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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICLAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESIA TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (LOAN 2578-IND) SEPTEMBER 8, 1994 Agriculture Operations Division Country Operations III East Asia and Pacific Regional Office Report No This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESIA TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (LOAN 2578-IND) CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS At Project Appraisal: US$1.00 = Rupiah (Rp) 1,100 At Project Completion: US$1.00 = Rupiah (Rp) 2,000 GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA FISCAL YEAR April 1 - March 31 GLOSSARY APBN - Government Rupiah Budget BAKOSURTANAL - National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping DG - Directorate General DG Pankin - Directorate General of Settlement Preparation DG Rahbin - Directorate General of Mobilization and Development DGSP - Directorate General for Settlement Preparation (MOT) DIP - Directorate of Inventory Planning DPP - Directorate of Planning and Programming GOI - Government of Indonesia LRDC - Land Resources Development Center (ODA) MOT - Ministry of Transmigration ODA - Overseas Development Administration (of U.K. Government) PCR - Project Completion Report PLP - Directorate of Land Preparation (within DGSP) Pusdiklat - Transmigration Training Center (within MOT) Repelita - Indonesia Five-Year Development Plan RePPProT - Regional Physical Planning Program for Transmigration RSI - World Bank Resident Staff in Indonesia SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SFSE - Site Feasibility Studies and Engineering SKP - Transmigration Area Development Unit SUAT-V - Transmigration V Start-up Activities TAG - Technical Advisory Group (within DGSP, MOT) TAT - Technical Advisory Team (within BAKOSURTANAL) TOR - Terms-of-Reference TSSDP - Transmigration Second Stage Development Project TST - Technical Support Team (within PLP, MOT)

3 THE WORLD BANK Washlngton, D C U.S.A. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation September 8, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Indonesia Transmi2ration V Project (Ln IND? Attached is the Project Completion Report on Indonesia - Transmigration V Project (Loan 2578-IND). Parts I and m were prepared by the FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program for the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. Part II is comprised of condensed versions of PCRs prepared by the Ministry of Transmigration and the National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping. The project was the seventh and final Bank operation supporting the Indonesian transmigration program. Within its first year, the project was revised due to severe cuts in government funding and over-optimistic expectations at appraisal. The three components of the revised project achieved varying degrees of success. The aerial mapping component was implemented successfully, with foreign consultants transferring skills and technology to the local private consulting sector. The settlement planning component met with mixed success, and the program support and institution building component, though having several significant accomplishments, was largely unsatisfactory. The PCR reports that the skills mix of supervision missions was inappropriate and that Bank staff at times gave conflicting messages to implementing agency staff. The Bank did not adequately consider its prior experience with Transmigration II and III, and thus overestimated institutional capacities to absorb technical assistance and to manage the large number of contractors. Consequently, there were time overruns in the mapping component, and the project's impact on institutional development is rated as modest. Bank support for site selection and planning was appropriate, and Indonesia now has its first country-wide land use maps. The outcome of the project is thus rated as satisfactory. However, inadequate dissemination of the new maps and the continued scarcity of government resources leave the sustainability of the project achievements uncertain. The PCR adequately discusses the implementation and outcome of the project. No audit is planned. Attachment Robert Picciotto by Hans-Eberhard Kopp This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients onty in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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5 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESIA TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (LOAN 2578-IND) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PART 1: PROJECT RESULTS FROM BANK'S PERSPECTIVE PREFACE... EVALUATION SUMMARY... i ii 1. Project Identity Background.1 3. Project Objectives and Description Project Design and Organization Project Implementation Project Results Project Sustainability Bank Performance Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Project Relationship Consulting Services..... I 1 PART Il: PROJECT RESULTS FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE BAKOSURTANAL 1. Introduction Executive Summary The Transmigration Program Major Constraints Organization and Management Finances Conclusions Lessons Learned and Follow Up NIINISTRY OF TRANSMIGRATION 1. Evaluation of Factual Information Evaluation of World Bank Performance Project Implementation This document has a restricte distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanoc of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

6 Table or Contents (Cont.) 4. Evaluation of Government Performance Organization and Management of Project Project Implementation Period of Project Implementation Project Costs Lessons Learned Review of Effectiveness ot Working Relationship Between the Bank and the Government PART III: STATISTICAL INFORNIATION Table 1: Related Bank Loans and Credits Table 2: Project Timetable Table 3: Loan Disbursements.. 31 Table 4: Project Implementation Table 5: Project Costs and Financing A. Project Costs B. Project Financing Table 6: Project Results A. Direct Benetits B. Economic Impact C. Financial Impact D. Studies.33 Table 7: Status of Covenants.. 34 Table 8: Use of Bank Resources.35 A. Staff Inputs (staffweeks).35 B. Missions.35 C. Costs (unavailable)

7 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESIA TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (Loan 2578-IND) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Transmigration V Project in Indonesia for which a Bank Loan (2578-IND) of US$160 million was approved in June A total of US$65.8 was cancelled and the Project was closed two years behind schedule on December 31, As of December 30, 1993, actual disbursements totalled US$94.2 million, or 100% of the revised Loan Amount. The PCR, prepared by an FAOlWorld Bank Cooperative Program Mission which visited Indonesia in January/February 1993, is based on the Staff Appraisal Report and other relevant documents, discussions held with key Government officials responsible for project implementation and World Bank resident office staff, and the mission's field observations in Riau province where a significant proportion of the settlements planned under the Project has been implemented. The Ministry of Transmigration and BAKOSURTANAL, the two main agencies implementing the Project, had produced comprehensive PCR reports for their part of the project, condensed versions of which are given in Part II of this report. These agencies also reviewed and commented on Parts I and III of the report.

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9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESi TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (Loan 2578-IND) Evaluation Summary Objectives This was the seventh Bank-funded project in support of the transmigration program in Indonesia. The objectives of the Project were to: (a) improve the quality of site selection in order to promote the welfare of transmigrants and local people living in the area; (b) promote institution building through training and technical assistance; and (c) develop the national consulting industry. These objectives were to be achieved through the implementation of the Project's three main components: (a) aerial photography and base mapping consisting of a national mapping program and land resource survey for Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya; (b) transmigration settlement planning for 300,000 sponsored and spontaneous transmigrant families, including regional, site selection, and settlement feasibility studies; and (c) program support and institution building, involving technical advisory teams, special studies, training and technology transfer to the national consultancy industry. The total cost of the Project was estimated at US$275 million, to be financed by a Bank Loan of US$160 million (58 percent) and Government of Indonesia budgetary allocations equivalent to US$115 million (42 percent). As appraised, the Project included a large consultant component (22,600 staff-months), representing about 80 percent of the total cost. Implementation Experience The Project was implemented between 1986 and 1992, running two years behind schedule. It underwent a major downward revision in scale one year after its effectiveness due to budget constraints. The settlement planning component bore the brunt of the changes: the target of preliminary planning for the resettlement of 300,000 families was reduced to 167,500 families in Phase 11 studies (site selection) and the target of preparing feasibility studies (Phase III) on 225 sites was reduced to 32 sites. The revised Project also included an additional subcomponent involved with second-stage development studies for the improvement of 50 existing settlements, with some 160,000 families. The revision led to a reduction in project cost of about US$129 million-from US$275 million to US$146 million. The aerial photography and mapping component met its targets and made a satisfactory contribution to the national mapping program, but base maps prepared with project funding were completed too late to fully benefit the planning component of the Project. The revised targets of the settlement planning component were also met but with mixed results. The Phase I land resource mapping and review was extended to cover the whole of Indonesia and was successfully completed to provide the first national land information system. However, due to the timing, scale and detail of their output, the land resource studies made only a marginal contribution to the site selection process. Site selection in Phase II was completed successfullly, meeting 96.5 percent of its revised target, and is considered the most successful part of the planning component of the Project. Phase III feasibility studies were carried out for each of the 32 sites of the revised target. For these, physical plans and feasibility studies were prepared for settling 50,655 families, of whom

