V. Bureaucracy: Public Administration and Public Policy

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "V. Bureaucracy: Public Administration and Public Policy"

Angelica Harrell
6 years ago
Views:

1 V. Bureaucracy: Public Administration and Public Policy Bureaucracy : The Term Bureaucracy < bureau Fr. desk + kratien Gr. to rule First introduced as a pejorative term to describe the Prussian administrative system of the 18 th century. In fact the word continues to be used in a pejorative sense to this day (e.g., a bureaucratic mindset ) Cf.: Federal Bureaucrat Virus Divides your hard disk into hundreds of little units, each of which do practically nothing, but all of which claim to be the most important part of the computer. 1

2 In its modern, non-pejorative sense: Bureaucracy: A specific form of government structured (in theory) to provide as much efficiency as possible by setting up a hierarchical decision-making process that minimizes arbitrary decision making. In this sense, bureaucracy is related to the descriptive term public administration the public servants (or civil servants ) who conduct the day to day business of government. Modern Bureaucracy: Specialization, Hierarchy Modern states are inherently complex and, accordingly, the administration of a modern state requires highly developed technical expertise in any number of domains. No one person, or small group of persons, can possibly know enough about, or even keep track of, everything that transpires in all of them 2

3 The characteristically modern response to this complexity has been a hierarchical organization of public administration. The supposed advantages of hierarchical organization: Efficiency and keeping arbitrary, personal factors to a minimum. Weber, Again According to Weber, bureaucracy in modern, legal-rational states is characterized by: 1. Specialization of official duties 2. Hierarchical organization of authority 3. Operations governed by consistent application of abstract rules to particular cases 4. Impersonal detachment toward subordinates and clients 5. Employment based on merit and protection from arbitrary dismissal 6. Maximization of technical and organizational efficiency 3

4 The Bureaucratic Ideal As we ve seen, most public administrators (at least at the federal level) belong to the part of the executive that is not politically responsible and (therefore, supposedly) politically neutral. I.e., their authority is delegated from their political superiors and based on their technical expertise; their political masters may take credit for their work, but they must also take the blame for their mistakes At least in theory, this fits with the Weberian ideal of a modern bureaucracy: (Relatively) incorruptible, politically neutral experts providing the needed expertise to run the modern state in a fair, consistent, and efficient manner. Ideally policy-setting is the specialized Ideally, policy setting is the specialized domain of politically accountable actors; public administrators are the specialized instruments of government. 4

5 The Bureaucratic Reality There is in fact a great range of professionalism (97) in the bureaucracies of the North American democracies. Bureaucrats are not always politically neutral with respect to recruitment (e.g., patronage) or their role in the flow of information within government hierarchies (e.g., corruption; influence-peddling) Also, while bureaucrats are (usually) not politically responsible, they do play a major role in setting public policy. Public Policy Defined 1. The purposive p actions of government; ;g goals, incentives, measures. 2. The impact of government on individuals and society. 5

6 How is public policy determined? a. Behaviour of politicians in light of historical, geographic, socio-economical realities. b. Interactions between politicians and civil servants. In any given case, these two determinants of public policy may or may not be compatible Policy Powers of Bureaucrats As we ve seen, bureaucrats are supposedly politically neutral, but they do in fact play an (increasingly) i important t role in setting public policy. Specialization: Bureaucrats have access to specialized information and technical skills pertinent to what needs to be done; what can be done. Tenure: Politicians come and go; bureaucrats tend to remain in office 6

7 Interest Groups: Accordingly, interest groups have an incentive to cultivate long- term relationships with bureaucrats. Bureaucrats, in turn, control the flow of information from interest groups to politicians. E.g., The revolving door of CFIA and Health Canada regulators; the role of lobbyists in shaping public policy Public Service Organization: Numbers Federal bureaucracy, the raw numbers: U.S. 3 million Mexico 1.5 million Canada 250,000 But in per capita terms: Mexico has the most, the U.S. the least, Canada in between. Geographical distribution of federal bureaucracy: Washington, 11%; Ottawa, 30%; Mexico City, the great majority 7

8 Main Categories of (Federal) Public Administration: 1. Government Departments 2. Public Enterprises 3. Regulatory Commissions 4. Independent Agencies Public Service Organization: U.S. 14 cabinet-level departments each headed by a secretary (except for Justice Department, headed by the Attorney General) Cabinet secretaries and other senior officials are appointed by the president; secretarial appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate. Others, e.g., White House staff, are appointed at the president s sole discretion. 8

under Harper), some in the inner cabinet, some in wider ministry (e.g.

