SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA

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2 SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA 18 April 2013 Szczecin, Poland Organising Committee: Dr Jan Jankowski, Polish Register of Shipping Chairman of the Committee Dr Andrzej Borowiec, Maritime Office in Szczecin Member Mr Jerzy Korecki, Short Sea Shipping in Szczecin Member Dr Adolf Wysocki, Polish Shipowners Association Member Ms Anna Stajewska, Polish Register of Shipping Programme Coordinator Honorary Committee: Ms Magdalena Jabłonowska, Shipping Safety Department, Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, Poland Prof. Stanisałw Gucma, Maritime University in Szczecin, Poland Mr Paweł Szynkaruk, Polish Shipowners' Association The Symposium is organized under the patronage of the Polish Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy with the attendance of Ms Anna Wypych-Namiotko, Undersecretary of State.

3 CONTENTS Overview by Jan Jankowski, Polish Register of Shipping... 5 Foreword by Anna Wypych-Namiotko, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, Poland... 7 Foreword by Paweł Szynkaruk, President of Polish Shipowners Association... 9 Panel discussion and key points of Symposium presentations on Session I MLC 2006 good for sailors and the safe operation of ships Adam Dunikowski, Polish Register of Shipping, Poland The role of the media in maritime safety Richard Clayton, Fairplay Session II The impact of goal based standards (GBS) safety level approach (SLA) on future regulations assuring safety at sea Anneliese Jost, Maritime Safety Division, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs, Germany Technological advances in risk management Francis Zachariae, Danish Administration Session III Safety of the fishing fleet new stability criterion Prof Pawłowski, Polish Register of Shipping, Poland A greener maritime industry? Environmental strategy of the Finish Shipowners Association Olof Widén, Finnish Shipowners Association... 65

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5 OVERVIEW Shipping in the Baltic Sea Region is specific by nature. The Baltic Sea is a small and enclosed water basin featuring characteristic, dangerous weather conditions, hazardous particularly for some ship types. The specificity of shipping also includes heavy traffic of people and goods between the well-developed countries around the Baltic. The Gdańsk 2011 Symposium SAFE SHIPPING ON THE BALTIC SEA confirmed both the specifics and the needs revealing several issues of general concern for Baltic maritime players. The Szczecin 2013 provides a continuation of the discussion forum for maritime administrations and shipowners to identify and discuss measures for progressing safe shipping on the Baltic. Discussion will follow several introductory papers addressing three key issues identified during the Gdańsk 2011 Symposium. I Sharing Collecting and sharing knowledge among Baltic countries as different States have different problems to solve, different experience, perspective Everyday knowledge (practical perspective) is useful and complementary for the safe operation of ships Revised ILO Local/ regional cooperation calls for attention to establish common standards II Risk models to measure safety under different conditions/ in different aspects LNG projects Huge ship traffic on the Baltic Sea Safety of fishing fleets III Industry image Improving the image of maritime industry, Stimulating growth of a national fleet Innovative technologies a greener maritime industry Media reflected enforcement and prosecution of EU/IMO regulations The identification of hazards faced by the shipping sector and related discussions cannot be expected to solve directly the practical problems but raising awareness and better knowledge of necessary measures sets the first step in moving forward. Jan Jankowski Polish Register of Shipping 5

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7 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to welcome you for the fifth time to the Symposium dedicated to safe shipping on the Baltic Sea. The Maritime Administration in Poland, which I have the honour to represent, is fully involved in the process of improving the safety conditions on the Baltic Sea. On the national, non-statutory level, the Administration is working continuously towards improving the safety of fishing boats, domestic passenger ships and pleasure crafts. On the European level, we are involved in executing European maritime safety regulatory provisions and we follow closely the development of the new European maritime safety law, having our services engaged in the process of its implementation. My Administration is taking all necessary measures to continue work towards ensuring shipping safety. The Republic of Poland is an active participant of the maritime environment protection processes, taking part in works of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) and the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). On the global level, we are an active member of the International Maritime Organization, engaged in the work of all its Committees and Subcommittees, contributing to many initiatives dedicated to maritime safety and supporting the initiatives of our colleagues from the fellow Member States of the European Union. This year the Symposium will be divided in three sessions based on key issues identified during the 2011 Symposium held in Gdańsk, which are: mutual sharing, risk models to measure safety and industry image. The first part will comprise, inter alia, a presentation concerning the role of European Maritime Safety Agency in creating sea-safety policy of the region from shipowners perspective. EMSA undertakes a number of mainly preventive, but also reactive tasks, in certain key areas, among others monitoring the implementation of EU seasafety legislation, developing maritime information capabilities at EU level and providing technical and scientific advice to the European Commission in the field of maritime safety and prevention of pollution by ships. The Session will also refer to the role of MLC 2006 and the significance of the new instrument. For the first time in the Symposium history we will have the opportunity to hear from quality media how they see their role in contributing to safety at sea. 7

8 The second session will refer to different aspects that have influence on projecting risk models to measure maritime safety. Today s safety regime is regarded to be over prescriptive and suffers from the almost continuous process of tacit amendments. This situation is in general terms not acceptable to all stakeholders. Thus, there seems to be a need for a move towards a more sophisticated safety regime. A new more generic safety regime is being developed based on a goal based standards safety level approach. Traffic on the Baltic continues to require further attention. The Baltic Sea is a good testing ground for new risk-based technologies. Another challenge is the LNG projects around the Baltic related to new requirements and economic conditions. During the third session concerning industry image, a presentation on A greener maritime industry will be given, emphasizing the question of close relations between pollution prevention and maritime safety. New ecological regulations are often related to an identification of new threats for the environment and life-at-sea safety, which forces very dynamic activity in the field of legislation. Fishing fleet records worldwide show the dark side of the industry but the new stability criterion to be presented will help save lives and improve the safety related image. EU bodies also have their role in contributing to a healthy image of the maritime industry Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to warmly thank the Polish Register of Shipping, Polish Shipowners Association and Maritime Office in Szczecin, for organizing this Symposium, their hard work and commitment. I am also grateful to the speakers who agreed to deliver presentations, and to all the participants for their presence reflecting their dedication to matters related to safe shipping and pollution prevention on the Baltic Sea. I wish everybody fruitful discussions and new ideas. I believe that this Symposium will be very important for further development of new maritime safety initiatives. Anna Wypych-Namiotko Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy, Poland 8

9 Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the Polish Shipowners Association I would like to welcome all participants of the V Symposium "Safe Shipping on the Baltic Sea." A lot of various discussions on the Baltic Sea took place since our last meeting, both in internal debates among shipowners, as well as talks with the participation of the Polish government. In these discussions, however, we focused less on the security issues of our ships, and more on issues related to the protection of the Baltic Sea environment. In our talks among the shipowners, ecology has become extremely important, not only because fresh air and clean water are a prerequisite for a healthy society, but also because in the near future ecology will have a significant impact on the financial condition of many shipping companies operating on the Baltic Sea. In 1974, seven countries signed the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, known also as the Helsinki or the Baltic Convention. All the Baltic countries signed it jointly, regardless of which side of the Iron Curtain they were on. At that time it was unusual. Signatories to the Convention seemed to be aware that the purity of the Baltic Sea is a top priority over political differences. At the same time the Helsinki Commission HELCOM was established to enact the provisions of the document, which spoke of the need to reduce pollution of the Baltic from land-based industry and from ships. HELCOM, which is the guardian of the Helsinki Convention regulations, consistently strives to restore the purity of the Baltic Sea lost during the economic changes of the twentieth century. In recent years, the organization has focused on the implementation of an ambitious project called the Baltic Sea Action Plan. The plan is to restore the good ecological status of the Baltic marine environment by 2021, with all the Baltic countries introducing rules on environmental measures. These rules concern four main areas. Firstly, the prevention of eutrophication, i.e. the excessive fertilization mainly by phosphorus and nitrogen, which leads to exesive growth of algae and consequently to the formation of the so-called anaerobic zones. Secondly, measures to prevent the discharge of hazardous substances, including carcinogens and toxic dioxins. Thirdly, efforts to provide environmentally friendly maritime transport. Fourthly, efforts to protect the biodiversity of organisms living in the Baltic Sea. 9

10 From the viewpoint of shipowners the third area is the most important for eco-friendly Baltic shipping. And here we come to the issue that I mentioned at the beginning of this speech. Protection of the environment, once treated by the ship owners as a kind of "incidental" duty resulting from company culture, is becoming today one of the most important elements of its activity. According to the specialists from the industry, in the last five years more environmental regulations in shipping have been developed and introduced than in the entire previous fifty years. The Baltic Sea became privileged at the same time. It's here - and in the North Sea and the English Channel - where so called SECA zones (Sulfur Emission Control Area) was created, then renamed the ECA zones, with the advent of regulations for the control of other harmful substances discharged into the air from ships chimneys. The Mediterranean Sea has similar features as the Baltic: it is also a reservoir with very limited water exchange with the ocean. It is not, however, a SECA zone, because in the Mediterranean countries, economic interests prevailed over ecology - with all its positive and negative consequences. Soon, therefore, all the ships that will sail in the Baltic Sea will not emit sulfur or nitrogen, they will not import foreign organisms from other seas in their ballast water tanks because this will be prevented by the new regulations regarding the need to install on ships ballast water treatment systems. In the Baltic ports the harmful effect of shipping activities on the environment will be reduced to virtually zero, because the ships will plug in to a land electric supply network so they will not emit any exhaust gases and they will not disturb anybody with their noise. A certain irony is in the last sentence, but in recent marine legislation, regulations for environmental protection have become more important even than the basic safety regulations for crews and ships. Paradoxically, the latter are more friendly and above all less costly for owners than pro-environmental regulations. It does not mean of course that the security issues in the shipping are neglected. We mounted recently on Polsteam ships a lot of new instruments for better safety, including Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) that effectively improve the safety of navigation, especially in areas with heavy traffic, Water Ingress Alarm Systems preventing sea water from flowing to the most vital spaces of the ships, elements of BNWAS (Brigde Navigational Watch Alarm System) to improve the watch on the bridge. Currently the ECDIS system is being implemented to replace paper maps with the electronic ones. However, the introduction of all these solutions according to the legislature of IMO is spread out in time, so they are not oppressive for shipowners, technically or financially. We're talking about modern electronic devices, and yet their cost to the company is only a fraction in comparison with the additional costs that we will have to bear, when burning fuel with 0.1 percent of sulfur content in the nearest future. High costs of low-sulfur fuels will hit mainly shipowners, but they will also affect the condition of ports and even entire economies of the Baltic States. I think, it is not 10

11 fully understood by the representatives of our government, who do not recognize the problem and do not intend to assist shipowners in carrying their financial burdens of new regulations. This is in contrast to what is happening in Finland, where the government has created a special fund to reimburse costs invested by the owners of the ships for devices that enable the use of traditional fuels. Similar concrete examples of help we watch in other sea countries. Finally, the European Union also understands this situation difficult for shipowners because it has already ruled that it will not treat this type of financial gestures as an unlawful State aid. The nearest future will be hard for the shipowners. We will have to recover from the present deep crisis in the shipping market and at the same time we will be burdened with the high costs of the new environmental regulations. For organizations such as HELCOM and other institutions which are responsible for the clean Baltic Sea, maritime transport should be a splendid model in terms of the rigor of fullfilling their recommendations. Shipping has become the industry where the highest standards of safety and the highest standards of environmental protection are the most important goal. I only hope that realizing the idea of supersafe and super-ecological ships we will not forget that these ships are also a place of work for seafarers and they should be a source of at least modest profits for the shipowners. Paweł Szynkaruk President of Polish Shipowners Association 11

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13 PANEL DISCUSSION AND KEY POINTS OF SYMPOSIUM PRESENTATIONS Disclaimer The opinions expressed during the panel discussion as collected do not necessarily present the standing on particular issues of represented organisations or bodies but are individual views, concerns and ideas as voiced by symposium participants during the open discussion. Introduction The issues covered by Session I on seeking clarity in proliferated regulations for Baltic Sea shipping proved that higher efficiency can be achieved by working together and a turn to risk based analysis in regulating safety on the Baltic Sea will result in reducing the proliferated regulations. Session II Operational and technical safety on the Baltic continue to raise a stir particularly in view of the risk relating to growing tanker traffic, development of LNG applications and terminals, and SOx and COx emission restrictions. Session III Gaps to be filled to ensure safe shipping on the Baltic addressed such challenges as optimizing response capacities in the Baltic Sea based on the results of the risk assessment of shipping accidents and pollution, harmonising hydrographic re-surveys of the entire Baltic and a closer look at the question of small vessel safety. Discussion covered several presentation related thesis, proposals and question marks. Higher Efficiency of collective action the need to know and responsibility to share Examples of achievements such as EMSA negotiated terms with the satellite image providers for the CleanSeaNet service that resulted in a system with the highest technical specifications possible, at a substantially reduced price per satellite image, and better operational conditions than those that can be obtained by Member States individually leave no doubt that collective action means higher efficiency pointed out Willem de Ruiter, European Maritime Safety Agency. Similarly the fleet of 16 oil pollution response ships mobilised through so-called stand-by contracts with private operators, show how a robust response system covering all the different sea areas of the EU coast line could be assured with limited financial means, thanks to the transnational nature of the enterprise. In addition, by working together with the experts of the various Member States and by involving specialised private parties, best practices can be identified and shared. A single combined inspection conducted by EMSA to check the quality of maritime training colleges in the labourproviding countries resulted in substantially reducing the duplication of effort of a multitude of national inspections. 13

