabinet, and (d) has some legislative authority. 5 In parliamentary systems the executive is (a) selected by the legislature, 6 and (b) dependent on the legislature s confidence (Jones, 1995, p. 6). 7 Of the 17 countries listed in Table 1, 15 have had a parliamentary system at one time or another. The majority of these are former British colonies (Bangladesh, Burma, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Sri Lanka) or 4 Based on these criteria the following countries were included: Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. Vietnam is included in Table 1. Cambodia is included although the 1997 coup d etat took place only 4 years after elections. China, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam, Bhutan and Brunei were excluded altogether because they did not meet these criteria. China, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea are communist systems. Brunei is a sultanate while Bhutan is a monarchy. Hong Kong and Macau, as former colonial territories now part of China, were also excluded. Because of the lack of data the elected regimes of 1950s and 1960s South Vietnam and Cambodia had to be excluded from all but Table 1. 5 On the importance of the latter two criteria see Carey and Shugart (1995). 6 In many parliamentary systems it is the head of state that formally selects the Prime Minister, but does so on the advice of the legislature. 7 For a more detailed look at the differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes, see Shugart and Carey (1992) and Lijphart (1992, 1994).

4 124 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 1 Regime types in Asia System Time period Form of government Legislative branch a Federal/Unitary Bangladesh I Presidential Unicameral Unitary Bangladesh II 1991 Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Burma b Parliamentary Bicameral Federal Cambodia I , Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Cambodia II 1998 Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary India 1950 Parliamentary Bicameral Federal Indonesia I c Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Indonesia II 1971 d Hybrid e Unicameral f Unitary Japan 1947 Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary Malaysia 1957 Parliamentary Bicameral g Federal Nepal 1990 Parliamentary Bicameral h Unitary Pakistan i Parliamentary j Bicameral Federal Papua New 1975 Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Guinea Philippines I Presidential Bicameral Unitary Philippines II k Hybrid l Unicameral Unitary Philippines III 1987 Presidential Bicameral Unitary Singapore I Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Singapore II 1991 Hybrid m Unicameral Unitary South Korea I Hybrid n Unicameral Unitary South Korea II Presidential o Unicameral p Unitary South Korea III Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary South Korea IV 1962 q Presidential r Unicameral s Unitary South Vietnam I t Presidential Unicameral Unitary South Vietnam Hybrid u Bicameral Unitary II Sri Lanka I Parliamentary Bicameral v Unitary Sri Lanka II w Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Sri Lanka III 1978 x Hybrid y Unicameral Unitary Taiwan I z Presidential aa Unicameral bb Unitary Taiwan II 1997 Hybrid cc Unicameral bb Unitary Thailand I dd Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary Thailand II 1997 Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary a In the Legislative Branch column an italicized Bicameral signifies that the second or upper chamber is appointed rather than elected. b The Prime Minister handed the government over to an army-controlled caretaker government for eighteen months between 1958 and c Indonesia fought a war of independence from 1945 through 1949, formally receiving its independence on December 27, The 1950 constitution was actually Indonesia s third constitution. An independence constitution was drafted in 1945 (and later readopted by Sukarno in 1959) and a short-lived federal constitution came into being in d In 1959 Sukarno abrogated the 1950 constitution and reinstalled the 1945 constitution in its place. This in effect brought the parliamentary era to an end, although the title Prime Minister was used to describe the executive position up until From 1959 until 1971 the legislature (DPR) and electoral college (MPR) were appointed bodies.