10 - iii - some 20,000 have already been settled. Mission observations of transmigration sites planned under the Project in Riau province indicate that these settlements are not much different from those constructed outside the project area, except for the critical advantage of having benefited from proper site selection. In contrast to assumptions made in the Staff Appraisal Report, detailed development plans for settlements were not prepared. In practice, these were replaced by 'as built' drawings prepared by contractors. The absence of professional adaptation of structure plans to the actual site conditions reduced the potential benefit of the technical expertise deployed in the earlier phases of planning. Second-stage development studies were executed in all of the 50 targeted existing settlements, 46 of which have been recommended for improvement, at a total investment cost of about US$600 million. These investments, however, are beyond the budgetary resources available to the Ministry of Transmigration (MOT) at present. Consultancy assistance provided through the Project, though not needed on the scale as originally planned, was required for achieving the technical output of the Project. Compliance of terms-of-reference by consultants was generally satisfactory. The program support and institution building component had deployed three major advisory groups to the Directorates of Planning and Programming (DPP) and Land Preparation (PLP) in the Directorate General Pankim, MOT and to the National coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL), with some satisfactory results. The results of special studies carried out in MOT have not always been well focused, or operationally effective. However, environmental studies (manuals, monitoring) have yielded positive results, and contributed significantly to improved environmental awareness within MOT. Contribution was also made to improved communication between directorates, and to better technical procedures and introduction of manuals and guidelines. Staff of both MOT and BAKOSURTANAL benefited from the training support provided through the Project and assistance given to the MOT Staff Training Center (Pusdiklat) has been well utilized. Project Results The originally intended project objectives were not fully realized due to a combination of factors: drastic reduction in settlement targets within the first year following Loan Effectiveness; original project design flaws; delays in implementing certain critical activities, and the lack of technical as well as financial resources to implement settlement development as planned under the Project. Aerial photography has been the most successful component. However, delays in the production of base maps limited its usefulness to the settlement planning component. Much of the results of Phase I planning studies became available during or after the completion of Phase 11 studies and made only a limited contribution to the site selection process. Phase 1I studies which met the revised target constitute the single most significant achievement of the settlement planning component, providing a pool of sites suitable for future settlements. Phase III studies also met their revised target but the usefulness and cost effectiveness of their output have been reduced by the limited number of plans produced. Second-stage development studies were undertaken in all the targeted sites. None have been fully used, and due to the lack of funds, they are unlikely to be utilized in the near future.

11 - iv - Following the appraisal approach, no economic rate of return has been recalculated for the Project. The settlement planning component, which accounted for the major proportion of project cost, was found to be the least cost effective. Sustainability The Project has generated a capacity for sustaining the surveying and mapping activities to meet future demand both in BAKOSURTANAL and in the private sector. The national land resource surveys (RePPProt) can only remain a valuable source of information if regularly updated. No responsibility has been assigned for this task to any agency to date. Therefore, it is unlikely that their usefulness can be sustained. The Phase II site selection studies have left a reservoir of suitable sites. Given policy changes aimed at involving private sector interests in transmigration settlement development, those sites which meet the locational criteria of the private sector are likely to be utilized over time, although it cannot be taken for granted that MOT will always give priority to these sites over those which have not been screened. Those Phase III plans not yet implemented, but prepared for settlements in locations suitable for the private sector and planned for nucleus estate tree crops, are likely to be utilized albeit with some adjustments. Whether second-stage development plans in 46 existing settlements can be implemented depends upon the availability of funds. The Project's program support activities succeeded in improving technical procedures, introduced manuals and guidelines which remain available for reference, and contributed to a better awareness of environmental issues and a successful training program. Findings and Lessons Learned In the formulation of a large-scale technical assistance program, it is essential to ensure that the scale and level of assistance is in balance with the agency's technical absorptive capacity and financial resources to ensure sustainability. If technical assistance is provided only to the planning phase of a proposed development, it has to be in balance with the technical capacity available for implementation and management, if it is to be productive. In a country with strongly centralized and sectoral administrative traditions, planning studies should be confined to areas within the competence of the executing agency, so that implementation of recommendations is not hindered by problems of inter-agency coordination. Institution-building assistance can only be successful if it is related to specific perceived problems (technical, organizational, procedural). No amount of assistance and training will resolve motivational issues, unless they are accompanied by major changes in the staff compensation system. For a project as large and complex as the Transmigration V Project, it is imperative that the technical skills used for supervision missions are commensurate with the task.

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13 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT INDONESIA TRANSMIGRATION V PROJECT (Loan 2578-IND) PART I 1. Project Identity Project Name Loan No. RVP Unit Country Sector Subsector Transmigration V (National Mapping and Settlement Planning) 2578-IND East Asia and Pacific Region Indonesia Agriculture Transmigration 2. Background 2.1 The transmigration program, which dates back to the beginning of the century, is implemented by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) for the resettlement of people from the densely populated 'inner' islands to the sparsely inhabited 'outer' islands of the country. The program has been viewed as a means to reduce population pressure in the overcrowded areas, spearhead balanced regional development, improve agricultural production, employment and incomes, and strengthen national unity. After 1950, it was accorded a high priority in the national development plans, and the scale of the program increased significantly. During the first two Indonesia Five-Year Development Plans, [Repelita I ( ) and 11 ( )], some 46,000 and 83,000 families were resettled respectively. The number of families moved during Repelita III ( ) increased dramatically, peaking in when nearly 100,000 families were settled in a single year and reaching a total of about 366,000 settled under the fully sponsored program, in addition to an estimated 169,000 families who moved spontaneously during the quinquennium. Encouraged by these results, GOI set an ambitious target to resettle 750,000 families during Repelita IV ( ), which was later drastically reduced due to budgetary constraints and environmental concerns. 2.2 Since 1974, the World Bank has been associated with the transmigration program. To date, seven loans have been approved and disbursed by the Bank in support of this program. Of these, two [(the Bank-financed Transmigration II and III Projects (Loan 1707/Cr. 919-IND and Loan 2248-IND respectively)] financed, among other things, site selection and physical planning activities. Building on the experience of these projects, Transmigration V was exclusively designed as a mapping, resource evaluation and settlement planning project.

14 -2-3. Project Objectives and Description 3.1 The Project was the seventh Bank-funded project supporting the transmigration program. It was prepared by Government with the assistance of consultants engaged under the Transmigration III Project. The Project was intended to improve and expand the surveying and mapping of large, relatively unknown areas of Indonesia combined with settlement planning on the required scale, and to improve the economic and social analyses undertaken in site planning. The Project's main objectives were to: (a) improve the quality of site selection in order to promote the welfare of transmigrants and local people living within the transmigration areas and provide a sound basis for regional development over the ten-year period following the arrival of settlers; (b) promote institution building through coordination of training activities and technical assistance to the implementing agencies; and (c) develop the national consultancy industry by the association of foreign and national consultants under the large consultant component. 3.2 The main components of the Project included: (a) (b) (c) Aerial photography and base mapping (US$28.6 million), consisting of a national mapping program for the Outer Islands and land resource and land use base maps for Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. Transmigration settlement planning (US$169.5 million) for 300,000 sponsored and spontaneous transmigrant families in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, including regional, site screening and settlement feasibility studies, involving three phases, viz. Phase I Studies (regional development maps at scale 1:250,000), Phase If Studies (site screening and evaluation at scale 1:50,000) and Phase Ill Studies (feasibility at scale 1:20,000). Program support and institution building (US$77 million) for Directorate General for Settlement Preparation (DGSP) within the MOT, a 1987 transmigration program review, technical advisory teams and training for the project implementing agencies and the national consultancy industry. The Project, estimated to cost US$275.3 million, was appraised in November/December 1984 and a Bank Loan of US$160 million was approved in June The Loan became effective in April 1986 after a lapse of about ten months since its approval. As appraised, the Project included a large consultant component (22,600 staff-months), representing about 80 percent of total project costs. 3.3 Just before Loan Effectiveness in April 1986, oil prices collapsed, resulting in severe resource constraints and consequent cutbacks in Indonesia's development budget. The transmigration program budget suffered the most. In just one year, its budget allocation was reduced from Rp 208 billion in FY86-87 to Rp 79 billion in FY The corresponding policy changes required substantial lowering of targets for sponsored transmigration and called for increased spontaneous migration, special efforts for improvement of existing settlements and emphasis on private sector participation. 3.4 Consequently, the Project underwent major changes within one year of its effectiveness. The size of the new settlement planning studies was scaled down from 300,000 to 167,500 families (in Phase 11 studies) and from 224 to 32 sites (Phase III studies). Additionally, provision was made for second-stage planning studies (Transmigration Second Stage Development Project (TSSDP I and II)) for the improvement of fifty existing sites settled with some 160,000