14 Benoit Loicq, European Community Shipowners Association, emphasised the significance of the Maritime Safety Package III with CleanSeaNet, the EMSA Oil Spill Response and the EU LRIT Data Centre constituting a package of maritime surveillance now in place thanks to collective action. Yet another joint effort, the EU-LRIT datacenter brought substantial benefits for the Member States in terms of reduced costs for development and operation and facilitated global daily exchange of LRIT data. An example of the above was presented by Sub Lt. Katarzyna Kulesza, Maritime Regional Unit of Border Guard, Poland, who outlined the Polish Border Guard Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) project and the benefits of border and coast guard integrated blue border management and maritime area surveillance cooperation. The project outlined capacity building by continuing and developing joint initiatives and best practices in practical cooperation of law-enforcement vessels. The joint exercise was based on development of operational readiness in terms of integration and coordination based situational awareness. Sharing maritime domain surveillance responsibilities lead to efficient solutions in terms of safety security and environmental protection. Information on regional efforts for safer navigation, hydrographic re-surveys and cleaner Baltic shipping, prepared by Anne Christine Brusendorff, HELCOM, and delivered by Monika Stankiewicz, evidenced the benefits of a decision taken at ministerial level, whereby national land-based monitoring systems, based on Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals create the basis for the common Baltic Sea monitoring system. AIS, complemented by the shore-based AIS network provides the competent authorities with a monitoring tool for supervision, risk analyses, designing new routeing measures, search and rescue operations, port state control, security and other safety-related tasks to ensure safe navigation in the Baltic Sea. But there are also other uses of AIS, which go beyond the traditional safety aspects. The AIS data are, for instance, used to provide estimates of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions from Baltic Sea shipping (357,000 tonnes in 2009). This information is particularly important for the region, as atmospheric nitrogen deposition is one of the main contributors to the high nutrient concentrations that stimulate massive algae blooms in the Baltic. Joint efforts for environmental protection may give rise to restricting regulations. As agreed in the Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP), HELCOM countries supported efforts within IMO under the review process of MARPOL Annex VI. HELCOM submitted a joint document to MEPC 57 in 2008 (IMO document MEPC 57/INF.14) calling for tighter international regulations to prevent a predicted sharp increase in NOx emissions from Baltic shipping. The paper indicated that with the projected annual 5.2% growth of maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea, a 80% reduction in emissions from marine diesel engines is required to reverse the increasing trend of NOx emissions in a long term. Mathematical models calculating CO2, SOx, NOx, ship emissions and PM (particular matter) on the basis of AIS data (ships actual movements) show the growing hazard. 14

15 Dr Urszula Kowalczyk, Maritime Institute in Gdańsk, Poland expressed concern that highly EU regulated and enforced emissions from ships on the Baltic, at a high cost to shippers, may be detrimental both for the development of shipping and the natural environment in the loosing battle with land transport. Emissions from land are incomparably higher than at sea and will continue to grow with the potential switch to land transport. At the same time transport by land gains a competitive edge, as it is not restricted by such stringent regulations on generating emissions. Dr Kowalczyk brought to attention the warning that the low sulphur legislation will prompt an environmentally damaging modal shift from short sea to overland transport and pose severe financial implications. Under pending IMO requirements, vessels operating in the Baltic, North Sea and Channel Emission Areas (ECAs) will soon have to comply with a 0.1% limit on fuel sulphur content. In response Mr De Ruiter pointed out that emissions by land transport are only a minor part of the overall land emissions. Continuing the subject of information sharing Isto Matilla, European Commission Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, familiarised Symposium participants with the overall objective of Maritime Surveillance developing mechanisms for improving maritime awareness. The commitment of Member States and stakeholders to this project shows that they fully understand the benefits that cooperation and the creation of a network across all surveillance authorities may bring: Search and rescue authorities will swiftly avail of better information when people's lives are in danger at sea. Coast Guards, police and navies may share information to combat all kinds of illegal activities at sea or to protect merchant ships and fishing boats from all kinds of threats. Increased safety, security and cleaner seas are ultimate objectives for all. Therefore, surveillance policy initiative is an enabler for those authorities to respond adequately to the challenges and risks in the waters under their jurisdiction and in the high seas. The paradigm of information exchange is in the opinion of Mr Matilla gradually changing from the more restrictive "need to know" to the more open "need and responsibility to share". In his opinion the development of a common information-sharing environment for the EU maritime domain faces several challenges: diverse user and operator communities at national and EU level, national authorities responsible for defence, border control, customs, marine pollution, fisheries control, maritime safety and security, vessel traffic management, accident and disaster response, search and rescue as well as law enforcement which all collect information for own use. While in some cases the involved authorities are unaware that similar information is collected by other authorities and systems, in other cases they are aware but unable to share this information with one another because information sharing standards, agreements, policies regarding information exchange processes currently exist only in certain user communities. 15

16 The diverse legal frameworks with different maritime surveillance activities falling under different articles of the Lisbon Treaty and specific legal provisions resulted in developing surveillance systems on the basis of sector-specific, international and EU legislation. A Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for all EU sea basins is the vision. The first tangible result will be better tactical patrolling and increased response capability in case of maritime incidents (being they of law enforcement/border control nature or search and rescue, response to natural disaster, tracking illegal fishing or polluters of the marine environment etc). At a second level, better knowledge of the processes and interactions in the EU maritime domain can contribute to improved governance and thus create a favourable environment for maritime business to flourish. In the Commission's view, the most appropriate way to address the legal, technical and financial aspects of the Common Information Sharing Environment is to continue the close collaboration of the Member States and the EU Agencies. Expertise available therein is nowhere else available. At the same time, HELCOM works for the advancement of rules tailored to the specific conditions in the Baltic Sea Area the maritime traffic and the specific sensitivity of marine environment. The 2007 HELCOM meeting in Krakow brought the enhancement of the earlier adopted Baltic Sea Action Plan (BSAP). BSAP contains a specific section on Maritime Activities promoting use of AIS to improve both safety of navigation and environmental protection inline with the amended Annex IV to MARPOL on requirements for the nutrient discharges in sewage: HELCOM Recommendation 31E/5 on mutual plan for places of refuge, adopted at the 2010 ministerial session, is the first of its kind agreement providing the basis to accommodate a ship in need of assistance in the Baltic Sea in the safest shelter irrespective of national borders. One important development supporting the enhanced regional cooperation on maritime matters is the HELCOM map and data service. The environmental information is made public and is accessible for stakeholders and interested users. The service enables viewing, searching and downloading of various data related to the Baltic Sea. This data includes e.g. shipping traffic, accident risk areas, emergency response capacity, marine protected areas and environmental status indicators. The purpose of the service is to act as a regional information hub. Working together in a regional framework appears to be essential for a great variety of topics in our sector. The development of a distribution system for LNG as a future green fuel for shipping in the ports around the Baltic Sea and the North Sea is another and completely different topic that requires such regional cooperation. 16

17 Dr Adolf Wysocki, Polish Shipowners Association, who chaired the panel discussion, asked the panellists to say what message we would like to convey to the authorities around the Baltic. Higher efficiency in collective action and the need to share data around the Baltic Sea was emphasised by practically all panel members. Andreas Nordseth, Danish Maritime Authority shared his impression that we also have to cooperate with non-european countries to ensure safe shipping on the Baltic Sea. Denmark shares the same key interests as Russia in ensuring safety. Cooperation of all interested parties around the Baltic Sea is vital and we should invite and involve non-european countries to the projects and organize common symposium. Karol Kurpiński, Gdynia Maritime Office, Poland pointed out that we also need to focus on local/ regional cooperation so as to establish common standards for everybody and cooperate for example at HELCOM forum because it is the way to find the most suitable solutions. According to Dr Jan Jankowski, Polish Register of Shipping, joint endeavours are required to study closer the sea itself. Knowledge of Baltic Sea States and the wave spectrum would facilitate prediction of sea states and raise safety. The Baltic should be divided into sub areas and each State should prepare a study on sea states for each of these areas. Without cooperation of the States around the Baltic performance of this task is impossible. Key safety cooperation issues vary in the opinion of Zbigniew Szozda, Szczecin Maritime University. The Minister of Infrastructure Anna Wypych- Namiotko indicated energy safety as the most important for Poland today whereas, Mr Szozda sees the safety of fishing vessels as a safety priority in view of the high number of fatalities of fishing vessels, which globally reach people per year (over 60 people daily). If we take a look at the region of the Baltic Sea, the largest fatality number concerns the seafarers of the Polish fishing fleet and numbers up to 10 people on average per year. Dr Wysocki pointed to the discourse and work on a recast of the 2001 Maritime Code in Poland to both modernize and duly integrate the safety and security related subjects and account for a more public perspective. Shipowners members of the Association in cooperation with other associations of owners, organize regular meetings and establish committees to discuss social issues, environmental and safety issues. Maritime stakeholders are looking forward to the Polish and consecutively Danish EU Presidency for further progress in this respect. Proactive counter reactive In his presentation Andreas Nordseth, Danish Maritime Administration drew attention to the fact that without a change of attitude to safety related matters common regulations will not be effective The typical reflexive approach leads to late and superficial actions while reality requires compliance with the purpose of the rules. Proactive quality shipping means Doing the right things right and improvement 17

18 of safety and efficiency through innovation. The often-met bureaucratic approach does not favour best practice. Research indicates that safety is created when management focuses on and communicates actual, practical safety issues. Mr Nordseth emphasized that there is more to quality shipping than clean certificates. The call to solve problems with new and more detailed rules will only lead to an endless stream of regulation. The development of ship s safety regulations, according to Dr Jan Jankowski from PRS, based on a reactive approach to casualties leads to the proliferation of regulations and the number of control bodies. A proactive approach involves the development of a risk model for each ship function and reflects the deductive approach to ship safety regulations (reasoning from general to specific). Dr Jankowski reminded the Symposium participants that classification assessment of ship's strength up to the nineteen fifties followed the reactive path and was mainly based on past experience. Rules and minimum standards developed under the approach ensured safety for existing ship types, but the approach was difficult to apply to new types of ships. For example the requirements for ship's structure scantlings had a tabular form and were dependent on a ship's main dimensions, with the ship structure appraised in terms of separate structure members. It was conservatively assumed that if each structure member satisfied the minimum requirements then the whole hull structure would be safe. The trend to optimize fleets leads to new ship types adjusted to the diversity of carried cargo and loading and unloading means. New improved construction materials, new loading technologies, improved propulsion systems and computerised deck control systems revolutionised shipping and led to building bigger and faster ships. However, these innovations were not followed by appropriately developed safety regulations. Casualties at sea show, said Dr Jankowski during his presentation, that the growing number of regulations and their stringent enforcement are not necessarily the best way forward. The indicated unsatisfactory state of regulations on ships' structure triggered the development of Common Structural Rules (CSR) for Bulk Carriers and Double Hull Oil Tankers by IACS, and the development of the Goal Based New Ship Construction Standards (GBS). Prof. Maciej Pawłowski, Gdańsk University of Technology, commented that generally, GBS are aimed at increasing ship safety within the existing state of the art. They are rational and able to discriminate between weak and good designs. It is worth realizing, however, that GBS are unable to indicate conceptual faults in ship design. Regarding bulk carriers, these include the lack of double sides within cargo holds and the lack of the forecastle. 18

