European Railway Agency. Final Report. Impact Assessment on the use of Derailment Detection Devices in the EU Railway System

Transcription

1 Final Report Impact Assessment on the use of Derailment Detection Devices in the EU Railway System Reference: ERA/REP/ /SAF Document type: Public Version : 1.0 Date : 07 / 05 / 2009 Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by Name Leading author: Jean-Charles Pichant Anders Lundström Emmanuel Ruffin Airy Magnien* Contributing authors: Christophe Cassir Torben Holvad* Position Safety Unit Project Officers Head of Interoperability Unit Head of Safety Unit *Economic Unit Advisor *Head of Economic Evaluation Unit Date & Signature Signed Signed Signed File : Era-Rep Saf.doc PAGE 1 OF 111

2 Amendment record Version Date Section number Modification/description Author All First Framework Document ER All Inclusion of pre-existing working documents ER All Framework update ER, CC All 1 st Draft of the Impact Assessment report All Final draft Impact Assessment report (issued under reference ERA/REP/ /SAF) All Final report on Impact Assessment (issued under reference ERA/REP/ /SAF) ER, CC, TH ER, CC, TH ER, CC, TH Page 2/111

3 Table of Contents 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION Background Consultations Consultations undertaken during the impact assessment study Formal consultation of social partners Other comments received by the Agency Expertise Expertise related to the Derailment Detection Devices Expertise related to risk assessment of dangerous goods accidents PROBLEM DEFINITION Problem mapping Objectives of the present study General objectives Specific objectives POLICY OPTIONS Prevention vs. Mitigation of derailment accidents Presentation of the considered options Option 0 Present situation of EU freight derailments Option 1 Voluntary use of the Derailment Detection Device Option 2 Required use of DDD on DG wagons Option 3 Required use for all freight wagons Option 4 Alternative - prevention - measures IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIED OPTIONS Overview of the three step impact analysis Step 1: from EU railway traffic and accident data to the derailment categorisation Statistics on traffic data and derailment accidents Page 3/111

4 5.2.2 Studied derailment categories Step 2: from a severe derailment to the risks of dangerous substance involvement Potential involvement of a given category of substance Apportionment of the DG accident scenarios Risk estimates from DG accident scenarios Step 3: Assessing the costs and benefits according to quantified and qualified impacts RESULTS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION (EU ) AND THE STUDIED OPTIONS The derailment likelihoods Present situation Option Measurement of the options impacts on derailment likelihoods The derailment severities Present situation Option Measurement of the options impacts on derailment severities Overall derailment risks and associated costs Present situation Option Measurement of the options impacts on derailment risks and costs Min-Max sensitivity analysis Influence of input parameter on final results Impacts due to false alarms of the DDD Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS IMPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK Safety and Risk policies in the concerned regulation frameworks Influence of the options on Safety, CST implementations and derailment prevention Influence of the options on implementation of Interoperability Directive and TSIs TSIs in relation with to derailment risks Page 4/111

5 7.3.2 Potential TSIs issues in case of DDD (mitigation) implementation Potential TSIs issues in case of preventive measure (Option 4) Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis Other potential legal issues Driver licence directive COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS Introduction Core assumptions for the CBA Quantitative results for options 2 and Other impacts Stakeholder perspectives Min-Max sensitivity analysis for the net present value CBA conclusions CONCLUSIONS Effectiveness of studied options Overall assessment Option 2a RID Committee of Experts provision Other options Other conclusions Conditions for voluntary use of the DDD in other situations than field experiments Local management of risks instead of the harmonised DDD provision The situation in the Baltic States (EE, LT, LV) REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS Reference Documents Terms and definitions LIST OF ANNEXES Annex 1 Text provisionally adopted during the 44th session of the RID Committee of Experts meeting in Zagreb Page 5/111

6 11.2 Annex 2 Consultation of NSA and NIB Networks on derailments of freight wagons & Recording of answers Annex 3 Formulas for Event tree analysis of the Derailment Detection Device Annex 4 Synthesis of answers on freight derailments received from National Safety Authorities and National Investigation Bodies Annex 5 List and values of parameters included in the Min-Max sensitivity analysis of quantified risk assessments Annex 6 Analysis of the application scope of the RIDCE proposed provision Annex 7 Detailed results on severities calculation for the Options 2 and Annex 8 Results on the formal consultation of social partners Page 6/111

7 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the present restructuring phase of the European Railway System it is of primary importance to ensure a coherent and harmonised development of the Safety and of the Interoperability of the Community railways while allowing new organisational or technical developments provided these are efficient. Following the provisional adoption, by the RID Committee of Experts, of a new requirement imposing the use of a derailment detection device (hereinafter referred as DDD) on dangerous goods wagons carrying the most hazardous substances, the RISC Committee decided that it was necessary that the Agency assesses the potential impacts of such a new provision on the EU Railway System. This assessment takes place in the following context: - today there is no existing EN standard defining the functionalities and the required performances for derailment detection devices. Imposing such devices now may thus give undue competitive advantages to the few suppliers of DDD existing today. The DDD aims at mitigating the severity of occurred derailments, by automatically venting the brake pipe when a derailment is suspected, instead of preventing derailments, while the Article 4 of the EU Railway Safety Directive 2004/49 gives clear preference for accident prevention measures. The present impact assessment relates to the potential use of the DDD in EU-27 and includes the study of the following policy options: - Option 0; The reference situation of freight train derailments in EU , without the use of DDD, - Option 1; Voluntary application of the DDD, - Option 2a; Mandatory application of the DDD on the wagons carrying the most hazardous dangerous goods as required in the proposed RID 2011 provision, - Option 2b; Mandatory application of the DDD on all wagons carrying dangerous goods (enlargement of the proposed application scope), - Option 3; Mandatory application of the DDD on all freight wagons, The assessment of these options includes detailed analysis of the following aspects: - Potential impacts on the risk level for human safety, environment and railway system (tracks and rolling stock), - Potential impacts on the EU legal framework, including interoperability aspects, - Expected economic impacts of each option taking into account both qualitative and quantitative impacts. The potential improvements offered by the use of the DDD were assessed in comparison to the reference situation (Option 0) after having taken into consideration the experience acquired from the use of the DDD in Switzerland, information on some 691 past freight train derailments occurred within the EU over more than 10 years, as well as relevant information on risk assessments relating to the transport of dangerous Page 7/111

8 goods. Particular attention was devoted to fulfil the EC Guidelines on Impact Assessment as well as the RID Committee of Experts Generic guidelines for the calculation of risk inherent in the carriage of dangerous goods by rail. It is important to note that conservative assumptions overestimating the potential benefits of the DDD were made for complementing the necessary input data as well as for some methodological aspects. The results of the impact assessment can be summarized as follows: - From the safety point of view, and despite the above mentioned favourable assumptions it was assessed that the proposed RID 2011 provision (Option 2a) does not significantly contribute (< 0.01 %, i.e. far less than 1 fatality per year) to the reduction of the overall human risk level applicable to the railway systems of the EU Member States, in accordance with the Directive 2004/49/EC. Knowing the specific nature of the major hazards relating to the transport of dangerous goods and according to the subsidiarity principle the impact assessment suggests that, to the exception of construction requirements on wagons, the concerned EU Member States should rather find local solutions, when and where local risk levels are considered too high. - From the point of view of Technical Specifications of Interoperability (TSI) relating to the trans- European conventional rail it was identified that the RID 2011 provision would require several induced amendments of the existing TSI relating to the subsystem "Rolling stock Freight wagons". It would also require modifications of rules and procedures by infrastructure managers and by railway undertakings regarding the implementation of the relevant existing requirements in the TSI relating to the subsystem Traffic Operation and Management. This might result in some unnecessary regulation and expenses for the sector with respect to the low safety benefits mentioned above. - From a sector economic perspective it was estimated that the open line freight train derailments in EU 27 cost more than 200 million Euros per year, and are almost entirely related to infrastructure and rolling-stock damages as well as operation disruption impacts. However, in the particular case of the proposed RID provision, the implementation costs might not be compensated by the expected benefits. In conclusion, the present impact study and the above mentioned results are supporting the final Agency recommendation (ERA/REC/ /SAF) which advises the Commission not to adopt the new provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts. However, in view of the potentially important benefits which could be achieved in reducing costs incurred by derailments it would be advisable for the sector to explore solutions offered by prevention measures besides any mitigation measures. Page 8/111

9 2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CONSULTATION 2.1 Background The present impact assessment (IA) examines the potential effects of the introduction in the EU railway system of a new technical system the Derailment Detection Device (DDD) which automatically acts on the main brake pipe of a freight train when a derailment of a wagon equipped with that device is suspected. At the 44 th session of the RID 1 Committee of Experts (RIDCE) held in Zagreb on the 21 st of November 2007, a technical study about the performance of a DDD [22, 50] was presented and a new provision, reported in annex 1 of the present report, was provisionally adopted by the RIDCE and recorded in the report [20] of the meeting with the intention to include this new provision in the RID If adopted, this new provision would require the use of a DDD on every tank-wagon or battery-wagon, constructed from the 1 st January 2011, devoted to the transport of specific categories of dangerous substances. The provisionally adopted text specifies the detailed application scope. Before the meeting in Zagreb, the Commission underlined the need for a consistent approach and invited the Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) 2, according to the EU Directive on the EU Railway system interoperability [2], to agree on the need for coordinating the Community position before any decision is taken for the RID The RISC meeting agreed on the potential impact of this new RID provision on the EU Railway System, which in case of adoption would be mandatorily applicable to the EU member states according to the EU Directive on Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods [3]. After the meeting in Zagreb, a collaboration principle was agreed during the Committee on Transport of Dangerous Goods. In the particular case of the DDD, the EU consultation principle proposed first by the RISC meeting was agreed by the Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) Committee, and the European Railway Agency (Agency) was asked to examine further the potential impacts and benefits of the DDD. 1 International regulation on the carriage of dangerous goods by rail, appendix C of the COTIF (Convention sur le transport international ferroviaire - Convention on international railway transport). 2 Minutes of the RISC meeting - 96/48-PV46 version EN01 Page 9/111

10 On February 2008, the RISC meeting was informed that the Agency would issue to the Commission a recommendation 3 supported by the present impact study, according to the Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Agency regulation. On this basis, a EU consultation procedure shall be organized, and the Commission should take a decision about the new provision proposed by the RIDCE. 2.2 Consultations Consultations undertaken during the impact assessment study Consultation of the National Investigation Bodies (NIBs) and of the National Safety Authorities (NSAs) Of particular interest for this study was to look at the differences between the various kinds of freight train derailments which can occur. For example, some derailments will result immediately in an accident with a high degree of severity (and will therefore be immediately detected), while some other derailments will take time before they are detected. The latter type includes those derailments for which the DDD would be expected to bring benefits. It has therefore been necessary for the impact analysis to collect data about the relative frequency and the average consequences of such types of derailments. To that end a specific questionnaire was prepared by the Agency and used to collect more information on the derailments of freight trains, carrying or not carrying dangerous goods. This questionnaire is reported in annex 2. The consultations of the NIB and NSA networks were launched respectively on the 06/02/08 and the 20/02/08 during the plenary meetings, and the consultation objectives were explained. The deadlines for the NIB and NSA networks were respectively set to the 14 th March and to the 31 st March, however the Agency took into account the answers received up to the end of May, thus allowing nearly three and half months consultation. The Agency received 251 filled-in questionnaires from AT, DE, EE, ES, FI, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK, UK and NO. In addition the Agency received comprehensive surveys on freight train derailments as follows: - IT reported a comprehensive list of 45 derailments over 7 years, - DK reported its synthesis from 235 derailments, - FR reported a comprehensive list of 160 derailments over 10 years. In total, information on 691 derailments, with various level of details, were collected covering a period of over more than 10 years. 3 European Railway Agency Recommendation on the provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts requiring the use of the Derailment Detection Devices (ERA/REC/ /SAF) Page 10/111

11 Rough information on operation disruption as well as environmental (in case of dangerous goods involvement) impacts of freight train derailments were also obtained Consultation of the OTIF On the 17 th of January 2008 the OTIF secretary was invited to provide the Agency with all the reports, minutes and informal documents the RID Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology (WGTVT) had discussed or issued on derailments. The Agency informed the OTIF secretary that is was important not to forget any document the OTIF would like the Agency to take into account for its study. In response to this invitation the OTIF prepared and sent to the Agency a CD-ROM containing the reports of those meetings of the RIDCE and the WGTVT in which the item derailment detectors has been treated as well as the related documents [12 to 39] Formal consultation of social partners According to Article 6 of the Agency regulation [4], the Agency is carrying out the present impact assessment to support its recommendation to the Commission. In application of Article 4 of the Agency regulation, and in a view of the potential implication of the recommendation on the working conditions of railway staff, the Agency is required to consult the social partners. In the present case CER, EIM and ETF shall be consulted. This consultation was officially launched on the 30 th January 2009 and was closed on the 20 th March In meantime a reminder was sent by the 10 th March The Agency received comments from EIM which fully support the draft recommendation and the draft impact assessment report. The full comment is reported in annex 8. CER informed the Agency that it has no comments from its members to report to the Agency. ETF did not report any comment nor information to the Agency. As a result, the Agency considered that in doing so CER and ETF have given their assent to the conclusions reported in the two documents. The Agency has taken due consideration of consultation comments to issue its final recommendation to the European Commission. Page 11/111

12 2.2.3 Other comments received by the Agency Besides the formal consultation the findings of the draft impact assessment and the conclusions of the draft recommendation were presented in the following meetings: - 14 th Plenary meeting of the National Safety Authorities on the 3 rd February 2009, - 51 st Railway Interoperability and Safety Committee (RISC) meeting on the 5 th March 2009, Following a proposition made during the 51 st RISC meeting the Agency accepted to organise a one day informal meeting with the experts on transport of dangerous goods by rail. This meeting was held on the 2 nd April 2009 in Lille. The Agency has taken due considerations of the comments received from NSAs and from the RISC meeting as well as from the informal discussions held in the dedicated meeting to issue the present final report and to issue its final recommendation to the European Commission European Commission consultation process The European Commission will organise the formal consultation of the Member States and of the relevant Committees on the basis of the final recommendation of the Agency. 2.3 Expertise Expertise related to the Derailment Detection Devices Field experiments from SBB in Switzerland In the beginning of the 90s the occurrence of three severe derailments of petroleum tank-wagon in Switzerland resulting in large fire events had caused concerns in the public. Since that period [13, 14] the Swiss Federal Office of Transport decided to adopt a series of prevention and mitigation measures to reduce the risk of catastrophic railway accidents and to reduce the general public concerns about such risks. Page 12/111

13 Amongst a set of possible measures, it was decided to experiment, on 620 tank-wagons of the SBB fleet, the use of the DDDs as a mitigation measure 4, to reduce the potential effects of derailments involving dangerous goods wagons. The SBB was invited to provide the Agency with the experience they have acquired in the fields of DDD investment, operation and maintenance. The Agency received information that were used to estimate the investment, operation and maintenance resources that have to be considered with regards to the various studied options. Derailment tests carried out with goods wagons In the November 2007 meeting of the RIDCE in Zagreb, the Technical University of Berlin (TUB) presented the tests carried out with the EDT101 5 derailment detection device. There was a long discussion about the DDD behaviour and the TUB answered the questions asked at the meeting. The Agency was attending the meeting and thus is fully aware of the results obtained during these tests. The tests results are reported in the references [22, 50]. Field experiment of false alarms In conclusion of the RIDCE meeting in Zagreb one supplementary test was considered necessary to give more information on the EDT101 behaviour under low temperature condition in relation with the possibility of false alarms. In the RISC meeting on 26 th November 2008, the representative of Sweden informed the meeting that the new tests concerning the low temperatures might be available by the end of The present report and the Agency s recommendation do not take into account these new tests as the results are not available yet. It is also important to notice that the informal discussions with experts on transport of dangerous goods by rail did not allow to conclude on the actual rate of false alarms. UIC leaflet th edition This leaflet [49] describes the characteristics that a mechanical derailment detection device should fulfil to be approved by UIC. Annex I of the leaflet provides the list of approved devices which only contains the EDT101 from the manufacturer referenced in [38, 39]. The leaflet does not define any quantified requirement on reliability or on the maximum tolerable rate of false alarms. 4 The DDD acts after a derailment has occurred with the objective to mitigate the potential consequences. 5 It is important to note that the EDT101 is indirectly referred to in the DDD Provision, through a reference to the UIC leaflet th edition, as a possibility to fulfil the provision. This was the reason why the tests were only devoted to the EDT101. Page 13/111