5 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 1 Continued e An electoral college (MPR) made up of elected and appointed members chooses the Indonesian president. The president has broad legislative powers and can appoint and remove the cabinet on his own. The MPR has the power to remove the president at any time. f Indonesia has two assemblies, one of which, the MPR, is not part of the normal legislative process and meets only once every five years to select the President and set broad policy outlines. It is made up of both elected and appointed members but the majority was appointed until g Majority of the upper house is appointed, with only a few elected members. h Majority of the upper house is elected while a minority is appointed. i (9) Martial law was lifted and new (amended) constitution promulgated in 1985, but elections were not held under the new constitution until The elections in early 1985 were held under martial law with a ban on political parties. j Pakistan has a more powerful President than many parliamentary regimes (s/he can dissolve the legislature and appoint and dismiss the cabinet.) However, because the President is not directly elected Pakistan is classified here as parliamentary. k The Philippines was under martial law from 1972 to The 1973 constitution called for a unicameral legislature. However, an elected legislature was not put in place until From February 1986 to May 1987 an interim Freedom Constitution was in place. l President-Parliamentary. The 1973 martial law constitution technically established a hybrid system with the President as head of State and Prime Minister as head of Government. However, for much of the period Ferdinand Marcos filled both positions. m President-Parliamentary. In 1991 a constitutional amendment was passed creating a President with some legislative and dissolution powers along side a Prime Minister and cabinet subject to parliamentary confidence. The President can appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister. n The President sat for fixed term, functioned as both the head of state and government but was elected by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly. o From 1952 to 1954 the President chose a Prime Minister who then chose and removed the cabinet. The cabinet was collectively subject to parliamentary censure. p A 1952 constitutional amendment created an upper chamber. However, due to the war, elections for the upper chamber were not held until q Spans the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Republics ( , , , 1987 ). r During the 3rd and 6th Republics ( , 1987 ) a directly elected President appointed the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister appointed and removed the rest of the cabinet. The cabinet was not subject to parliamentary confidence. s Between 1972 and 1987 South Korea had an electoral college (the NCU) whose job was to elect the president. However, unlike the electoral colleges in Taiwan and Indonesia, under the Korean constitution the NCU was not considered a second legislative chamber. t In 1955 a referendum was held which did away with the monarchy and installed Ngo Dinh Diem as President. A republican constitution was subsequently adopted in u President-Parliamentary. The President with legislative power selects the Prime Minister and cabinet but they in turn are subject to parliamentary confidence. v One-half of the Senate was appointed and one-half elected. w After a violent uprising in 1971 a new constitution was passed in 1972 which changed the name of the country from Ceylon to Sri Lanka. x The first presidential elections under the 1978 constitution were not held until y President-Parliamentary. The President is directly elected, can appoint the cabinet, including the Prime Minister, and is not dependent on the confidence of Parliament to remain in office. However, the Prime Minster and Cabinet must maintain the support of parliament to remain in office.

6 126 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 1 Continued z The lifting of martial law and the decision to allow opposition parties to contest elections in 1987 was the beginning of a semi-democratic period. However, it was not until the constitutional changes of 1991 that the entire legislature was open for competitive election (the first election was held in 1992). Prior to 1991 supplementary elections were held for both legislative chambers, but only a minority of the seats were open to contestation. aa The President appoints the head of the cabinet, the President of the Executive Yuan (the Premier), and the Premier appoints the rest of the cabinet. The appointment of the Premier must be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. The President can remove cabinet members. The cabinet is not subject to legislative confidence. bb Taiwan has a legislative assembly (the Legislative Yuan) as well as a National Assembly. The latter has no legislative power and until 1996 met only once every four years to select the President and Vice-President. Since 1996 the President and Vice-President have been directly elected and the National Assembly s role has been confined to voting on constitutional amendments and holding the power of presidential impeachment. In 2000 the National Assembly was changed to a non-standing body elected entirely via list PR. cc President-Parliamentary. Under a 1997 constitutional amendment the Premier (President of the Executive Yuan) is subject to a no confidence vote by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan once such a vote has been cast. dd From 1991 to 1992 members of a coup group that had overthrown the previous government ruled Thailand. When democracy was restored in 1992 the pre-coup rules and institutions were largely readopted. were strongly influenced by the British system (Thailand). In addition to these countries, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Nepal and South Korea have also adopted parliamentary systems at some point in their democratic history. 8 Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia I, Pakistan, Singapore I, South Korea III and Sri Lanka II each have Presidents as their head of state, but are not classified Presidential systems since these Presidents are not popularly elected or do not have cabinet and/or legislative authority. Five of the countries have had a presidential regime which meets the four criteria listed above: Bangladesh (I), the Philippines (I, III), South Korea (I, III), Taiwan (I) and South Vietnam (I). Seven countries have used hybrid systems that do not fit well into either category. Singapore s (II) directly elected President has some legislative authority and can appoint and remove the Prime Minister. However, the Prime Minister and cabinet are also subject to parliamentary confidence. Until 1952 the South Korean President sat for fixed term and functioned as both the head of state and government but was not popularly elected. 9 In Taiwan II the President selects the head of the cabinet (the Executive Yuan) and the head of the Executive Yuan (known as the Premier) selects the rest of the members of the Executive Yuan. However, the Premier is subject to a vote of no confidence by the Legislative Yuan and the President has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan if a no confidence resolution is passed. Indonesia II 8 Most of these states were monarchies at one time. Empirically it is the case then whenever monarchies have democratized, they have chosen parliamentary government (Lijphart 1999, p. 142). 9 The President was selected by a 2/3rds vote of the National Assembly.