19 Past experience shows that it took decades to introduce mandatory double bottom, which today is so obvious. Similarly, on new ro-ros the double sides are common though they are not mandatory. There are even two first ro-pax ships, built in 2001 by Szczecin Shipyard Nova, equipped not only with the double sides extending above the car deck, but also with the double car deck - a kind of a pontoon deck. Similarly, the double sides are quite common on new tankers. This gives rise to a question whether the effects of the double sides on safety of these ships have been the subject of investigation. Prof Pawłowski is of the opinion that both lack of double sides and of forecastle facilitate intensive deck flooding. Flooding produces high dynamic loads on hatch covers, which feature quarter strength of the deck. There is nothing mysterious that the hatch covers are the weak link, which leads to the deadly dangerous flooding of the first cargo hold. Tankers can lack the forecastle as they do not have hatch covers, but following of this example on bulkcarriers gives rise to concern. Prof Pawłowski asked whether the effect of the forecastle on the mitigation of deck flooding had been investigated. Dr. Jankowski responded that evidently the forecastle reduces the green seas loads but the decision whether to apply forecastle or strengthen hatch covers, anther covers and their securing devices is on the designer side. In terms of GBS the essence is to determine green sea loads and the structure response of any structure concept. The same relates to the double sides of bulk carriers. The decision whether to apply double sides or strengthen the frames is on the designer side. GBS safety level approach was assumed to be a complete standard defining safety level through safety objectives and functional requirements. The role of class rules and industry practices and standards (embraced by GBS) is to develop a complete set of criteria transposing the defined safety level to ships. The aim of these criteria is to ensure that any structure concept, fulfilling the criteria, meets the required safety level. In other words, the aim of the criteria is to be a reference system for designers, identifying unsafe concepts, but not putting constraints on the designers by proposing ready solutions. The safety regulations developed under GBS SLA and risk models (fault trees and mathematical theories used to describe basic events) will be harmonized with the sea environment and ship operation. Deterministic and probabilistic risk models need to be developed and used to make a quantitative evaluation of basic events leading to the undesired event the ship s sinking. Risk models The risk model enables identification of the risk (probability) of ship function failure and appraisal of its conformity with the risk level set as the criterion. The risk model can also be used to make an analysis in order to set safety level as a criterion. GBS SLA will be developed by MSC as a high priority issue under the current agenda item on GBS. It is a huge project and, therefore, requires cooperation of maritime players. The GBS SLA, if successful, could heal the ailing safety system and like the Okham razor shave away" the superfluous regulations. 19

20 Magdalena Jabłonowska, Ministry of Infrastructure, Poland, focused on risk related to transporting substances via pipelines. Pipelines for transporting large volumes are believed to be one of the safest and economically viable methods for transporting hazardous substances. Nevertheless, they may pose a serious risk. Releasing of flammable and toxic materials may trigger emergencies with catastrophic effects. The dominating risk is believed to come from external factors. These include damage caused by cast or trawled anchors, dredge nets trawled by fishing vessels as well as abrasion or hitting of the pipeline by a ship sailing over the pipeline without sufficient clearance. Pipelines can also suffer damage caused by a heavy container lost in heavy weather overboard a vessel navigating over the pipeline. In areas of heavy traffic a collision resulting in ship sinking and resting on the pipeline cannot be excluded. Offshore pipelines for transporting oil and gas laid on the sea bottom in water bodies of limited depth cast doubt on the freedom of navigation of deep draught ships. Prudent assessment of navigation risk in water bodies of limited depth involves identification of individual ship parameters: inter alia; identifying keel clearance, navigational water margin, water margin for mud, water margin for tide estimation error, water margin for identifying the water state, water margin for identifying ship draught, margin for ship heeling, water margin for squat of ship in motion, water margin for sea waving, requires relevant data. Though many studies have been performed relating to underwater installations, including oil and gas pipeline systems, there are no relevant international regulations in force, which invites various interpretations of these analyses and in effect does not contribute to improving safety. The 2001 HELCOM Copenhagen Declaration regarding hydrograhic re-surveys was later extended to cover more areas and routes. All Baltic Sea countries are to present their national re-survey plans, including the time schedule for the implementation, by 2015 at the latest. The IHO Baltic Sea Hydrographic Commission (BSHC) developed and approved in 2002 the Harmonised Hydrographic Re-Survey Scheme and established a Monitoring Working Group to monitor its implementation. BSHC adopted a new Vision for the re-surveys in 2009, which states that the whole Baltic Sea area should be covered by a harmonised re-survey scheme based on national re-survey schemes. The speeding up of hydrographic re-surveys has been included as a flagship project of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, jointly led by HELCOM and the Baltic Sea Hydrographic Commission. The ongoing BRISK project, implementing HELCOM Recommendation 28E/12 on strengthening of sub-regional cooperation in the response field, is finalizing the overall risk assessment of shipping accidents covering the whole Baltic Sea Area. A corresponding project in Russia (BRISK-RU) provides a vital expertise to the risk assessment and secures Russian participation in the joint activities. 20

21 Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, missing response resources in each sub-region of the Baltic Sea will be identified. The gap identification needs to be followed by the necessary investments in the response equipment as well as optimization of the emergency response. The risk assessment will also enable identification of hot spot areas with the highest risks and will provide the basis for development of further risk control measures. The Baltic Sea countries also agreed to undertake necessary measures to ensure sufficient project funding, including external funding for re-surveys and improved mariners abilities to assess and interpret hydrographic content in nautical charts and publications either in printed or digital form, especially in ECDIS. Risk calculation methods for formal risk assessment of the LNG Terminal design process for navigation dominated the presentation authored by Prof. Lucjan Gucma and Dr Maciej Gucma from Szczecin Maritime University. The safety assessment of complex marine systems calls for models of a number of parameters, such as: vessel traffic, hydrometeorological conditions, area parameters and others. These parameters are mostly random; therefore analytical methods are not suitable for building the models, particularly if these models are to include the human factor (probability of operator s error). Such systems can be modelled by simulations methods, Monte Carlo (MC) methods in particular. These consist in generating random numbers aimed at estimating their distributions. M. Gucma presented the assessment and comparison of the navigational safety of two proposed locations of an LNG terminal in Poland with several approach routes based on the original probabilistic model created at the Maritime University of Szczecin. The model is capable of assessing the risk of a large complex system with consideration of human (navigator) behaviour models, ship dynamics model, real traffic stream parameters and external conditions such as wind, current, visibility, etc. The model works in fast time and can simulate a large number of scenarios. The output from the model such as a place of collision, ships involved, and navigational conditions can be useful for risk assessment of the proposed LNG terminal locations. The results were used for the determination of the optimal location of the LNG terminal based on the navigational risk criterion. Several aspects of safety were covered with special respect to port operations i.e.: manoeuvring, mooring, alongside, unloading of LNGC inside port area. Results from manoeuvring simulations proved the optimal shape of the designed terminal in Świnoujście with use of statistical tools for comparison. Safety assessment has been conducted for typical LNG vessels for the designing of outer port in Świnoujście, where the largest analyzed vessel was Q-Flex type, within the range of prospected operations inside the port. Capt. Wolfgang Hentzsche, Association of German Shipowners, and Mr Nordseth raised questions about the safety aspects of port operations in the urban area of LNG vessels and the mathematical risk models of ship structure failure and consequence analysis models. 21

22 Dr Gucma explained that there is a plan to build a second terminal to handle smaller vessels up to 1000 m 3. Safety aspects of port operations in the urban area were studied using a variety of tools; very advanced risk analysis and model experiments. The port s location in the city tissue is a challenge. Though trials are carried out on the open sea ship speed reduction at port are accounted for. An example of a similar location is Boston, where fully loaded tankers go through the centre of the city. Thousands of people, we could say are in danger, yet this practice is safe. Dr Monika Warmowska, PRS, reported progress in studies on small fishing vessel safety, the issue raised by Dr Szozda as an acute problem. Dr Warmowska spoke about improving survivability of smaller vessels by developing new survivability standards based on ship dynamics in extreme weather conditions a significant element missing in the safety assurance system. Particularly alarming is the safety of fishing vessels, which generally feature unfavourable relation between stability capability/capacity and the magnitude of external heeling moments (waves, wind); experience water trapped on deck and shifts of weight. These factors in case of smaller ships result in significant change of centre of gravity, often causing dramatic change of stability. The presently binding stability criteria and standards are based on static stability in calm water, and not on real dynamic behaviour in waves. Additionally, small vessels, in particular fishing vessels, often lack technical documentation, may be in poor technical condition, often undergo alterations to hull and equipment without appropriate supervision; and are sometimes operated by insufficiently skilled crew. Small vessels also face insufficient financial resources to make technical improvement. PRS embarked on a long-term project aimed at developing a set of rational stability criteria and standards, operational guidelines and training courses for crews. In the first step a computer program was developed to simulate the motion of smaller vessels taking into account effects of water flowing on deck. The stage of developing mathematical modelling of these phenomena is nearly completed. The simulation model of smaller vessel s motion comprises models describing: irregular wave rounding the vessel, forces and moments acting on the vessel and determining equations of vessel motion, phenomena of water inflow and outflow on vessel deck, motion of water over the deck, forces and moments caused by water trapped on deck. Further work is in progress on modelling of irregular wave, modelling of vessel s motion in irregular wave, modelling of water flow on small vessel s deck, inflow and outflow of water over the bulwark and through the openings, deck submerged in water, the flow of water on deck, verification of the theories and software, deck moving with constant acceleration, inflow and outflow on non-moving deck, water motion on oscillating deck, comparison of simplified method and shallow water method, comparison of results obtained for vessels with open and closed stern. The validated models of vessels with water trapped on deck moving in irregular waves and computer programs based on these models, enabling the simulation 22

23 of this phenomenon, are necessary elements of the project for developing vessel dynamic stability criteria. The validation should also include model tests verifying the theories and software. Then, using the software, it will be possible to perform systematic numerical simulations to identify the essential elements affecting the vessel s dynamic stability of a given vessel such as extreme waves. Dr Szozda expanded on the issue of stability from the IMO perspective indicating the coherence of PRS research with IMO efforts in USA, Italy and Japan. The safety of fishing vessels remains an acute problem. A diplomatic conference is to be held in November 2012 Cape town, South Africa, with the aim to agree upon and implement the regulations concerning fishing vessels. Technical regulation provisions concerning fishing vessels safety will be discussed and stability criteria established. These criteria should account for dynamic stability. Regulation provisions available today shall be revised, including those provisions concerning stability (chapter no. 3 of Torremolinos Protocol). Roundup Dr Wysocki, the moderator of the Panel Discussion asked the panellists for final comments and a proposal of a message from Symposium participants to the authorities of the countries around the Baltic as how to improve safety regulations. He also asked for subjects to be covered by the 5 Symposium agenda and which issues, from the panellists perspective, should be given priority. Four keynotes interspersed in the course of the Symposium presentations were also reflected in the panel discussion. The need to adopt a proactive approach in developing the overall shipping safety was supported by all panellists and participants of the Symposium. Attention was drawn to shift focus from discussing shortcomings to action and involvement of non-european countries around the Baltic in developed projects. The need to raise awareness that Baltic wide agreed projects are feasible when broken down to performance of individual states followed by data sharing, best practice and exchange of experience. Such conscious cooperation and sharing could lead to a hydrographical resurvey of the entire Baltic Sea as well as a wave spectrum of the water basin. Overcoming of cross border threats faced by Member States in the EU maritime domain often require an improved trans-national and sometimes even a trans-sectoral approach, in particular with regard to the high seas and with regard to the processing of personal, confidential or classified data. Continued development of risk models to measure different aspects of safety under different conditions is a vital measure contributing to increased safety. Effective measures are also required to improve the image of the industry, both locally in particular states as in the entire Baltic Sea Region. 23

24 Remarks were voiced that focus on local/ regional cooperation calls for establishing common standards for everybody to both enhance safety and facilitate data sharing. Panellists did not shun from local issues such as the challenge of developing the Polish fleet. The problem of fishing vessel safety (at present a subject of IMO actions) and alarming fatality statistics raised concern of all participants and support of the need to address the problem. Development of the LNG related industry, seabed pipeline supply systems, benefiting from the Hanza resources, the growing operational complexity of technology point to urgent practical solutions, which according to Capt. Hermanis Cernovs, Latvia must remain concurrent with complicated mathematical calculations of scientific research and theoretical contributions. Everyday knowledge (practical perspective) is useful and complementary for the safe operation of ships. Therefore Symposium organisers suggest focusing on the following issues during the V Symposium on Safe Shipping on the Baltic Sea, which shall take place on 18 April 2013 in Szczecin, Poland: I II Sharing 1) Collect information and share knowledge among Baltic countries as different States have different problems to solve, different experience, perspective 2) Everyday knowledge (practical perspective) is useful and complementary for the safe operation of ships 3) Local/ regional cooperation calls for attention to establish common standards Risk models to measure safety under different conditions/ in different aspects 1) LNG projects 2) Huge ship traffic on the Baltic Sea 3) Safety of fishing fleets III Industry image 1) Improving the image of maritime industry, 2) Stimulating growth of a national fleet 3) Innovative technologies a greener maritime industry 4) Media reflected enforcement and prosecution of EU/IMO regulations 24