14 This leaflet does not report the characteristics that an electronic derailment detection device should fulfil, even if a place is reserved in the leaflet for future complements. Other derailment detection technologies In the minutes [12, 17] of the RID Committee of Experts meetings, the following technologies were discussed: - Electronic detectors without cable along the train (Telematic applications), - Active pneumatic-mechanic detectors (independent mechanical-pneumatic system), (Knorr Bremse), - Pressure pulsation transmission system (pressure signal transmission to the driver cabin), (Sintro), - Electronic detectors with cable along the train, (Schindler Waggon - Altenrhein), The advantages and disadvantages of these technologies were discussed by RID WGTVT who considered that the independent mechanical-pneumatic system was the technology gathering more advantages than disadvantages and was, at that time the only technology on the market. Other norms or standards The provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts gives, in principle, the possibility to use other derailment detection devices than the DDD approved in accordance to the UIC leaflet However, in practice, there are no other norms or standards specifying the functional requirements and the performance objectives of the derailment detection devices in conformity with the foreseen RID provision Expertise related to risk assessment of dangerous goods accidents The Swiss decision to implement the DDD on highly dangerous goods tank-wagons was supported by assessment studies on the potential risk reduction achievable with various safety measures, and the DDD was considered by these studies as a cost-effective measure in the Swiss context. On the Agency invitation, the Swiss Federal Office of Transport accepted to provide the Agency with relevant study reports [40 to 45] on the risk based assessment of the potential DDD benefits. In addition to these reports, the Agency also used the opinions exchanged in the framework of the RID Working Group on Standardized Risk Analysis. Page 14/111

15 Since 2004 this working group has produced relevant documents and other information that can be used in the present impact study to estimate the specific risks associated with the dangerous goods involvement in railways accidents or even in road transport 6. It is important to mention that the Agency assessment model for the potential risk reduction associated with the use of the DDD is fully compliant with the Swiss adopted approach mentioned above, the French [51] and Dutch [52] frameworks, as well as with the Generic Guidelines [48] established by the RID Working Group and adopted by the RID Committee of experts in its 42 nd session in November The Agency model complies also with the final recommendation on Common Safety Methods, according to the EU Directive on EU Railway Safety. The detailed information on the specific model developed by the Agency for the present impact study are given in section 6. 6 Similar risk assessment methods have been reported in specific Guidelines for the road transport of dangerous goods. Page 15/111

16 3. PROBLEM DEFINITION An important background to understand the problem of railway derailments is given by the example of what happened in Switzerland with regards to derailment risks. Important public concerns arose following some severe derailments that occurred in the beginning of the 90 s in Switzerland. In response, the Swiss Federal Office of Transport decided to adopt a series of prevention and mitigation measures, including the use of the Derailment Detection Device (DDD) to mitigate the potential consequences of catastrophes which might involve dangerous goods. Amongst the set of measures, the use of the DDD 7 was selected as a cost-effective measure to reduce the risk of catastrophic railway accidents, which were considered too high in some specific locations of the Swiss railway network. In total 623 wagons carrying dangerous goods have been equipped in the SBB fleet since mid Due to the important share of international transport, it was considered that the use of the DDD would be more effective if such a measure would be of general application, by requiring it within an international regulation. Document [26] also indicated that the Swiss Federal Office of Transport will require safer tank wagons from 2010, with no exception. Similar reflections also took place in the 90 s in Germany, where a Working Group was set up to identify viable measures that could reduce the risk of catastrophic railway accidents involving dangerous goods. It was then thought that in order to promote transportation of dangerous goods by rail, additional safety measures might be needed so as to alleviate local public concerns about the risk of Dangerous Goods accidents (DG accidents), particularly in densely populated areas. As the main cause of such catastrophic accidents by rail was considered to be the derailments, global application of the DDD for wagons carrying the most dangerous substances was found to be one of the most cost-effective measures that could be adopted. This was in particular preferred to local traffic restriction measures which might have negative impacts on the attractiveness of DG transport by rail (in comparison to e.g transport by road). In November 2002, the situation in Switzerland and Germany had prompted the RIDCE to discuss the possibility of requiring derailment detectors in RID as a new safety measure. During the subsequent meeting the RIDCE [12, 17] considered different technologies under development to detect the derailments as well as potential future technology based on foreseeable telematic applications. The RIDCE considered that the independent mechanical-pneumatic systems offered the most advantages from the railway operational point of view and was also the only available product of that kind on the market, even if future (non available yet) telematic applications were in principle preferred. In 2004 a decision of principle was taken by the RIDCE [17] to introduce a general description of the objectives to prevent the derailments in the RID 2009, as follows: 7 As referenced in the UIC leaflet OR, only the DDD EDT101 is approved by UIC on the 1 st of July 2007, this product is manufactured by Oerlikon-Knorr Eisenbahntechnik. Page 16/111

17 The RIDCE is convinced of the need for measures to prevent derailments in the transport of dangerous goods. It will get in touch with the other competent bodies dealing with the subject of derailment in order to develop the best suitable measures. In connection with this, RID should include a general description of the objective, the entry into force of which is planned for 2009, subject to the resolution of technical problems. During the same meeting the Chairman confirmed that various technical solutions are vital. The decision of principle should provide the basic conditions for the development of alternative systems. Today, the Agency considers that the application of the new DDD provision does not respect, to a large extent, the initial decision of principle of the RIDCE because of the following reasons: - the expression of the necessity to adopt the new provision was strongly driven by the Swiss experience and by the related risk assessment studies, in regards to the public concerns expressed following important Swiss derailment accidents. After detailed consideration of the Swiss studies by the Agency, it is clear that although these studies assess the potential achievable risk reduction at Swiss level, they do not demonstrate the need to adopt a new provision at OTIF or EU level. - the basic conditions for the development of alternative systems are not guaranteed with the proposed DDD provision since its fulfilment is for the time being mainly based on the opportunity offered by the only DDD approved by the UIC so far (another one shall be approved soon), without any other available standard. Furthermore the DDD provision focuses on a single set of technological products aiming only at mitigating the derailments, and the technologies aiming at preventing the occurrence of derailments are not considered. It should also be mentioned that the background situation appears to have slightly changed in Switzerland, since the decision of principle by the RIDCE in A new study report [45] issued in 2006 showed that actually no part of the Swiss network presented an unacceptable 8 risk any more. According to this report the updated results from the risk assessment mainly came from changes in Chlorine 9 traffic composition, a downward trend in derailments statistics and from new safety measures, including the use of the DDD 10. The following section summarises the different key parameters it is necessary to re-consider, at EU level, to study the general problem of freight derailments, as well as the particular issue of using a derailment detection device. 8 In the Swiss study acceptable risks are defined thanks to a Frequency/Fatality risk diagram (FN diagram). The cumulative risk curve calculated on some portions of the Swiss appeared to lie within the unacceptable region in the FN diagram. 9 Following a number of chlorine factory closures in Switzerland, the transport by train of chlorine has indeed decreased, thus making the event of a catastrophic accident involving chlorine less likely wagons of the SBB fleet were equipped with the DDD since mid Page 17/111

18 3.1 Problem mapping A detailed problem mapping has been developed in the course of the present study. In particular, across the potential social, environmental and economic impacts the following dimensions were considered: Railway system perspective (as technical system); Safety perspective; Railway market and competitiveness. This analysis allowed a better understanding of the links between the various issues to consider. This way it is possible to better express the general and specific objectives of the impact assessment. In summary the following important issues have to be considered. From the Railway System perspective: The DDDs should not prevent the development of interoperability and has to be consistent with the existing TSIs The DDDs can mitigate the consequences of some derailments, however it is necessary to quantify the potential achievable risk reduction, at EU level, as well as the nature of the main risks. The efficiency (cost-effectiveness) needs to be measured with respect to the changes required on the EU Railway system, and the effects of various application scopes have to be considered. In case it would be possible to achieve a similar reduction of risks with similar cost effectiveness with derailment prevention measures, it would be preferable to encourage, according to the Railway Safety Directive, the improvement of safety with cost-efficient prevention measures. The resources allocated to mitigation measures could reduce the resources available for prevention measures, even though alternatives exist to prevent derailments, All the necessary safety related requirements and revision of operational procedures need to be fulfilled when a new safety device, like the DDD, is introduced. This is part of the impact assessment. From the Safety perspective: The Railway transport is already safe, and all the derailments (passenger and freight) represent a small share of the railway accidents (EU over 4928) and of victims fatalities and injuries - (EU over 2599) The freight wagon derailments do not induce, in average, more than 1 fatality per year, as referred to in EUROSTAT. The corresponding average for DG freight railway accidents is even lower. Page 18/111

19 The safety strategy of each EU member states and the related (new) safety measures will influence the achievement of the Common Safety Targets. It is not certain that a commonly imposed new safety measure (as proposed by the new RID provision) corresponds to the most effective safety improvement that can be achieved at EU level. In addition to the human impacts the TDG accidents can result in potential damage to the environment, to the railway system and to surrounding built-up areas. As it has been clearly demonstrated in the Switzerland risk studies, some locations are more vulnerable than others in case of a TDG accident, however the criticality of a given location can vary rapidly 11 in function of the traffic, local urbanism, and even acceptance criteria. The number of railway TDG accident (including derailments) - 50 declared in EU is low, with around 25 releases of dangerous substance declared per year. The TDG accidents are rare, however high consequences can occur in all modes of transport and it remains a political issue to answer public concerns about such risks. From the Railway market and Competitiveness perspective: Today the new proposed RID provision is, in practice, only applicable with one type of commercial products (with so far only one product approved by UIC as referred to in the annex I of the UIC leaflet OR). This may impair the development of other types of product by creating unfair conditions for competition, unless suitable standards are developed. According to the White paper on transport 12, rail transport should increase to satisfy the overall demand with reduced environmental impacts. However such increase depends, among others, on the social acceptance of railways, and therefore on the perceived risks induced by railway traffic. Both for specific transport situations (for example vulnerable sites) or in case of a general application it is necessary to consider, on the one hand, the optimum application scope, and on the other hand, the efficiency and the feasibility of the investment for the sector. The reduction of track and rolling stock damages, as well as the reduction of operation disruption could be beneficial for the sector. Even if the DDD mitigation measures would be beneficial in the short term, it is necessary to assess whether the development of prevention measures could be more beneficial. The overall risk presented by dangerous goods transport should be considered, in accordance with Article 1.4.b) of the new Directive on Inland transport of dangerous goods, with a view not to over- 11 After review of the initial risk study the locations considered as critical in Switzerland are now considered as acceptable [45]. 12 European Commission Transport White Paper from 2001 European Transport Policy for 2010: time to decide. Page 19/111

20 regulate with new provisions of general application the safer modes of transport. Over-regulation could even increase the use of more risky modes and might consequently increase the overall risks. In general the railway transport is reputed safer than road transport, then intermodal competitiveness have to be taken into account in order not to over regulate the railway sector. 3.2 Objectives of the present study General objectives Before any detailed assessment of the potential reduction of derailment risks, the problem mapping allows the Agency to give the following preliminary comments: - Imposing one type of mitigation measure such as the DDD referenced in the new RID provision might be seen as discriminating against other type of derailment risk reduction measures, including derailment prevention measures., - the DDD Provision might infringe the proportionality principle as it is not clearly demonstrated that the proposed measure is necessary and in adequate proportion to the considered risks. - the requirement of a EU-wide safety measure to reduce public concerns about the risks in a specific location of a given railway network is a priori in contradiction of the EU subsidiarity principle, especially if a local solution exists at state level. For these reasons the general objectives of the present study are the following: - study the suitable conditions to better prevent (or mitigate) derailment accidents in a market-neutral way, - study the conditions in which the proportionality principle would be satisfied, according to the risk potential presented by the derailments at EU level, and recommend on potential effectiveness of a new safety requirement to prevent or mitigate derailment accidents. - study the conditions in which the subsidiarity principle would be respected, according to the EU legal framework, including EU railway safety and interoperability, and advise on the legal feasibility to require a new specific regulation regarding freight train derailments Specific objectives According to the problem mapping, the present study did not address the possibility to solve the following linked key issues: Page 20/111

21 Risk acceptance criteria have been considered as different in the various states, and consequently the acceptable risk level of major accidents largely remains a local political issue, rather than a European one. The possibility to use preventing measure instead of mitigation measure was the objective of Option 4 (see also 4.2.5), however it was not possible to study the preventive measures in the limited time frame allowed by the international regulation schedule. The study of the Option 4 might be carried out in the future, after the present study, if the Commission would require this further assessment. The Nimby syndrome 13 and routing prevention measure are taken into account as key parameter to address specific local risk management issues. The effects of a general increase in railway transport promoted by the White Paper on transport were not quantified in the options assessment. The quantifications are based on the EU-27 situation in The remaining specific objectives of the present study were thus defined as follows, and were agreed in the RISC meeting on February 2008: To give comprehensive, robust, and transparent assessment of the need (at EU level) to require (or not) the DDD as a new safety measure, To assess the costs and benefits of the provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts and of other potential alternative options, including the use of prevention measures, To assess the impacts on the Community legal framework, including the EU Railway Safety and Interoperability Directives [1, 2]. In addition to the necessary detailed assessment of the derailment risks, involving or not dangerous substances, these objectives are particularly important to follow in view of issuing a well founded recommendation to the Commission taking account of all relevant aspects including the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. 13 Nimby, for Not In My Back Yard, is reflecting the public attitude which involves lack of acceptance of living in the proximity of identified hazards, and to prefer re-locating these hazards elsewhere. Page 21/111

22 4. POLICY OPTIONS 4.1 Prevention vs. Mitigation of derailment accidents According to the present study objectives, the Agency had examined the possibility to carry out an impact assessment of derailment prevention measures, in addition to the particular case of the DDD mitigation measure. It was, however, necessary to give priority to the assessment of the DDD impacts, with regard to the agenda of the decision making process for the RID Taking into account the timeframe required for gathering detailed information on derailments (including the consultations presented in section 2.2) and the time required for assessing, in sufficient details, the potential benefits of the use of a DDD, the Agency has foreseen to split the freight derailments study in two steps, as follows: 1st step: assessment of the DDD mitigation measure 1 st recommendation of the Agency focussing on the RID DDD provision 2nd step: assessment of prevention measures for derailments 2 nd recommendation on a EU development plan for freight train derailment management. The present document mainly reports on the first step related to the potential use of the DDD (see Options 1 to 3 in next section) and mentions, only for information, what could be the approach of Option 4 which takes into account the development of derailment prevention measures. 4.2 Presentation of the considered options A detailed consideration of the options to be selected for this study was undertaken in the initial phase. The following options were identified as pertinent for the study: Option 0 Present situation of EU freight derailments Even if a continuous safety improvement (where reasonable and practically applicable) has to be considered in application of the Railway Safety Directive, this option 0 corresponds to the present situation of the derailment impacts in EU 27. The impacts are described in a suitable form to allow comparison to the other options. This option gathers in a readable form the available data on EU derailments, including the results of Page 22/111

23 the specific consultation of the National Investigation Bodies and National Safety Authorities networks, carried out during the study Option 1 Voluntary use of the Derailment Detection Device This option corresponds to the possibility offered to the IM and RU to voluntarily use the existing technology to prevent or mitigate derailment risks. A sine qua non condition to apply this option is to ensure that Interoperability and Safety principles for the EU Railway system are fulfilled and are in no contradiction with existing TSIs Option 2 Required use of DDD on DG wagons This option includes two variants: a) Required use of DDD according to the RID 2011 application scope. This option would correspond to the adoption of the new provision proposed by the RIDCE during its 44 th meeting with all the necessary amendments to fulfil the EU regulation framework, and especially the existing and future TSIs. b) Extension of the mandatory application scope of the DDD provision. This option would correspond to the adoption of an amended RIDCE provision, extending the application scope to all DG wagons while fulfilling the EU regulation framework Option 3 Required use for all freight wagons The option involves the mandatory application of a derailment detection device for all freight wagons. Within this new application scope some amendments to the EU regulation framework, in order to increase the benefits of the use of the derailment detection device in the EU Railway system, would be necessary Option 4 Alternative - prevention - measures This option is wide-ranging and could evolve around an EU railway sector action plan for the improvement of derailment risks management. The application of a mitigation measure may induce a decrease in efforts for introducing prevention measures and may thus finally result in an increase of risks. Option 4 could contain an integrated set of preventing and mitigating safety measures for freight wagon derailment accidents consistent with the EU framework principles and the foreseeable technology development. This would mean: - accept the principle of derailment risk mitigation and allow the voluntary use of existing technology, in respect of the EU legal framework, - consequently to the previous point, cancel the mandatory requirements from the RID 2011 provisions, Page 23/111