9 Since the Pendleton Act (1883), however, most U.S. civil servants are (supposedly) hired on the basis of merit and end to the earlier spoils system. Assassination of James Garfield, 1881 Public Service Organization: Canada About 30 cabinet portfolios (40 under Mulroney, 23 under Chrétien; 27 under Harper), some in the inner cabinet, some in wider ministry (e.g., Secretaries of State) The administrative head of each ministry its senior public servant is the Deputy Minister (DM), appointed by the PM. The Clerk of the Privy Council is essentially the Deputy Minister to the PM 9

10 Each Deputy Minister presides over an administrative hierarchy, with at least two Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADMs) heading different branches of the ministry. Below ADMs in the hierarchy are Directors General or Directors Public Service Organization: Mexico About 19 cabinet agencies, corresponding to various policy jurisdictions; all cabinet officers are appointed by the president. Some of special, idiosyncratic significance in Mexican politics: Agrarian Reform, Tourism, Social Development Agency (which funds local development projects) Under Fox, a re-organization of cabinet portfolios: Economic, Social Development and Law and Order groupings; cabinet members drawn from all major political parties 10

Public Enterprises Government owned business, especially those held to be of special interest t to policy objectives and/or the public good (e.g., infrastructure) In Canada and the U.S.

11 Public Enterprises Government owned business, especially those held to be of special interest t to policy objectives and/or the public good (e.g., infrastructure) In Canada and the U.S., generally operate outside of direct political control. (In the US, however, this was recently called into question under the Bush administration.) Crown Corporations Crown corporations (e.g., Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, EDC, CBC) report to Parliament through a designated minister, but are not directly supervised by or responsible to any minister. Chairpersons and directors may be appointed by the political executive, but there is normally no political interference in day to day operations. (Consider what that would mean, e.g., in the case of the CBC) 11

12 Parastatals In Mexico, by contrast, executive directors of parastatals are appointed by the president and also have semi-cabinet status (akin to minor ministry posts in Canada) Formerly, there were some 800 parastatals During the 1980s and 90s most of these were sold off to raise money, to streamline government, and/or for ideological reasons. Only a handful remain: the Federal Electricity Commission, the National Water Commission, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) Regulatory Commissions Independent regulatory agencies U.S.: Federal Trade Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, etc. Canada: CRTC, CNSC, Canadian Labour Relations Board, etc. 12

13 Powers of Regulatory Commissions Quasi-judicial powers: Adjudicate cases under their enabling legislation; free from direct government control, not part of departmental structure. (e.g., granting or withholding license approvals) Quasi-legislative powers: Formulate binding general rules in their areas of jurisdiction (e.g., Cancon, rad counts) Independent Agencies In U.S. nomenclature, independent agencies are agencies independent of the federal departmental structure, with relatively narrow responsibilities. Heads appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the president. E.g., NASA, EPA, the former Office of g,,, Homeland Security 13

14 In both Canada and the U.S. there are also advisory bodies that deal not with administration of existing law, but with the creation of new public policy. E.g., Royal commissions such as the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies ( ) Public Service Recruitment Jackson et al.: The evolution of a professional public service emerged alongside the development of liberal democracy (103) Formerly (as, for the most part, in pre-modern times): The spoils system patronage top to bottom Since the end of the 19 th century: merit systems based on examinations (e.g., the British civil service; the U.S. Pendleton Act) and/or academic qualifications. 14