15 - 3 - transmigrant families. There were also some changes in program support, while the aerial photography and base mapping component remained essentially unchanged. Reflecting this, the Project Cost and the Loan Amount were reduced from US$275.3 million and US$160 million to US$146.4 million and US$94.2 million respectively. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.1 The Project was formulated on the underlying assumption that proper site selection and detailed settlement planning were prerequisites for the successful implementation of the transmigration program. To this end, the project design: (a) concentrated on and elaborated the methods of the site selection process; and (b) expanded the scope of feasibility studies and development planning, including the introduction of a wider range of farm models suitable for a variety of physical and socio-economic conditions. The improved site selection process was recognized to be a significant contributor to the economic welfare of settlers. In the event of non-utilization of site selection results, the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) considered that such results would be useful for future transmigration or other regional or agricultural programs. The principal problem lay with the Phase III studies which were intended to be much more detailed (and hence more costly) than was appropriate or necessary for the program. Further, the fact that MOT cannot exclusively handle the area planning requirements in the Phase III studies, built on a regional approach, seems to have been overlooked. 4.2 The design of the mapping component was appropriate, based on proven surveying and mapping technologies. The scope and scale of this component corresponded to the requirements of the Project. In retrospect, however, the Project would have benefited from more emphasis on digital mapping and geographic information systems as an integral part of its activities. Project design would also have benefited from more emphasis on the production of orthophoto maps, as they can be produced quickly and also provide significantly more information on land use and vegetation cover. 4.3 Settlement target changes could not have been predicted at appraisal. There was no reason to believe at that time that oil prices would decline by more than 50 percent, leading to severe cuts in transmigration budgets and settlement targets. Nonetheless, even without such cuts, the scale of the settlement planning component was unrealistically large based on overly optimistic expectations in respect of the rate of settlement uptake and GOI's willingness and ability to implement the plans. Sufficient note was not taken of Transmigration III experience while determining the project scale and drawing up specifications for planning studies. The Transmigration III Project Completion Report and Audit Report confirm that only about 5% of the families for whom plans were prepared under Transmigration III were settled (even those plans were not closely followed) and GOI was reluctant to adopt high cost farm models. Yet, under the Project as originally designed, some 60 percent of the consultancy input assigned to settlement planning was allocated to Phase III studies, following and elaborating the approaches adopted for Transmigration III. 4.4 Project revision (see paras. 3.3 and 3.4) resulted in major restructuring to reflect some of the new priorities. The planning of new settlements was significantly reduced and planning for second-stage development in existing settlements, a priority identified in the Transmigration Sector Review (Report No IND, dated October 24, 1986), was introduced.

16 -4-5. Project Implementation 5.1 The Project was implemented over a period of 6'/2 years instead of 4't2 years which was expected at appraisal. Timely revision of the Project leading to adjustments in planning studies resulted in major (over US$60 million) cost savings. Total Project Cost at completion was Rp billion or US$122.3 million, compared to the revised cost estimate of Rp billion (US$146.4 million) and the appraisal cost estimate of Rp billion (US$275.3 million). About 80 percent of the Project Cost was absorbed by the planning and program support components executed by MOT and the remaining by the mapping component implemented by the National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL). In rupiah terms, there was an overall cost underrun of about 16% as compared with the revised cost estimate. Savings occurred mainly in settlement planning and to some extent in the program support component. In Decemeber 1993, the revised Loan was disbursed in full. 5.2 Aerial photography and base mapping component. In spite of a two-year delay, this component has been successfully executed. The delay was largely due to difficulties with security clearances and bad weather conditions. Both these factors were well known to BAKOSURTANAL from previous experience, and should have been foreseen while preparing the project implementation schedule. Dependence on essential inputs (e.g. aerial triangulation data and terrain height information) which were supposed to have been provided by other projects funded from different sources, added to the problem. The implementation of this component resulted in: (a) nearly 40,000 km of flight lines of new aerial photography (91.3 percent of target); (b) new aerial Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) coverage for the whole of Sumatra (100 percent); (c) 1.4 million km: of satellite remote sensing (70 percent); (d) 13,517 km of levelling, with 3,085 benchmarks (150 percent); (e) 952 map sheets at 1:50,000 scale (87 percent) and 121 map sheets at 1:100,000 scale (100 percent). Despite the excellent contribution made by this component to the overall mapping requirements of the country, the base maps funded under the Project were completed too late to fully benefit the settlement planning component of the Project. 5.3 Settlement planning component - Phase I studies for preparing the regional planning context for site selection were not carried out under the Project as described in the SAR (page 19). The Regional Physical Planning Program for Transmigration (RePPProT) land resource survey, carried out by Land Resources Development Centre (Overseas Development Administration of the UK Government (ODA)) and funded 80% under the Transmigration V Project and 20 percent under an ODA grant, was designed as one of the inputs to Phase I studies. Its results, however, only became available in stages between 1986 and 1991, often during or after the completion of Phase 11 studies. When they were available, the RePPProT maps provided background information to the site selection process in Phase IIA, and were useful in dealing with inter-departmental forest boundary disputes. Otherwise, the scale and detail of these maps, which were based on available data and published materials with only occasional field reconnaissance, limited their usefulness to the Project. The RePPProT team produced eight regional land resource reviews and 775 map sheets (land systems, land use and land status maps) at 1:250,000 scale, with bilingual legends and separate agro-climatic maps. The team also produced a data base of land systems and climate information. The digitized RePPProT maps and the accompanying data base represent the first national land information system covering the whole of Indonesia. Copies have been made available to interested central and local government departments, universities and international agencies. If kept updated regularly, the RePPProT maps and reports will remain a valuable source of information on the utilization of land resources of Indonesia.

17 Phase II studies for site selection and evaluation were reduced from screening 330 potential sites for 300,000 families to 142 sites for 167,500 families. Despite considerable extension of the search area (from 4.6 to 10.9 million ha), only 106 suitable sites were identified. In these areas, 2.5 million ha were surveyed, of which 2 million ha were found suitable for settling 161,600 families (96.5 percent of the revised target). This is the single most significant achievement of the settlement planning component of the Transmigration V Project, both for its thorough methodology and for the pool of suitable sites it established for future programs. 5.5 Phase III studies were originally planned on 225 sites for 300,000 families, but were first reduced to 102 (in 1986/87), and later to 32 sites (in 1988) following the decision to conduct a Transmigration Second Stage Development Program II (TSSDP II) in 40 sites (see para 5.7 below). For these, physical plans and feasibility studies were prepared in Phase IIIA, for settling 50,655 families, of whom some 20,000 have already been settled. In contrast to SAR assumptions, detailed development plans (later called Phase IIIB) did not form part of the consultants' contract under the Project. In practice, the Phase IIIB work has not been carried out, but replaced with 'as built' drawings prepared by the contractors. Consequently, the settlement centers have not been designed and, in the absence of detailed surveys, the simplistic structure plans have not been properly adjusted to the site conditions of the actual locations of the settlements, often leading to poor road alignments. Mission observations of transmigration sites planned under the Project in Riau Province indicate that the settlements do not appear much different from those constructed outside the Project without such precise planning, except for the critical advantage of having benefited from proper site selection. 5.6 The mission considers that the specifications for Phase III studies were more detailed (therefore more costly) than was necessary. It would have been enough to have selected the sites on the basis of Phase II plans and developed outline plans for major infrastructure and then to have proceeded with site development. In reality, none of the site developers/contractors have been able to follow Phase III plans closely -- primarily because of the variations in the topographical characteristics not obvious in the uncleared situation -- between sites for which plans were prepared and the sites on which actual development took place. 5.7 Second-stage development studies were included in the revised project, targeting 50 existing sites in the Transmigration Area Development Unit (SKP). Ten sites were chosen in 1986 (TSSDP I) and 40 sites in 1988 (TSSDP II), containing a total of 160,000 families. Forty-six of these sites (150,000 families) were found suitable for second-stage development, requiring a total investment of about US$600 million, or about US$4,000 per family. These investments are beyond the budgetary resources available to MOT at present, and past experience shows that without external funding, there is little possibility that these plans would be implemented. 5.8 Consultancy assistance provided through the Project, though not needed on the scale as planned, was required for achieving the technical output of the Project. In many cases, it was carried out with acceptable competence. Compliance of terms-of-reference (TOR) by consultants was generally satisfactory with respect to Phase II studies, Phase III physical surveys and second-stage development studies. 5.9 The program support and institution building component of the Project did not suffer severe cuts, except in the case of regional staff of the two central advisory teams, viz. the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) within DGSP, MOT and the Technical Support Team (TST) within the Directorate of Land Preparation (PLP), MOT. These central teams assisting the DPP and PLP, both within MOT, have provided satisfactory services in their coordinating/supervisory/technical assistance roles, as envisaged in the SAR. Liaison between the two teams was good and has led to