24 - define specific objectives for derailment impacts reduction, - study the most promising prevention measures with the help of both rolling stock and infrastructure technologies development, - open the market for innovations and technology by developing suitable EN standards. Besides the alternative technologies, it is also necessary to consider operational procedures as safety measures which could be reviewed or reinforced in order to better prevent derailments. The study of Option 4 by the Agency would however only take place, upon Commission request, after having issued the final recommendation which will only focus on the proposal of the RID Committee of Experts. Page 24/111

25 5. IMPACTS ANALYSIS OF THE STUDIED OPTIONS This chapter describes the methodology and the input data that have been used for estimating the risks and consequences associated with freight train derailments, for each of the policy options considered. The methodology uses a three steps approach, whereby: - first the likelihoods of different derailment scenarios are estimated, - then the average consequences arising from each derailment scenarios are estimated in terms of severities (human and material impact) - and finally, all the severities are aggregated with the likelihoods, and are then monetarised to provide an estimation of the costs associated to the risks It is important to stress that due to the large scope of the study (EU27) and the lack of some detailed data received for this study, some simplifying assumptions were necessary for the estimation of average risks. The estimates were however always made either on the conservative side or such as to maximise the expected benefits of the DDD. Therefore, it must be understood that the present model used in the study will tend to produce risks (and consequently risk reduction) figures which are probably overestimated. However this should not affect the comparative analysis of the options nor the conclusions of the study, all the quantified assessments being supported by a min-max sensitivity analysis. 5.1 Overview of the three step impact analysis This section explains the different steps that are followed in the present analysis in order to estimate the total costs and benefits achieved by the railway sector for each policy options. In the first step, an analysis of the general data of EU freight traffics development is made (see diag. 1) in order to derive (from these data and from the data on past railways accidents) the likelihood of involving normal freight wagons as well as dangerous good wagons in severe or less severe derailments. The influence of the derailment detection device on the likelihoods of the different derailment scenarios outcomes is analysed during this step, both for normal freight trains and DG freight trains DG freight trains are defined as freight train hauling at least one DG wagon. Page 25/111

26 The derailment risk assessment depend of the general traffic parameters: - EU- 27 railway traffic structure ( ), - Policy options for DDD use (PO 1-3), Likelihood to have a severe derailment of DG wagons (overturning of one or more wagons, potential substance release ) DG Freight trains Freight trains traffic Derailment accident event tree taking account the potential benefits of the derailment device And Likelihood to have a non severe derailment of DG wagons (every wagon kept on track, no substance release) EU Rail Traffic [Eurostat ] Aggregation of outcomes in severe and non severe derailment categories for both DG and normal freight wagons Likelihood to have a severe derailment of normal freight wagons (overturning of one or more wagons, potential substance release ) Normal Freight trains Inputs for comparison with overall EU railway system risks. Likelihood to have a non severe derailment of normal freight wagon (every wagon kept on track, no substance release) Passenger trains traffic Not in the study scope Assessment of Freight train derailment risks depending on the following parameters : - involvement or not of DG wagons, - Application scope of DDD. Diagram 1: Likelihood assessment of freight wagon derailments The second step (see diag. 2) derives, from the first step, the potential average severities of the expected derailment scenarios. This second step results in an estimate of the leading derailment risks that are: the societal risk for human life (fatalities), the environmental risks and the economic risk for the railway system (tracks, rolling stock and operation disruption). In this part there is no supplementary assumptions made on the potential benefits of the derailment detection device, since these benefits are all studied in detail in the first step in accordance to the past EU derailments lessons as well as the knowledge acquired on the DDD itself. This approach allows a common estimate of the leading impacts for each policy options, making them comparable. Page 26/111

27 EU and International lessons learnt from past accidents Reference accident scenarios Dose / Effect respons for human life (No influence on conclusion with the choosen comparative approach) Likelihood to have a severe derailment of DG wagons (turnout or overturning of one or more wagons ) Condition probability to have an involvement of DG as referenced scenarii 0 Estimated extent of dangerous areas for human life Estimated number of person at risk per year 0 Likelihood to have a non severe derailment of DG wagons (every wagons kept on track) Environment damages Estimated extent of damaged environment per year = 0 (Not involving DG substance) Estimated extent of damage on DG wagons Likelihood to have a severe derailment of normal freight wagons (turnout or overturning of one or more wagons ) Estimated damage on railway system per year = 0 (Not involving DG substance) Estimated extent of damage on tracks Likelihood to have a non severe derailment of normal freight wagon (every wagons kept on track) Condition probability to have domino acciddent with DG scenario 0 Not estimated Estimation of outcomes deriving, from the primary Railway accident, into accident scenarii involving or not dangerous goods. Output of Derailments risk assessment following the three categories of impacts (Economic, Social, Environmental) as Input of the overall CBA. Diagram 2: Severity assessment of freight wagon derailments The last step (see diag. 3), aggregates the previously calculated direct costs with all complementary potential costs and benefits, different from those related to the risks for human life (fatalities and injuries) and to the railway system. These complementary CBA 15 parameters are notably the operational and investment aspects as well as the legal and implementation aspects of the studied policy options. 15 Cost Benefit Analysis Page 27/111

28 Derailment accidents direct costs Operation costs Investment costs EC and EU MS administration costs Estimated number of fatalities per year Quantified costs and benefits Mean Human life cost Traffic operation disruption, including DDD false alarms EC Administrative cost Monitoring of effectiveness for the chosen option Estimated extent of polluted environment per year Mean environment cost Maintenance of Tracks (IM) Economic impacts for each options Estimated damaged on railway system per year Cost of damaged track and repair Cost of repaired freight wagons Maintenance of Rolling stocks (RU) Maintenance of DDD Training of IM and RU staff Revision of internal procedures (IMs and RUs) Investment costs in DDD equipment vs lifetime RU administrative costs Revision of TSI EU MS administrative costs Impacts assessed for each policy options Qualitative assessment of costs and benefits Not assessed Diagram 3: Cost and benefit assessment from the mitigation freight wagon derailments and from changes induced by the use of DDD These three steps are detailed hereinafter in the section 5.2 to Step 1: from EU railway traffic and accident data to the derailment categorisation Statistics on traffic data and derailment accidents As input to the Agency model, EU statistics on freight train derailments and freight traffic data were required. EUROSTAT official data were used for that purpose. The tables below give an indication of some EUROSTAT figures regarding the number of train derailments (including passenger and freight trains), the Page 28/111

29 total goods transported by rail, as well as the dangerous goods transported by rail, by UN class. It also indicates in bold the extrapolated figures that were used in the present study. Railway traffic data Source Data Folder ERA estimates from Eurostat raw data Railway transport measurement - Goods (detailed data based on Directive 80/1177/EC or Regulation (EC) 91/2003) Present study Table Name RAIL_GO_TYPEALL = Railway transport - Goods transported, by type of transport EU 27 Year tot_tra (Total transport) (2008) EU _t EU mio_tkm Note: according to the Commission Regulation 1192/2003, 'tonne-km' (tkm) means the unit of measure of goods transport which represents the transport of one tonne (1000 kilograms) of goods by rail over a distance of one kilometre ; mio_tkm means one million of tonne-km. Source Data Folder Table Name ERA estimates from Eurostat raw data Railway transport measurement - Goods (detailed data based on Directive 80/1177/EC or Regulation (EC) 91/2003) RAIL_GO_DNGGOOD = Annual railway transport of dangerous goods (1000 t, million tkm) Present study EU 27 Year (2008) Unit Mio t.km EU 27 (without BG reporting) Mio t.km EU 27 All classes (100%) Class ,7% Class ,8% Class ,6% Class ,6% Class Class Class Class ,4% Class Class Class ,6% Class Class Class ,5% Class ,9% Class ,8% Remark Due to missing data reporting and, in some cases, strong evolution of traffic reported by member states, it is only possible to use the reported figures to get rough average share of classes. Page 29/111

30 Accident data: Source ERA estimates from Eurostat raw data Data Folder Railway transport - Accidents Present study Table Name RAIL_AC_CATNMBR = Railway transport - Annual number of accidents by type of accident (number) RAIL_AC_DNGGOOD = Railway transport - Annual number of accidents involving the transport of dangerous goods (number) EU 27 Year originac = derailmt (Derailments) (2008) EU number 500 Year type_acc tot_acc_dg Accidents involving railway vehicle transporting dangerous goods (2008) EU number 50 Year type_acc acc_dg Accidents in which dangerous goods are released (2008) EU number 25 Remark The reported derailments are both those of the passenger trains and of the freight trains. The reported dangerous goods accidents are not specific to the derailments but in relation with all kind of railway accidents. The 500 significant derailments/year that were used in the study concern both passenger trains and freight trains. It is assumed in the study that about 60% of all derailments are freight train derailments 16. This gives an estimate of about 300 significant freight derailments per year. It was then further estimated (see section ) that about 50% of all open line derailments will be significant, to the point that they would be included in the EUROSTAT statistics 17. This finally yields about open line 600 freight train derailments per 16 The 60% figure is an expert assumption reflecting the expectation that there would tend to be more derailments occurring on freight trains than on passenger trains, as the latter are considered in general to be submitted to more stringent safety measures and control. In any case, variations of about +/-10% around this figure are not expected to change significantly the results nor the conclusions of the study. This would make the number of open line derailments vary between 500 and 700 per year in Europe. The effect of these variations on the results are briefly analysed in section We may further consider that all significant derailments reported in EUROSTAT are open line derailments, as it appears unlikely that a derailment occurring in a shunting or marshalling yard will result in significant damages, according to the EUROSTAT definition of significant. Page 30/111

31 year to be considered in the study as input to the freight train derailment branch in the event tree reported in section Studied derailment categories A model based on an event tree of the derailments has especially been set up by the Agency in order to estimate the expected frequencies of different categories of derailment. These categories were defined beforehand such as to reflect appropriately the impacts or benefits that the DDD would be expected to bring for each policy option analysed Main expected benefits of the DDD Safety risk benefits The primary safety benefit of installing the derailment detection device lies in its potential for preventing an initially non-severe derailments from evolving into a more serious derailment, because it is not timely detected. According to the Swiss study, 40% of severe or potentially severe freight train derailments are not initially detected. The other 60% correspond to cases where the derailment is immediately or swiftly detected by staff, due to the severity of the derailment. This situation arises typically in the following cases: - The derailment is initially so severe that the brake pipe is ruptured, triggering an emergency brake. - The derailment is otherwise swiftly detected by the driver or some other staff and the emergency brake is applied This means that the DDD would bring some benefits only in those cases where the device can detect a non severe initial derailment and brake the train before a more serious accident might occur, for example when running over a switch. From a safety point of view, it is therefore expected that a system with installed DDD will reduce the amount of severe derailments potentially resulting -in case of DG trains derailments- in a release of dangerous goods. One of the aims of the analysis is to estimate the percentage of severe derailments that can be avoided by the DDD, and to estimate in the next step the number of fatalities that can be prevented by such reduction of severe derailments. Other risk benefits Further to the safety benefits, another potential benefit of the DDD is, in those cases where the derailment is not immediately severe, to reduce the damages on the track caused by derailed train running until it is eventually stopped (either following detection from the driver or through the severity of a subsequent aggravated derailment). Given the high reliability of the device -compared to the awareness of a driver and the longer time it takes the driver, on average, to detect a derailment- some benefits can be expected in Page 31/111

32 reducing the time, and therefore the distance run, before the derailment is detected and the train brought to a halt. Other expected benefits includes potential savings in rolling stock damages, savings in operation disruption caused by severe derailments, as well as savings related to damages to the environment following DG release Considered event tree for risk estimates For the risk analysis, a general event tree is used, containing the main parameters to be taken into account, in order to identify and quantify different derailment scenarios, starting from a general open line freight train derailment. The event tree is applied, with the same input, to the different application scopes covered by the considered options. For each option, different values will be used for some of the parameters inside the event tree. Event tree input For all options considered, the input to the event tree will be the expected number of freight train derailments occurring on open lines (shunting areas and marshalling yards are excluded from the analysis 18 ) per year in Europe, as indicated in section List of parameters taken into account in the risk assessment tree The list of parameters used inside the event tree is the following: P1: Probability that a derailment that occurs would concern a train hauling at least one DG wagon. P2: Probability that a derailment is immediately severe. P3: Probability that the derailment occurs initially on a wagon equipped with the DDD. P4: Probability that the DDD functions as intended. P5: Probability that a non-immediately severe derailment is detected by staff. P6: Probability that a severe derailment impacts a DG wagon. The annex 3 is giving detailed explanation on the meaning and the formula that have been used for estimating the corresponding parameters. 18 Shunting areas and marshalling yards are excluded from the analysis, since derailments in those areas are expected to be of such limited severity due to the low speed at which they will occur, that the DDD, if working at all (in marshalling yards the DDD is not activated as the main brake pipe is disconnected), would hardly bring any benefit. Page 32/111

33 The corresponding event tree diagram Below is a representation of the event tree used for the risk analysis. All the parameters mentioned above are shown in the diagram, as well as the different derailment outcomes. The last parameter P6 is calculated differently depending on the type of severe derailments (see annex 3), hence the different subscript, a),b) and c). Also the probability of DG substance involvement is calculated for each class (hence the sub-parameter [cl]), as this is necessary to calculate subsequently the probabilities of different DG accident scenarios and their associated risks. Page 33/111

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35 In the table below is a breakdown of the different event tree parameters, as well as their values used for each of the different options. Parameter Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 P1: Derailment occurring on a DG train Depends on the proportion of DG freight train traffic (mixed and complete trains) Idem Idem P1= 65,6% P2: Is the derailment immediately severe? According to comprehensive survey of derailments in FR and IT, about 33% of derailments on open line are immediately severe Idem Idem P3: Derailment occurring on a DDD equipped wagon? Depends on DDD installation rate for all DG class and on the proportion of complete DG trains, for each DG class. P3=0 for normal freight trains For option 2 a), it depends on the estimated proportion of DG wagons covered by the RID scope and on the proportion of complete DG trains for each DG class, P3=2,5% for DG trains (mixed and complete), P3=0 for normal freight trains All freight wagons are equipped, P3=100% For option 2 b), it depends on the proportion of complete DG trains for each DG class and the average number of DG wagons in mixed trains. P3=15% for DG trains and P3=0 for normal freight trains P4: Proper detection and action by detection derailment device 99% The DDD is assumed to be very reliable and to function at high as well as low speed (> 15 km/h) Idem Idem P5: Non-immediately severe derailment detected by staff? This probability is estimated according to the comprehensive survey of derailments from FR and IT Idem Idem P5= 70% P6 : Is a severe derailment involving a DG wagon? This conditional probability depends first on whether the severe derailment was immediate or not (in which case it shall only depend on the DG traffic composition and on the probability of induced DG wagon derailment). If it is not the case, then P6 is correlated with the probability P3 that the initial derailment occurred on an equipped wagon (see annex 3) Idem All wagons being equipped, this probability is the same whether the derailment is immediately severe or not (no correlation with P3) Page 35/111

