Hi tech Safety & Health Management. Jung Pin Yu SAHTECH

Transcription

1 Hi tech Safety & Health Management Jung Pin Yu SAHTECH

2 Outline Chemical Assessment & Management new chemical management toxicity assessment release simulation and control Tool & Facility Safety

3 SAICM GPA Target year Dubai Declaration Gap analysis & priority setting National integral management system Agreement of international cooperation Regulation policy & organization Management on protection zone Prevent illegal trade of toxic & danger. subs. Capacity building on national chemical management Reduce pesticide risk on health & environ.ment Clean production High production volume chemical Risk assessment, management & communication Regulatory mitigation & response IFSC IFSC IFSC IFSC 2007 GHS implementation Chemical safety & children OHS Toxic pesticides/risk redu. Pesticide management Lead in fuel Private sectors involvement/ responsibility testing capacity SDS management/disseminate. life cycle management Register regulatory Training & awareness raising Social/economic considerat. Responsibility & compensa. Performance index Polluted site remediation POP toxic substance Waste management & reduction involving government, industries, and trade units Involving NGO 2020 UN Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) 3

4 Taiwan Chemical Management Regime (SAHTECH as the national office) Inter agency collaboration Risk Identification Chemical List Dangerous/Harmful Chemical List Risk Analysis/Evaluation & Challenge Program Highly Concerned Chemical List Risk Treatment: Authorization &Control Regulatory Chemicals Existing :PRTRs info New: Hazard and exposure risk info Regulatory specifications/ codes (agency dependent)

5 Chemical Toxicity Estimation Step 1 identification of the substance Step 2 Analysis of mode of action Species and testing endpoints Fathead minnow 96h-LC 50 Daphnia magna 48h-EC 50 Descriptor Log K ow calculated by US EPA EPISUITE, version 4.0 Step 3 identification of possible analogues Step 4 Gather in vivo test data of analogues Step 5 Fill data gaps by QSAR models Step 6 Results output

6 Hit of GHS toxicity classification estimation (semiconductor photolithography process chemicals) Acute hazard Chronic hazard Substance name Fish Daphnia Daphnia Exp. P2 Exp. P2 Exp. P2 Isoprene N/A N/A ethyl acrylate Glycidylmethacrylate N/A ethylene glycol 4 4 Ethanolamine isopropyl alcohol N/A N/A N/A ethyl acetate 3 N/A MIBK N/A N/A N/A n-butyl acetate N/A N/A cellosolve acetate Acetone 4 4 Ethanol 4 4 Ethylbenzene N/A N/A Missed 1/12 (8.33%) 3/10 (30.0%) 1/8 (12.5%) UN GHS (2009): EC50 or LC50 <1.0 mg/l) Actue I ; > Actue Ⅱ ; > Actue Ⅲ : practically non-toxic (EC50 or LC50 > 100 mg/l) 6

7 Experimental data and predicted toxicity by QSAR models The ratio should be great than 0.1 or less than 10.0 Substances Exp. ( mg/l) Exp./Protocol 1 Exp./Protocol 2 Fish Daphnia Fish Daphnia Fish Daphnia Butyl ether Dichloromethane Nonpolar Ethanol 4, , Toluene Narcosis BBP * Dibutyl phthalate* Diisobutyl phthalate* Nitrophenol Chloroaniline Polar Aniline Narcosis N-methylaniline Phenol Pyridine ,4-Dinitroaniline Pentachlorophenol Salicylaldehyde Reactive Disulfoton Oxidative 2.94 phosphorylation 0.02 uncoupling Malathion ,4-Pentanedione chloroethanol * Candidates of Substance of very high concern (SVHC) proposed by European Chemical Agency. 7 SAHTECH

8 Our work indicated that assessing environmental toxicity of chemicals by OECD QSAR models were suitable for some narcotic substances, but further improvement is needed to make it more reliable. The toxicity of reactive substances seemed inadequately predicted which might be due to their complex structures and/or specific mechanisms of action. The results shown in this study were fairly correlated with GHS categorization for acute aquatic hazard. Prediction model for the toxicity organometallics and inorganics needs further development. 8