25 SESSION I

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27 MLC, 2006 good for seafarers and the safe operation of ships Adam Dunikowski Polish Register of Shipping The International Labour Organization adopted the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 on 23 January 2006 considering the need of special protection for seafarers compared to people working ashore. It is dedicated to seafarers, i.e. people employed, engaged or working in any capacity on board a ship. This document comprises 37 existing ILO conventions consolidated into a single comprehensive instrument. The primary purpose of the Convention is to secure fundamental human rights and principles as well as employment and social rights of seafarers. Each ratifying Member undertakes to give complete effect to the provisions of the Convention by implementing them into national laws. Furthermore, each Member shall establish an effective system for the inspection and certification of ships and crewing agencies (so called recruitment and placement services) to ensure that principles of the Convention are obeyed. It is of key importance that the Convention is enforced by virtually all maritime states through flag state inspection and port state control. This will create a level playing field for all seafarers any ship calling to a port of a ratifying state shall be subject to inspection and will not receive more favourable treatment than a ship flying the flag of any ratifying country. The strength of MLC, 2006, compared to the previous conventions lies in its enforcement by PSC. Seafarers need special protection because their situation is differs fundamentally as compared to workers ashore: they usually work on board a ship flying a foreign flag, where unknown foreign law applies, they are away from home and families for a long period of time and cannot rely on even mental support in solving their problems, when at sea they are also away from any institution which can protect their rights or help them, there may be no person on board a ship they know or can trust, they may have no time or possibility to contact ITF when their ship is in a port, to list the most obvious aspects. The Code, forming a part of the Convention, is divided into 5 parts/titles: 1. Minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship 2. Conditions of employment 27

28 3. Accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering 4. Health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection 5. Compliance and enforcement Minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship relate to minimum age, medical fitness to perform duties at sea, required training or qualifications and access to an efficient and well regulated recruitment and placement system. The STCW Convention already regulates all these aspects, except the last one. Requirements of both conventions are consistent. Conditions of employment cover the following aspects: fair employment agreement, payment for work, regulated hours of work or rest, entitlement to leave and entitlement to repatriation at no cost to seafarer when employment agreement expires or is terminated, or in case the seafarer is unable to perform his/her duties on board any longer, compensation in case a ship is lost or sunk, sufficient personnel for the safe, efficient and secure operation of the ship and national policies promoting employment in the maritime sector and encouraging seafarers to have a career and develop skills. Up till now the STCW Convention regulated only hours of work and rest and sufficient personnel number. Accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering title is aimed to ensure that seafarers have on board, at no cost to themselves, decent accommodation and recreational facilities and access to good quality food and drinking water. These aspects have not been regulated yet. Health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection title relates to: protection from financial consequences of sickness, injury or death occurring in connection with employment, work environment on board ships which shall promote occupational safety and health, access to shore-based facilities and services to secure seafarers health and well-being, protection of seafarers health and ensuring their prompt access to medical care on board ships and ashore, taking measures with a view to providing seafarers with access to social security protection. Up to date only access to medical care on board ships has been regulated by IMO resolution A.890(21). The last title Compliance and enforcement apart from typical provisions regarding any convention enforcement (flag and port state inspections) gives seafarers a powerful tool the on-board complaint procedures. Such procedures are aimed at fair, effective and expeditious handling of seafarers complaints alleging breaches of the convention s requirements. Any kind of victimization of a seafarer for filing a complaint is prohibited and penalized. All seafarers shall be provided with a copy of the on-board complaint procedures and are entitled to seek the resolving of their complaint at the lowest level possible, but they can also complain directly to the master or appropriate external authorities in the flag state or their country of residence. As mentioned above, MLC 2006 is a compilation of 37 existing ILO conventions into a single instrument so one can say that all aspects had been already regulated. That is true, but the previous conventions were not global instruments, while MLC, 2006 will have the same power as SOLAS or MARPOL Convention. Although some 28

29 aspects of MLC, 2006 have already been covered by IMO instruments (SOLAS, STCW) the perspective is completely different. IMO conventions perspective is safety of life and property at sea, ILO perspective is human dignity and well being. These perspectives are complementary, therefore, enforcement of MLC, 2006 should also increase safety at sea. Expected benefits of MLC, 2006 enforcement should then be: seafarers physical and emotional well-being, seafarers better motivation to work, better human relationships, less errors and accidents in performing duties on board, safer shipping, work at sea more attractive to young people. 29

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31 The role of the media in maritime safety Richard Clayton, IHS Fairplay, London My flight was approaching Heathrow airport. There was a strong cross-wind, and the pilot looked as if he was heading for the terminal building rather than the runway. Not only was the wind blowing from north to south, it was irregular there were strong gusts, then moments of calm, then gusting again. Sitting back there in the cheap seats, I wanted to be anywhere but in the air. As the tree tops grew closer it seemed as if we were going to land with one wing high in the air, and I m sure we touched down on one set of wheels. With great effort the pilot managed to pull the starboard wing level, then the nose hit the runway. For a moment we seemed to be drifting off course, then the engines turned and we slowed and headed for a taxi way. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, the pilot said. Welcome to London s Heathrow airport. That s the end of the safest part of your journey; please drive home safely. We sat back in some relief, the pulse racing, feeling lucky to be alive. What did he mean the safest part of the journey? I only have to get back to my car and drive home, on roads I know, with junctions and roundabouts, and motorways I have been handling for many years. How is that not the safest part of my journey? Then I remembered I needed to book a service on my car; one tyre is close to the safety limit, and the handbrake needed tightening. And I must get someone to look at the small hole in the exhaust pipe. Next week maybe next week. To many of us, safety is what we think it is. It s having enough training and experience to cope with any situation the road throws at us. I passed my driving test 35 years ago, so I certainly don t need to be tested again. The car passed its safety inspection test 11 months ago, and is good for another month. Here was a situation where a pilot was flying in windy weather. He had been trained for this situation at ground school, in a simulator, in light piston-engine aircraft, then in several types of jet, in clear and calm weather, in rain and snow and in strong cross-winds. He not only had a certificate, he had experience, he was within his statutory flying hours and he knew the capabilities of his aircraft. All his attention was on flying safely. The aircraft had been maintained each night be professional ground crews, who would never compromise on safety. My life was in the hands of professionals, yet I was scared. My car was at the limit of its safety envelope. It hadn t been maintained properly for several months, I knew there were areas of concern, and I also knew that I hadn t slept properly for 18 hours. My body thought it was four in the morning, when it was actually seven in the evening. But I was convinced my part of the journey was safe, and the flight was the part I had to worry about. 31

32 Ladies and gentlemen, today is not about aircraft or about cars, it s about safety. The point I m making here is that few of us really understand that safety is subjective: my acceptable level of safety depends on my experience, your acceptable level of safety might be more stringent or you might feel I m going beyond what s necessary. In order to measure acceptability, the regulators set standards and expect us to meet those standards on every trip our ships make. If we cut corners, if we fail to follow what is regarded as best practice, two things can happen. We get away with it, there is no accident, no one is injured, there is no damage to your vessel and no pollution. Or there is an incident that will leave you looking foolish. Shipping professionals usually follow best practice, but investigations reveal that minimum standards often overlook many unusual circumstances. The incident report then outlines the events leading up to the accident, the events themselves, and the lessons the industry can learn. But we all know that shipping professionals are under increasing pressure, and the dangers of overlooking a vital stage in the navigation of ships, or the management of companies, or even the handling of human resources can lead to serious consequences. My task today is to look at the role of the media, specifically as it relates to maritime safety, here in the Baltic Sea. My initial point is that the media will not care whether professionals have been properly trained, how much pressure they are under, or what the circumstances are. For the most part, the media sees an incident in isolation an event, an accident involving life, or pollution, or damage to ship or berth. The media wants to know who is to blame? Whether we talk about the trade media, the general media or the new social media, the level of professional knowledge is thin. This means shipping companies unfortunate enough to be involved in an accident must have access to crisis management capability. Someone who is brought in to train senior executives and communications staff in how to stay one step ahead of the media. In the old days before Facebook, Twitter and the wider instant messaging circus the trade media could be handled differently from the general media. Shipping periodicals had some background knowledge and wanted to know the chain of events that led up to the accident; but the general media had little real understanding of shipping, and was attempting to beat their competitors in finding juicy details that often had no consequence, and ridiculous sound bites from stressed executives from head office. The general media here in Poland, in Germany or Sweden or in Russia does not have your best interests at heart. When MSC Napoli was beached on the south coast of England, I was interviewed by Sky television. In the background was a film of bounty-hunters streaming down the cliffs to pick up whatever they could find nappies and motorbikes are the two items that stuck in my mind. I prepared for the interview by reading everything I could about the role of the Secretary of State s representative for salvage, the heroic work of the helicopter crews in picking up seafarers from lifeboats pitching and tossing in the heavy English Channel waters, and the details of the ship s voyage. 32

33 The first question told me more about the general media that anything I had read or been told. Who owns the nappies? I gently tried to focus her attention on the real issues here: no one has been killed, there is no pollution, the ship is where it can be stabilised for salvage. Who owns the motorbikes? The role of the general media in maritime safety is to provide their audience with whatever they want to read or see. If there is an accident, they want a culprit, someone to blame, a face to put on the front page or at the head of the prime-time TV bulletin. They have no interest in what went right, they are focused only on what went wrong. If you have not prepared for this, and if you are not willing to invest in managing your reputation in the event of a major incident, you are exactly like the man who ignores the safety warnings on his car. One day your time will come. Both the trade and general media can be handled, for better or worse, with a good crisis management team. Now we must turn our attention to social media. This has changed the role of the media in maritime safety beyond all recognition. The driver is not What was the chain of events that led up to this incident? or even Who is to blame? Social media is about speed. Getting the message out fast, updating it minute by minute, and adding your own observation or thought to a swelling mass of sentiment. How can a company hit by an incident involving loss of life or pollution hope to counter this tsunami of ill-informed sentiment? In truth, social media is so new that no one has been able to demonstrate how it can be done effectively. We are told that shipping companies need to have an in-house social media expert responsible for placing the company s own message across all the necessary social media outlets. But while many of us have joined LinkedIn, or understand how Facebook works, or even tweet regularly, do we really know how to direct the flow of the social media tsunami? I m not even sure the crisis management experts, many of whom I know personally, are young enough to take this new danger seriously. Companies are serious about keeping investors aware of financial results, new investments in ships or sales of assets, and managing their reputation at the stock market level. Why are they failing to take seriously the dangers of social media, which can be more damaging to reputations than a small slip in quarterly profits? We only learn when we are at risk. This is a critical time for the shipping industry because we are all at risk, but only some of us are learning. I believe the Costa Concordia tragedy should not be regarded as an incident that defines maritime safety in the social media age. Costa Crociere and Carnival Corporation made a number of safety errors that led to this grounding, badly-coordinated evacuation and unnecessary loss of life. There were thousands of wealthy vacationers on board with access to social media tools and the opportunity to use them. The result has been deeply damaging for the ship s operator, owner and Master, although less damaging for the wider cruise industry. This is because maritime 33

34 regulators still have no investigatory report on which to base their conclusions, but they will wait as long as it takes. The social media circus has moved on. Many of the guests on Concordia will have enjoyed another cruise, this time without incident: the tweets they send home are about food and festivities onboard and ashore. This patient wait for conclusions is what marks out maritime professionals, and I include the trade media in this, from most bloggers and tweeters of the social media world. I recall being contacted in September 2007 by the head of the UK s marine accident investigation branch, which analyses shipping incidents and publishes recommendations based on their findings. He wanted me to pay special attention to the report of an incident in the Baltic Sea. The Annabella had suffered a collapse of containers during a period of heavy weather while en route for Helsinki. As a result of its analysis of the accident, the MAIB recommended that better communications was needed between shippers, planners, the loading terminal and the vessel so as to ensure the safe loading of a container ship. When combined with the investigation into the structural failure and flooding of the MSC Napoli, the agency identified a compelling need for a code of practice for container shipping, and the specialist maritime media was an obvious channel for getting that message across. In the February 2013 issue of IHS Safety at Sea magazine, a sister publication to IHS Fairplay, we read that extensive coverage of the dangers of using counterfeit Life Saving Appliances was rewarded when the crew of a Unicom-managed liquefied natural gas carrier checked their own man overboard signals, and discovered they were carrying one of the counterfeit beacons. The office issued claims to suppliers, and a new one was received promptly after that. Keeping seafarers, and their employers, aware of developments in maritime safety is part of the responsibility of trade publications. So the maritime media continues to play a role in indentifying bad practice, commending good practice, and encouraging everyone involved to make safety their top priority. 34