7 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) has a President that is chosen by an electoral college (the People s Consultative Assembly or MPR) made up, in part, of the members of the legislative assembly. 10 The President can appoint and remove the cabinet independent of the legislature and has very broad legislative powers. The President is not subject to the confidence of the legislature (House of Representatives or DPR) but the electoral college (MPR) can remove the President prior to the end of his term. In Sri Lanka III and Vietnam II a fixed term President with legislative power selected a Prime Minister, but the Prime Minster could be removed by a no confidence vote of the legislature. Finally, the 1973 martial law constitution in the Philippines (II) established a Hybrid system with a directly elected President with legislative powers as head of state and a Prime Minister as head of government. The Prime Minister was nominated by the President and approved by the legislature and the Prime Minister and cabinet were responsible to the legislature. 11 The footnotes to Table 1 include a finer classification of these hybrid regimes using Shugart and Carey s (1992) President-Parliamentary and Premier-Presidential categories. 12 Table 1 also contains two other ways of classifying regimes: by their legislative structure and by structure of central local government relations. Legislatures can be unicameral or bicameral. In bicameral legislatures the upper house can either be elected or appointed. The number of countries with unicameral versus bicameral legislatures is about equal in the region. Column 4 in Table 1 presents the information on structure of the legislative branch. Six countries have changed key features of their legislative branch over time. Cambodia, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam and Sri Lanka have switched between a unicameral and bicameral legislature. Thailand recently replaced an appointed second chamber with an elected version. Countries in the region also differ to the extent the national government formally shares power with sub-national governments. In federal systems there is a formal division of power between the central/national government and sub-national governments (Lijphart, 1999, p. 186). Typically, this includes a formal division of legislative authority. Such a formal division does not exist in unitary states. Column 5 in Table 1 lists any state that formally declares itself federal in its constitution. Only four states have had federal regimes Burma, India, Malaysia and Pakistan. It is worth noting that the terms federal and unitary mask a good deal of complexity within each category. There are formally unitary states, such as Japan and the Philippines, which have granted substantial powers to sub-national governments, and there are 10 The MPR s role goes beyond that of an electoral college. This is discussed in more detail below. 11 In practice this hybrid system functioned more like a presidential system. For much of the period Ferdinand Marcos was both the President and Prime Minister. He was for all intents and purposes an all-powerful and dominant president. (Brillantes, 1988, p. 123). 12 Premier-Presidential regimes meet the following criteria: (a) the president is elected by popular vote, (b) the president possesses considerable powers, and (c) there also exists a premier and cabinet subject to legislative confidence, who perform executive functions. President-Parliamentary systems have the following characteristics: (a) the popular election of the president, (b) the president appoints and dismisses cabinet members, (c) cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence and (d) the president as the power to dissolve parliament and/or legislative powers. (Shugart and Carey, 1992, pp ).