36 Derailment categories (event tree output) In the event tree, some simplifying assumptions are used. They are however all made such as to deliver output values representing a maximum benefit from the use of a detector device. The first assumption is to assume that all derailments which are not timely 19 detected will eventually end up in being severe (in reality this will not always be the case). The second one is to assume that whenever the brakes are applied after detection of a derailment, the derailment will not be severe (there may be some rare cases where in spite of detection and brake application, the derailment will end up in being severe nevertheless). This is in line with the conservative estimate principle exposed above. In output of the event tree, we obtain with the above assumptions the following outcomes: - Number of severe DG train derailments per year: o o SD1: occurring immediately SD2: occurring some time after (undetected) initial derailment - Number of severe normal freight train derailments per year: o o SD3: occurring immediately SD4: occurring some time after (undetected) initial derailment - Number of non severe freight train (DG and normal) derailments per year: o o NSD1: derailment immediately detected by device NSD2: detected with some delay (less than 1mn) by driver or others Each of these outcomes can be associated with some average consequences both in terms of expected fatalities (depending on whether a severe derailment involves DG goods or not, and also which type of DG goods is involved) and in terms of damaged track kilometres as well as other cost driving factors (damages to rolling stock, disruption to operation, etc...). These average consequences are evaluated in the second step of the present impact assessment Links between the studied derailment categories and the definitions used in other databases In the derailment categories mentioned in the previous section, the term severe indicates a derailment with a mechanical impact such that it would have the potential to cause a leakage in a dangerous good wagon. This would be the case, for example, if the wagon were to turn over following the derailment. Unfortunately, such type of derailment is not recorded in any official statistics. EUROSTAT records only significant accidents, which are per definition accidents either causing fatalities or with total damages amounting to over 150k. 19 we may consider arbitrarily that timely means within 1 min. Page 36/111

37 In order to calibrate the model with the observed statistics (those from EUROSTAT as well as those received from the consultation) on derailments, it has been necessary to establish some assumptions about the correspondence between severe and significant freight train derailments. This relationship can be illustrated by the following figure: 600 Estimated Open Line freight train derailments to be considered as input of the P1 branch in the event tree. See section Potential severe & Severe Non Severe Immediately severe 53% Non immediately severe 47% Non Significant 33% Significant 33% 20% Significant 16% Non Significant 4% 47% 300 (49%) significant freight derailments estimated from Eurostat 51% of non significant freight train derailments The simplified assumption was that, given the amount of damages, a significant derailment is considered a severe derailment. On the other hand, a severe accident (as defined in the model) may not be significant, as shown in grey coloured cells. This is essentially due to the fact that in the model (see section ) derailments which are not timely detected are counted as severe, when in reality these derailments only have a potential to end up severe, and may thus not necessarily cause damages that would amount to significant according to the EUROSTAT definition. According to the analysis of the survey results, it was estimated that about 53% of open line freight derailments are, or have the potential to be severe (these include the immediately severe ones as well as those that were not timely detected). A further analysis of the survey answers (using those that contained figures on derailments costs) indicates that about 80% of the derailments that are not timely detected (this amounts to 80 x 20% =16%) are significant, whereas all immediate severe derailments are also significant. Such assumptions allowed establishing an estimate of about 600 open line freight derailments expected to occur every year in the EU in order to be consistent with the number of significant derailments recorded in the EUROSTAT statistics (details of the calculation are given in annex 4). This was used as input in the event tree for all considered options Reference data for the studied derailment categories Data on the studied derailment categories were collected from the survey to NSA and NIB on derailment. Details about the results of the survey are provided in annex 4. In summary, the analysis of the results allowed the following statistical estimations: - Apportionment of open line freight train derailments into different categories: immediately severe, late (non timely) detected, non-severe timely detected derailments. This was made possible with the data received from the few Member States (Italy and France) who delivered a comprehensive set of freight train derailments records covering up to 10 years. These statistics were used to derive estimates of some parameters in the event tree (P2 and P5) - The other Member States delivered information only on a sample of freight train derailments (involving or not dangerous goods). From this information, it was however possible to estimate the average consequences for the different categories of derailment in terms of: Page 37/111

38 track kilometre damages cost of damages to track number of wagons impacted cost of damages to wagons hours of operation disruption environmental costs (for accidents with DG release see ) The risk estimates for the railway system are calculated by multiplying the expected occurrence frequencies of the different derailment scenarios together with their estimated average consequences to the railway system. As a result of the analysis of the reported data it was concluded that rough average damages to the railways system could be estimated as follows for the different derailment categories: Average damages to tracks Average damages to rolling stocks Average damages to operation Accidents category Average Km Average cost ( /km) Average # wagons Average cost/wagon ( /wagon) Average hours of disruption Average cost/hour ( /hour) Immediate severe derailment of DG wagons (SD1) Delayed severe derailment of DG wagons (SD2) Immediate severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD3) Delayed severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD4) Non severe derailment of DG or normal freight wagons (NSD1) immediately detected Non severe derailment of DG or normal freight wagons (NSD2) 0, , , , , , These values were used as reference values in the study. For the sensitivity analysis, minimum and maximum benefit values were also used, these are shown in annex 5. Page 38/111

39 5.3 Step 2: from a severe derailment to the risks of dangerous substance involvement Some of the severe derailments (categories SD1 and SD2) will possibly result in a release of dangerous substances when the derailment accident involves a DG wagon. The conditional likelihood to have a release of hazardous substance in case of a severe derailment a DG wagon, as well as the related potential impacts on human and environment have been quantified according to the methods commonly used in the following references: - Switzerland references [40 to 45], - Netherlands references [52] - French reference [51]. The Netherland study provided the conditional probabilities to have a release of dangerous goods from an impacted DG wagon, and the conditional probabilities to have a specific DG scenario. The DG accident scenarios were derived from the following representative hazard categories (HazCat): - Flammable liquids, - Flammable gases, - Toxic gases, According to the Netherland and the French studies, the following specific DG scenarios (SC) were considered to be representative of the main potential impacts of the dangerous good substances: - Pool fires, - Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE), - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), - Jet fires of Liquefied Petroleum Gases (LPG), - Chlorine releases, - Ammonia releases, - Solid fires (from class 4), - Pollution to environment In addition the present study categorized as less significant the scenarios derived from less hazardous substances, in respect of the UN classification of the dangerous substances, those scenarios not being represented in the previous scenarios. The Class 1 (explosives) and Class 7 (radioactive material) were not considered, these not being within the proposed scope of the new DDD provision. Page 39/111

40 The quantification of the risks was derived from the potential involvement of dangerous substances utilising the following sequence: - Probability to involve a DG wagon in a severe derailment (input from the step 1) - Estimation of the probability to involve a given category of hazardous substance, knowing the class of the DG wagon involved in the accident - Estimation of the probability to have a substance release from the involved DG wagon(s) (e.g. tank breach) - Estimation of the probability that the substance release would result in the predefined DG scenario, - Estimation of the risks associated with the effect (thermal, pressure, toxic) of the predefined DG scenario Potential involvement of a given category of substance The first step of the analysis allowed to estimate what the probability (P6[cl]) of involving a DG wagon of a given class in a severe derailment is, for each UN class. When a severe derailment has occurred, a DG wagon will be involved: - Either if the initial derailment occurred on said DG wagon and the immediate or delayed severity causes the wagon to overturn, or - if the severe derailment of an ordinary freight wagon causes a neighbouring DG wagon to overturn. This possibility is taken into consideration in the model (see annex 3). Making a link between the actual traffic of DG and the probability to impact a given class of DG wagon, and in turn have a given category of hazard, is rather difficult without detailed data on the traffic. The only existing DG traffic statistics relate to the total DG tonnage transported for each UN class, and do not differentiate between the various kinds of substances that exist within a class. However the following attempt was established to represent the order of magnitudes of the main representative DG hazards. Using the analysis of the hazard classification of the UN numbers, the probabilities to involve a substance representative of the categories: flammable liquid, flammable gases or toxic gases, were established. Some assumptions about specific dangerous goods traffic were necessary to complement the analysis of the UN classification of substances in order to estimate the respective shares of traffic falling in the pre-defined hazard categories. To that end it was assumed that 80% of the class 3 ( flammable liquids ) traffic is composed by petroleum products, fuels and gasoline, and that 40% of the class 2 traffic falls in the flammable gases category due to the LPG traffic. The rest of the traffic was assumed to be in the same proportion as the ratio of hazard codes associated with each UN substance within a class. From these assumption a conditional probability matrix (MatTrafficShare (HazCat. j ; Cl. i)) was established allowing to relate the involvement of a given class i with the predefined hazard categories j. Page 40/111

41 Following these assumptions, the particular case of the DDD provision scope is analysed in annex 6. From the reported table one can establish that 18% of the UN classified substances are in the DDD scope and belong to the most hazardous toxic gases and flammable liquids with subsidiary hazards 20. It was assumed that these substances are in the same proportion in terms of DG traffic. Taking into consideration the different designs of tanks (TankHaz parameter) carrying highly hazardous substances or less hazardous substance, like fuels, and assuming an even distribution of the tank impact speed below and above 40 km/h, the conditional probabilities given by the reference [52] to have a breach (PCond breach (TankHaz. j)) of given tank category was used. According to these assumptions the probability to involve a substance of a hazard category j from the involvement of a DG wagon carrying a substance of class i, in a severe derailment, is given by the following expression: P6(Cl.i) x PCond breach (TankHaz. j) x MatTrafficShare (HazCat. j ; Cl. i) Apportionment of the DG accident scenarios Making a precise link between the actual traffic of dangerous goods and the probability to reach one or another DG accident scenario (SC) is nearly impossible without detailed consideration on the substances themselves. For this reason we refer to representative scenarios as listed in the top of the present section 5.3. Each category of hazard can lead to various kinds of DG accident scenarios, which mainly result in the following effects: - pressure effects from deflagrations, detonations, vapour cloud explosion VCE or from boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion - BLEVE, - thermal effects from explosions and also from solid, pool and jets fires, - toxic effects from toxic gases or liquids releases or, for example, induced by a decomposition of the substance in a fire. The table below (extracted from the reference [51] and complemented by the Agency) identifies the potential scenarios which are likely to occur, alone or in combination with another scenario, in case of involvement of a substance from a given class. In the right hand column, we provide a reference to the corresponding share of mass railway transport by class. 20 Subsidiary risks means that in addition to a main hazard, e.g. flammable, the substance can also have toxic, corrosive or asphixiant properties, etc Page 41/111

42 DG Classes Main achievable DG scenarii following the involved class of dangerous substance EU shares in % of ton kilometre transported Toxic release Solid explosion VCE BLEVE Fire Jet Fire 1 Yes Yes 2 % 2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 13 % 3 Yes Yes Yes 58 % 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 Yes Yes 6 % 5.1 Yes Yes 5.2 Yes Yes Yes 5 % 6.1, 6.2 Yes Yes 3 % 7 Yes 1 % 8 Yes Yes 7 % 9 7 % All classes 100 % From this information it is still rather difficult to estimate the conditional probability to reach a given scenario because it depends also on the state (liquid, solid, gas), the packaging and the container of the involved substance and also of the railway accident severity (impact speed, size of the breach, etc... ). The reference [52] gives some of the conditional probabilities to reach these kind of DG scenarios initiated with the involvement of a flammable liquid, a flammable gas or a toxic gas. These conditional probabilities take account the possibilities to have various kind of releases and/or ignition of the hazards, as follows: - probability to have an instantaneous or a continuous release depending on the breach size, - probability to have an immediate, delayed or no ignition in case of flammable substances. The present study combines as far as possible the information of the reference [51, 52] to establish a matrix (PCondSCe (SC k, HazCat. j)) which relates the probability to have the reference Scenario k from an Hazardous substance Category j Risk estimates from DG accident scenarios Human risk After having described relationships established between the occurrence frequency of severe derailments and the conditional probability to have the occurrence of a pre-defined scenario involving a dangerous substance, we now need to estimate the potential severity in terms of human impacts. These impacts have been estimated using reference [51] that provides the expected impact areas of the considered scenarios and the related expected fatality percentage. The Agency extracted the results reported in the table below to estimate the potential number of fatalities due to the involvement of the DG substance. Page 42/111

43 Considered DG accident scenario Considered impact distance (m) Considered impact area (m 2 ) (Referred as IA) Considered lethality (%) (Referred as VUL) Pool fire 2 x 10 (both side of tracks) Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 2 x 60 (both side of tracks) % % Boiling Liquid Expanding in Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) VCE of Liquefied Propane Gas (LPG) 2 x 120 (both side of tracks) 2 x 75 (both side of tracks) % % Jet fire of LPG % (single side) Chlorine release 2800 (single side) Ammonia release % % (single side) Class 4 fires 2 x 20 (both side of tracks) % Less significant scenario (with or without DG substance involvement) 2 x 10 (over estimated) % Class 1 Not Quantified Not Quantified Not Quantified Class 7 Not Quantified Not Quantified Not Quantified Finally, using all the above described relationships, the expected risks resulting from the severe derailments of DG wagons are calculated as following: R human / year = POPDENS x SUMk [ IA (SC. k) x VUL (SC. k) x [ SUMj PCondSCe (SC k, HazCat. j) x PCondBreach (TankHaz j) x [ SUMi ((P6(Cl. i) x MatTrafficShare (HazCat. j ; Cl. i) ]]] With: Page 43/111

44 - R human / year being the human risk related to the involvement of hazardous substances in severe or potentially severe derailments and expressed in terms of expected number of fatalities per year, - POPDENS being the mean average population density in the European countries weighted by the railway network length of each member states, expressed in person/km 2. According to this definition POPDENS is equal to 144 in This rough approach does not account for the difference in population density between urban and non urban areas, however this gives an estimate of the potential population concerned with the DG accident impacts in EU-27, - P6(Cl. i) being the expected frequency per year of a severe derailment (namely SD1 and SD2 derailments) of a Class i DG wagon, - PCondBreach(TankHaz. j) being the conditional probability to have a breach in a tank carrying category j of hazardous materials (Flammable, Toxics...) and resulting in the pre-defined scenarios, - MatTrafficShare(HazCat. j ; Cl. i) being the proportion of freight traffic of Class i (see 5.2.1) which can lead to the involvement of the considered categories of Hazardous material (j). For example, MatTrafficShare (Flammable liquids ; Class 3) = 1, - PCondSCe (SC k, HazCat. j) being the conditional probability to reach a predefined scenario from the involvement of a substance of a given hazard category, For example, PCondSCe (Pool fire; Flammable liquid) > 0, - IA being the considered Impact Area of the considered scenario (see considered impact above) produced by the dangerous substance, expressed in square meters, and - VUL being the vulnerability of person at risk within the considered impact area, in percentage of lethality, for the given accident scenario Environmental risk For derailments resulting in DG substance release, it is furthermore necessary to estimate the average damages such accidents would cause to the environment. This estimation uses the reporting made by the NSA and NIB upon the specific targeted request of the Agency (see annex 2) to collect data about past derailments for the present study. As a result of the analysis of the reported data it was concluded that average damage to the environment could be roughly estimated as follows: Derailment category Severe derailment of DG wagons (SD1 and SD2) resulting in release of dangerous substance Average damage to environment in Euros Minimum value Reference value Maximum value Page 44/111

45 5.4 Step 3: Assessing the costs and benefits according to quantified and qualified impacts Overall, the assessment of costs and benefits is derived from the Agency Economic Evaluation Guidelines [11]. Furthermore, the structure of the assessment also follows closely the recommendations included in the European Commission s Impact Assessment Guidelines [9]. The key principle of the impact assessment is the comparison of the current situation (generally without DDD, with some local exceptions) against the different options discussed above (with DDD at different scales). This will allow identification of effects on key variables caused by introducing the DDD. In particular, the assessment concerns comparison of the current situation with the planned situations. This form of comparison does not take into account any effects during the transition period from current to planned situation, e.g. the possible effect of resource or supply shortage in case of rapid transition are ignored. The chosen approach is consistent with the overall methodology used in this study where the introduction of DDD is assessed in the best possible light. The core impact assessment is based on a costbenefit analysis (CBA) involving consideration to the monetarised costs and benefits. Non-monetarised impacts are considered as appropriate. In accordance with the ERA Economic Evaluation Guidelines, the assessment of impacts examine main benefits and costs for different categories of stakeholders (e.g. railway undertakings, infrastructure managers, rail manufacturers, Governments, rail users etc.) coming from the introduction of the DDD on different scales. The following variables have been identified to be examined as part of the impact assessment: Monetarised elements - Fatalities and injuries (*) - Environmental damage costs (*) - Costs of damaged track repair (*) - Costs of freight wagons repair or replacement (*) - Traffic operation disruption (*) - RUs acquisition, installation and maintenance costs for DDD (*) Non-monetarised elements - Training of IM and RU staff - Maintenance of tracks - Maintenance of Rolling stock - Revision of internal procedures (IMs and RUs) - RU administrative costs (certification part A and B) - EC Administrative cost (impact study of DDD) - Monitoring of effectiveness for the chosen option - Revision of TSI - EU MS administrative costs (certification part A and B) - Cost of lost cargo Page 45/111