35 SESSION II

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37 The impact of goal based standards (GBS) safety level approach (SLA) on future regulations assuring safety at sea Anneliese Jost German Federal Ministry for Transport, Building and Urban Development Abstract This presentation describes the development of prescriptive safety requirements and their deficiency when it comes to increasingly complex systems on board. The struggle of enhancing the prescriptive framework when ship systems are increasingly complex by design is exemplarily shown. Based on the description of a goal based safety level approach a way of assuring a safety regime is proposed. Keywords: goal based standards safety level approach, risk based approval, increased complexity of ships and ship systems. 1. Setting the scene It seems timely to (re-)consider the need for adequate safety provisions in shipping and most particular to the life s at risk in seagoing trades. It is only a few days more than one hundred and one years ago when the presumably unsinkable Titanic foundered. The marine accident investigation as it would be called today led to the establishment of the first international Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Even though the first edition of SOLAS was agreed in , it never entered into force owing to the First World War. In 1929 a reviewed version (SOLAS ) was agreed and came into force governing all aspects that were regarded necessary in international shipping then. Ships were no longer made from wood and driven by sails. Instead, ships were increasingly built from iron or steel and mechanically propelled. Nevertheless, safety regulations were drawn up by stating carriage requirements of well-defined equipment or construction details. Thereby the safety regime prescribes a particular fitting, material, appliance or apparatus in order to address a specific safety segment. Many prescriptive details in ship design and construction had been developed empirically based on individual experience. This knowledge was passed on from father to son each facing their timely demands. In total the development of ship designs took place over generations. Equally, the movement of people and goods looked much alike regardless in which region it was carried out. With the early 90tees of former century shipping started to change considerably. There is a now distinct difference in the carriage of goods, since specialised ship 1 Full text SOLAS 1914, IMO knowledge center 2 Full text SOLAS 1929, IMO knowledge center 37

38 types have evolved, e.g. bulk carriers, tankers, container ships and general cargo ships. This process is accompanied by a continuous increase in the technological development, in particular for passenger transporting ships, causing a need for review of regulations in order to follow this development. Today, passenger ships are no longer involved in cross-ocean transport. This trade has been replaced by air traffic. Passenger ferry traffic has evolved. It may include carrying ro-ro cargoes additionally to passengers. There are cruise vessels in ever growing sizes as a means of leisure resorts. Almost all ships are made from steel that may be high tensile steel due to the fact that mild steel would not suffice. All ships are mechanically driven. Thus, specific parts of the ship are dedicated to ship operations not to payload. Since the early 1970s ships are certified in accordance with the global safety regime. Each ship needs to carry a variety of certificates issued by the Flag State Administration stating compliance with the global regime. This includes a ship safety construction certificate, which is issued based on an appropriate class certificate from a classification society. Compliance with the safety regime is to be re-confirmed regularly by these surveyors and inspectors respectively. This survey and certification scheme forms an integral part of the safety regime. Safety regulations have been amended again and again over the years. They are currently prescribing precisely a particular fitting, material, appliance or apparatus and its inspections in the context of carriage requirements drawn up for each of the safety segment covered by SOLAS. This envelope is set up to ensure safe ship designs and construction as well ship operations in a worldwide regime. It is covered in todays edition of SOLAS 1974, as amended 3. Flag State responsibility is disposed by referring to the state-of-the-art safety requirements. These are perceived to define an adequate level of safety. Comparing this prescriptive safety culture that originates from the time of the foundering of the Titanic, provokes to re-think the term adequate safety. In a prescriptive world, it is perceived that adherence to the rules will make a system inherently safe. This may have been a reason why the Titanic was perceived as unsinkable. One hundred years later, the understanding of safety changed. It is generally accepted that regardless of the size of investment in safety measures there will always be a remaining risk. Thus, proportionate safety measures can be measured by risk control options where a compelling need has been demonstrated that investment has a reasonable effect. For this kind of judgement a more structured approach of the term adequate safety level is proposed. 2. Safety is a complex problem in view of technical developments Following the technological development, ship designs as well as ship types have evolved over the years. Similarly, the tools used to design and built ships have continuously developed. This is of course true literally, but also in a wider sense. There are two main challenges today: firstly, the number of amendments based on tacit acceptance resulted in a safety regime, which may not be as consistent as 3 SOLAS1974/ 2009 and amendments, Imo publications 38

39 necessary. Where, for example, several amendments were introduced in the same regulation over time with different application provisions in each, decreasing transparency should not come as a surprise. Secondly, the substance to be regulated is increasingly complex and may not be covered by the safety regime in total. For illustration the following examples are offered. 2.1 Traditional safety rules (Intact Stability) A great challenge in the1930s was to design ships with adequate stability. At that time a large number of losses of fishing vessels in the Baltic Sea occurred. This fact triggered a research project with the aim of trying to establish adequate stability margins 4. The outcome of this study eventually led in 1939 to intact stability criteria (Rahola Criteria), which are used to judge the stability margins of all sizes and types of ships even today. However, it may be questionable if this is to be considered still adequate? The criteria developed then, had not been physically sound. The criteria had been developed based on observations with stability incidents of fishing vessels that had been smaller in length than 60 m and traditionally shaped. Hull forms had not been taken into account. Intact stability calculations were based on spreadsheet kind calculations and empirically developed factors to account for volumes and heeling levers. This was state-of the-art in the 1930s. Nevertheless, these same criteria nowadays are used to judge all ships stability characteristics. However, ship particulars will be drawn up using today s state-of-the-art computation methods. It took some 70 years to mandate intact stability criteria. In the expert discussions there was no agreement to be found with respect of a different empirically derived criterion. Part A of the Intact Stability Code , as amended, was made mandatory under SOLAS. It contains almost in the same wording the traditional Rahola Criteria. Only in 2008 the challenging task of developing physically sound vulnerability criteria to define adequate levels of stability was begun. It remains unclear when and to what extent more meaningful requirements for today s ship types and sizes will be agreed. 2.1 Mechanical fittings (construction of watertight doors) A ship includes many systems that have undergone technical development over the years. For example there was mechanic steering gear which is replaced by power operated steering gear. The design of watertight or fire boundaries and relevant closing devices, valves etc. has evolved. Such fittings, material, appliance or apparatus have been required to be fitted by a particular SOLAS version, applicable to a specific ship in accordance with her individual date of construction or delivery. Traditionally, matters of ship construction will be grandfathered for the lifetime of the ship. This includes the fitting of at least one watertight bulkhead at each end of the engine room compartment and the collision bulkhead in a prescribed location aft of the forward perpendicular, respectively. In particular in smaller ships passage through watertight bulkheads was compulsory for safe ship operations. 4 Jaakko Rahola, The judging of the stability of ships and the determination of the minimum amount of stability, Helsinki Intact Stabilty Code 2008, IMO publications 39

40 Thus watertight bulkheads had to be designed with doors. These doors would be required to be approved as watertight doors. According to the 1960s SOLAS, Chapter II construction, Regulation 13, these doors could either be hinged doors (1), hand operated sliding doors (2) or power operated sliding doors (3). The design and fitting of doors was surveyed and inspected on behalf of the Flag State Administration. Obviously, hand operated watertight hinged or sliding doors were required to be kept closed in general. If passage through was needed, compulsory closing and securing had to follow suit. The most commonly employed version was of course the hinged door. With respect to the safety regime this was a fair choice. Since there is no risk of progressive flooding, if these doors are maintained closed or immediately closed after passage and secured during the ships voyage. However, in case of a need to pass through the door in the event of flooding when using the escape route, this door was not operating if there was a head of water pressing the door blade into the frame. This route was no longer usable. Rule development, therefore, required the operability of watertight doors in way of escape routes in consideration of possible flooding. Thus, the higher standards of watertight doors were mandated. SOLAS , Chapter II-1, Regulation 13 and 13-1, respectively, require that the number of openings in watertight subdivisions is to be kept to a minimum compatible with the design and proper working of the ship. Doors used at sea need to be of power operated type and they need to be remotely controlled from the bridge. Furthermore: it shall be possible to open and close the door by hand at the door itself from both sides. Openings in watertight bulkheads (subdivisions) are still necessary. Passage through such doors remains an issue. However, the design of such doors has become much more complex. On-site testing may not be possible in all occasions. The approval of the system has become a more complex task. It involves more details and additional features than before. It will also include drawings on the remote control system and panel on the bridge, the power systems and power failure concepts. The safety concept describing the remote operation of the door needs to be designed so that anyone involved will not be misled using it. A guideline on the use of watertight doors (MSC Circ. 1380) and their closing and securing was agreed in Remotely controlled equipment (lifeboats) SOLAS further requires equipment, e.g. for fire protection, lifesaving, communications and navigation. There are many carriage requirements for state-ofthe-art equipment. This may or may not be similar to that used in land-based entities. Requirements on evacuation and escape routes have intentionally been updated to be similar to concepts as used by land-based fire teams. This was done in view of the possible advantages in benefitting from the support of land-based teams. However, it led to more complex systems installed on board. Any additional risk, as may result from the stand-alone situation a ship when at sea, was not discussed. 6 SOLAS 2009, IMO publications 40

41 Lifeboats are equipment, which is not generally used in land-based situations. Ships are required to carry at least two one on each side compatible with the number of persons on board. Only when lifeboats are located on the centreline, there is no need to duplicate the number of the equipment. Lifeboats have undergone a considerable technical development since the Titanic. The latest revision of Chapter III of SOLAS, the supporting lifesaving appliances code (LSA Code) 7 and testing provisions 8 entered into force in The regulations with respect to design and size of lifeboats have not been adapted to allow for the rapid increase in size of cruise ships. If needed, new concepts have been accepted and approved under the alternative design scheme (see below). Lifeboats are carried on deck readily accessible, if needed. They are required to be fitted with release systems. Furthermore, there is a regularly mandated drill to be carried out by the ship s crew. The release-hook-systems required for lifeboats, in contrast to the lifeboat design, have undergone substantial technical improvement in the wake of recorded multiple problems of aging equipment. The most up-to-date release-hook-systems shall be remotely controlled from inside the boat according to a standardized operating scheme. The systems must be designed to comply with requirements for the on-loadrelease type and be re-approved in accordance with re-updated testing requirements. Following a drill lifeboats are retrieved from the water. The hooks have to be reintroduced and the release-hook-systems closed and secured before the lifeboat is hoisted back on deck. Lessons to be learned from failing of release-hook-systems led, firstly, to mandating improved release-hook-systems to be designed as on-load type. This means that the opening mechanism must remain operational in on-load condition. Unfortunately, equipment failures continued. Records indicated still high numbers of fatalities during the mandatory lifeboat drills. Finally, a further review of the applicable requirements was carried out. Re-revising the testing requirements for such hooksystems was agreed. This scheme is currently being implemented. This re-review resulted solely in amendments to the test procedures for individual pieces of equipment. The implementation includes retrofitting of the new safety measures on all existing ships. For an interim period, until the re-evaluation and retrospective implementation of existing ships has been concluded, fall preventer devices (FPDs) are mandated. Even within the current reappraisal of release-hook-systems, there continues to be no requirement for an approval of the integrated release-hook-systems. All necessary parts continue to be tested and approved on an individual basis. These may be assembled as per yards decision regardless of longer-term considerations on maintenance and operational needs. Release-hook-systems are but one example of mechanically operated complex systems employed on board where due to technical developments partly based on 7 Lifesaving appliances (LSA) Code, as amended, IMO publications 8 MSC Res 81(70), as amended, IMO publications 41