8 128 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) formally federal states where the powers of sub-national governments are extremely limited, e.g. Malaysia. 3. Election of the president and presidential vetoes In the region s presidential and hybrid systems voters can either elect the president directly, or choose representatives who then elect the president. Among the presidential and hybrid systems listed in Table 2, eight provide for the direct election of the president via the plurality formula: Bangladesh, Philippines I, II, III, Singapore, South Korea II, V and Taiwan II. Sri Lanka also directly elects its president but uses preference voting rather than strict plurality. 13 The remaining systems in Table 2 indirectly elect their presidents. From 1948 to 1952 (South Korea I) the South Korean President was chosen by a 2/3rds majority of the National Assembly. In Indonesia I voters elected most of the members of the Indonesian parliament (DPR). The 500-member DPR joined with 500 additional presidential appointees to form the People s Consultative Assembly (MPR). The MPR met every 5 years to select the president by majority vote. Under the current Indonesian system the 500-member DPR joins with 65 appointees and 135 other elected representatives to form the MPR. In Pakistan the president is elected by a majority of an electoral college composed of members of both legislative chambers and the provincial assemblies. South Korea III used a 5000-member electoral college called the National Conference for Unification (NCU) to elect the President using the majority rule. The NCU was disbanded under a 1980 constitutional amendment but was replaced with a nearly identical electoral college (South Korea IV). Voters in pre-1996 Taiwan elected an electoral body (National Assembly), which then elected the president on a majority basis. See Table 8 for more details on systems that rely on electoral bodies. There is also quite a variation among the Asian presidential regimes in terms of presidential terms and term limits (Table 2, columns 4, 5). The length of presidential terms ranges from 4 year in the case of Philippines I and Taiwan II to 7 year in South Korea IV. A presidential term limit does not exist in Bangladesh, Indonesia I, Philippines II, Singapore and South Korea II and III while there is a ban on reelection in South Korea IV, and V and Philippines III. Sri Lanka, Taiwan, South Korea I, Indonesia II and Philippines I place a two-term limit on their presidents. Finally, differences in the veto power of presidents are marked. The South Korea III and Indonesian presidents are the most powerful in terms of veto power their vetoes can not be overridden. Taiwan s president, by contrast, has no veto power 13 Each Sri Lankan voter ranks up to three candidates for president in order of preference. If no candidate gets an absolute majority of first preferences all but the top two candidates are declared defeated. The votes of the defeated candidates supporters are then transferred to whichever of the remaining candidates they have marked as a second preference. If still no candidate has an absolute majority, third preferences are distributed to the remaining two candidates and the candidate with the most votes is then declared the winner.

9 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 2 Presidents in presidential and hybrid systems System Time period Method of election Presidential Term limit Veto/override term (yr) requirement Bangladesh Plurality 5 None Package/majority a Indonesia I b Majority of electoral 5 None Package/none body (MPR) Indonesia II 1998 Majority of electoral 5 Two term Package/none body (MPR) limit Philippines I Plurality 4 Two term Partial & limit package/2/3rds both houses Philippines II c Plurality 6 None Partial & package/2/3rds Philippines III 1987 Plurality 6 No re- Partial & election package/2/3rds both houses Singapore 1991 Plurality 6 None Package (limited)/2/3rds d South Korea I /3 rd vote of National 4 Two term Package/2/3rds Assembly e limit South Korea II , Plurality 4 None g Package/2/3rds f South Korea Majority of electoral 6 None Package/none III body (NCU) h South Korea Majority of electoral 7 No re- Package/2/3rds IV body election South Korea V 1987 Plurality 5 No re- Package/2/3rds election Sri Lanka 1978 Preference voting- 6 i Two term None j majority limit Taiwan I Majority of electoral 6 Two term None k body (National limit Assembly) Taiwan II 1996 Plurality 4 Two term None l a Non-money bills only. b From 1959 until 1971 the MPR was completely appointed by the president. c No presidential elections were held during the martial law period ( ). d Provisions for overriding a presidential appointment veto were added in a 1996 constitutional amendment. In addition to the power to veto certain appointments to government agencies, statutory boards and government corporations, the president must also approve the budgets of some government entities. The president can also veto any changes to the Central Provident Fund and bills affecting foreign borrowing. e If no candidate could obtain 2/3rds of the votes after two rounds of voting a majority run-off election would be held between the top two vote-getters. f Spans the 1st and 3rd Republics ( and ). g In 1954 and again in 1969 the constitutions were amended, lifting restrictions on re-elections, thus allowing the sitting presidents (Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee) to run for re-election. h The National Conference for Unification, headed by the president. i A 1982 amendment allows the president to call for elections any time after serving 4 yr. limit