9 Transportation Quantitative Risk Assessment Analysis process of quantitative risk 1 Risk analysis data collection HAZOP JSA What if Consequences Analysis (ex. DNV-Phast) YES AIChE NPRD... YES Hazard Identification Event list Choice of Event Consequences of Small scale potential hazards High severity Can modify the system reduce the consequences? NO Frequency analysis of potential hazards High frequency Can modify the system reduce the frequency? Low frequency NO

10 Transportation Quantitative Risk Assessment Analysis process of quantitative risk 2 Risk Analysis Software (ex.dnv-phast Risk) NO Combined severity and frequency, to estimate the value at risk. Risk standard (ex. UK, Netherland standard) YES Other alternative routes or options risk value acceptable? NO Can modify system to reduce risk? NO Unacceptable risk YES Acceptable risk Residual risk Emergency response plan

11 Transportation Quantitative Risk Assessment Individual risk contour map Individual risk criteria Netherland: /yr; UK: /yr Societal risk criteria Netherland :Death count 1 (frequency=1 10-3/year) ~ death count 100 (frequency=1 10-7/year) UK:Death count 1 (frequency=1 10-3/year) ~ death count 100 (frequency=1 10-6//year) Societal risk F N Curve

12 Special Fire and Smoke Control H 2 ~3500lpm Valve close results to pipe vibration and might ignite the H 2 H2 explosive=>safety design for exhaust VOC fire=>semi S2 certification & safety design for exhaust LED industry H2 explosive=> H2 safety guideline SiH4 explosive=> SiH4 safety guideline

13 Silane Tonner Explosion Simulation Pressure Envelope 13

14 Silane Tonner Explosion Simulation The release silane mass before explosion depends on the storage pressure and size of the released orifice. Larger orifice and higher pressure will increase the amount of metastable mass upon release. The more silane mass released, the greater the explosion damage. For the same release mass, gas explosion damage in a compartment depends strongly on the degree of building confinement or the vent arrangement. The gas yard should be designed to eliminate confinement and thereby dissipate pressure waves. Operators should put on proper PPE (personal protective equipment) in exchanging silane cylinders. 14

15 Hydrogen Trailer Explosion Simulation Temperature Profile

16 Hydrogen Trailer Explosion Simulation It is recommend to vent the unexpected released hydrogen upward for its light weight characteristics. Horizontal release of hydrogen, fractured PRD and pipe vent down, will cause serious damage depending on the formation of the flammable vapor cloud and the building confinement. Explosion may damage pipes or valves resulting secondary damage in facilities. Therefore, hydrogen storage yards should make sure the mitigation measures such as sprinkler systems and shut off systems can work to reduce the overall damage. Avoid water accumulates in the went pipe, frozen, corrosion may cause the failure of the PRD (Pressure release device). 16

17 H2 /SiH4 safety guideline SEMI Japan SEMI NA Eugene Ngai SAHTECH IC : TSMC, UMC, Inotera MOEAIDB CLA, SIPA SEMI Taiwan ESH Committee Gas: Airproducts, Boclh, Airliquide, Praxair, TNST LED: Epistar PV: GET, Gintech, Neosolarpower, Nexpw FPD : AUO, CMO, CPT, Innolux

18 Contents of Bulk SiH4 Safety Guideline 第二章大宗矽甲烷設施安全參考規範一 目的與範圍二 使用之專有名詞三 室外儲存及使用 Storage and Utilization 四 火焰偵測 Flame Detection 五 消防設施 Fire Protection 六 通風系統 Ventilation 七 尾氣處理系統 Exhaust Treatment 八 迫淨氣體系統 Purging System 九 電氣設施 Electrical Installation 十 風險評估 Risk Assessment 十一 容器與管線測試 Container and Piping 十二 防震 Seismic Protection 附件一矽甲烷物質安全資料表附件二矽甲烷容器與配管防震設計附件三更換大宗矽甲烷設施程序 第三章大宗矽甲烷事故緊急應變程序一 目的二 適用範圍三 應用限制四 名詞解釋五 矽甲烷危害與特性六 矽甲烷供應系統洩漏防範 Leak Prevention 七 緊急應變處理八 緊急應變 Emergency Response