46 The monetarised costs are of course included in the CBA. Other items are considered qualitatively. Outputs from the risk assessment provide quantitative measures of the consequences of DDD with respect to the five monetarised costs. It should be emphasised that all quantitative estimates provided as part of the impact assessment should be viewed as order of magnitudes and not precise figures. However, conclusions drawn from the estimates are robust as uncertainty has been taken into account through testing of key parameter values in the form of a Min-Max analysis (see section 8.6). This involves two tests: (1) lowest likely value of the NPV based on a combination of pessimistic (input) values; (2) highest possible value of the NPV based on a combination of optimistic (input) values. All impacts of options are measured by comparing them to the present situation, and the impacts are quantified in monetary terms and combined in order to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV) of each option. This will allow a comparison of the alternative options according to the NPV. In principle, a negative NPV value would imply that the situation without DDD is the best performing option in terms of monetary impacts, while positive NPVs imply that the alternative options lead to an improvement relative to the without DDD situation. The alternative option with the highest positive NPV value would be the preferred option according to the monetary impacts. If no positive NPV value is identified, the without DDD situation is the preferred choice. This is because overall impact of non-monetarised costs is likely to favour the status quo (changes to the railway system will induce most of the non-monetarised costs). In addition to the NPV the Benefit-Cost (B/C) ratio are also computed for the options considered. Detailed consideration to stakeholder perspectives is addressed as part of the examination of consequences. The focus in the assessment is on the concerns of the following groups: - Railway undertakings - Infrastructure managers - Rail manufacturers - Governments / National Safety Authorities - Rail users - Non-users - Other parties (e.g. maintenance suppliers, wagon keepers, service providers and procurement entities) This analysis is important in order to examine who the likely winners and losers are. Particular attention is given to the stakeholders: railway undertakings / infrastructure managers, governments / National Safety Authorities. Page 46/111

47 The main data sources used for this part of the study are: (1) Derailment survey among NIB / NSA with specific reference to the DDD; (2) DDD cost information from SBB concerning acquisition, installation and maintenance; (3) VTG-Rail for costs of wagon replacement; (4) HEATCO 21 for unit costs regarding avoided fatalities / injuries and values of time in delay circumstances. 21 HEATCO is an EU FP6 research project (completed in May 2006). The primary objective of this project was the development of harmonised guidelines for project assessment on EU level. Further information about HEATCO are available from the project web-site: Page 47/111

48 6. RESULTS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION (EU ) AND THE STUDIED OPTIONS In the restricted time frame of the present impact study, it was not possible to develop a quantitative analysis of option 4 which might require a detailed examination of each possible preventive measure of derailments in the short and the long term. Options 1, 2 and 3 (all considering mitigation with the DDD) have been quantified on the basis of the data input consultation results and complementary assumptions. It will be possible to quantify the effectiveness of the option 4 in a further stage if this is required by the Commission. The main objective of this section is to bring sound information on the potential risk reduction in case of implementation of options 1 to 3. The analysis investigates the potential achievable reduction for the following risks: - Human risks, expressed in terms of expected fatalities and injuries per year, then converted in monetary unit using the so-called VPF (Value for Preventing a Fatality) - Railway system risks, expressed in terms of Average damages (costs) to the track following a derailment Average damages (costs) to rolling stock following a derailment Average hours of operation disruption ( train delays) then converted in monetary units - Environmental risks, expressed in terms average costs to the environment 6.1 The derailment likelihoods Present situation Option 0 In order to have an estimation of the present situation regarding the apportionment of derailments into the different categories specified in the previous chapter, the event tree is used first without the detection device (probability of equipped vehicle, P3=0). The results obtained in terms of expected frequency and percentage of each derailment category out of a total of 600 open lines derailments occurring in EU-27 are shown in the table below: Page 48/111

49 Option 0 - Reference year 2008 SD1 - Immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon SD2 - Non immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon (without detector) SD2' - Non immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon (with detector failing) SD3 - Immediate severe derailment involving a normal freight wagon SD4- Non immediate severe derailment involving a normal freight wagon NSD1 - Non severe derailment detected by the derailment detections device NSD2- Non severe derailment detected by staff , % 3% 0% 29% 17% 0% 47% 100% Measurement of the options impacts on derailment likelihoods Applying the event tree to the different scopes represented by the policy options provides the following results in terms of frequencies and percentage of the derailment categories: SD1 - Immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon SD2 - Non immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon (without detector) SD2' - Non immediate severe derailment involving a DG wagon (with detector failing) SD3 - Immediate severe derailment involving a normal freight wagon SD4- Non immediate severe derailment involving a normal freight wagon NSD1 - Non severe derailment detected by the derailment detections device NSD2- Non severe derailment detected by staff Option 0 - Reference , year % 3% 0% 29% 17% 0% 47% 100% Option 2a - Mandatory , RID proposal 4% 2% 0% 29% 17% 1% 46% 100% Option 2b , Mandatory - all DG 4% 1% 0% 29% 18% 6% 42% 100% Option 3 - Mandatory , all freight wagons 4% 0% 0% 29% 0% 66% 0% 100% Nota: The defintions of 'severe' derailments and 'non severe' derailments categories are refering to the severities taken into account in the present impact assessment in order to estimate the corresponding risks. It can be seen from these results that the effect of the DDD is, as expected, only to reduce the number of severe derailments that do not occur immediately (SD2 and SD4) and which constitute about 20% of all derailments in the present situation, while the number of immediate severe derailments remains constant. This reduction is also proportional to the number of wagons equipped. Interestingly it is estimated that the DDD Provision would prevent about two (2) severe derailments involving DG wagons per year, whereas the extension of the scope to all DG wagons appear to result in a more significant reduction (13). However bear in mind that the extra 11 severe derailments prevented by the extension of the scope would concern essentially DG wagons with substances out of the RID scope, and hence less critical from a hazard point of view. The 3 severe untimely detected DG derailments remaining, when all DG wagons are equipped, are due to induced DG wagon derailments, i.e. when a normal freight wagon derailing will cause a neighbouring DG wagon to derail (the probability of such an event is estimated to be about 6% with the same assumptions than the ones which are used in the Swiss studies). Extending the scope further to all freight wagons is unsurprisingly of small impact for severe derailments involving DG wagons it would just prevent those 3 above cited severe derailments. On the other hand it does also prevent almost all of the 105 (assuming that the DDD has a very small probability of failing -1%) non-immediately severe freight derailments, which from the railway system perspective, if not from a human risk one, may bring about significant benefits. Also of interest is to note that some of the non severe derailments detected by staff (NSD2) become derailments detected by the DDD (NSD1), by extension of the DDD scope. This is of importance as there is a Page 49/111

50 slight difference in average track damages between the two types of non-severe derailments: derailments detected by the DDD are indeed expected to cause less track damages thanks to earlier detection. 6.2 The derailment severities Present situation Option 0 Applying the other steps (consequence analysis) of the risk model option 0 gives an estimation of the current damages and severities expected from freight derailments without the DDD. The following table brakes down the estimates by types of derailments. The explanations related to monetarised impacts are reported in section 8.2. Option 0 Societal, Environmental and Economical Risks Occurrence Frequency Population Victims Railway system Quantified scenarii involving Population the dangerous good within lethal Fatalities Injuries Damaged tracks Damaged wagons Operation disruption substance area Nb / Y Nb Nb / Y Nb / Y km / Y Nb / Y h / Y Pool fire 0,872 0,046 4,03E-02 4,03E-01 VCE gasoline 0,003 1,631 5,01E-03 5,01E-02 BLEVE 0,006 6,352 3,62E-02 3,62E-01 VCE LPG 0,585 2,598 1,52E+00 1,52E+01 Jet Fire LPG 0,005 0,346 1,68E-03 1,68E-02 Chlorine (50mm breach) 0,005 38,975 1,94E-01 1,94E+00 see below see below see below Ammonia (50mm breach) 0,008 1,444 1,16E-02 1,16E-01 Fires (Class 4) 2,735 0,173 4,74E-01 4,74E+00 Pollution to Environment 4,361 NQ NQ NQ Less significant (with or without DG substance involvement)* 16,628 0,046 7,68E-01 7,68E+00 Class1 (with or without DG substance involvement) 2,077 NQ NQ NQ Class7 (with or without DG substance involvement) 0,103 NQ NQ NQ * The consequences of those accidents have probably been overestimated NQ=Not Quantified Severe DG wagon derailments with substance involvement** Severe derailments of a normal freight wagon 277 Severe Derailments Non severe derailments - see below Nb / Y ME / Y Nb / Y ME / Y Nb / Y ME / Y km / Y ME / Y Nb / Y ME / Y h / Y ME / Y ME / Y Severe DG wagon derailment without substance involvement Derailments mitigated by the Derailment detection device Detected by staff or other means ,0 NSD , ,6 NSD SD1 SD2' 3,0 4,6 30 6,1 SD2 SD1 SD2' SD2 1,0 1,5 2 0,4 SD3 SD4 All considered derailments , **The amount of these scenarii is overestimated. Only a part of severe derailment will result in the involvemnt of the substance for the "Less significant", "Class1" and "Class 7" scenarii. Damaged environment In this table, the expected number of fatalities arising from derailments involving dangerous goods amounts to three per year. This appears to be an overestimate, when compared against the results of a study [53] which revealed that out of all freight train derailments with DG involvement that have been reported in the press in EU27 over a period stretching up to 16 years, only 3 fatalities were recorded. Page 50/111

51 6.2.2 Measurement of the options impacts on derailment severities The breakdown of damages and severities for all the options with the DDD is included in annex 7. Following what had been described previously regarding the impacts on derailment likelihoods, it is worth noting that the application of the RID provision scope would hardly save any fatalities from severe derailment involving dangerous goods. This is due to the very small probabilities of having DG scenarios with catastrophic consequences on a number of events (2 prevented severe derailments with DG wagons per year) which is already small. The high consequence, low frequency scenarios are included but their contribution to the risk reduction is so small that it can be almost neglected, considering that these rare scenarios could only apply to 2 potentially hazardous events per year that can be prevented by the DDD. On the other hand, extending the scope to all DG wagons would save about 1 fatality per year. This is due to the higher frequencies and lower consequences DG scenarios associated with dangerous substances out of the RID scope, which will be involved in the extra 13 severe DG train derailments prevented by the extension of the scope to all DG wagons. The disruption of service operations, and the related costs, has been assessed to be the main indirect impact of derailments (see section 6.3.2) while the track damages is the main direct impact. Regarding this direct impact, the main effect of the DDD, is to reduce track kilometre damages in two ways: - By reducing the number of undetected (potentially severe) derailments. The tables in annex 7 show that this corresponds to a reduction ranging from 10 km/year (option 2) to 520 km/year (option 3) - By detecting derailments earlier than staff would do otherwise for non severe derailments. This corresponds to a reduction ranging from 8km (option 2a) to 43km (option 2b) per year. The impact of option 3 on non-severe derailments is less clear to identify, since the category of non severe derailments becomes significantly bigger (from 281 to 401), due to the large transfer in this category of derailments that would go undetected without the DDD. For similar reasons the DDD also reduce the rolling stock damages. 6.3 Overall derailment risks and associated costs Present situation Option 0 On the basis of the previous results in terms of frequencies and consequences, and using average cost values for each type of consequences, the costs arising from each type of freight derailments in the present situation are estimated as follows: Page 51/111

52 According to RA results on Option 0 Apportionment of freight train derailments Human risks Railway Syst. risks Environmental risks Immediate severe derailment of DG wagons with involvement of the DG (SD1) Delayed severe derailment of DG wagons with involvement of the DG (SD2) Immediate severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD3) Delayed severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD4) Non severe derailment of DG or normal freight wagons (NSD2) 26 (4%) 2 fat/18 inj 6,6 ME 16 (3%) 1 fat/12 inj 4,1 ME 172 (29%) 0,6 f/1,2 inj 1,1 ME 105 (17%) 0,4 f/0,8 inj 0,8 ME 281 (47%) 2 inj 0,4 ME 31 ME 6,8 ME 26 ME 4,2 ME 184 ME ME - 35 ME - Sum of All the categories ME 446 ME 11ME Following these results, the overall costs of EU-27 derailments of freight wagons are estimated to be of 471 million Euros per year for the reference year These monetarised impacts of freight train derailments are for about 95% from the railway system, 2% from the environment and 3% from human impacts. Concerning the railway system impacts, a more detailed look at the results (see next section) shows that the majority (about 60%) of those costs are coming from operation disruption costs. However, this figure should be taken with caution, as average operation disruption costs are the most difficult costs to estimate, and are therefore subject to high uncertainty and strong local variations (impact of a derailment on operation depends strongly on the location and time where the derailment occurs). The costs related to derailments with involvement of dangerous goods (constituting most of the human and environmental impacts) thus appear quite marginal in comparison to the other costs. Even if a major catastrophe involving dangerous substances is always possible, the likelihood of such an event is rather low, compared to the yearly damages caused by the derailments to the railway system, which are more certain and frequent. The environmental impacts have been estimated in case of significant involvement of dangerous goods and therefore are also quite small compared to the impacts on the railway system Measurement of the options impacts on derailment risks and costs The aggregate human, railway system and environmental impacts as well as the related costs and the expected potential benefits brought by the options 2a, 2b and 3 are reported in the table below and compared with the present situation: Page 52/111

53 Concerning the human impacts, the detailed results are the following: - The absolute value of human impacts per year is estimated to be 3 fatalities per year from DG involvement and 1 fatality per year from the normal freight transport. These figures seems to be already high (probably overestimated) compared to the DG accident that have been reported, as already stated. - From this basis the potential reduction is assumed to be one fatality per year as a maximum for the Options 2b and 3 and very low (3% reduction 0.1 fatality/year) for the proposed RID application scope (Option 2a). This is explained by the fact that this application scope focuses on the most hazardous substances, which represent a small proportion of the total transport, in order to reduce their potential involvement in case of (rare) major DG accidents. Also the potential big impacts of such rare events, which are estimated to occur only once every 100 or 1000 years, are considerably diluted when taken as an average over one year period. - In terms of value to prevent a fatality the reduction of human impacts is smaller than 0.3 M /Y in case of the RID application scope (Option 2a) and, at a maximum, of 4 M /Y if the derailment detection device would be installed on all the freight wagons. Therefore, in pure economic terms the investment in the derailment detection device for human impact reduction cannot be justified 22. Only the integration of aversion criteria for major DG accidents might justify the investment for human impacts reason. 22 The monetarisation using value of a preventable (statistical) fatality (VPF), does not put a value on a human life, but merely expresses the willingness of citizens to pay for avoiding a fatality somewhere in the Page 53/111

54 Concerning the environmental impacts, the various options enable the following reductions: - Option 2 a) the RID proposed application scope is not focussed on the reduction of environmental impacts but on the reduction of rare but major potential human impacts. The model indicates a potential reduction of 1% of the environmental risks. - The results clearly show that only Option 2b and 3 might result in a significant reduction (> 30%) of environmental risks. This is mainly due to the inclusion of all the class 3 transport in these application scopes. Concerning the railway system impacts, - The reduction of the impacts due to the derailment is proportional to the extent of the application scope, as follows. The RID application scope has been assumed to apply to 18% of the all DG railway transport when expressed in Mio t.km. It has not been possible to confirm this value because there is no public data making a relation between the substances on which the new RID provision applies, and the respective actual traffic in terms of Mio t km. One can estimate the actual figure might range within 6% to 30%. - The damages to the railway system are, compared to the other estimated damages, by far the most important ones. These damages represent around 95% of the freight train derailment costs for all options. They are split in three main categories: o the damages to the tracks - from 30% in option 2a)/ b) to 20% in option 3 o the damages to the rolling stock about 10% and o the induced operation disruptions from 60% to 70% (option 3) - the railway system impacts are therefore the most important impacts where the main potential economic benefits are achievable. The absolute cost induced by derailments on the railway system are estimated to be around 446 M /Y. They can be reduced to 441M /Y (option 2a), to 418M /Y (option 2b) to finally to about 267M /Y (option 3), which for all options represent the overwhelming majority of all savings that can be expected with the introduction of the DDD (from 80% in option 2b) to 90% in option 2a) and 3) Expected improvements for the Option 4 (not quantified) Given the important costs incurred from derailments, it is expected that measures aimed at preventing derailments, not just mitigating them, could bring about more substantial benefits than those considered in the previous options. Preventive measures would potentially act on more than the 20% of derailments for country. In other words, if the cost to avoid one loss of life exceeds the VPF, that means that society as a whole would prefer to spend its resources elsewhere (e.g. on more efficient ways to reduce risks, or any other purpose). Page 54/111