42 increased safety demands survey and judgement of compliance with state-of-theart requirements have become a complex issue. There are many more examples for vital systems installed on board ships, including measures to support officer in charge on the bridge, deck officers loading cargoes and deriving strength and stability particulars, engineers controlling the machinery and steering gear. Modern ships regardless of type and service area are designed to include as much support as possible to the human in charge. 2.3 Complex systems used on board In general regulations on required safety systems today, to be fitted are by far more complex than previously. Technical developments as those described in the example have been triggered by a perceived need to enhance relevant safety related requirements. This perceived need has become more and more frequent. In many cases the enhancement of the safety regime was initiated by lessons learned from a casualty that had received more or less public attention. Recalling only a few of the more recent incidents, e.g. the HARALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE, the SCANDANIAN STAR, the EXXON VALDEZ, the ESTONIA, the ERIKA and the PRESTIGE some similarities can be drawn up. In each of the accident investigation reports the main conclusions referred to operational anomalies. Standards related to ship design and construction had been enhanced even though expert opinions concluded otherwise. It seems like regulators accept that the wider public will only be able to understand the enhancements, if they can literally be seen or painted. In each of these incidents safety measures had to be introduced in a timely manner. It was perceived that immediate action was required. This has led to a situation where the enhancing of the safety regime has become a perceived continuous process. Some of the updating and re-updating of Regulations may in itself include misgivings. There is not sufficient time to evaluate the implementation of amendments in respect of the complexity of provisions included in the Conventions. In light of the grandfathering granted to existing ships on construction standards, the acceptable safety level of different generations of ships differs. In order to support safe ship operations, the International Safety Management (ISM) 9 Code has been developed and introduced in SOLAS in the late 1980s. This development aims at the human element in a wider context. The Codes objective is to define the responsibilities in shipping. It requires a management system to be drawn up for each ship of any company. The safety management system is overarching. It includes also land-based responsibilities. Thus it embraces all operational aspects of a specific ship. The ISM Code does not include ship design and construction. These measures remain to be regulated by International Conventions, Rules of Classification Societies, agreed technical standards and specific national requirements, if applicable. Compliance with these requirements is proven and confirmed by a regular 9 International Safety Management (ISM) Code, as amended, Res. A 741(18), IMO publications 42

43 survey and inspection scheme. This is continuously updated in accordance with the enhancement of the safety regime. According to the UNCLOS Convention 10 it is the Flag States responsibility to monitor the seaworthiness of any ship. The examples above illustrate some of the challenges the regulators face trying to dispose this responsibility. Survey and Inspection in itself may be challenging when the systems to be judged vary from ship to ship. Such systems may be placed on the market by a large variety of manufacturers not using standardized concepts for operation and maintenance of their equipment. Survey and Inspection become more challenging exercises where the fittings, material, appliance or apparatus are no longer mechanical systems but mechatronic or electronic or even integrated electronically controlled systems. These enhanced systems and their continued well-functioning cannot be monitored in a meaningful manner by yardsticks or checklists. Extended use of complex technical solutions for vital systems employed in or on a ship has become a complex problem in itself. Globally applied standards are one of the prerequisites of today s world trade. Due to the Flag State principle any ship operator is invited to optimize with the goal of finding a most economically sound safety regime for his services. Open registers have overtaken the traditional role of a Flag State Administration in which country the managing owner was physically located. Hence, meaningful supplementary national regulations are no longer a solution for local issues. It is the no-more-favourable-treatment concept which triggers level playing fields both for all involved. 3. Safety level approach Where a global regime is put in place, it has to be transparent and allow for visibly objective implementation. For a long time this objective has been the driving concept when enhancing the deterministic requirements contained in IMO Conventions, e.g. the current SOLAS Convention. As shown, the complexity of very technical substance and many amendments have developed the Convention into a safety regime widely open for differing interpretations on the applicable safety level. Different interpretations of substance must not result in port entry problems faced by individual ships. Deterministic requirements provide for a transparent implementation where the application is easily accessible and the measures in use can be judged by intuition, e.g. the closure of a man hole by its cover is acceptably watertight when the bolts are evenly spaced not more than 10 D apart. (D is the bolt diameter). Technical developments have led to increasingly complex ships and ship systems. Shipping the backbone of world trade is expected to function without interruptions regardless of weather conditions in any part of the world. Technical enhancements shall improve these services. Such demand can no longer be addressed in a timely manner by deterministic concepts. It may only be satisfactorily addressed, if the enhancement of the safety regime including those parts that pertain to ship design and construction is 10 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN publications 43

44 carried out carefully taking into account both state-of-the art technical development and the expected 30 years of service. Thus, frequent amendments to any safety regime including possible needs for retrofitting should be avoided. The safety regime in itself needs to provide for updating without needing explicit amendments. In other industry sectors (where mass production is employed), this kind of regime is put in place by defining proto type tests. These may include non-destructive as well as destructive testing, if it is ensured to embrace all intended modes of use. The scope and procedures for such tests were developed based on risk models and formal safety assessments including failure mode analysis. Risk evaluation criteria and risk acceptance criteria have to be defined. Due to the intensity of the tests carried out, complex systems can be proven to remain fit for purpose throughout the intended period of use. Ships are not built in such large numbers. Thus, a concept for proto type testing of ships similar to airplanes is not feasible. In shipping the number of variations in cargoes and trading patterns is too large. Nevertheless, tools for assessing and defining safety measures in shipping need to be modernised in a way that accounts for more than lessons to be learned from incidents (incident statistics are rather small, due the very small numbers of occurrences in shipping and missing consequent collection). Thus, it is time to reconsider the mechanics of the safety regime. The current practice of almost continuously amending prescriptive rules and regulations has been criticised by all stakeholders: Regulators are constantly at work without the possibility to evaluate the amendments effects; Operators have to maintain an overview in the evolving situation and plan for investments; and finally, Monitoring by surveyors and inspectors is hampered. The safety regime in total is becoming less and less transparent. Sophisticated practices to address numerous different highly complex systems for advanced technical standards are needed. These technical standards themselves are evolving increasingly. As a structured means of addressing such needs Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) has been introduced into the IMO regime. One of the objectives of FSA is to verify both cost efficiency (1) and proportionality (2) of any proposed new measure. In addition, a policy of reviewing FSA reports has been put in place to ensure a proportional approach on decision making. In the longer term this concept, however, it will only provide for adequate safety of ships in general, if it is implemented holistically. For this reason a comprehensive goal oriented risk-based-approach was agreed in IMO s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in the beginning of this century. In trying not to underline the negative connotation this kind of reference to risk implies, the IMO calls the concept safetylevel-approach. 44

45 The overall objective is to relate the IMO mission statement to the developed safety regime by means of a structured process. Figure 1 has been taken from a discussion paper to MSC. It illustrates the mechanics of such a concept. The vertical lines show the safety segments. Each horizontal section relates to one of the six tiers included in the concept. Figure 1: presents the goal based standards safety level approach (MSC 81/6/2). The column to the left identifies the stakeholder s responsibilities. This figure includes the background for a structured risk based approach and the stakeholders involvement. As expected, the largest part of the responsibility of the safety regime remains with the regulator. The stakeholder s involvement is more explicitly shown in Figure 2. With such a tiered approach a justifiable safety regime is defined. It accounts for lessons to be learned. Future enhancements will become included conceptually, by means of the regular updating process of the casualty data. 45

46 Figure 2 11 : the current safety regime presented as part of the GBS SLA approach (MSC 90/5/2) The adequate safety level still needs to be decided. Any additional safety measure proposed should be presented as a prescriptive requirement. Such new requirements would be verified against the goals (tier 1) and functional requirements (tier 2). The particular proposal is one of many possible means to address both this particular goal and the related functional requirement. Based on a cost benefit analysis the effect of the additional safety measure on the safety level will be discussed and decided. The effects to be expected are accounted for in a more comprehensive manner extending beyond the current safety segments. Any not intended additional consequence of a proposed amendment may be identified. Therefore, the imminent challenge is to comprehensively develop safety goals and functional requirements pertaining to the safety regime currently in use, e.g. SOLAS. Figure 3: safety goals shall be developed. 11 Figures 2, 3 and 4 by Dr. Rainer Hamann, Germanischer Lloyd 46

47 Safety of life at sea in this figure means anything covered by IMO s safety instruments, including in particular SOLAS, Load Lines Convention, etc. Specific areas of safety related functions are grouped in Figure 4. These functions will be addressed by both statutory requirements and class Rules. As mentioned before some functionalities are currently supported by classification societies Rules. These are regularly updated based on a structured approach defined by each of these organisations. Thus, a process has to be developed for justifying these updates to goals and functional requirements without hampering the competition of the different societies. Figure 4: Sectors of Ship safety. There are two options for adapting today s safety regime to a goal based standards safety level approach. They may be used in parallel. 3.1 Proving for an equivalent level of safety Within the SOLAS requirements there have always been exemption and equivalent provisions. These pertain to novel ship designs and situations where requirements of a particular fitting, material, appliance or apparatus, or type thereof may be waived or accepted otherwise to the discretion of the Flag State Administration. Exemptions and equivalencies, if used rarely, do not constitute an issue. Where however, the general demands are no longer addressed by the safety regime, there is a need to define a process more clearly that opens up for other compliance schemes in parallel. This was the objective when within those chapters of SOLAS that provide for ship design and equipment an additional section was introduced. This new alternative acceptance procedure allows for replacement of the ship construction provisions prescriptively spelled out. It introduces a concept of bringing all responsible entities to one table. It requires their agreement on any proposed alternative means. The threshold to be overcome is the task to prove an equivalent level of safety. 47

48 In the revised fire protection provisions that entered into force in 2002, this concept had been included for the first time. It raised many questions within the responsible parties. Meanwhile this procedure is widely used within the same safety regime. For large cruise vessels it remains the only way to judge proposed safety provisions. However, there remains to be a lack of guidance for overarching consequences. For example: Installing a lifeboat other than that required in the relevant SOLAS Chapter III, will presumably also effect mustering and evacuation. Evacuation requirements, however, are covered in the fire protection context. There is no mandatory requirement to simulate the effects on any fitting within the general arrangement on evacuation. Therefore, any alternative solution will not be evaluated in this holistic way. The process of the alternative compliance scheme has been supported by the development of several guidelines. The latest guidelines currently under development are the Guidelines for the approval of equivalents and alternatives as provided for in various IMO instruments. 3.2 Developing generic safety levels In parallel to the approval of equivalents and alternatives the safety level approach in a more generic process is brought forward. In the context of several ship type specific formal safety assessments developed within research projects a description of an abstract level of safety prescribed for specific ship types is being developed. The motivation for developing a generic safety level approach is the need by administrations for improved ways of traceable, transparent and objective approval of highly complex ship system not only in the new built situation but also covering the entire working life of the ship. Eventually such a framework will have to cover the entire ship holistically, including all her systems, e.g. propulsion, electric power generation and distribution, navigation, steering, evacuation systems etc. A transparent process needs to be developed into which the comprehensive risk evaluation is integrated. This process will be based on hazard identification, risk quantification and risk evaluation criteria. It will result in functional requirements that are goal oriented and quantified. Due to the risk evaluation criteria, compliance with the set safety level may be proven by using risk acceptance criteria. Once the transitional period of comparing to previously acceptable solutions is overcome, any safety measure will be identifiable by its functional requirements and the boundary conditions in which it is expected to remain useful. The safety regime based on this concept will include a transparent compliance process defining safety objectives for each step, a recommended analysis effort, as well as predefined documentation. By means of this documentation the process becomes measurable and objective. 4. Assuring safety at sea Assuring safety at sea is the governing concept under which SOLAS surveys and certification are carried out. It is the prerequisite for port entry of foreign flagged vessels and thus for world trade. For a number of years already, it has become more important to present to third parties, e.g. port state control officers, evidence of approved and accepted fittings, material, appliance or apparatus. 48

49 As illustrated above any ship and her outfitting will include complex systems, which cannot be understood easily. Thus the Flag State Administration in the first place, but likewise anybody who is required to understand and/or use such systems, will have to be well informed about the proper use and any limitations that the specific installation may have. Manufacturers of such installation will not only have to prove its fitness for purpose, but provide for details thereof.also by means of operating and maintenance manuals The proof of finesst for purpose of any fittings, material, appliance or apparatus in respect of safety is currently carried out by looking at the approval certification. This review is limited to show compliance with governing prescriptive standards that may or may not be meaningful (physically relevant) for any identified hazard. If a system installed on board is not regarded vital to the safety regime, it will not even be looked at. For example a ballast water system is not regarded a vital system for the ship. Its details are not approved for the safety regime. If it was a computer optimized ballast water system, the optimization goal may be optimizing fuel consumption. Due to the adverse effects of free surfaces on stability, its use may result in stability deficiencies, even though the system itself has not been appraised. Complex systems can systematically be verified by making use of a failure mode effect analysis and the verification against set criteria. Such studies would be carried out by the system designers, involving any administration, classification society and additional expert opinion as and where necessary. This regime is embraced by the safety level approach ina wider context. Qualitative and quantitative analysis as well as risk evaluation criteria constitute integral parts of the safety level approach. Compliance is verified against risk acceptance criteria and explained in detail within the documentation available on board. Based on this documentation surveyors and inspectors are supported in carrying out their respective duties. 5. Conclusions Today s safety regime is regarded to be over prescriptive and suffers from the almost continuous process of tacit amendments. Thus, actual safety level varies for individual ships depending on the year of built. This situation is in general terms not acceptable to all stakeholders. Thus, there seems to be a need for a move towards a more sophisticated safety regime. The proposed new safety regime shall better address the increasingly complex technical provisions on board ships. A modern definition of adequate safety provisions will best be based on a risk based concept, including risk evaluation and risk acceptance criteria. The new more generic safety regime should thus be developed based on a goal based standards safety level approach. This kind of regime will better support surveyors and inspector when monitoring safety measures and continued well-functioning of complex ship-design and construction applications, including any fitting, material, appliance or apparatus as may be evolving to better address safety goals; 49