15 Why not a completely merit-based system? Well, an too-securely entrenched bureaucracy may be resistant to political change, escaping effective democratic governmental control See, e.g., any standard plot on Yes, Minister! Accordingly, all of the NA democracies reserve some positions in public administration for political appointments: While there appears to be a growth in explicit political appointments to the upper echelon of the bureaucracy in Canada, the United States and Mexico are most developed in this regard. (104) 15

16 In the case of the U.S., this has mainly been a process of continual development toward a merit-based, competitive system. There are still many political appointments, however. In recent years: e.g., Michael Brown, FEMA; W. David Hager, FDA Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee; Steven Griles, Deputy Interior Secretary Canada continues to have a British-style merit system, but there has been an increase in political appointments in the PMO, Privy Council Office, etc.. Accountability and Control A basic principle of liberal democratic politics: Public democratic control over the bureaucracy (most especially the police and the military) This is achieved (when it is achieved) by two main mechanisms internal controls and oversight. 16

17 Internal Controls Standards and procedures that regulate the conduct of bureaucrats from inside public service. Perhaps the most important internal control: Merit and performance-based hiring and promotion criteria. Or maybe not: Some argue that, in a democracy, public administration should also be representative of the population it serves: Affirmative action Representation in Public Administration In the U.S., concerns about representation in public service are mainly focused on race and in gender. These are concerns in Canada as well, but regional and linguistic representation are also especially important. Some say: In theory an appointment process based on merit would be best for everyone (107) An alternative theory: A representative bureaucracy may be more effective in serving diverse constituencies 17

18 Oversight Accountability of bureaucrats to the executive, to the legislature, l and, ultimately, t l to the people. Creation and abolition of departments/ministries Fiscal controls in legislature Investigative powers Oversight Mechanisms In the U.S.: Government Accountability Office (GAO, formerly General Accounting Office), Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget Office, various legislative committees In Canada: Ministerial responsibility, Question Period, Office of the Auditor General, Public inquiries (e.g., the Gomery inquiry) 18

19 In Mexico, by contrast, corruption and bribery (e.g., la mordida) were endemic in the days of PRI control. Reinforced by the camarillas system: Government effectively controlled access to economic opportunity; legislative oversight was weak due to PRI control Moreover, police (at least in comparison to Canada and the U.S.) often operated outside of civilian control. Under Fox various anti-corruption measures were implemented. Even ten years on, however, it remains to be seen if these will be more effective than similar measures in the past. 19

20 Bureaucracy since the 1980s Beginning in the 1980s, governments across the world have been influenced by conservative (i.e., what might more properly be called, neo-liberal ideology) The neo-liberal slogan: the less government the better E.g., the Republican Contract with America 1994; (certain aspects of) the platform of the former Reform Party of Canada, the CPC Accordingly there have been a number of initiatives to reduce the size of the bureaucracy, supposedly with the aim of making it more efficient and/or getting it out of the way of the market: Efficiency: Private sector management practices ( new public management ) including pay for performance measures, a client service orientation. Privatization/Contracting Out: Sell off government enterprises so that they can (supposedly) be run more efficiently; privatize some government operations (e.g., prisons, utilities) to create efficiency through profit incentives. 20

21 Decentralization: Move more of the federal bureaucracy out of capital cities, put bureaucrats a in contact with the people they serve. Deregulation: Minimize bureaucratic constraints on the economy (AKA red tape ); reduce the overall size of government Problems with the Neo-Liberal Agenda Private parties are arguably even less amenable to democratic control and/or oversight than overgrown bureaucracies (see, e.g., private prisons in the U.S.) Similarly, deregulation may devolve into nonregulation, leading to injustice and corruption. (e.g., self-regulation of the financial services industry in the U.S.) and/or to increased economic, social and environmental costs (e.g., deregulation natural gas market in BC) 21

22 Moreover, the supposed efficiency gains may be illusory (e.g., public health care in Canada vs. health care in the U.S.) 22

Chapter 7 Bureaucracy and the Executive Branch. AP Government

Chapter 7 Bureaucracy and the Executive Branch AP Government The Paradoxes of Bureaucratic Politics Americans generally have negative views of bureaucracy, and we tend only to focus on bureaucracy when