55 which the DDD can be effective. For this to happen, the measures would have to be of various natures and combinations, in order to tackle the different causes of derailments (track side, on-board side). A wide range of options is expected to be considered Min-Max sensitivity analysis The reference data used in the quantification of impacts (absolute) and potential benefits (changes) that might be achieved by the various option are reported in annex 5. For each parameter, a variation range around the reference value has been estimated from the publicly available data, from the consultation of the NSA and NIB networks, or from ERA experts judgment. The sensitivity analysis has been carried out first by identifying the most influencing parameters amongst those influencing the quantification of benefits, and second, by setting upper or lower limit to each parameter either to maximise the potential benefits for the use of the DDD or to minimise these benefits. The reference, maximising and minimising set of values used in the sensitivity analysis are reported in annex 5. From the reference, maximising and minimising assessment of benefits, it is possible to reach sound and robust conclusions while taking into account the main known uncertainties. With a minimising set of parameter values, the aggregate costs for all options are as follows: Option 0 - Present situation EU legal framework in force, including RID 2009 provisions Expected risks over the reference year (EU ) Abs. Value Victims from DG wagons derailments vs related costs ME Option 2 (a) - Proposed provision RID 2011 Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Option 2 (b) - Application scope extended to all DG wagons Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Option 3 - Application to all freight wagons Expected changes from the options 2, 2b and 3 compared to the present situation (orange cells highlights the highest changes for each option) Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 3 4,6 0,1-3% -0,1 1,0-31% -1,4 1-38% -1,7 Humans Expected injuries (Inj./Y) 31 6,2 1-3% -0, % -1, % -2,3 Victims from normal freight wagon derailments EU Railway system Environment Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 1 1,5 NQ Very limited - NQ NQ Very limited - NQ NQ NQ Limited - Not Not Not Quantified Expected injuries (Inj./Y) 4 0,8 NQ Quantified NQ NQ Quantified NQ NQ NQ Damages to the infrastructure, the rolling stock and traffic operation disruption to infrastructure (km/y) % -0,5 23-4% -2, % -28,1 to rolling stock (Nb/Y) ,2% -0,2 47-1% -1, % -6,2 induced operation disruptions ,1% -0,2 81-1% -1, % -14 (h/y) Damages from derailment involving the dangerous goods to environment (ME/Y) NQ 5 NQ 2% 0,1 NQ -29% -1,3 NQ -37% -1,7 Overall derailment costs and potential benefits of changes in Million Euros 238 Opt. 2a --> -1 Opt 2b --> -10 Opt. 3 --> -54 On the other hand, the maximising set of values yield the following results: Page 55/111

56 Option 0 - Present situation EU legal framework in force, including RID 2009 provisions Expected risks over the reference year (EU ) Abs. Value Victims from DG wagons derailments vs related costs ME Option 2 (a) - Proposed provision RID 2011 Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Option 2 (b) - Application scope extended to all DG wagons Expected changes from the options 2, 2b and 3 compared to the present situation (orange cells highlights the highest changes for each option) Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Option 3 - Application to all freight wagons Exp. Change +/- % +/- ME Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 12 18,3 0,3-3% -0,5 3,8-31% -5,6 5-62% -6,9 Humans Expected injuries (Inj./Y) ,3 3-3% -0, % -7, % -9,2 Victims from normal freight wagon derailments EU Railway system Environment Expected fatalities (Fat./Y) 1 1,5 NQ Very limited - NQ NQ Very limited - NQ NQ NQ Limited - Not Not Not Quantified Expected injuries (Inj./Y) 4 0,8 NQ Quantified NQ NQ Quantified NQ NQ NQ Damages to the infrastructure, the rolling stock and traffic operation disruption to infrastructure (km/y) % -3, % -18, % -193,4 to rolling stock (Nb/Y) ,5% -0, % -4, % -23,4 induced operation disruptions ,5% % % -172 (h/y) Damages from derailment involving the dangerous goods to environment (ME/Y) NQ 21 NQ -2% -0,4 NQ -31% -6,4 NQ -38% -7,8 Overall derailment costs and potential benefits of changes in Million Euros 868 Opt. 2a --> -8 Opt 2b --> -59 Opt. 3 --> -413 The results obtained with these parameters do not change very much the interpretation of the reference results: the overwhelming part of economic (monetarised) benefits are achievable on the railway system and not with respect to human and environmental impacts. On the other hand the absolute values of the estimated benefits (cost reductions) do vary quite considerably, and this will be taken into account in the ensuing Cost-Benefit analysis. However, given the conservative model used (which tends to overestimate the benefits of the DDD), real benefits would be expected to lie somewhere more between the minimising and the reference set of values, rather than between the reference and maximising ones. Page 56/111

57 6.3.4 Influence of input parameter on final results As indicated previously, there is also some uncertainty regarding the number of open line freight train derailments expected to occur every year in the EU. Using EUROSTAT figures as a basis, a reference number of 600 derailments per year was used in the study. This figure was derived in part thanks to an assumption made about the proportion of freight train derailments with respect to passenger train derailments. It was assumed that 60% of all open line derailments will be freight train derailments. The table below shows what the influence of a variation of +/- 10% around this 60% assumption, has on the final results for option 0 (without the DDD). Such variation would correspond to +/- 100 derailments per year. Influence of number of derailments as input of the event tree on the reference situation (Option 0) Immediate severe derailment of DG wagons with involvement of the DG (SD1) Delayed severe derailment of DG wagons with involvement of the DG (SD2) Immediate severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD3) Apportionment(unchanged) Safety Impact/year Economic impact/year Delayed severe derailment of normal freight wagons (SD4) 17% +/- 0,04 fatalities Non severe derailment of DG or normal freight wagons (NSD2) Sum of All the categories 4% 3% 29% 47% +/- 0,3 fatalities +/-6.7 ME +/-0,2 fatalities +/- 6,3 ME +/- 0,1 fatalities +/- 31 ME +/-27 ME +/- 5,8 ME 100% +/- 0,64 fatalities +/-78,8 ME The effect of such variation in the input is reflected proportionally, across the different derailment categories and overall, in the final results. Overall a change of +/- 100 freight train derailments ( which constitutes a change of +/- 16,6% in the number of freight train derailments per year) induces a change of +/- 16,6% in the expected fatalities and overall costs in the reference situation as well as for all options. That means all the changes expected from the use of the DDD would be affected in the same proportion. These variations in the study estimates are well within the uncertainty range analysed in the previous section, and would therefore not affect the conclusions of the study Impacts due to false alarms of the DDD In the initial phase of its introduction in Switzerland, the DDD had been shown to trigger too many false alarms, with trains stopping for no apparent reason, usually causing delays and stoppages of at least 20 minutes and sometimes causing disturbances of services for up to five hours. This is of course a real concern for operators and should therefore not be ignored in the analysis. However, following the series of Page 57/111

58 initial false alarms, the design of the DDD was modified (see Ref : Applying the brakes to catastrophic freight disasters ) and consequently no false alarms have been recorded in Switzerland. Even though this does not mean that false alarms will not occur in the future, and in other countries, it was decided on the basis of those recent good records not to integrate directly the impacts that false alarms might have on the railway system and also on safety. This simplification is anyway in line with other simplifications or assumptions taken in the analysis which all tend to show the DDD in a favourable light, by overestimating its potential benefits and minimising the drawbacks. However in the CBA (see chapter 8), an analysis is carried out such as to find out the maximum number of false alarms which would imply the reduction of estimated NPV to zero. This could provide some idea about the requirements that should be set on the DDD regarding false alarms, in order for it to become an interesting investment for operators Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis In summary, the analysis described above delivers aggregate estimates which are used as input for the final Cost-Benefit analysis. They comprise the aggregate benefits of the DDD (without taking the impacts of false alarms into account) for each option, with the reference parameter values, as well as with the minimising and maximising parameter values. Taking an excerpt from the table above, they read as follows: Reference situation: Overall derailment costs and potential benefits of changes in Million Euros 471 Opt. 2a --> -5 Opt 2b --> -34 Opt. 3 --> -192 Minimising: Overall derailment costs and potential benefits of changes in Million Euros 238 Opt. 2a --> -1 Opt 2b --> -10 Opt. 3 --> -54 Maximising: Overall derailment costs and potential benefits of changes in Million Euros 868 Opt. 2a --> -8 Opt 2b --> -59 Opt. 3 --> -413 Page 58/111

59 7. ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS IMPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK 7.1 Safety and Risk policies in the concerned regulation frameworks The RID and the Safety Directive appear to have different policies or approaches regarding safety. The RID is directed towards avoiding major hazards involving dangerous goods, and to this end prescribes or encourages the use of safety measures that protect against such hazards. This protection can be achieved basically in two ways: - By promoting tank reinforcement for very dangerous substances. This may guarantee that in case of a train accident, the leakage from the tank is unlikely. There is however a limit as to how far one can go with this approach in order to exclude totally the possibility of such an event. One can build very safe and thick tanks, but there are certain economic constraints which will limit this effort. Therefore, the risk of a leakage, however small, is implicitly accepted. - By promoting transport safety, in particular in areas with great exposure (densely populated areas). This is to avoid that train accidents occur in the first place. But of course the risk of such accidents, which are inherent to railway operation, cannot be entirely eliminated. Therefore, again, with this approach a certain risk has to be tolerated. Nevertheless, the RID does not mention anything explicit about what constitutes an acceptable risk. Therefore, it is left to each State to decide for themselves what level they regard as acceptable in terms of risks of a major accident involving dangerous goods. On this basis the RID allows for States to take safety measures that will address the concerns they may have about the risks of major accidents in certain areas. However, since there is no harmonised acceptance criteria yet existing for such risks, it follows that the measures taken will tend to be rather local than general ones. The Safety Directive advocates explicitly a risk based approach for managing safety. It even gives a clear indication about what can be considered acceptable in terms of risks, when it states that Safety levels in the Community rail system are generally high, in particular compared to road transport,... (preamble (4)) and that according to Art 4 1 Member States shall ensure that railway safety is generally maintained and, where reasonably practicable continuously improved......and giving priority to the prevention of serious accidents. Furthermore, the Safety Directive foresees quantitative tools in the form of CST (common safety targets) for monitoring and evaluating the levels of risk in each Member State. The first set of CST are currently still under development but will, once adopted, imply that each Member State at least maintains its measured current level of safety. The CSTs thus constitute, at EU and at Member State level, explicit risk acceptance criteria for the development of safety in the Community s railways. However, the Safety Directive does not say anything more about major impact accidents, and no CST will specifically address such risks. There is, therefore, no harmonised acceptance criteria regarding risks of major accidents and risk aversion either in the Safety Directive. Here again, like allowed for in the RID, Member States may thus decide locally on this issue and implement local safety measures that will address Page 59/111

60 their specific concerns. But the Safety Directive also states, if such measures were to become national safety rules, that the Commission will have to monitor their introduction to ensure that the rules do not become further barriers which may constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on rail transport between Member States (Article 8 5, 6, 7). Finally it must be added that several instruments are foreseen in the Safety Directive which should help improving railway safety. Among these are the requirements for railway undertakings and infrastructure managers to have a safety management system, the supervision of these safety management systems by the National Safety Authorities (NSAs), as well as the obligation by National Investigation Bodies (NIBs) to carry out independent investigations following serious accidents and to coordinate their actions with the other NIBs. All these instruments may lead to the introduction of safety measures (preferably prevention measures), if it is found to be necessary by the concerned stakeholders (RUs, IMs, NSAs, NIBs). 7.2 Influence of the options on Safety, CST implementations and derailment prevention Given the very small impact the use of the DDD will have on reducing safety risks at EU level, it can be said that the DDD would only marginally contribute towards the objectives of the Safety Directive, which are to improve safety as far as reasonably practicable. In particular, the contribution of the DDD towards reaching the CST for each Member State is likely to be insignificant. Even with the maximising set of parameter values (in a model which is already overestimating the risk reduction from the DDD), the maximum reduction in fatalities amounts to 5 per year for the whole EU (assuming option 3, all freight wagons equipped). Compared to approximately 1500 fatalities (including trespassers and level crossing users but excluding suicides) recorded from the entire EU railway operation in EUROSTAT for the year 2006, this is indeed very low (0,25 %). On the other hand, the study shows that other safety benefits than the reduction of fatalities might be achieved by reducing the number of freight derailments. Even though such derailments, however severe, will have in general little direct impact on (human) safety, it must be considered as good safety management practice to try and reduce the occurrence of such inherently unsafe events. In that sense introducing a derailment prevention measure, at a company (RU or IM) level might be more effective than a mitigating measure like the DDD. This should be further explored.. Furthermore, given the positive economic impacts the reduction of derailment occurrence can have on the railway system (important potential savings in track and rolling stock damages as well as operation disruption), efficient and reasonably practicable prevention of derailments might improve the quality of railway operations and would thus be in line with the objectives of the Safety Directive. The question is, however, whether such measure should be imposed, by law, on all Member States.. The potential economic benefits are practically entirely related to the impacts on railway infrastructure and operations, therefore it Page 60/111

61 should be rather up to the sector to propose, at a more general level, the action they may (or not) wish to undertake in order to improve the quality of service of EU railways regarding freight derailment impacts. These potential actions should preferably take in consideration prevention measures (as stated in Article 4 1 of the Safety Directive) besides the possibility of mitigation offered by the DDD. 7.3 Influence of the options on implementation of Interoperability Directive and TSIs It is of primary importance to ensure that any new safety measure does not prevent the development of the railway system s Interoperability which contributes to the EU railway market opening and development. This is a key instrument contributing to the achievement of the White paper objectives on transport TSIs in relation with to derailment risks To analyse the potential impacts of the DDD use on interoperability of the EU railway system the Agency has identified the links which exist between the safety barriers contributing to the mitigation of the derailments and the requirements of the main relevant TSIs. It was considered that the most relevant TSIs contributing to the mitigation of the derailments were: - The technical specification of interoperability relating to the subsystem rolling stock freight wagons of the trans-european conventional rail system 23, hereinafter referred as WAG TSI. - The technical specification of interoperability relating to the subsystem Traffic Operation and Management of the trans-european conventional rail system 24, hereinafter referred as OPE TSI. - The technical specification of interoperability relating to safety in railway tunnels in the trans- European conventional and high speed rail system 25, hereinafter referred as SRT TSI. The three above mentioned TSIs are relevant for the assessment of options 1 to 3 (mitigation of occurred derailments) and for option 4 which deals with the prevention of the derailments. The following TSI: - Draft technical specification for interoperability relating to the infrastructure sub-system of the trans- European conventional rail system 26, 23 Commission Decision 2006/861/EC of 28 July 2006 notified under document number C(2006) Commission Decision 2006/920/EC of 11 August 2006 notified under document number C(2006) Commission Decision 2008/163/EC of 20 December 2007 notified under document number C(2007) Version 3.0 Page 61/111

62 is mainly relevant for option 4 (prevention of the derailments) and has not been considered for the assessment of options 1 to 3. The Agency has identified the requirements which are amongst the most relevant ones, for the WAG TSI and the OPE TSI in relation with the derailments mitigation, and thus for the assessment of options 1 to 3. From this work it was possible to establish two different types of information, as follow: - What are the requirements which should be amended and the new potential requirements in case the DDD would be mandatory in the EU legal framework? - What are the existing TSI requirements that need to be applied if the DDD would be used, and what would therefore be the induced changes or efforts for the sector? The results are summarised in the following section Potential TSIs issues in case of DDD (mitigation) implementation It is important to note that the potential required modifications of the SRT TSI have not been assessed, thus the section presents only the results for the WAG TSI and the OPE TSI Potential modifications of the TSIs The analysis of WAG and OPE TSI requirements in relation with the mitigating measures of derailments shows that amendments or new requirements could be necessary in case of mandatory application of the DDD. Following requirements deserve particular attention: - OPE TSI : Recording of supervision data on-board the train, This requirement contains in particular the recording of emergency stop. In case of DDD use it is necessary to record the DDD activations, in particular to monitor the occurrence of false alarms. An appropriate record of True and False alarms should be ensured by the users of the DDD. - OPE TSI 4.2.2: Train Composition, In relation with this requirement it would be necessary to inform the driver of the presence of the DDD device in case of equipped wagons. This would at least contribute helping the driver to adequately and rapidly recognize an emergency situation in case of DDD activation. - OPE TSI Annex C Safety related message Page 62/111