18 -6 - better coordination between the directorates. They have contributed to a more professional environment in their host directorates. However, they did not succeed in changing the basic working practices and leaving behind sufficiently trained manpower within MOT to continue the technical work undertaken by them. Nonetheless, the main beneficiaries of technology transfer are likely to have been the local consultants, given their long association and close working relations with their expatriate colleagues. BAKOSURTANAL greatly benefited from technology transfer resulting from the successful advisory services of the Technical Advisory Team (TAT) within BAKOSURTANAL. Local private companies associated with established foreign companies have similarly benefited and acquired the skills necessary to undertake similar tasks in the future Overall, technical assistance provided through the Project has produced relatively better results in BAKOSURTANAL than in MOT. This is largely attributable to the fact that BAKOSURTANAL staff, comprising higher-level technical and management personnel, were more directly involved in implementing the component. In contrast, technical assistance teams in MOT were located at the level of directorates. As a result, project consultants providing technical assistance in MOT might not support its policies and programs The Project also assisted in setting up a professionally-designed and secure Documentation Center within DG Pankim, initially to accommodate all available WB-funded documents, properly sorted and electronically indexed. Documentation of Transmigration III and V, Site Feasibility Studies and Engineering (SFSE) and TSSDP Projects are complete, only the transparencies of Transmigration V maps have not been stored. A Management Information System has also been set up in MOT, and is operational under competent leadership, but is lacking in funds because of budgetary constraints (recent cut of 80%). The system has been unable to expand its coverage to all settlements, and widen the range of inputs. Unless its potential is recognized as a useful tool of decision-making by senior management, the system will remain a passive asset Training of MOT staff under the Project was carried out at several levels: formal long-term training benefited 131 individuals, 33 of whom attended degree courses, 13 of which were overseas. Short-term leadership courses were attended by 679 participants, while other courses, seminars and workshops were attended by 2,434 participants in Indonesia and 117 overseas. The trained personnel are all now on the staff of MOT. Assistance given to the Staff Training Center (Pusdiklat) has been well utilized. SAR expenditure on training was increased by 102 percent in the course of the Project, and on-the-job training and skill transfer to local consultants were provided in the course of the implementation of the consultancy contracts. BAKOSURTANAL also benefited from training courses and from 30 overseas fellowships, all of which contributed significantly to longterm strengthening of mapping capacity Environment and Social Studies. As part of program support, a number of special studies have also been carried out on a variety of subjects, including spontaneous transmigration, environmental management, land rights, organizational review and the preparation of operation manuals. Staff-months allocation for these purposes was increased from the planned SAR allocation of 230 to 1,183 staff-months (including local and foreign consultants). The quality of the studies varied considerably. For example, the environmental management study has produced a series of manuals and provided a useful basis for a system of environmental monitoring. This study, together with TAG's activities, has made a major contribution to increasing environmental awareness in MOT. Some of the other studies (e.g. land rights and spontaneous migration studies), however, appear to have been ill-focused and their contribution to the intended objectives had not been achieved, as their findings cannot be operationalized.

19 Project Results 6.1 The originally intended project objectives were not fully realized due to a combination of factors: drastic reduction in settlement targets within a year after Loan Effectiveness; design flaws; delays in the implementation of certain critical activities; and lack of technical as well as financial resources to implement settlement development as planned under the Project. 6.2 The aerial photography and base mapping component of the Project concluded satisfactorily in terms of: (a) contribution to the national mapping program; (b) absorption of technical assistance leading to strengthening the institutional and technological capacity of BAKOSURTANAL to undertake similar assignments in the future; and (c) effecting skill transfer from foreign to local mapping firms. The result of this component was not successful in providing support for the transmigration component. 6.3 The transmigration settlement planning component included a national land resource and land use review (RePPProT) referred to in para 5.3, originally designed as one of the inputs to the context setting regional development studies in Phase I. As noted earlier, the results of these studies came in stages during the project period. Because of the timing of their availability and the inadequate level of their detail, they were of limited use for project purposes and made only a marginal contribution to the Phase II site selection studies. But they represent a significant potential resource to future national/regional planning as the first national land information system covering the whole of Indonesia. 6.4 The results of the Phase II studies have provided a pool of sites suitable for future settlement programs. 6.5 Phase III studies have nominally met their revised target of conducting feasibility studies on 32 sites. But, the usefulness and cost effectiveness of their output have been reduced by their limited number. Given the private sector's preference for potential sites which are easily accessible and close to existing population centers and facilities, the plans prepared for settlements in remote areas such as Irian Jaya would not be used in the foreseeable future. 6.6 Second-stage development studies were conducted in all the sites targeted in the revised Project. None has been used fully yet for want of funds. The mission considers that it would have been in the Borrower's interest not to commit resources for these studies without any firm commitment of interest from funding sources to support the implementation of the projects prepared. More so, because these existing settlements will be handed over by MOT to local government administration in the foreseeable future. The handover will create a new institutional environment for plan implementation, in which the studies prepared may no longer fully apply, or where they do apply, implementation of recommendations would be influenced by local priorities. 6.7 At project completion, the settlement planning expenditure per family was US$1,725 2/ in 1992 prices, compared to the appraisal estimate of US$500, or US$780 in 1992 prices, representing a real increase of 120 percent. This has resulted from a smaller number of Phase III plans produced, lowering the cost effectiveness of the settlement planning component. The other 2/ Based on total cost of US$87.4 million (in 1992 prices) for 50,655 families. This cost comprises expenses incurred for settlement planning activities and technical assistance to Bina Program and PLP.

20 -8- reasons for this apparently low cost effectiveness are that the cost of settlement planning includes payments made for technical assistance, which was also used in support of TSSDP studies not foreseen at appraisal, and many of the Phase 11 plans prepared under the Project were not taken to Phase III stage. 6.8 Since the benefits of improved mapping and site selection cannot be adequately quantified and related to their costs, no economic rate of return calculation was made for the Project. The justification, however, was based on considerations such as identification of sites in more remote areas, economic benefits which could be expected when the transmigrants would be actually settled on the sites identified and planned under the Project, planning procedures that would benefit the transmigrants and local populations and minimize conflicting land claims, and environmental benefits that would result from methodical evaluation, screening and selection of sites. Although the Project has resulted in the identification of sites in remote areas, e.g. Irian Jaya, many of them have not yet been taken for settlement development, partly because of lack of interest by spontaneous settlers and the private sector, and partly due to GOI's decision to reduce the number of sponsored transmigrants. It would be premature and above all speculative to undertake at this stage an analysis of the expected economic, social and environmental benefits because the benefiting settler families constitute just under 7% of the originally planned number, and most of the settlements located in the areas planned under the Project are too recent (less than three years old) to allow for a meaningful assessment of the social or environmental benefits. 6.9 The program support and institution building component had deployed three major advisory groups to the Directorates of Planning and Programming (DPP) and Land Preparation (PLP) in the Directorate General Pankim, MOT and to the National coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping (BAKOSURTANAL), with some satisfactory results. The results of special studies carried out in MOT have not always been well focused, or operationally effective. However, environmental studies (manuals, monitoring) have yielded positive results, and contributed significantly to improved environmental awareness within MOT. Contribution was also made to improved communication between directorates, and to better technical procedures and introduction of manuals and guidelines. 7. Project Sustainability 7.1 Sustainability has been assessed from the point of view of: (a) GOI's ability to sustain the standards achieved by the Project in the preparation of maps and new settlement plans in the future; and (b) GOI's ability to utilize in future the plans prepared during the Project. 7.2 Aerial photography and base mapping component. BAKOSURTANAL, which is the National Coordinating Agency for Surveying and Mapping, generally operates on requests from other agencies and is staffed with competent technicians. The Project has strengthened the capacity for sustaining mapping activities and for meeting future demand arising from other development projects both within BAKOSURTANAL and in private sector surveying and mapping companies. 7.3 Transmigration settlement planning component - Phase I studies - the RePPProT land resource reviews and maps have particular potential interest to provincial governments and several central government agencies. However, to maintain their usefulness, the land use and land status information contained in the RePPProT maps require regular updating. No responsibility has been assigned for this task to date, and MOT does not have the resources to undertake the task by itself. Hence, sustainability of this subcomponent remains uncertain.