10 130 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 2 Continued j Presidential approval is required before the results of a referendum become law. k The president by himself does not have a veto over legislation. However, the Executive Yuan may veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can be overridden with a 2/3rds vote in the Legislative Yuan. l The Executive Yuan may veto legislation with the approval of the president. Such a veto can be overridden with a majority vote in the Legislative Yuan. The change from a 2/3rds to majority vote occurred in independent of the Executive Yuan. The Sri Lankan President also lacks veto power over legislation, although the president s approval is required before the results of a referendum become law. In South Korea (I, II, IV, V) and the Philippines presidents have package vetoes that take a supermajority to overturn. The Bangladeshi and Pakistani presidents can veto non-money bills but the veto can be overturned by a simple majority. 14 The Philippine president also has a partial or line item veto over budget-related bills. In Singapore the position of President is a relatively new invention created in 1991 via a constitutional amendment. However, unlike the heads of state just mentioned, the Singaporean President cannot veto most legislation. He can however veto certain government appointments as well as bills that affect the Central Provident Fund (CPF). 15 The President must also approve the budgets of certain government agencies and can veto bills relating to foreign borrowing. His veto can be overridden by a 2/3rds vote of the legislature. 16 The presidential veto powers and override requirements are listed in Table 2, column Parliamentary systems and heads of state As is the case in many parliamentary democracies, parliamentary systems in East, South and Southeast Asia separate out the duties of the head of government (the Prime Minister) from the duties of the head of state (a President or Monarch). Usually the duties of these heads of state are only ceremonial in nature, however this is not always the case. Table 3 presents information on the different heads of state in Asian parliamentary systems and their various powers. Seven of the parliamentary systems have had monarchs as their head of state. In all cases but Malaysia these monarchs sit for life. The position of Malaysian monarch and head of state is passed between nine Malay Sultans, each of whom serves a term of 5 years. The remaining parliamentary regimes have presidents as heads of state, none of which are directly elected. 14 In the case of bicameral Pakistan, a majority of both houses is required. 15 The CPF was introduced in 1955 to give financial security to retired or disabled workers. Employees and employers must contribute a percentage of an employee s salary to the CPF. 16 The President may also veto any bill that would curtail his discretionary powers. This veto can only be overturned by a 2/3rds vote in a national referendum.

11 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 3 Heads of state in parliamentary systems System Time period Head of Method of election Term (yr) Veto/override state requirement Bangladesh 1991 President Majority of Parliament 5 Non-money/majority Burma President 2/3rds of Parliament a 5 None Cambodia ; Monarch Non-elected Life None 1993 India 1950 President Electoral college b 5 Non-money/majority Indonesia President NA c NA c None Japan 1947 Monarch Non-elected Life None Malaysia 1957 Monarch Elected by Sultans d 5 Non-money/majority both houses e Nepal 1990 Monarch Non-elected Life Non-money/majority Pakistan President Electoral College f 5 Non-money/majority both houses Papua New 1976 Monarch g Non-elected Life None Guinea Singapore President Majority of Parliament 4 None South Korea President 2/3rds of Parliament h 5 None i Sri Lanka I Monarch g Non-elected Life None Sri Lanka II President Appointed by Prime 4 None Minister Thailand 1978 Monarch Non-elected Life any bill/2/3rds both houses a The President was elected by a 2/3rds vote of joint session of lower and upper legislative chambers. Candidates were rotated between the various ethnic groups. b The Electoral college consists of the members of both national legislative chambers together with the elected members of state assemblies. c The method of electing the President and his term were to be determined in a Presidential election law but no such law was ever passed. As a result, no presidential elections were held during this period. President Sukarno, President of the short lived Republic of the United States of Indonesia, stayed on as President under the 1950 constitution. NA=not available. d The Monarch is selected from among nine Malay Sultans. e Prior to constitutional amendments in 1983 and 1984, it was unclear what exactly the Monarch s veto powers were. The 1983 and 1984 amendments set forth the above rules. f Members of both national legislative chambers together with the members of state assemblies. g The British Monarch. h If, after the first round of votes no candidate received a 2/3rds majority, a second round would be held. If a second round failed to produce a 2/3rds winner, the plurality candidate would be declared the winner. i The president could veto a state of siege declaration passed by the Prime Minister and Cabinet. In Sri Lanka II the Prime Minister appointed the President. The remaining presidents are elected by an electoral college which combines the national legislature with representatives from local assemblies (India) or by the national legislature only (Bangladesh, Burma, Singapore, South Korea). As mentioned, these heads of state enjoy primarily ceremonial powers. However,