63 In relation with the two previous points, the potential adaptation of the safety related message in case of DDD activation might be necessary - WAG TSI : Marking of freight wagon, and, OPE Annex P.12: Letter marking for wagons In relation with these elements it is necessary to consider the amendment of EN standard on wagon marking, - WAG TSI : Braking performance For this requirement it is necessary to re-consider the application of the emergency brake, either by the driver or automatically, in case of DDD use. It will be necessary to check the potential amendments of the OPE TSI in connection with the related potential amendments of the WAG TSI. - WAG TSI 4.8.2: Rolling stock register The DDD is a new constitutive part of the equipped wagon, thus it is necessary to describe a new type of wagon and record this new type by amending the annex H of the WAG TSI - New requirement in WAG TSI: x: Marking requirement for DDD equipped wagons. In this section all the present and future type of DDD should be reported in accordance with the particular characteristics of the derailment detection device. Other modifications could be required in case of mandatory application of the DDD, for example in the SRT TSI. It is important to notice that even in case of voluntary application of the DDD, the users should ensure that the use of the DDD does not prevent the application of the existing TSI, and should pay particular attention to the previous mentioned requirements (Re)-application of existing TSI requirements and review/amendments of the procedures for the Stakeholders In addition to the requirements listed in the previous section, DDD users would need to review their procedures and adopt all new necessary procedures to ensure the safe and interoperable use of the DDD. A corresponding (new) authorisation/certificate should be delivered by the competent authorities. The main induced changes are summarized hereinafter. Member States and representative bodies The member states and the representative bodies should be involved in (new) certification and/or (re)- assessment of the (new) procedures taken by the concerned stakeholders to integrate the use of the DDD in the railway system, in application of the Safety directive and the existing TSI requirements. Page 63/111

64 Infrastructure managers and Railway undertakings According to their respective responsibilities and in application of the existing TSIs, the IMs and RUs should review their rules and procedures and train the concerned staff. Particular attention should be paid to the drivers training concerning emergency (true or false alarms) situations. The question of automatic emergency brake would need a specific training of the driver taking into account the different potential contexts, urban, non-urban, tunnels... Entity in Charge of Maintenance Particular attention has to be paid to the issue of false alarms. The rate of false alarms should be kept at the lowest possible level to avoid the disruption of service operations. An induced increase of emergency brake activation could also increase the overall level of wheel defects. In addition a low level of false alarms should be ensured. Wagon keepers and Manufacturer(s) These stakeholders are mainly concerned with wagon identification and the marking of operation restrictions. Train Drivers The train drivers are mainly concerned with the new procedures and new behaviour to adopt in case of automatic braking triggered by the DDD. In particular the immediate recognition of an occurred derailment is uncertain as it is not sure, on contrary to what the RID provision suggests, that the venting of the pipe following a DDD alarm would constitute a clear signal to the driver that a derailment has occurred. Effectively, there exist other reasons which can result in the venting of the pipe, for example loss of train integrity. This situation might induce delays in the proper handling of the actual emergency situation Potential TSIs issues in case of preventive measure (Option 4) In principle, if the further study of Option 4 is required by the Commission, the assessment of preventing measure should also include the analysis of potential impacts on TSIs. Page 64/111

65 7.3.4 Inputs for the Cost Benefit Analysis Our analysis of the influence of the DDD use on implementation of the Interoperability Directive and TSIs has highlighted that introducing this device could imply modifications of TSIs (incl. potential amendments and new requirements). Furthermore, key stakeholders, notably RUs and IMs could be required to review / amend relevant procedures and undertake staff training as a result of introducing the DDD. Authorisation / certification by competent authorities could also be required to ensure the proper integration of the DDD to the railway system. These activities will require resources implying additional costs to the different stakeholders. This aspect should be taken into account in the Recommendation. 7.4 Other potential legal issues Driver licence directive Provisions in EC Directive 2007/59 on the certification of train drivers operating locomotives and trains on the railway system in the Community are linked to the DDD. In particular, requirements for issuing a licence and complementary certificate are specified: - Annex IV (General professional knowledge and requirements regarding the Licence): Amongst others it is mentioned that drivers must be able to identify the procedures applicable to accidents involving persons drivers must be able to distinguish the hazards involved in railway operations in general - Annex V (Professional knowledge of rolling stock and requirements regarding the certificate): Amongst the requirements it is specified that: Drivers must be able to be attentive to unusual occurrences concerning the behaviour of the train Text of present RID provisionat present time the RID 2011 proposal is strongly orientated on mitigation of derailments with on-board technology. In order to prevent any disadvantage of a particular technology aiming at reducing derailment accidents or their impacts, any proposal for new safety requirement should be preferably expressed in functional and performance objectives without giving any advantage either to mitigation or prevention measures. Page 65/111

66 8. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 8.1 Introduction On the basis of the methodology described in Section 5, detailed analysis of costs and benefits has been undertaken for the Options 2a, 2b and 3. For each of the options impacts are determined relative to the current situation. In particular, positive impacts (benefits) are the result of reduced costs associated with derailment accidents, while negative impacts (costs) are mainly associated with investment costs in DDD equipment, plus other costs incurred as the result of introducing new equipment to the railway system (e.g. revision of internal procedures for RUs / IMs or administrative costs). Magnitude of the different impacts depends on the extent to which freight wagons are required to be equipped or not. It should be noticed that our analysis of impacts considers DDD fitting for all wagons (new and existing) as it could be at a final implementation stage. In principle, it would be possible to examine the effects of only fitting new wagons with the objective to analyse implementation scenarios. However, such an analysis would not change significantly the conclusions of the IA only resulting in scaling down, at the beginning of implementation, both costs and benefits of DDD. The rest of the Section is structured as follows. In sub-section 8.2 the core assumptions utilised for the CBA are presented. In particular, this will include information about unit costs for the different impact categories. Section 8.3 contains overall information about the quantitative results for each of the options both in terms of the different impacts and the aggregated Net Present Value (NPV). The following section discusses those impacts that have not been quantified (monetarised) but should be taken into account in the impact assessment. The perspectives from the different stakeholders are considered in Section 8.5 with main focus on railway undertakings, infrastructure managers and government. In Section 8.6 the outcome of the tests performed regarding the influence of using lower and higher values of key input values on the NPV. Section 8.7 summarises the findings of the cost benefit analysis. 8.2 Core assumptions for the CBA Applied values for life time and discount factor The NPVs are calculated for three life time values, 10, 40 and 60 years, using in all three cases a discount factor of 4%. Our central value for life time is 40 years, while the 10 year and 60 year values are used to provide information about NPV for a short and long time horizon. The 10 year life time value may be particularly relevant for industry where short term economic feasibility may be important with a longer time horizon would be considered too uncertain. In the following the core assumptions regarding unit costs values are presented for the following items: Page 66/111

67 Value for Preventing a Fatality Value for Preventing an Injury Track damage costs per km Rolling stock damage costs per wagon Operation disruption costs per hour of incident Environmental costs per derailment All unit costs reported in the following refer to 2008 price levels (prior to the current worldwide economic recession). Value for Preventing a Fatality (VPF) Monetary values per avoided fatalities are available on European basis from the HEATCO project as used as part of the revision of Annex I of the Safety Directive for the common safety indicators (CSIs). Web-link to HEATCO: Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Value for Preventing an Injury (VPI) Monetary values per avoided injuries are available on European basis from the HEATCO project as used as part of the revision of Annex I of the Safety Directive for the common safety indicators (CSIs). Web-link to HEATCO: Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Track damage costs per km Track damage costs per km are estimated from the consultation (see above) of the NIBs and NSAs on past derailment accidents. The unit costs (reference values) are highest for track damage to be repaired in case of immediate severe derailment and lowest for track damage to be repaired in case of non severe derailment detected by the DDD, staff or other means. Page 67/111

68 Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Track damage to be repaired in case of immediate severe derailment Track damage to be repaired in case of non immediate severe derailment Track damage to be repaired in case of non severe derailment detected by the DDD Track damage to be repaired in case of non severe derailment detected by staff or other means Rolling stock damage per wagon The costs of wagon replacement / repair have been estimated from the data communicated by VTG-Rail as well as the NIB / NSA Derailment survey. Higher replacement / repair costs are assumed for severe derailment than non-severe derailment. Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Rolling stock damage to be replaced or repaired in case of severe derailment Rolling stock damage to be replaced or repaired in case of severe derailment (without dangerous goods wagons involved) Rolling stock to be replaced or repaired in case of non severe derailment (detected by DDD) Rolling stock damage to be repaired in case of non severe derailment (detected by staff or other means) Operation disruption costs per hour of incident Unit values for disruption costs per hour of incident are fixed according to the following table. The values have been estimated using HEATCO values of time (adjusted upwards as transport users value higher the time for delays / waiting compared to normal travel time). Information from the UK RAIB (Rail Accident Investigation Board) and other UK sources about delay minutes for a sample of derailments have been used to determine how many trains will be affected during a 1 hour of an incident. Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Operation disruption in case of severe derailment Operation disruption in case of non severe derailment Page 68/111

69 Environmental costs per derailment The typical environmental costs per derailment have been estimated from the consultation of the NIBs and NSAs on past derailment accidents. Minimum ( ) Reference ( ) Maximum ( ) Average environmental costs for severe derailments involving dangerous substances In addition, assumptions regarding DDD acquisition, installation and maintenance costs have been specified as follows based on information from SBB: Costs per vehicle ( ) DDD acquisition costs(a) DDD installation costs(b) 135 DDD maintenance costs(c) 310 a: The DDD unit costs 700 (therefore 2 units per vehicle is required). Estimate is based on an order of 1000 units. b: This includes labour cost, cost for handling and a small margin for engineering (adaptation) while wagon downtime cost is not included. c: Maintenance work on the EDT 101 is carried out every sixth years during the vehicle's main overhaul. No additional maintenance work is required between two main revisions. However these (average) costs do not reflect any possible effect of resource or supply shortage in case of rapid transitions. 8.3 Quantitative results for options 2 and 3 Total costs per wagon in PVC terms On the basis of the cost information given in Section 8.2 it is possible to calculate the Present Value Cost (PVC) per wagon using different assumptions about lifetime. The main cost component is the cost of acquisition (1 400 ) and installation ( 135 ). PVC (60 years): 2 562,9 PVC (40 years): 2 418,7 PVC (10 years): 1 780,0 Page 69/111

70 By definition the PVC figure is highest for a lifetime period of 60 years followed by 40 years and 10 years due to additional maintenance required over the longer periods. Total costs for wagons under Option 2a, 2b and 3 Information about PVC per wagon and number of wagons concerned under Options 2a, 2b and 3 allows estimation of the total costs expressed in PVC. It is assumed that the same PVC per wagon can be used as a unit cost for all three options. The total cost for each option is shown in the following table together with information about number of wagons assumed: Number of wagons Total PVC (ME) 40 years life time Option 2a ,1 Option 2b ,9 Option ,4 Source: Own calculations, VTG-Rail, DG TREN and Eurostat Overview of annual benefits The following Table shows the annual benefits for each of the three options. Annual benefits are determined based on the unit costs estimates (presented above) and the changes in: Number of fatalities or injuries Length of damaged tracks Number of wagons to be repaired or replaced Number of hours of traffic disruptions (or potential line closure) Extent of environmental damage (expressed in monetary terms, Euros) The changes for these categories are estimated as part of the risk assessment and are linked to the introduction of the DDD. These changes are calculated with reference to current levels. Information about current levels for the different categories is based on the dedicated Derailment Accident Survey described earlier in this paper whereby it has been possible to determine the typical consequences of freight derailment Page 70/111

71 accidents in terms of casualties, damages to track, rolling stock and environment as well as traffic disruption. Other data sources have been used where appropriate. The table shows that annual benefits is highest under Option 3 with 192ME / year, followed by Option 2b while Option 2a results in the lowest annual benefits of 5ME. This result is according to expectation: higher extent of take-up of the DDD in the freight wagon fleet will increase the likelihood of the consequences of freight derailments being reduced and hence lead to higher annual benefits. Other important findings relate to the composition of the annual benefits: benefits to the railway system are the biggest contributor (between 80% and 96% depending on the option considered), whereas benefits in terms of reduced fatalities / injuries and reduced environmental damage have very limited influence (between 4% and 20%). Overall net benefits The annual benefits shown in the previous paragraph should be compared with the costs of acquisition, installation and maintenance in order to determine, for each option, the net benefits calculated in terms of Net Present Value (NPV). Additionally, B/C ratios are also estimated. NPVs and B/C ratios are computed for different life times (10, 40 and 60 years) based on a discount factor of 4%. Furthermore, results are reported on three bases: (a) all annual benefits, (b) all annual benefits except traffic disruption, (c) annual benefits for reduced fatalities, injuries and environmental damage only. Page 71/111

72 NPV NPV NPV B/C B/C B/C 10 years (ME) 40 years (ME) 60 years (ME) 10 years 40 years 60 years Option 2a (I) ,4 2,5 2,6 Option 2a (II) ,7 1,3 1,4 Option 2a (III) ,1 0,2 0,2 Option 2b (I) ,5 2,8 3,0 Option 2b (II) ,9 1,6 1,8 Option 2b (III) ,3 0,6 0,6 Option 3 (I) ,2 2,2 2,4 Option 3 (II) ,7 1,3 1,4 Option 3 (III) ,1 0,1 0,1 Note: (I), (II), (III) refers to calculations with all annual benefits, annual benefit without inclusion of traffic disruption and annual benefits for reduced fatalities, injuries and environmental damage only respectively. The estimated NPVs (and B/C ratios) demonstrates that there could be substantial net benefits from introducing the DDD in parts of, or the entire freight wagon rolling stock. For a life time of 40 years and all annual benefits considered (I) shows that Option 2a has net-benefits of 60ME, Option 2b 430ME and Option ME. Positive NPVs are even obtained without inclusion of benefits from reduced traffic disruption (II). On the other hand if only human safety and environmental benefits are considered (III), then costs are clearly outweighing the advantages. This finding highlights that the main source of benefits are for the railway system (reduced rolling stock damage / track damage) and its users (time delays for passengers and freight customers). It is important to emphasise that the monetarisation of impacts is not complete as relevant items have not been included as discussed in Section 8.4. This context puts importance on the robustness of the results, and Section 8.7 presents the findings of the tests performed regarding the effect of changing key input variables on the NPVs, thereby considering the possibility for uncertainty in these. 8.4 Other impacts The following potential consequences have not been taken into account in the quantitative analysis reported above, but may nevertheless be important if the DDD is introduced (in terms of possible lower net-benefits than shown in the previous section): Training of RU and IM staff Revision of internal procedures (IM and RU) RU administrative costs (re-certification of Part A and B + rolling stock) EU MS administrative costs (certification of Part A and B + rolling stock) TSI revision as required Page 72/111

73 These items have not been included in the NPV calculations presented in Section 8.3. If Derailment Detection Devices are put into use - even if only voluntarily the Agency has already identified a substantial number of induced changes to be implemented by stakeholders in accordance with the existing legal framework. According to the respective responsibilities, stakeholders would need to review, check, assess, certify and/or authorize the use of this new safety measure. Training of RU and IM staff Installation and use of the DDD is likely to require additional training of relevant staff (in particular train drivers). The total costs are likely to vary between the options considered. However, it is likely that training costs would not be substantial. Revision of internal procedures (IM and RU) The installation and use of the DDD is likely to result in revision of certain internal procedures. This may lead to costs for RUs / IMs, although likely to be on a relatively limited level. RU administrative costs (re-certification of Part A and B + rolling stock) Installation of DDD may require new authorisation / certification for the RU in order to be allowed to place the equipped vehicles into service. The item could be important if the NSA considers the equipped vehicle as a new vehicle. Otherwise, this would not be a significant impact. EU MS administrative costs (certification of Part A and B + rolling stock) This item is linked to the previous item RU administrative costs and the importance of these costs will depend on the extent to which new certification / authorisation of rolling stock equipped with the DDD is required. In the case of the SBB programme no additional approval or certification costs for authorities were incurred. TSI revision as required If the Derailment Detection Device becomes a new mandatory safety measure, it would be potentially necessary to amend certain TSIs. The existence of the costs of these revisions and any additional checks and certifications should be taken into account in the recommendation. Page 73/111