21 Phase II studies for site selection and evaluation have generated a significant volume of valuable information. It is likely that this information will be gradually utilized over time, particularly in areas attractive to the private sector. However, it is known that parallel with the Transmigration V Project, MOT commissioned over 70 local consulting firms using local government rupiah budget (APBN) funds to carry out Phase IIIA studies in 440 sites, some of which had not been screened for suitability. Therefore, it cannot be taken for granted that already screened sites will always have priority over others. Regarding the maintenance of the standards of site selection in the future, it is unlikely that MOT will have the budgetary resources required to ensure these standards are met. 7.5 Phase III studies also produced a reservoir of plans for settling some 30,000 additional families. As most of these were planned on the basis of a nucleus estate tree crop model in which the private sector may be interested, their utilization is likely in the future with minor site adjustments. 7.6 Second-stage development feasibility studies are available for 46 sites. The utilization of these would depend largely on acceptable financing arrangements for productive investments 7.7 Program support and institution building. The primary task of the consultants working with DG Pankim in MOT was to assist in the implementation of the project components. Their contribution to institution building was incidental. However, it is worth noting that some middle-level staff have benefited from associating with the consultants' work and improving work procedures. However, there is no convincing evidence that the Project succeeded in building up capacity within MOT to continue the technical work undertaken during the Project without further assistance. Consultants working with the Pusdiklat made a valuable contribution through developing training modules and materials and assisting to train a core group of trainers (72), in addition to their active participation in the delivery of training courses. Technology transfer to local firms appears to have been more successful in the case of local surveying and mapping companies than in the case of local consulting firms associated with the planning activities. The Project succeeded in improving technical procedures; introducing manuals and guidelines, which remain in use or are available for reference; improving communications between directorates; contributing to a much better awareness of environmental issues; and assisting with the establishment of a functioning Documentation Center and the start-up of a management information system. These are sustainable achievements of the Project. 8. Bank Performance 8.1 Bank missions correctly identified site selection as the critical area of the transmigration program requiring assistance, if it was to achieve the targets for implementation set by GOI. The appraisal placed more emphasis on setting large physical targets for settlement planning than on assessing either absorption capacity or affordability of implementing plans. 8.2 Project Loan administration and budgetary control have been competently handled during implementation. However, in the early stages of implementation, Bank supervision missions did not always include a sufficient number of staff weeks with the necessary technical expertise to adequately supervise project implementation. Technical skills used were not commensurate with the requirements of a project of this magnitude and complexity, proposed TORs for consultant services seem to have been accepted without satisfactory review, and there was little substantive comment on the content of studies. Effort was made, which met with some success, in the later stages of project implementation to employ the appropriate skills mix necessary to address these issues.

22 Borrower Performance 9.1 The Directorate of Planning and Programming relied heavily on TAG at all stages from project preparation to consultant supervision and evaluation. 9.2 The involvement of MOT staff in the formulation and conduct of some of the special studies was inadequate to ensure that the results of these studies can be operationalized. 9.3 Slow contracting procedures, frequent contract amendments and consequent changes in TORs and delays in the payment of remuneration, have subjected consultants to pressures which distracted their full attention from their technical responsibilities. 9.4 In contrast, the BAKOSURTANAL managementeam was directly involved in overseeing the implementation of the mapping component of the Project, with the consequent result of more successful absorption of technical assistance. 10. Lessons Learned 10.1 The main lessons of experience learned in the Project include the following: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) When large-scale technical assistance is given to improve a critical aspect of a government agency's normal activities, special care should be taken to ensure that the level of sophistication of such assistance is in balance with the agency's technical absorptive capacity and/or financial resources, to ensure sustainability. Resources spent on technical assistance directed at one stage in a sequence of activities (such as settlement planning, followed by implementation and management), have to be in balance with those available for the subsequent stages. If funding sources and technical/managerial capacity available for implementation are not commensurate with the sophistication of advice given, there is little likelihood that technical assistance will be effectively used. In a country like Indonesia, which has a strongly centralized and sectoral administrative tradition, TORs of planning studies should normally be confined to areas within the competence of the executing agency, so that implementation of recommendations can be handled without delays due to problems of inter-agency coordination. Technical assistance can be successfully aimed at institution building, if the perceived weaknesses relate to institutional or technical problems (para. 5.10). However, if they primarily relate to motivational factors, significant improvement can only be achieved if accompanied by major changes in the staff compensation system. The experience of BAKOSURTANAL highlights the problems that can arise, if the implementation of one project component is dependent on inputs from sources over which it has no control. (For example, delays in the delivery of aerial triangulation

23 data provided by the Resource Evaluation Aerial Photography (REAP) project financed by CIDA caused considerable delay in the base mapping activities under the Project.) It is highly desirable to ensure, whenever possible, funding from a single source. 11. Project Relationship 11.1 Cooperation between MOT and the Bank during project preparation, revision and execution was good. The tripartite relationship between MOT, BAKOSURTANAL and the Bank was satisfactory, due to clearly defined and understood responsibilities for planning and mapping activities BAKOSURTANAL experienced problems of coordination with other projects under separate funding arrangements, on whose results the implementation of some mapping tasks depended Because of delays base maps and aerial photography needed by MOT could not be supplied on schedule by BAKOSURTANAL; therefore, some of SFSE consultants conducted surveys without the specific base maps/aerial photography. 12. Consulting Services 12.1 The implementation of this technical assistance project relied heavily on consultants. In total, 14,146 staff-months of consultancy services were utilized (reduced from 22,586 in the SAR), of which foreign professionals represented 37%, and local professionals 63%. Of this total, 8,436 staff-months (60%) was assigned to the settlement planning component of the Project and the remainder to program support and institution building The settlement planning component was implemented by six consortia appointed to carry out Phase II, Phase III and feasibility studies for second-stage development (TSSDP II) in different regions of Indonesia, notably in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Sulawesi (for TSSDP II only), while another group of consultants was assigned to prepare the TSSDP I feasibility studies. The DPP in DG Pankim, with the assistance of TAG, issued comprehensive guidelines to the consultants detailing requirements. The RePPProT resource survey team also made some contribution to Phase II planning activities (see paras 5.3 and 7.3) The quality of consulting services in settlement planning was uneven. While the more experienced consultancies deployed competent surveyors, soil scientists, agronomists, engineers and physical planners, there is less evidence of comparable deployment of regional planners and social scientists. Consequently, those aspects of the reports dealing with the physical and socio-economic surveys of existing settlements, in a broadly defined 'study area' aiming at the regional integration of new settlements, were inadequate. General inability to put fragmented findings into an analytical framework characterized this aspect of planning studies by the less experienced consultancies. Some of the studies consulted did not succeed in integrating their Phase III socio-economic findings into their settlement planning activities, which indicates a conceptual problem inherent in the terms of reference The program support and institution building component benefited from 5,710 staffmonths of consultancy services. A large part of this consisted of three advisory groups, whose

24 activities were crucial to the execution of the Project. TAG and TST were competently assisting three directorates in DG Pankim, DG Rahbin and the regional MOT office concerned. TAT, which was assigned to assist in the implementation of the mapping component at BAKOSURTANAL, provided satisfactory advisory services. Most of the remaining staff-months allocated to program support were assigned to special studies of mixed results in MOT.

25 PART II: BAKOSURTANAL: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND BASE MAPPING IMPLEMENTATION 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world and consists of 17,580 islands with a total land area of almost two million sq km, and sea area of more than three million sq km. The majority of its people live on the islands of Java, Bali and Madura where population densities in rural, irrigated areas can easily reach persons per sq km. Other major islands have much smaller population densities, e.g. with only about four persons per sq km in Irian Jaya. 1.2 From the beginning of the twentieth century it has been the policy of successive governments to promote and support the transfer of people from the densely populated islands referred to in para to the sparsely populated so called outer islands. This has been implemented through their transmigration programs. 1.3 The studies which are needed to support the transmigration program are divided into three phase. Phase 1 - Broad regional planning; Phase 2 - Reconnaissance, project identification and out-line planning; Phase 3.A - Feasibility study, project design and settlement planning; and Phase 3.B - Land clearing, detailed survey and design. Medium and small scale topographic maps, aerial photography and remote sensing imagery were necessary to carry out the Phase 1 and 2 studies. 1.4 At the beginning of the 1980s, Indonesia's base mapping was inadequate and incomplete. Before that time an effort was made by BAKOSURTANAL and other government agencies to produce a new series of base maps at scales of 1: , 1: and 1: This effort was assisted by the Bank-financed National Resource Survey and Mapping Project (Loan 1197-IND) as well as bilateral aid. 1.5 BAKOSURTANAL estimated that without external assistance, it would take more than 17 years to complete the national base mapping program. This would mean that the available aerial photographs (dating from 1981 and 1982) would become obsolete even before they were used. To avoid this, BAKOSURTANAL designed a seven-year mapping program to complete the nation's base mapping and requested World Bank financial assistance for this effort. 1.6 Lack of reliable base maps and altimetric networks, particularly in the outer islands, hampered the transmigration program and regional development projects. Under the Transmigration III Project (Loan 2248-IND), consultants were engaged by the Ministry of Transmigration (MOT) to prepare maps at a scale of 1: The production of these maps, under the supervision of an agency which did not specialize in mapping, was time-consuming, inaccurate and expensive. 1.7 To improve the quality of settlement planning, and realize economies of scale, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) decided that, for the Bank-assisted Transmigration V Project, all