50 support ship designers when implementing technical developments; support ship owners when optimizing their services both with respect to new built vessels and adaptation of fleets in service to other modes of operation; and support regulators to update the safety regime where lessons to be learned shall be introduced. Based on risk acceptance criteria a level playing field for all competitors should be developed. The risk acceptance criteria would be based on formal safety assessments carried out as and where a ship owner intends to employ technically enhanced systems. The motivation for investing in this course of action is the improved overall safety performance and increased adaptation to specific needs. 50

51 Technological advances in risk management Francis Zachariae, Deputy Director General Danish Maritime Authority, Denmark 1. Introduction The Danish Maritime Authority cooperates with other Baltic states and various nongovernment partners on how to use knowledge of risks and risk models as a basis for the development of technology that helps minimize the risk of accidents at sea. The Baltic Sea is the testing ground for these projects, but once development is complete, the new technologies can potentially increase safety of shipping all over the world. 2. Enhancing global maritime safety through regional cooperation When the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was adopted as the Union s first macro-regional strategy in 2009, its priority areas addressed a long range of issues of which one is maritime safety. The overall ambition of the Strategy is for the Baltic Sea to become a leading region in maritime safety and security. The Danish Maritime Authority in close cooperation with the Finnish Transport Safety Agency serve as coordinators for the topic of maritime safety and security in the Strategy. Our main task is to facilitate a policy dialogue among the countries of the Baltic Sea Region and to monitor and develop projects regarding maritime safety and security. In order to ensure that the activities are anchored all over the region, the Priority Area Coordinators have created an international Steering Committee encompassing representatives of relevant maritime authorities in the Baltic Sea States and regional organisations such as HELCOM, NDPTL and CBSS as well as the European Commission. The Committee has an ongoing dialogue on maritime safety and security issues, and in 2012 it undertook the preparation of a joint, regional scenario for the development of maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea Region. This scenario is expected to lead to joint discussions on how to plan and prioritise investments and work in accordance with the future needs of the region. Historically, the countries around the Baltic Sea have been leading players in shipping, and even today our nations have a strong influence globally. Vessels registered in Denmark, e.g. take care of 10% of global trade, and the Baltic Sea countries are very well connected with numerous ferry routes. In Finland, some of the world s largest and most modern cruise liners are being built. The region also has a lot of competent suppliers to the maritime sector. We have previously seen that new technology and methodology developed in this region for the maritime sector has spread to become a new global standard. A good example of this is the Automatic Identification System (AIS) that allows vessels to see the course and speed of one another, and allows authorities to monitor real time vessel traffic from ashore. 51

52 A common understanding and an innovative approach mean that the region can easily serve as a laboratory and test bed for new initiatives. The next successful example of this will likely be the e-navigation system with dynamic provision of data to the helmsman. This system is to a large extent developed in the countries around the Baltic Sea and the results are already being followed by countries all over the world. On top of this, e-navigation could potentially be part of the solution to the challenges of increased traffic in Arctic waters IWRAP a tool to assess the risk of collision or grounding Since 2006 The Danish Maritime Authority has worked with IALA and the software company Gatehouse to develop a toolbox called IWRAP 13 (IALA Waterway Risk Assessment Program). IWRAP estimates the expected number of collisions and groundings in a given area. The toolbox uses AIS data to generate a model of the area. The model consists of a number of legs with information of the number of ships divided into ship types and ship sizes. How the ships sail relative to the legs are also computed. The results can be shown graphically on a chart, providing a warning of where incidents are likely to occur. The toolbox has been tested in several parts of the world and the results of predictions are close to historically observed values. IWRAP is part of the IALA risk management toolbox, which also includes the Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment (PAWSA). IMO SN circular 296 recommends using the IALA risk management toolbox when assessing the risks for a given waterway. 4. Automated detection of abnormal ship behaviour The Danish Maritime Authority has recently started a project, which will make it possible to detect abnormal behaviour of ships in Danish waters. The purpose is to gain insight into what is actually going on in Danish waters. Once the software is fully developed, it is expected to be able to detect abnormal behaviour before accidents occur making it more likely to avoid those accidents. The software combines two methods: The first method is based on statistics. The relevant area is divided into cells of 400 x 400 meters. Calculations are made for each cell creating statistics on ship types, ship sizes, speed and course over ground. This information is stored in a database. When a new ship enters a cell, the database is updated and the system calculates the probability that the ship s behaviour is definable as normal when compared to existing data. The second method is based on the ship domain theory. If either a ship or the bottom of the sea enters the safety domain of a ship, this is stored as a possible abnormal incident. The size of the domain depends on the ship type, ship size and its speed. 12 Further information can be found at and 13 Further information can be found at 52

53 SESSION III

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55 Safety of the fishing fleet new stability criterion Maciej Pawłowski Polski Rejestr Statków, Poland Abstract The paper proposes a new stability criterion for small vessels such as boats and fishing cutters. These vessels often lack technical documentation, and are not covered by any stability rules. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a method for stability assessment of such boats based on a simple criterion that does not require a reconstruction of the vessel s documentation. This can be achieved on the basis of the inclining test. Keywords: stability, safety, small vessels below 24 m in length 1. Assumptions Formally, small vessels are not covered by stability requirements. IMO regulations apply to vessels over 24 m in length [1]. Statistical data over the years invariably indicate large numbers of casualties in the fishing fleet [2], of the order of 24 thousand of life losses per year. Thus, Polish Register of Shipping (PRS) has embarked on the development of a stability criterion for small vessels. The criterion shall be based on the following assumptions: the vessel lacks technical documentation; the heeling moment is generated by people and gears located on the vessel side; the action of the moment is static; for boats without a deck the heeling moment cannot exceed the range of initial stability φ D, i.e. the angle at which the deck is immersed in the water or the (assumed) bilge comes out of the water, whichever is smaller. 2. Theoretical basis A heel of the vessel due to the action of a certain nominal weight p, shifted from the ship s plane of symmetry (PS) to the side results from the equilibrium between the heeling and restoring moments. The heeling moment, induced by a horizontal shift of the weight is equal to pecosφ, where e is the horizontal shift of the weight and φ is the heeling angle. If we assume that the metacentre remains constant the righting moment is given by the equation Dh 0 sinφ, where D is the vessel s buoyancy (unknown) and h 0 GM is the initial metacentric height (unknown). By equating the two moments we obtain an equilibrium equation: pecosφ = Dh 0 sinφ, yielding the heel angle: tanφ = pe/dh 0, (1) 55

56 B ) called the metacentric equation. This angle should not exceed the range of initial stability, denoted by φ D, i.e. φ φ D, where tanφ D = 2f/ Bm; f is the minimum freeboard H = T, but not more than 0.8T, H is the depth of the boat, T is the draft, and BB m is the maximum breadth of the boat. Hence, we get the following inequality: pe D h 0 f, 1 2 B m (2) The product of buoyancy and metacentric height Dh 0, termed in ship s theory the coefficient of stiffness is important not only in ship statics but also in ship dynamics, as it determines the vessel natural frequency of roll. Substituting e = ½ Bm, equation (2) yields: (Dh 0)f/(½B 2 m p. Dividing this inequality by the gravitational acceleration g, we get an inequality in the category of mass: 2 (Mh 0 )f/(½ Bm) m, (3) where m is the mass of the nominal weight, and M is the vessel mass. Inequality (3) can be regarded as a stability criterion provided that the mass stiffness coefficient Mh 0 is known and the nominal mass m is defined. Introducing the notation K Mh 0 for the coefficient of mass stiffness, inequality (3) reads: 2 Kf m(½ Bm). (4) It can also be written as: Kf/½ Bm m½bb m. The latter inequality indicates that its left hand-side, i.e. Kf/½ Bm is nothing other than the restoring moment at the angle φ D, defining the range of initial stability (the moments are divided by g). Inequality (4) shows that the restoring moment at the critical heel angle must be greater than the heeling moment induced by the load at the vessel s side. The coefficient of mass stiffness can be determined precisely with the help of an inclining test, which does not require any technical documentation of the vessel ( Fig. 1). 56

57 Fig. 1. Inclining test 3. Criterion The key issue in applying relation (4) as stability criterion is the knowledge of the mass of the nominal weight m, charging the vessel s side. Reference [3] postulates m = 0,13M, that is 13 percent of the vessel s mass, which is virtually unknown. For the needs of the criterion an estimate of the ship s mass is sufficient: M = ρlbtδ = ρδ(τ/β)lb2 = ρcmlb2, (5) where L, B, T are the main particulars of the boat at the waterplane during the inclining test (outside the hull), δ is the block coefficient, ρ is the water density, and cm δ/(b/t) is the coefficient of the vessel s displacement. The block coefficient has to be determined from a regression formulation: δ = 0,775α 0,131, (6) but not less than 0,30, where α is the coefficient of fineness for the waterplane, obtained by measuring the waterplane ordinates during the test (Fig. 2). 57

58 Fig. 2. Waterline dimensioning For five fishing boats analysed in reference [3], the displacement factors c M were from the range 0,10 0,15, with an average value c M 0,12. In the case of 35 boats tested by PRS, the displacement factors were from the range 0,07 0,25, with an average value c M 0,15. As the nominal mass m = 0,13M, we obtain: m = c m ρlb 2, (7) where the coefficient of the nominal mass c m = 0,13c M, while the coefficient of displacement c M δ/(b/t). In the case of lack of data we can assume c M = 0,14. Due to the wide spread of the coefficient of displacement, resulting from a wide spread of the ratio B/T, it is recommended to assess the coefficient of displacement using the said equation. The ratio of B/T for tested boats was from the range 1,75 6. Substituting to equation (4) the mass m, given by equation (7), we get the stability criterion in the form: Kf ¼c m ρlb 2 Bm 2. (8) The above criterion does not require any technical documentation. If no data is available we can adopt the nominal mass coefficient c m = 0,13 0,14 = 0,0182, irrespective of the vessel size. Criterion (8) can be presented in terms of the righting arms. Dividing it by ½MB m, where M is the vessel mass, we obtain: l D l C, (9) 58

59 where l D = (K/M) t is the righting arm at the angle φ D, i.e. at the angle at which the deck edge is immersed or the (assumed) bilge comes out of the water, whichever is smaller, determined on the basis of the measurement of boat stiffness K and freeboard f, M is the boat mass, t tanφ D = f /½ Bm is the tangent of the angle determining the range of initial stability, and l C = 0,13 ½ Bm = 0,065B m B has the meaning of the minimum righting arm (lower bound), identical with the maximum heeling arm. As we can see, it is proportional to the vessel breadth B m. According to IMO, however, parameters of the righting arm, treated as minimal, remain constant for ships with length L > 24 m, which means that for bigger vessels the maximum heeling arm l C should also be constant. Criterion (9) generally applies to vessels for which the heeling moment is produced by people and equipment placed on vessel side, as adopted in the assumptions. These are predominantly fishing vessels up to 24 m in length. Bigger vessels are assumed to have technical documentation. For such ships criterion (8) could be treated as an interim criterion. In criterion (8) the nominal mass m charging the boat s side is 13% of the vessel s mass. It follows from this criterion that the minimum righting lever at the angle at which the deck edge is immersed in water equals l = 0,065 Bm. For vessels of breadth B = 3 m, this yields l = 0,195 m, which seems to be reasonable. It proves that the value of the nominal mass has been fixed correctly. As the right hand-side of criterion (8) grows with the size of the ship it needs to be limited to comply with the IMO philosophy regarding stability criteria. It can be done in two ways. When the boat length is over 20 m, the boat length in criterion (8) should be taken as L = 20 m. Alternatively, the minimum restoring arm l C in criterion (9) need not be bigger than, for example, l C = 0,32 m. 4. Boats with deck The above considerations are fully adequate for open boats without a deck. Among the investigated boats there were six such vessels, which all satisfied criterion (8) with ample margin. However, in the case of boats with deck, nearly half of the boats (precisely 37 out of 58) did not satisfy the criterion, though they had decent GZcurves. For open boats the righting arm l D at the angle of deck edge immersion is the maximum arm. In the case of boats with a deck the deck edge may be immersed in water. Thus, the maximum righting arm occurs for angles beyond the range of initial stability. For such boats the stability criterion remains the same provided that the arm l D is treated as the maximum righting arm l max. The determination of the maximum righting arm is much more involved than determination of the righting arm l D at the angle of deck edge immersion or the (assumed) bilge emergence. For the angle of heel φ = φ max, where the GZ-curve reaches maximum, the derivative of the GZ-curve, which is the same as the metacentric height h = r BZ, vanishes, where BZ = a + l d is the height of the centre of gravity above the centre of buoyancy, a = z G z B is the height 59