19 Contents of Bulk H2 Safety Guideline 第四章大宗氣態氫氣設施安全參考規範一 目的與範圍二 使用之專有名詞三 室外氫氣設施氣體區 Storage and Utilization 四 火焰偵測 Flame Detection 五 消防設施 Fire Protection 六 電氣設施 Electrical Installation 七 容器與管線測試 Container and Piping 八 防爆牆 Blast Walls 附件一氫氣物質安全資料表 第五章大宗氣態氫氣事故緊急應變程序二 適用範圍三 應用限制四 名詞解釋五 氫氣危害與容器規範六 緊急應變處理七 緊急應變 Emergency Response

20 General Fire and Smoke Control 災害控制系統 Calamity Control Fire Toxic Smoke Escape simulation Calamity Control System Maximum Foreseeable Loss, MFL Probable Maximum Loss, PML Fire/ Smoke/toxic simulation Very Early Smoke Detector PDB

21 Fire Simulation for Clean Room Wet bench (e.g.) 檔案編號模擬情境 Bench 火苗竄出 Ceiling 煙竄出 Ceiling 火苗竄出 撒水機台延燒 單位 : 秒 其他 W1-01 W1-02 W1-03 W1-04

22 Functionality of Protection Layers Plant Emergency Response Physical Protection (Relief) Critical Alarms, Operator Supervision, and Manual Intervention Community Emergency Response Process Design Basic Controls, Alarms, Operator Supervision Safety Instrumented System Physical Protection (Dikes) Business Continuity Plan

23 Tool/Process Safety Assessment Steps Process/ Equipment unit PrHA & PHA Risk Assessments Consequence Analysis Risk Analysis Layers of Protection (ETA/FTA) Consequence Analysis Risk Analysis (F N Curve) Layers of Protection & Effectiveness Analysis ETA/FTA Data Analysis & Recommendations Review & Validation

24 Tool fire VESDA Quantitative Risk Assessment (e.g.) Tool CO2 Distigusher ERT Sprinker Indoor Hydrant Fire zoning & seals Conseque ncy Risk Failure *2.6X10 2 Success P=0.95 Failure P=0.05 Success P=0.95 Failure P=0.05 Success P=0.8 Failure P=0.2 Success P=0.95 Failure P=0.05 Success P=0.8 Failure P=0.2 ` Success P=0.8 Failure P=0.2 successful ly distigushed 2.4X10 2 Sub system loss 1.3X10 3 Tool partially damaged 6.48X10 5 Tool totally Damaged 1.3X10 5 Area damage 6.48X10 7 Area total loss 1.3X10 7 total loss 2.59X10 8

25 Equipments' Safety: User Purchase specifications Review and improve third report In situ sign off Risk control for Non compliance Safety review for existed equipments More Safer working environment Less impact to clean room In situ sign off Safety review for existed equipments Interlock F2 Cryo Pump connector

26 Equipments' Safety: Vendor S2+S10 Training S2+S10 Review Additional requirement Enhance Engineer s technology for Safety Design More Safer More Uptime Less Retrofit Faster Installation Local Code: electric explosiveproof Seismic Protection Safety Report Meet Purchase Spec.

27 SEMI S23 Safety & Energy Saving Facilities Exhaust Vacuum CDA N2 Pure Water Cooling Water Electricity. Process MOCVD Facilities and Process Transfer Energy Tool Pure Water Existed Fabs 1. Energy Bias Analysis 2. Energy Saving & Safety Increase 3. Energy Consume per Unit Product New Fab Design 1. Provide Data Base for IE 2. Modify Facilities Design to Below Industrial Baseline inch IC Industrial 9 kwh/m3 LED Industrial Average 3.2 kwh/m3

28

29 Thanks for your Attention