26 aerial photography and base maps needed for the program would be produced under the responsibility of a single agency, BAKOSURTANAL. This base mapping and aerial photography was to be expanded and integrated into the national mapping program carried out by BAKOSURTANAL. 1.8 It was further decided to provide program support and to strengthen BAKOSURTANAL's institutional capabilities through the provision of a Technical Advisory Team (TAT) and to provide training for BAKOSURTANAL's staff. 1.9 Altogether, this would form the mapping component of the Transmigration V Project for which BAKOSURTANAL is the executing agency. Aerial triangulation (AT) results, which are a prerequisite for photogrammetric mapping, would be provided under the Canadian-financed REAP project. 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2.1 Planning. Under the Transmigration V Project, the on-going national base mapping program of BAKOSURTANAL was merged with a program to provide basic map and aerial photography data for the transmigration planning. This resulted in the mapping component of Transmigration V (a follow up of the National Resource Survey and Mapping project, IBRD Loan 1197-IND) with the following components: a. Aerial photography, covering about 520,000 sq km at a scale of 1: in West Kalimantan, Sumatra and East Timor. b. Procurement of satellite imagery, originally not foreseen for TRANS-V, but later included. c. Base maps at a scale of 1: of Kalimantan, Sulawesi and part of Irian Jaya (about 1,100 sheets) and at a scale of 1: of Irian Jaya (about 120 sheets). d. Levelling networks in Sumatra, Sulawesi and parts of Kalimantan for a total length of about 9,000 km. e. Establishment of a Technical Advisory Team to assist in project management, the development of software and the solution of scientific and technological problems in automated cartography, digital mapping and advanced geodesy. f. Training for staff, including refresher courses, workshops and overseas fellow ships. g. Procurement of materials, spare parts and maintenance services. 2.2 In order to secure a timely execution of the Transmigration V Project, some Start-Up Activities (SUAT-V) were financed under the Transmigration III Project (IBRD Loan 2248-IND). For BAKOSURTANAL this included the procurement of aerial photography and the production of photographic maps. This was also a precondition for the effectiveness of the Loan as well as for disbursement for certain parts of the Transmigration V Project.

27 The Transmigration V Project Loan was originally set for the period mid-1986 through the end of Execution. Almost all activities had a slow start but gained momentum as the Project was implemented; some could be described as having been an outright success, while others were only successful if one looks at the results, and not at the time needed to achieve those results. 2.5 As the executing agency for this Project, BAKOSURTANAL felt responsible for the delays but it must be added that the major delays, security clearance for aerial photography and delivery of aerial tri-angulation results, were in fact outside the control of BAKOSURTANAL. Most project components had a built-in transfer of knowledge mechanism through the cooperation of foreign and local contractors. 2.6 The SUAT-V component consisted of aerial photography and the production of photomaps. The photography was initially delayed due to the lack of security clearance, but once this clearance was received, progress and quality were good except for some major areas in Sumatra. Consequently the production of photomaps was also delayed. Delivery of the photography started slowly and procedures were cumbersome. Eventually, production was speeded up and final deliveries were precisely on schedule. In areas in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, with permanent cloud cover, SAR images were acquired from 266 radarmaps at a scale of 1: and 53 at a scale of 1: respectively. 3. THE TRANSMIGRATION PROGRAM 3.1 Aerial photography was needed for transmigration sites at a scale of 1: and for REAP gaps at a scale of 1: Eventually, security clearance procedures became less difficult and almost all photography targets, albeit after contract extensions, were met. This was quite an achievement if one considers that over most areas cloud conditions are not favorable for photography. Purchase of satellite imagery was far below expectations because it was very difficult to get cloud free images. 3.2 The base mapping program was seriously delayed due to a lack of AT results which were to be provided by Canadian contractors under the REAP project and financed by Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The type of maps to be produced were adjusted in line with state-of-the-art technology and quality of photography. After AT results became available, it became clear that the time limits set for line mapping were too ambitious and the cartographic process formed a bottleneck. Eventually, one contractor succeeded in finishing his contract in three years, one contractor needed almost four years and the third needed more than three years and a reduction of his workload which was transferred to the Indonesian partner of the first contractor. In total, 566 maps at the scale of 1: were produced by the three contractors. 3.3 BAKOSURTANAL produced 16 line maps and 120 photomaps. In order to help update map information on Sumatra, 600 radarmaps at a scale of 1: of that island were produced. This was decided after the good results of the SUAT-V radar campaign.

28 The levelling networks were redesigned and a total of 13,517 km levelled, 3,085 benchmarks were established and nine tide gauges operated. Gravity was measured along the levelling lines. 3.5 The TAT produced 533 staff-months of consultancy. Close cooperation with BAKOSURTANAL counterparts was established and work generally went smoothly. Due to the huge tasks BAKOSURTANAL had to face during these years, it was not always possible to assign the optimal number and quality of counterparts. TAT worked alongside BAKOSURTANAL in the supervision of other Transmigration V contracts. 3.6 BAKOSURTANAL staff received 219 staff-months of formal education overseas and 326 months in Indonesia under the Project. Furthermore they received 72 weeks of overseas training and 100 weeks of local training. 3.7 Procurement of materials, spare parts and maintenance went smoothly in general. 3.8 Due to the delays in the base mapping program and parts of Transmigration V Project outside the responsibility of BAKOSURTANAL, the Loan period was extended twice; initially until December 31, 1991 and finally until December 31, MAJOR CONSTRAINTS 4. 1 In the beginning of the Project it took a long time to obtain the necessary security clearance for the SUAT-V aerial photography operations which led to long delays in the project. With good cooperation by Pussurta ABRI, the agency responsible for this security clearance, all problems were eventually solved. In the Transmigration V Project aerial photography and radar campaign, there were almost no more delays, apart from the first photography contract. 4.2 The base mapping component of the Project was delayed even longer because of the lack of AT results. These data were to be provided by Canadian contractors under a CIDA grant project but the selection of the contractor by CIDA took quote a long time. Once the contractor was mobilized he worked reasonably quickly but did not show too much awareness that he was producing AT results for a mapping program. Altogether, this delayed the start of the mapping by one to almost two years. On top of this the 1: photomapping had to be made from a REAP 1: photograph flown in 1981/1982. Due to the adverse weather in parts of Indonesia it is not possible to get photography of homogenous and adequate quality everywhere. It took much time to find the best production method and the final result is still not particularly good. 4.3 During production of the base maps, the contractors had serious problems in producing products which fulfilled the required quality standards. This was also one of the reasons why the work went beyond the two years allowed for in the contract. Technical specifications had to be written, bid documents compiled, shortlists made, bids evaluated, contract negotiations finalized, and personnel mobilized. These procedures alone often took two years. 4.4 The transfer of knowledge under the TAT, such as the introduction of new technologies as computer-assisted mapping integrated in a GIS environment, and SAR mapping, was slow

29 because BAKOSURTANAL did not yet have enough staff with the right educational background to be involved in these subjects. The overseas training project was, in fact, a major competitor for personnel. The complicated project monitoring procedures, requiring skilled technical staff in administrative functions, did not help to solve these problems. 5. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 5.1 The Transmigration V Project was coordinated and supervised by the MOT coordinator for Bank-assisted projects, the Secretary General. A project working group was set up within the existing Settlement Planning Technical Team under the chairmanship of the Director of Bina Program Pankim. 5.2 The Transmigration V mapping component was carried out by BAKOSURTANAL. Within BAKOSURTANAL the Foreign Assisted Projects Coordinator, the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) administrator, supported by his staff, and the PIMPRO (Pimpinan Proyek), were responsible for the execution of the Project. The Chairman of BAKOSURTANAL held the final responsibility. 5.3 Accounts have been audited each year throughout the Project and the audit reports were submitted to the Bank in: July 1988 for fiscal year July 1989 for fiscal year February 1990 for fiscal year October 1990 for fiscal year November 1991 for fiscal year November 1992 for fiscal year for fiscal year / 5.4 Quarterly and annual progress reports were submitted to the Bank. The yearly reports were published in April of 1988 (for the period from the start of the project up to ), 1989, 1990, 1991, and Interim reports were prepared when Bank missions visited BAKOSATURNAL. This was: 1986 November 1990 June, September 1987 March, August, November 1991 May, November 1988 April, October 1992 August 1989 April, September, November The Bank's detailed mid-term review was done in October Discussions and decisions regarding these visits were documented in Aide Memoires produced by Bank staff at the end of each mission. 5.5 Cooperation between various Bank officials and consultants was excellent. Administrative and technical problems were dealt with promptly and the success of the 1/ Audit for fiscal year 92-93, not yet received by the Bank.