60 of the centre of gravity above the centre of buoyancy in the upright position, and l d is the dynamic arm, i.e. the integral curve of the righting arm l. Thus, the angle φ max determines the equation: r = BZ. Hence, r = a + l d, (10) where a z G z B = r 0 h 0 is a constant, easy to determine. The dynamic lever equals l d (l d ) D + l D Δφ + ⅔ΔlΔφ, (11) where l D and (l d ) D are the righting and dynamic arm at the angle of deck edge immersion φ D, respectively, while Δφ φ max φ D, and Δl l max l D is the increase of the GZ-curve; the constant ⅔ results from adopting a square approximation for the GZ-curve between the angle φ D and φ max. With the square approximation of the GZ-curve after exceeding the angle φ D the maximum righting lever is equal to l max = l D + ½l D 'Δφ, where l D ' h D is the derivative of the GZ-curve at the angle φ D. Assuming that at the range of initial stability the GZcurve is expressed by the metacentric equation l = h 0 sinφ, thus h D = h 0 cosφ D, and the increase of the GZ-curve equals: Δl ½h 0 Δφcosφ D. By accounting for this result the last expression in equation (11) reads: ⅓h 0 (Δφ) 2 cosφ D, whereas the right hand-side of equation (10), i.e. the segment BZ, reads: BZ = r 0 h 0 cosφ D [1 t c Δφ ⅓(Δφ) 2 ], (12) where t c = f c /½ Bm. Should we assume that the run of the metacentric radii above the angle φ D is analogical as for a rectangular pontoon, then 1,5 r0 tc tc tc r = 3 0 = 2 0 cos tg = r cos tg r cos sin, φ φ φ φ φ φ 1,5 1,5 (13) where r 0 is the initial metacentric radius. In reality, metacentric radii for boats are s times bigger then indicated by equation (13), see Fig. 3. Accounting that sinφcosφ = ½sin2φ, we obtain: r = sr 0 (2t c /sin2φ) 1,5, where s is the boat s metacentric radius related to the radius r, as given by equation (13). The ratio s varies with the angle of heel. For the sake of simplicity, a constant value of s can be assumed, equal to the ratio of metacentric radii in an upright position, but not more than 0,9s max, where s max is a certain maximum value, which will be discussed later. This is a rough approximation for the average s value. 60

61 Taking into account the foregoing considerations equation (10) reads: sr 0 (2t c /sin2φ) 1,5 = r 0 h 0 cosφ D [1 t c Δφ ⅓(Δφ) 2 ]. Dividing both sides by the initial metacentric radius r 0 we get a non-dimensional form: s(2t c /sin2φ) 1,5 = 1 (h 0 /r 0 )cosφ D [1 t c Δφ ⅓(Δφ) 2 ], (14) 1,8 1,6 1,4 1,2 1 0,8 cutter 0,6 0,4 pontoon 0,2 deg Fig. 3. Exemplary curve of the metacentric radius (WŁA-84) where Δφ φ max φ D is in radians This is a transcendental equation relative to φ φ max, which can be solved iteratively, e.g. using Goal seek in Excel. The equation may have no solution if a graph of the left hand-side exceeds a maximum value of the right hand-side, i.e. if the factor s is too big, that is to say, if s > s max. The accuracy of solution for φ max depends on the accuracy of estimation of the factor s. Equations (14) determines s = s(φ) as a function of the angle of heel (Fig. 4); the factor s is understood as the ratio of the function on the right hand-side and the power function on the left hand-side of equations (14). A maximum value s max corresponds to the maximum of the function s = s(φ), which for the investigated boats occurs almost exactly at the angle φ = 50, irrespective of the parameters t c and h 0 /r 0. However, if the parameter h 0 /r 0 is over-predicted maximum of the function s can occur at angles higher than 50. In such cases s max should be taken for the angle 50. The maximum drops rapidly with the rise of the parameter t c tanφ D, i.e. with the rise of the range of initial stability. For the range of interest, it is marginally affected by the parameter h 0 /r 0. The knowledge of φ max allows for determination of the ratio l max /l D, i.e. the degree of an increase of the maximum arm relative to l D. The maximum lever l max = l D + Δl, thus l max = l D + ½h 0 Δφcosφ D. 61

62 Dividing both sides of the equation by l D = h 0 sinφ D and introducing the notation c D l max /l D, the impact of the deck on the increase of the maximum lever takes the form: c D = 1 + ½Δφ/t c, (15) where Δφ φ max φ D, and φ max is the root of equation (14). With the help of the factor c D the maximum lever is equal to l max c D l D, the increase of the maximum lever Δl = (c D 1)l D, and Δφ = 2(c D 1)t c. Determination of the factor c D, as above, refers to the situation when the angle of flooding φ f is greater than the angle φ max at which the GZ-curve reaches maximum. Otherwise, the factor c D is affected by the angle of flooding, as follows: c D = 1 + ½c f Δφ/t c, where c f = 1 (Δφ f /Δφ) 2 is a reduction coefficient, accounting for the angle of flooding φ f, if it is smaller than the angle φ max, while Δφ f φ f φ D. Determination of the angle of flooding without the technical documentation is a quite difficult task. It can be visually estimated, in proportion to the angle of deck edge immersion. The quantity Δφ φ max φ D remains unaffected by the angle of flooding. Fig. 4. Factor s Fig. 5 presents correlation between l max = c D l D, where c D is given by equation (15), with the angle φ max as the root of equation (14), and the actual l max, taken from the vessel s documentation. The levers are in meters. As can be seen, on average l max is overestimated by 16,5%. 62

63 Fig. 5. Correlation between the estimated and actual l max values If φ max in equation (15) is taken from the vessel s documentation we get the correlation presented in Fig. 6. Now, the value l max is overestimated by 10,7%. If the data are correct, this could be the effect of the square approximation of the GZcurve in the left hand-side proximity of the peak. The spread of points, similarly as in Fig. 5, results from a rough approximation of the metacentric radii for large heel angles φ > φ D, as well as from the occurrence of deck sheer and superstructure. The spread is also affected by the assumed nature of the bilge, when the freeboard is big. In view of the above remarks, correlation between the calculated and real points appears to be quite good. The correlation depends on the quality of estimation of the factor s. Taking the ratio of the initial metacentric radii is only a rough approximation of the factor s. Fig. 6. Correlation between the estimated and actual l max values if φ max is taken from documentation 63

64 5. Proposed criterion Taking into account the foregoing considerations, a stability criterion is suggested in terms of righting levers. A vessel is deemed to meet stability requirements if it satisfies the inequality: c D l D l C, (16) where c D reflects the effect of deck on the increase of the maximum righting arm, l D is the righting lever at the angle φ D determining the range of initial stability, the same as in equation (9), and l C = 0,065 Bm, but not more than 0,32 m, is a minimum righting lever. For open deck boats the factor c D = 1, whereas for boats with deck, it is given by equation (15). Out of 58 examined vessels, 16 do not meet the above criterion. Should we apply in the criterion the angle φ max given in the documentation of vessels, 18 vessels would fail. Those vessels that fail, have GZ-curves with minimum parameters, such as l max in the proximity of 0,20 m, or φ max in the proximity of 25. References 1. International Maritime Organisation, Intact stability criteria for passenger and cargo ships, IMO, London 1987, sales number IMO 832E, p Deakin, B. Spend Less, Save More (Lives), Proceedings, 11 th Int. Conference on the Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, September 2012, Athens, Greece, pp Frąckowiak M., Pawłowski M. The safety of small open deck fishing boats, Proceedings, 3 rd Int. Conference on Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, Gdansk 1986, Vol. 2, pp , Gdansk. 64

65 Environmental strategy of the Finnish Shipowners Association Olof Widén Finnish Shipowners Association Mission statement The Finnish Shipowners Association (FSA) is established with the purpose to provide its member companies with relevant information about the existing regulations and to influence forthcoming requirements in tight collaboration with lawmakers and other stakeholders. We are monitoring and evaluating the rationality of new environmental regulations from the shipowners point of view. FSA helps its member companies to find the best solutions to meet asked requirements, as well as to promote the members to be frontrunners in putting mentioned regulations and requirements into practice. Vision Finnish shipping shall be prepared for providing its customers safe, sustainable and environmentally friendly transport services. The target is to minimize any harmful emissions and discharges. Objectives/Actions? Shipping is a global business, and by far the most environmental friendly and efficient way of transport. In Finland, 90 % of freight is transported by sea and shipping is of high importance to the Finnish industry and welfare. We need to face the environmental challenges and at the same time to ensure the vitality of the sector. Our member shipowners are committed to: meeting the future requirements cooperating proactively with other stakeholders and lawmakers in environmental issues increasing the environmental awareness and training of the crew and shore personnel improving the safety culture onboard taking responsibility for the future of the Baltic Sea 65

66 Marpol Annex VI and the EU sulphur directive (the 0,1% ECA SOx level in 2015) It has been acknowledged that a technology is partly an answer to meet new more stringent sulphur regulations, but it is evident that more time is needed to test and develop the existing technology. According to the pilot projects, the shipping industry has carried out the technological applications that will not be ready in 2015 to be commercial exploited. Alternatives to comply with the 0,1% ECA SOx level in 2015 State aid for environmental protection is a very valuable instrument and should continue also in the future. Shipping industry is facing historical challenges and is forced to huge investments in the near future when several more stringent environmental regulations will take place. There is an urgent need for such kind of aid mechanism. The current aid intensity and timetable has been revised. It is now possible to get maximum 50 % aid for retrofit environmental investments before a new regulation is coming into force. The revision of the FIN environmental act will probably help 30 % of the FIN flagged tonnage in the sulphur case 2015, but it is important to have this kind of instrument also for other environmental investments in the future. Additional to the scrubbers, engine adjustments and LNG possible investments to which apply this aid are: ballast water managements systems, catalytic SCR, bio-fuel vessels, particular filters or something similar for PM/Black carbon reduction, shore-side electricity connections onboard, GHG reduction, developing a holding capacity for sewage, greywater, cargo hold washing waters etc. Whatever investments it takes to fulfill the forthcoming more stringent regulations, minimize pollution aiming for zero discharges to the sea. Ongoing environmental state aid procedures in Finland. According to the environmental state aid guidelines Finland is allowed to give max 50 % aid for retrofit installations until the new sulphur regulation is into force. The commission approved this program on with 50 % aid intensity, but required at the same time to include the calculation of eligible costs during five years period after installation (benefits, operational costs) like it was included already in the present new-buildings environmental state aid program. The applicant has to calculate five years benefit due to the investment and take that sum away from the applicable investment costs. It would be very difficult to get any acceptable costs and aid for a scrubber investment because operating benefits during the first five years of the life of the investment need to be considered. Pay-back time of scrubber is normally less than five years. Finland has given earlier 30 M for new-buildings (28 MEUR for a Viking Line's LNG vessel and 2 MEUR for Meriauras vessel using biofuel as a bunker). That means that we have legislation ready to support environmental investments of new-buildings. The legislation work that is done at the moment is aiming at covering also existing vessels. The Finnish government has earmarked 30 MEUR for existing vessels for the years and only for sulphur abatement installations. 66

67 FSA is trying to understand what the five year benefit really means? A shipowner can get 50% subsidized, but after five years, a part of that money shall be repaid in proportion to the savings the company made. In a worst case this would mean that for a 5MEUR retrofit, the company could get 2.5MEUR up front. Then let s assume that the company save 2.5MEUR on the MGO-HFO spread over the five years. This then means that the ship owner shall repay the subsidy in full! If so, the support is rather to regard as an interest free loan than a subsidy. Finnish Shipowners Association is constantly negotiating with the Ministry of Transport and Communication about the question marks, who is going to quantify how much you saved over the five years??? 67

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