12 132 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) several heads of states in Asia do possess some additional powers. 17 The most common additional power granted to the head of state is the power to refuse to sign bills passed by the legislature or veto power. Where granted, veto power is typically limited to non-monetary bills and vetoes can be over-ridden by a majority vote of one or both legislative chambers. This is the case in Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Nepal. The Thai King enjoys somewhat greater power than most ceremonial heads of state. He can withhold his consent on any bill and send the bill back to Parliament for redeliberation. An override of the King s veto requires a 2/3rds vote of both houses Selection of the legislature Tables 4 7 contain the basic information for the legislatures in our set of cases. Table 4 contains data for lower or single legislative chambers elected using the plurality formula. Table 5 has the same information for those lower/single legislative chambers elected on a proportional or semi-proportional basis. Table 6 lists systems that use two-tier or mixed-member systems to elect the lower/single chamber. Table 7 includes data on the make-up and election method of the second or upper chamber in bicameral systems. Basic information common to many or all of these tables include: (1) the electoral formula used to allocate the legislative seats; (2) assembly size; (3) number of electoral districts; (4) district magnitude; (5) the presence or absence of thresholds; (6) the term length of legislators, (7) their term limits and (8) whether the legislature includes appointed/reserved seats. Assembly size, the number of districts and district magnitude often vary over time as the population changes. Where this is the case we included the data from the last election held under a given set of rules Electoral formulas for the legislature There are two general types of electoral formulas used to allocate legislative seats, namely, plurality formula and proportional representation (PR). Several countries employ a combination of these formulas in mixed-member systems. Such systems will be discussed in some detail below. Under the plurality formula the candidate(s) with the highest number of votes in a given district is elected. The plurality formula is usually used in single-seat districts, however, several countries use the plurality formula in multi-seat districts, for example, Thailand s lower chamber (prior to 1997) (see Table 4), the Philippine Senate (see Table 7) and the provincial seats in Indonesia s electoral college (see Table 8). In these three systems voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled and the highest polling candidates fill the available seats. Singapore s system (after 1987) combines a handful of single-seat districts with 17 In most cases these are rarely used. 18 The King s veto power has rarely, if ever, been exercised.

13 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 4 Lower/single chamber elected using the plurality formula System Time period District magnitude Number of Assembly Term length Term limits Appointed/reserved districts size seats Bangladesh None 30 a Burma None None India b None 2 c Japan to 5 (w/ SNTV) None None Malaysia None None Nepal None None Pakistan None 10 d Papua New Guinea None Up to 3 e Philippines I None None Philippines II f 8 to 21 (w/ multiple votes) None 35 g Philippines III h None 34 i Philippines IV terms None Singapore I None None Singapore II , 3 to 6 j None Up to 12 k South Korea I l None None South Korea II None None South Korea III (w/ SNTV) None 1/3 of seats m Sri Lanka I n None 6 o Sri Lanka II n p None 6 o Thailand to 3 (w/ multiple votes) None None