30 implementation of the Transmigration V Project was everybody's first concern. Input from staff at the Bank's resident office in Jakarta (RSI) improved the Project's efficiency. 6. FINANCES 6.1 In the original project planning, a total of US$ 15,526,000 equivalent (Bank) and Rp 6,396,000,000 (GOI, DIP) was reserved for the BAKOSURTANAL component of the Project. Eventually, a total of US$ equivalent was disbursed, along with Rp 7,943,000,000 from the Indonesian budget. The detailed overview hereunder uses the revised plan from 1987, at a time when realistic estimates could be made. GOI overhead costs are not included in any of the figures below. WB US$ Equivalent Rp GOI Category Activity planned realized Planned realized SAK T. /01 L.b/Y SPOT images aerial phot mapping alt. network if Materials III Training IV TAT (US$ x and Rp ) The changes are resulted from the devaluation of the Rupiah in September 1986, as well as from other currency exchange fluctuations, and by changes in the required works. Expenses for 1992 to 1993 are as per December 31, Cumulative disbursements were scheduled (1985) and realized as follows: % % % % % % This shows clearly that the majority of the activities were executed in the years The delays were mainly due to the mapping contracts and consequently a temporization of the TAT contract.

31 CONCLUSIONS 7.1 The mapping component of the Transmigration V Project was financed by the GOI and Band under Loan No IND. The purpose of this Loan was to finance a four-year slice of BAKOSURTANAL's seven-year mapping program, to acquire aerial photography and satellite imagery and to establish altimetric networks on several islands. The institutional capabilities of BAKOSURTANAL would be strengthened through the provision of a TAT to BAKOSURTANAL and the provision of training facilities. 7.2 For the base mapping, AT results would be provided under the final stage of the REAP program. Unfortunately, it was not possible to realize the delivery of the AT results in time which led to an almost 2-year delay in the start of the last part of the base mapping. Problems in the execution of the base mapping contract led to another delay of more than one year. Final results of the base mapping contracts are satisfactory. 7.3 For a quick update of imagery over Sumatra, SAR rather than aerial photography was the selected method. This decision was based on the very good results of the SAR campaign in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya under SUAT-V. The whole island was covered and the results were delivered within eleven months. 7.4 The acquisition of RS imagery, i.e. SPOT coverage of all Indonesia was disappointing. Due to weak programming and the very nature of this optical satellite system it was very difficult to acquire (nearly) cloud free images. 7.5 The establishment of altimetric networks was successful, albeit in smaller areas than originally foreseen, due to a redesign of the original networks. Technically, this led to superior results, with twice the original number of kilometers levelled resulting in denser - though still sparse - networks. 7.6 Gravity and GPS networks were established and BAKOSURTANAL extended these under it's routine program. 7.7 The purchase of materials and equipment went smoothly and the implementation of the training programs were based on availability of staff. 7.8 Cooperation with the TAT went smoothly and the major part of the goals set were achieved. 7.9 The relationship with the Bank was basically a good one too. No major problems erupted and meetings between Bank officials, it's consultants and BAKOSATURNAL were friendly, fruitful and conclusive. 8. LESSONS LEARNED AND FOLLOW UP 8.1 The main lesson learned from the Transmigration V Project mapping component implementation was that it was very risky to have different sources of finances for project

32 activities which are complementary and on the same critical path. Furthermore, mapping contracts should include the AT work if it has not yet been done. Even with full cooperation of all agencies involved, there can still be a difference in, for example, administrative requirements which would cause unexpected delays which are outside the control of the executing agency. 8.2 The problems with the cartographic work of the contractors were not a complete surprise because of the complicated nature of the work and the lack of experience of the contractors. Nevertheless no extra time was allowed in the contracts for this. In the Project documents, no attention was given to the problem of the storage of all the materials which was to be delivered by the contractors. The dissemination of the data, be it digital or conventional, was also not discussed. Consequently the marketing aspects of geo information were overlooked as well. During the last year of the Project this marketing aspect was briefly addressed. 8.3 The levelling and mapping contracts provided for a certain period to conclude the work. Some contractors tried very hard to meet the resulting deadlines which increased the costs of BAKOSURTANAL supervision considerably. Penalty clauses in the contracts would have given a stronger position for BAKOSURTANAL to motivate the contractors to stick to their production schedule. However, since a contractor will tend to try and recover such costs, this might have led to a deterioration of quality standards. A system of positive sanctions (i.e. more work) would perhaps better motivate contractors to fulfil their contractual obligations. 8.4 Another lesson from the mapping contracts is that it is possible to build up national capability in the private sector when this sector is supported by (overseas) experienced companies. This would however, also need considerable extra expert input from the side of the Client. This support and extra input should perhaps last three to five years if one starts from a situation were contractors have only large-scale mapping experience. 8.5 The contract to purchase an analytical plotter contains a very convenient provision to service the instrument over a three-year period. The TAT contract contained small budget items for training and maintenance which increased the flexibility and efficiency of the execution of the Project. 8.6 The base mapping component of the Project is a part of the national base mapping program. Under the national base mapping program, BAKOSATURNAL also started the mapping, in 1988, of Java, Nusa Tenggara and Timor which is considered to be a spin-off effect of Project. By the end of this fiscal year more than five hundred sheets will be produced; about 40% by BAKOSATURNAL and the remaining by outside contractors. A huge mapping task remains, for which BAKOSATURNAL has secured the assistance of the Norwegian government. Further Bank assistance, however, seems to be required, especially since the transfer from convention to digital technology is far from completed. Digital mapping, the production and use of Digital Topographic Databases and GIS will be of utmost importance to BAKOSURTANAL and the Indonesian geo referenced information user. 8.7 The knowledge and experience which has been built up by the private sector, at a considerable costs to GOI, should be conserved. Therefore ongoing work should be available so that the contractors have a chance to compete for this.

33 BAKOSURTANAL also started the establishment of a national geodetic network, based on GPS points. Good progress has been achieved but Bank assistance to finish the work is indispensable as well. The same holds for the extension of levelling and gravity networks. 8.9 There are areas in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya which are continuously covered by clouds and it has been nearly impossible to get aerial photography during extended periods of time. These area should be covered by SAR imagery During the final days of the Project, the island of Flores was struck by a serious earthquake with devastating tidal waves and maps were desperately needed for reconstruction works. Within ten days following the earthquake, BAKOSATURNAL produced seven new map sheets, starting from photos, using digital techniques.

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35 PART II: MINISTRY OF TRANSMIGRATION: SETTLEMENT PLANNING AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 1. EVALUATION OF FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 Results of Project. Generally speaking, in the implementation of the Project all scopes have been covered. The data presented, compared with those as estimated in the SAR including the changes, reflect the success of the project in achieving the main target in terms of the settlement planning as well as the program support, in spite of the fact that extension of the duration has been made, reduction of the quantity and adjustment to the original plan. 1.2 Settlement Planning. Apart from the volume of Phase III that has been achieved, the Ministry of Transmigration and the SFSE consultant have shown their abilities and understanding of the settlement planning to be made available for the project. The effort to improve the quality can be seen in each phase of activities showing the technical aspects, also the socio-cultural, economic and environmental aspects and the recommended pattern of settlement. 1.3 The target of the SFSE contract, seen from the point of view of the number of locations (SKPs) or the total transmigrant families to be resettled, was the main reason of the expanded area to be surveyed in addition to the restricted process of location selection, since each consultant wanted to meet all the requirements of his contract. The result by the end of Phase IIB was only an area of 2 hectares for 161,617 families, that is 54 percent of the SAR estimation (300,000 families) that have been resettled in proper transmigration settlements. 1.4 This 54 percent of the 6 first round package of SFSE is the real fact of the result of the study; only 50,546 families (33 percent of the potential locations or 17 percent of SAR target) have been resettled up to and including Phase IIIA. 1.5 The problem is now the question whether the Ministry of Transmigration has the ability to utilize the potentials and the opportunity, starting from the remainder of Phase IIB, implementation of Phase IIIA including the area that has been rejected in Phase IIB for other area development. 1.6 In addition, the opportunity made available by the Bank to select a proper transmigration settlement by the Ministry and consultant. However, together with SFSE study the Ministry, using the State Budget, has conducted planning up to the physical implementation, such as the Industrial Trees Forest (Hutan Tanaman Industri/HTI), TRANSARANGDFP., etc., although no appropriate policies and strategies were available. The opportunity, if benefitted, would be able to reduce the study are rejected to make place for wider settlement planning and, perhaps, for program improvement in the future. 1.7 Program Support and Establishment of Institutions. Since the very beginning, the program support has been designed to adjust and to set up policies for transmigration development in medium and long term. Strategically, this matter has not been done very satisfactorily. The increased special studies and other technical support have only put emphasis on the problems discovered in the National Inventory of Transmigration Sites (NITS) study results.