14 134 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 4 Lower/single chamber elected using the plurality formula a Thirty seats are reserved for women elected by Parliament. b A 1976 constitutional amendment extended the term to 6 years. A 1978 amendment changed it back to 5 years. c President may nominate up to two members of the Anglo-Indian community. d Non-Muslim minorities elect 10 members. e Three additional members may be appointed by a 2/3rds vote in Parliament. f An election law was passed in 1977 and elections for an interim assembly were held in 1978 under martial law. The voters could cast as many votes as there were seats. However, voters also had the option of block voting--voters could simply write the name of the party on the ballot and the votes would automatically be assigned to that party s entire ticket. g Twenty-one were appointed by the President from the members of the cabinet. Fourteen were elected by government-sponsored sectoral organizations. h Elections held in i Twenty were appointed by the President from the members of the cabinet. Fourteen were elected by government-sponsored sectoral organizations. j A handful of single-seat districts exist alongside Group Representation Constituencies with magnitudes of 3 6 seats. k The President and Parliament can appoint up to six representatives each. l Some sources claim that Korea switched to two member districts in However, most sources place the change to two member districts in m 1/3 of the seats were appointed by the president. Appointed legislators served a 3-year term. n Up to five 2 or 3 seat districts were allowed nationwide. o Parliament could nominate six people to fill seats. p The term for the National Assembly was 6 years with the exception of the first National Assembly, which served for only 5 years. The first National Assembly had already served for 2 years as a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution.

15 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 5 Lower/single chamber elected using proportional representation (single-tier districting) System Time period Electoral District Number of Assembly Party threshold Term length Term limits Appointed formula magnitude districts size (yr) seats Cambodia 1993 Closed list PR None 5 None None Indonesia I PR w/ flexible 16 a None b 4 None Up to 18 c list Indonesia II d Closed list PR seats e 5 None f Indonesia III 1999 Modified List None h 5 None 38 i PR with nominating district g a Average district magnitude. b There was no party threshold but to win a seat a candidate had to receive at least 300,000 votes. c The constitution mandated that three minority groups receive a minimum number of seats: Chinese 9, Europeans 6, Arabs 3. If these numbers were not attained via the elections, then the government would appoint minority representatives to fill these seats. d From 1975, only three parties were allowed to participate in elections. These are Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). e At times an internal DPR rule required parties to have a minimum number of seats ranging from 11 to 13. f The number of appointed seats in the DPR has varied over time but stayed between 15 and 25% of the total seats. g Parties present a list of candidates in each of Indonesia s 27 provinces. Each party also assigns its candidates to individual districts within each province. Voters cast a single vote for a party list. Seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the party s vote share in each province. Each party s seats are filled by the individual candidates assigned to the district where the party received its highest vote percentage. Under the Indonesia first election using these rules, the district list portion of the electoral rules were largely emasculated (NDI, August 1999) and the system functioned like pure list PR. h There is no threshold for winning seats in the current election, however, a party must gain 2% of the seats in the DPR or 3% of the seats in the provincial and district assemblies to be eligible to run in future elections. i Representatives of the military.

16 136 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 6 Mixed-member or two-tiered systems (lower/single chamber) System Time Tiers Single or Seat linkage Electoral District Number Number Threshold Term Term Appointed/ period separate between tiers formula magnitude of of seats length limits Reserved votes districts in tier (years) seats Japan 1994 List Separate None List PR 7 to a 200 None 4 None None Nominal Plurality None Philippines 1995 b List Separate None List PR 52 c 1 52 c 2% of votes 3 3 None b District Plurality None South 1962 List Single Yes d Plurality/PR d % of votes 4 None None Korea I 1972 and 3 seats Nominal Plurality None South 1980 List Single Yes e Plurality/PR e nominal 4 None None Korea II 1987 seats Nominal SNTV None South 1987 List Single Yes, Plurality/PR f % 4 None None Korea III 1996 Majority assuring f Nominal Plurality None South 1996 List Single None List PR % 4 None None Korea IV Nominal Plurality None