36 Although very important and included in the activities required for the project, the setting up of strategies and, in long term, the program improvement for new transmigration settlements/ptbs have been put aside. a. Special Studies As important matter that has not been studied thoroughly is the ability of the Ministry and the Bank to improve transmigration settlements and surrounding areas through the Second Stage Development Program/SSDP. After the completion of the Trans V Project, the Bank assistance seems to be aimed at supporting this program; several attempts have been made to support the TSSDP I and TSSDP 1I program by means of additional studies, such as on Land Tittle, Environmental Impact and Direction Action Program, in addition to improvement of infrastructure using the budget of the Government. It might be better, if the TSSDP 1I study which is being made by modifying the SFSE contract, be carried out after the implementation of TSSDP 1, in order to reduce the risks in using the resources, time and fund for the study. The Bank has actually program a mission to evaluate the proposal for TSSDP 1, however, owing to the Government policy on monetary affairs in terms of Investment Credit Value (Nilai Kredit Investasi) which is known as January 1990 Package, the plan for the mission was rejected, because the approaches in the proposal were not in accordance with the reality. As for the TSSDP I locations that have already been transferred to the local government, the follow up of the study has been left to the local government, while the follow up of the locations that are still under the guidance of the Ministry of Transmigration is being considered. b. Establishment of Institutions The available of TAG consultant through direct negotiations with Trans III is very correct; the gap of time can be avoided and there is guarantee that professional and experienced personnel will be obtained. The implementation of this project cannot be separated from the role of the TAG consultant, since a great part of the project represents the activities of consultant. The success of TAG in setting up a pattern for implementing the TSSDP study and guidelines for Phase IIA, IIB and IIIA are very helpful for the Ministry of Transmigration in supervising, controlling and evaluating the consultant's activities. The assignment of the TST consultant in the SAR has not been considered properly in the project planning, because it has wasted fund. The Support Team for the implementation of the construction was already available, whereas the technical design of SFSE had not yet been established. However, although the assignment of TST was not very rational, in order that the resources would not become idle its activities were to support the implementation of the program during Repelita IV and part of Repelita V.

37 The establishment of TST at regional level has been decided from the plans of 7 teams, the location selected is the province of Riau. The selection of TST in Sumatra is still the largest transmigration receiving area during the life of the project. The use of staff-months for local personnel, which exceeded that in the SAR estimation was due to the extension of the assignment; however, if observed more clearly, this implies the great trust of the Bank in local consultants owing to the improved capability of the personnel. It means that one of the objectives in improving the capabilities of local consultants has been achieved. In relation to the above matter, the hope for transfer of knowledge from expatriate to national consultants, in particular technical affairs, is often to other way round. This expatriate personnel does not always concur with the reality. The result is waste of sources and fund, which becomes the burden of the Ministry and the consultant's counterpart. c. Training The hope for improving the capabilities of the personnel of the Ministry could actually be achieved, because there have been so many kinds of training and participants during the implementation of the project. In addition, the technical assistance for TAG and TST, which together with the personnel of the Ministry control the project directly should also be able to improve the capabilities of the personnel and management of the organization. The challenge is now how to take benefit from the personnel as much as possible and to develop them in order to prevent change of profession, because the incentives and need for qualified personnel in the private sector are continuously increasing. 2. EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK PERFORMANCE 2.1 Bank's support to transmigration V Program has been continued, despite it were beset by criticism on all sides. This is the main issue which could be proclaimed as the main strengths of Bank's Performance. 2.2 Formulation and Scope of Project. The experience obtained from the program implementation in the past, in particular in handling World Bank assisted projects and the evaluations of the program implementation, has in general been benefitted in the formulation and the scope of the project. The approaches made to achieve the objectives of the project through improving the quality of settlement planning of the three phases in a continuous way have been accepted as most appropriate and at the same time have wiped out the negative image from the program implementation in the view of the world society. This applies especially to the social and environmental impacts, in particular the treatment of tropical forests. 2.3 The Bank also provides mitigating alternatives to the Ministry in selecting transmigration patterns including adjustment or policies to be developed in accordance with the available resources. It is a pity, however, that the interest in the subject of the program, that is would-be transmigrants, has not been touched at all. Although the results of the settlement

38 planning recommended provide inputs for proper human resources, it is no easy work to get them. Because, as is known, the target of the program covers people with limited knowledge and capabilities. 2.4 Technical support that can help aspects of mobilizing and developing the society would be very helpful for establishing policies, systems and techniques of selection including training to would-be transmigrants in the sending areas. Another matter that the Bank should take into consideration is the support from other agencies to the implementation of the study recommended. 2.5 The Bank officials are fully aware that there are always problems in coordinating and integrating the program which delay its progress and improvement. In the context of selecting a transmigration pattern, which puts emphasis on non-food activities in spontaneous transmigration, the implementation of the program will very much depend on the technical ministry. In other words, the role of other agencies is of supportive nature, they are no pioneers; from the technical point of view the program schedule by the Ministry is ready for implementation. 2.6 The Bank seems to be too confident that the problem can be solved by setting up a working group and technical committees with members from all the related agencies, but it is a pity that the personnel for these are still missing. 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3.1 It cannot be denied that the success of the Ministry in completing the project activities including the adjustment/changes is also the success of the Bank. The working system of the Bank, applied by the RSI staff and Supervision Team has a positive influence and has improved the capabilities of the organization. The periodic and continuous supervision is a very good example to be imitated by the Ministry, especially for the officials who have authority over the project so that they can directly know the situation of the project. 3.2 During the process of contracts procurement learning from past experiences the Bank should strongly encourage MOT staff which have had the experience in Trans 11 and Trans III to offer their independent judgement on each part of the process rather than reducing MOT staff responsibilities. G.O.I. concludes that in these respects the Bank has not used its wide experienced gained during Transmigration III project. There were inconsistency of thought amongst the Bank Managers. 3.3 Bank urged the recruitment committee in MOT to speed up the selection process and to ensure that the supervision consultants are engaged when contractors are ready to commence the works, on the other hand Bank permitted tendering of Settlement Planning project only after all sar imagery and Base map were available. These inconsistencies of thought amongst the Bank's managing staff reflected one of the weakness of Bank's performance. The personnel of the Supervision Team and RSI assigned by the Bank during the duration of the project are sometimes substituted by other personnel; this matter places the Ministry and consultants in a difficult position, especially in the problems being experienced or if directives are required to solve them.

39 The understanding of the Bank personnel about the project is sometimes divergent and their personal opinion stands more out than the Bank policy. The Bank is also optimistic that the program formulated from the recommendations of the consultant to this project could be implemented without any guarantee of fund from the Government or Bank by means of a commitment of further assistance. This recommendation has also caused the delay in completing the project which has resulted in extension of the loan termination. 4. EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 4.1. Planning and Scope of Project. In our further analysis, the approach we select in achieving the final target of the project is more focussed on the technical aspects in using the natural resources supported by policies which are in accordance with the recommendations. 4.2 The scope of the project, seen from the point of the kinds of activities gives much hope that the two aspects could be achieved. The existence of regulations to study the program implementation in the previous years and the attempts to solve the problems discovered at that time, however, have given way to changes in the project priorities. 4.3 Viewed from the quality of providing settlement planning (Phase IIIA) which represents the main objective of the project, the target determined is only based on the needs, and no limited factors or risks, in particular the fund and policies at the time of implementation, have been taken into consideration. In relation to the mitigation for a more selective settlement pattern in order to improve the welfare of transmigrants in long term, a large sum of fund will be required besides other innovative policies. 5. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PROJECT 5.1 The organization and management of the project with the several divisions which are based on the duties and function of the project implementation unit may indeed be capable to support the achievement of the first object of the project. For the final target, however, i.e. the readiness for implementation seems to need integrity of the program support form other agencies. Coordination is very decisive in this phase, which should be overcome by establishing a working group with officials from the related agencies at director level as members. It is a pity that this working group has never been established specifically. 5.2 Within the Ministry of Transmigration there seems to be the impression that the project activities are only to support settlement preparation matters, because nothing exists in the loan that supports mobilization and development are implicitly included. The role of the Secretariat General is the supervisor of World Bank assisted projects including the changes because of the restricted capabilities of the personnel still concerns with administrative matters and cannot yet touch upon technical aspects, management and program integrity.