17 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 6 Continued Sri Lanka g 1978 g 2nd Single None List PR None 6 None None 1st Modified PR 2 to over /8 of votes w/preferential 20 in given voting h district Taiwan 1991 i List Single None List PR 8; 41 j % 3 None 10% 20% l Nominal SNTV 1 to k None 20% m Thailand 1997 List Separate None List PR % 4 None None Nominal Plurality None a The list tier is divided into 11 blocs with district magnitudes of b The provision for a mixed-member system was included in the 1987 Constitution but a law fully implementing the measure was not passed until 1995 and not used in an election until In the interim both President Aquino and President Ramos appointed some sectoral representatives to the lower chamber. c There is a three seat cap on the number of seats a party can win in the list tier. Sectoral organizations, in addition to parties, are allowed to compete for the party list seats. During the 1998 elections only 13 parties passed the 2 percent threshold and so many party list seats were unfilled. The remaining seats were filled by appointed representatives from groups that fell behold the threshold. The rule was subsequently changes to require that unfilled seats be distributed among parties above the 2 percent threshold, but below the three seat cap. d The party that received 50% or more of the votes automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seats. If no party won 50% of the seats, the party with the largest number of votes automatically received 1/2 of the list tier seats. The second-place party received 1/3 of the list tier seats as long as its vote share was more than double that of the third place party. Failing this, the second place party received 2/3rds of the remaining seats. Any seats left over were distributed to the other parties on a PR basis. e The party that won the largest number of nominal tier seats automatically received 2/3rds of the list tier seat. The remaining 1/3 rd of the list tier seats were divided among the other parties on a proportional basis. f The party that wins the most seats in the nominal tier receives enough seats from the list tier to ensure that it has a majority in the assembly. The remaining seats in the list tier are then divided proportionally among the other parties.

18 138 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 6 Mixed-member or two-tiered systems (lower/single chamber) g Sri Lanka is a two-tiered system but does not meet the strict definition of a mixed-member system. The original 1978 Constitution did not include a two-tiered system. The first elections under the 1978 constitution were held in 1989, but prior to that time (1988) the constitution was amended to a twotiered system. h Each voter chooses a specific party list (or independent group list) and three of that list s candidates. The party or independent group that receives the highest number of votes in the district receives one bonus seat awarded to its candidate with the highest vote total. The remaining seats are then awarded to parties/groups (including the largest party) in proportion to the votes received. The candidates with the highest vote totals from each party s list then receive seats. i Prior to a 1991 constitutional change there were supplemental elections for a minority of the seats. The first election after the change was held in j 41 national seats and 8 seats representing overseas Chinese. k 168 from regular districts and 8 from two special aboriginal districts. l Prior to 1991 officially sanctioned functionalist bodies, including women s organizations, could elect several members of the Legislative Yuan. Since 1991 gender has been the only criterion for filling reserved seats. Under the current system there are reserved seats in both the list and nominal tiers. Parties that win at least five seats in the list tier must fill at least one of those seats with a female candidate. Parties with more than ten seats must reserve 10 percent of their seats for female candidates. m In nominal tier districts with at least five seats women are guaranteed at least one seat. If no female candidate is among the top finishers a seat is awarded to the female candidate with the largest vote total.

19 A. Hicken, Y. Kasuya / Electoral Studies 22 (2003) Table 7 Elected second chambers System Time Electoral Electors District Assembly Number of Term Term limits Renewal rate Appointed Legislative period formula magnitude size districts length Seats Powers (years) Burma Varied a States a 3 to None None None NA India 1950 List PR State 1 to None 1/3 every 2 Up to 12 veto non- Assemblies years money Japan I b 1946 SNTV Direct None 1/2 every 3 None veto non years money SNTV Direct 1 to None Japan II b 1982 List PR c Direct None 1/2 every 3 None veto nonyears money SNTV 1 to None Malaysia 1957 Plurality State None None 40 delay Assemblies Nepal 1950 STV Local Gov None 1/3 every 2 10 delay Units years Pakistan 1985 STV State 3 to None 1/2 every 3 None veto non Assemblies years money Philippines I 1935 Plurality Direct None 1/2 every 3 None veto all 1972 years legislation Philippines 1987 Plurality Direct terms 1/2 every 3 None veto all II years legislation South Korea Plurality Direct 2 70 d 35 6 NA e 1/2 every 3 None NA d years Sri Lanka 1948 STV Lower None 1/3 every 2 15 delay non f House years g money Thailand h 1997 SNTV Direct no successive None None delay election