74 False alarms The possibility for the device triggering false alarms should be taken into account as part of the impact assessment. The key issue here is that any false alarms would result in traffic disruption to the network. If there are such false alarms it would reduce the net-benefits calculated earlier. As part of the analysis we have assessed how many false alarms would eliminate the positive net-benefits (calculated as NPV) estimated in the previous section. Our results are calculated using a 40 year lifetime and consideration to all quantified annual benefits, i.e. the case I NPVs reported above. In the following table the number of false alarms per DDD equipment per annum is shown for Options 2a, 2b and 3. Number of false alarms per DDD equipment per year Option 2a 0,024 Option 2b 0,029 Option 3 0,019 Source: DG TREN data on rail freight transport and own calculations Note: The variation in the recorded values is the result of different ratios of NPV per equipment under Options 2a-3; the highest ratio is recorded for option 2b followed by option 2a and option 3. The figures in the table should be interpreted as follows. If the number of false alarms is beyond 0,02-0,03 per equipment per year negative net-benefits would be incurred. This would roughly correspond to about 1 false alarm every 50 years per device. To this minimum break-even value, a coefficient should then be added to keep some benefits from the DDD introduction in the railway system. Due to lack of some data, it was not possible for the Agency to compare this amount of false alarms to the actual data from the SBB field experiments mentioned in section In any case, it is expected that in the future, requirements for the number of acceptable false alarms should be defined (maybe in a standard), as this is certainly an important issue to consider for operators and infrastructure managers. 8.5 Stakeholder perspectives The following incidence groups are of importance for the impact assessment of the Derailment Detection Device: Railway undertakings Infrastructure managers Page 74/111

75 Rail manufacturers Governments / National Safety Authorities Rail users Non-users Other parties (e.g. maintenance suppliers, wagon keepers, service providers and procurement entities) Each of these interested parties is considered in the table below in terms of their key concerns. There may be differences within a given group in terms of perceived key issues, especially for countries with very different risk acceptance levels. Key concerns Railway undertakings Three main issues: (1) Cost implications of derailments that could be mitigated by the DDD (2) Costs of acquiring / using DDD on their rolling stock (3) Impacts on perceived railway safety risks Infrastructure managers Manufacturers For IMs main focus will be on the possibility for reduced track repairs and reduced extent of closure of lines / disruption to the network. Cost implications for equipping new and existing rolling stock with DDD Specific issues for the manufacturer of the DDD Government / NSAs A number of concerns (by default) would be relevant: Promote sustainability of the transport system as a whole Maintain and improve railway safety Contain cost due to limited resources Different governments will conclude on the basis of trading-off risk reductions and costs Railway users Key concern would be on implications on railway safety Secondary concern could be if there are implications on fares, freight tariffs etc. Non users Primary concern would be implications for human and environmental risks of DG accidents (e.g. those non-users close to a railway line or other railway facilities). Secondary concern could be consequences on taxation (but probably not of Page 75/111

76 significance in this case) Other parties Concerns for this group vary according to the specific stakeholder involved. The issues for keepers may be rather similar as for RUs (see above). For maintenance suppliers there may be issues related to competence management / training with potential implications on costs. From our quantitative estimates for Options 2a, 2b and 3 it is possible to conclude that the railway system (RUs and IMs) could potentially benefit from the introduction of DDD due to reduced track and rolling stock damage costs. These benefits more than outweigh the costs of acquisition, installation and maintenance of DDD (although as noted there are likely to be other cost items not considered in the quantitative analysis). In principle, it may be worthwhile for RUs / IMs to consider putting resources towards DDD since the benefits in terms of reduced track / rolling stock damage costs are likely to justify such investments. The feasibility of investing in DDD could be done on a case-by-case basis, and taking into account of the potential efficiency of the preventive measure (Option 4), in order that the local context is taken appropriately into account. In this context, there are possible complications as the initial costs of DDD may be borne by RUs while benefits would be for both RUs and IMs. The quantitative information also highlights the benefits to be derived from railway users (both passenger and freight) due to reduced time losses from derailment accidents. 8.6 Min-Max sensitivity analysis for the net present value Two tests have been performed regarding the influence of unit cost parameters on the NPV: (1) parameters are set to the levels that will result in the lowest possible NPVs; (2) parameters are set to the levels that will determine the highest possible NPVs. Only the values regarding annual benefits have been considered in the sensitivity analysis as the values for DDD equipment, installation and maintenance costs are likely to be more stable. Minimum NPV context The values used for the unit cost parameters in the minimum NPV context are set out in annex 5. The following table provides details regarding NPVs and B/C ratios. Page 76/111

77 NPV NPV NPV B/C B/C B/C 10 years (ME) 40 years (ME) 60 years (ME) 10 years 40 years 60 years Option 2a (I) ,3 0,5 0,6 Option 2a (II) ,2 0,4 0,5 Option 2a (III) ,1 0,1 0,1 Option 2b (I) ,5 0,8 0,9 Option 2b (II) ,4 0,7 0,8 Option 2b (III) ,2 0,4 0,4 Option 3 (I) ,3 0,6 0,7 Option 3 (II) ,3 0,5 0,5 Option 3 (III) ,0 0,1 0,1 Note: (I), (II), (III) refers to calculations with all annual benefits, annual benefit without inclusion of traffic disruption and annual benefits for reduced fatalities, injuries and environmental damage only respectively. This test results in all NPVs being negative (such that the present value costs are higher than the present value benefits). It should be pointed out that the test is extreme in the sense that it would imply simultaneous and significant over-estimation of all unit costs in the CBA calculations reported in Section 8.3. However, the test does demonstrate the existence of uncertainty regarding the overall net-benefits of DDD. This uncertainty should be taken into account in the recommendation. Maximum NPV context The values used for the unit cost parameters in the maximum NPV context are set out in annex 5. The following table provides details regarding NPVs and B/C ratios. NPV NPV NPV B/C B/C B/C 10 years (ME) 40 years (ME) 60 years (ME) 10 years 40 years 60 years Option 2a (I) ,2 4,0 4,3 Option 2a (II) ,5 2,6 2,8 Option 2a (III) ,4 0,8 0,8 Option 2b (I) ,7 4,9 5,2 Option 2b (II) ,9 3,5 3,8 Option 2b (III) ,9 1,6 1,7 Option 3 (I) ,6 4,7 5,1 Option 3 (II) ,5 2,7 3,0 Option 3 (III) ,2 0,3 0,3 Note: (I), (II), (III) refers to calculations with all annual benefits, annual benefit without inclusion of traffic disruption and annual benefits for reduced fatalities, injuries and environmental damage only respectively. Page 77/111

78 Higher NPV values are recorded for all cases for this test and for Option 2b positive results are even obtained when only including benefits from reduced fatalities, injuries and environmental damage (with 40 and 60 years life time). It should be pointed out that the test is extreme in the sense that it would imply simultaneously and significant under-estimation for all unit costs in the CBA calculations reported in Section CBA conclusions In this Section detailed analysis of impacts has been performed with respect to the DDD. Option 2a, 2b and 3 were assessed through cost-benefit analysis with focus on impacts regarding: casualties, track damage, rolling stock damage, operational disruption and environmental damage. These benefits were contrasted to the costs of acquisition, installation and maintenance of DDD. Our findings suggest that there could be significant benefits by introducing DDD as the NPV estimates indicate positive net-benefits. These netbenefits are largely generated for the railway system and its users, whereas benefits from reduced number of casualties and extent of environmental damage have more limited importance. However, the monetarisation of impacts is not complete as relevant items have not been possible to include. Common for these non-included items is that each would involve additional costs compared to the costs considered above. In particular, the costs associated with TSI revision could be substantial. Furthermore, the actual impact of false alarms from DDD should not be ignored as these could generate costs in terms of traffic disruption thereby reducing the estimated net-benefits. The Section also report on the outcome of sensitivity analysis. These analyses demonstrate the existence of uncertainty regarding the overall net-benefits of DDD. In particular, the results indicate that reducing certain unit costs is sufficient to obtain negative NPVs in all cases. Stakeholder perspectives were identified highlighting the possibility for RUs / IMs to consider investments in DDD due to the significant benefits that these stakeholders may obtain due to reduced rolling stock and track damage costs. The CBA has not examined Option 4 however it is possible that this option could lead to even higher netbenefits compared to the ones recorded for Options 2a, 2b and 3. The study of Option 4 by the Agency may only take place, upon Commission request. Page 78/111

79 9. CONCLUSIONS 9.1 Effectiveness of studied options Overall assessment Following the impact assessment including the cost-benefit analysis realised on each option considered in the present study, the table below provides a qualitative assessment of each option s effectiveness regarding the following three aspects: - Safety implications - Economic implications - Legal implications The assessment is based on a three-point scale as follows -, neutral, + Safety Economics Legal Option 2a neutral -/neutral - Option 2b neutral neutral/+ - Option 3 neutral + neutral Option 1 neutral + + Further explanations on the particular options assessment are given hereinafter Option 2a RID Committee of Experts provision Regarding Option 2a, the Safety impacts are so minimal ( < 0.01 % reduction on overall human risk level of the EU railway system, i.e. far less than 1 fatality per year) that they can be almost neglected. The same is the case for the economic impacts, where even though the CBA indicates a slight net benefit after 10 years, the uncertainty in the results and the fact that the model does produce results which tend to overestimate the benefits from the DDD, allow having some doubts about the real cost-effectiveness of this option. Given the small economic and safety effectiveness of the option, it follows that imposing legally the DDD to the RID scope would be disproportionate, while also running against the principle of subsidiarity regarding the (local) management of major accidents risks. This analysis motivates the Agency recommendation European Railway Agency Recommendation on the provision proposed by the RID Committee of Experts requiring the use of the Derailment Detection Devices - (ERA/REC/ /SAF) Page 79/111

80 9.1.3 Other options Compared to Option 2a the Option 2b is slightly more interesting from a safety point of view, as it allows mitigating an increased number of situations which can result in a possible involvement of dangerous substances. However, with respect to the overall level of EU railway safety, the safety gains (< 0.1 % of all fatalities per year) remain marginal. The economic aspects, even though better than for Option 2a, are still not too convincing for the same reasons as cited in the previous section. It is though likely that Option 2b results in some net-benefits albeit of limited magnitude. This would however still make imposing the use of the DDD to all DG wagons disproportionate, while remaining against the principle of subsidiarity. Option 3 is not much more interesting than Option 2b from a safety point of view, but appears to be an option to consider from an economic point of view, even taking the uncertainties and potential overestimation of net-benefits into account. In this case, given the size of the market thus created, it would be particularly necessary to develop a EN standard for DDD in order to ensure fair and open conditions for the manufacturers of such products. However, the TSIs are not the suitable place to impose the use of new equipment either for safety or economic reason, or any kind of best practice, since TSIs are devoted to the necessary functions and performance for interoperability. This is why imposing a derailment detection device to all freight wagons may be a disproportionate action in the EU legal framework except if a clear support of the sector would encourage a EU harmonised action. Option 1 (based on voluntary use of the DDD by the sector) should remain neutral for safety aspects, and have positive economic impacts, being assumed that the sector would only apply the DDD when and where it would be an efficient measure. This assessment is though conditional on the voluntary use not creating problems of interoperability between railway systems using the DDD and other systems. This particular situation requires, from the potential interested railway companies, to explore and solve the potential inconsistencies already identified in section 7.3 and to ensure that no other safety or interoperability problems will arise for the voluntary DDD use. In addition the voluntary use should not result in the prohibition of transport with unequipped wagons for the concerned parties who have chosen not to implement this particular safety measure, and who may prefer preventive measures instead. This last point is reflected in the Agency recommendation. 9.2 Other conclusions Conditions for voluntary use of the DDD in other situations than field experiments In any case, the following conditions for use of DDD equipped wagons need to be respected: - Users shall check their rules and procedure to safely apply the requirements set out in the existing TSIs and in particular the WAG, OPE and SRT TSIs, Page 80/111

81 - As the DDD modifies significantly the behaviour of the equipped wagons, automatic braking, these wagons should be authorised for placing into service by the competent authority in order to ensure a safe use of these new wagons, and the specific rules and procedures for their use should be assessed by the competent authority Local management of risks instead of the harmonised DDD provision It is important to stress that alternative possibilities are already offered to the Member States to limit the risks induced by the transport of dangerous goods, in accordance to the Article 1.4.b) of the Directive on Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods and in accordance to the Chapter 1.9 of the RID. More stringent safety requirements, at member state level, focussing on specific local risks, might be as effective as the Option 2a or even more effective, assuming that local requirements can be better adapted than uniform rules to solve particular local situations. This point is also reflected in the Agency recommendation. For example, the present legal framework allows the Member States to require more stringent safety measures or restrictions on transport operation using different modes of actions, as follows (non exhaustive): - Reduced speed, - Specified journey times, - Prohibition on train meeting each other, - Alternative routes or special provision on given routes... However, it is important to notice that the Article 5 of EU Directive on Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods does not allow the EU Member States to adopt more stringent construction requirements on wagons dedicated to national transport put in circulation within their territory. One difficulty faced by the Member States to use these existing legal instruments is that local safety measures can have repercussion far from the location they are applied due to the logistics (linked) of transport fluxes. Thus, in practice, the need for application of more stringent provisions have to be justified by the concerned State and have to be equally applied to the national and international transport within the concerned territory. However, this justification of the provision does not necessarily result in its acceptance by all the concerned States, as far as there is no common perception of (and aversion to) major hazards. It is feared by some experts that encouraging the use of local measures (such as the ones above cited) by Member States or even local authorities could eventually endanger the attractiveness of DG transport by rail, and thus lead to a shift of DG transport to the road. This in turn could lead to higher risks of DG accidents. Such possible counter-effects have not been analysed in this study because it was considered that if higher risks are recognised with the road mode, the local or/and national authority(ies) should prevent, knowing these potential shifting effects, the adoption of restrictions on the less risky mode leading to a higher global risk. But again, so long as there is no common risk acceptance criteria regarding risks of major accidents with dangerous goods, for all inland transport modes,, it is not obvious that applying harmonised safety Page 81/111

82 measures such as the DDD provision would deter e.g local authorities from applying additional local measures in order to address the concern they have about the risks, or rather their perception. Indeed, despite the regular adoption of new safety measures by the RID Committee (anti-overriding buffers, anticrash buffers, protection shields...) experts still continue to have the same concerns about potential local restrictions. This situation reinforces the Agency view that the tactic consisting to adopt new general safety measures, with the objective to reassure the local authorities, without any control on tolerable risk level (risk acceptance criteria) could be ineffective and endless. Finally, it is important to note that Art 4.1 of the Railway Safety Directive requires the EU member states to consider prevention measures in priority when they are cost-effective. Thus, with respect to the potential benefits in reducing costs incurred by derailments the Agency would advise the sector to better explore the solutions offered by prevention measures besides the possibility to use mitigation measures. 9.3 The situation in the Baltic States (EE, LT, LV) The situation in the Baltic States deserves particular attention. The transport by rail of dangerous goods in those countries represented in 2006 about 30% of the entire DG tonnage transported (ton.km) by rail in EU However, a very large proportion of DG rail transport in the Baltic States is performed using wagons which are not submitted to the RID regime, since they belong to companies established in countries outside OTIF. Therefore, it follows that the potential benefits of the DDD would be even more limited in those countries, since only a small proportion of all DG wagons circulating on their network would be equipped with the DDD. Page 82/111

83 10. REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS 10.1 Reference Documents Ref. N Author Title Last Community references Issue [1] European Commission [2] European Commission [3] European Commission [4] European Commission [5] European Commission [6] European Commission [7] European Commission [8] European Commission Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety on the Community s railways. OJ L 220/16, 21/06/2004. Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on interoperability of the rail system within the Community. OJ L 191/1, 18/07/2008. Directive 2008/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Inland Transport of Dangerous Goods. OJ L 260/13, 30/09/2008. Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European Railway Agency. Commission decision (2006/861/EC) of 28 July 2006 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to the subsystem rolling stock freight wagons of the trans- European conventional rail system. (notified under document number C(2006) 3345) Commission decision (2006/920/EC) of 11 August 2006 concerning the technical specification of interoperability relating to the subsystem Traffic Operation and Management of the trans-european conventional rail system. (notified under document number C(2006) 3593) Draft technical specification for interoperability relating to the infrastructure sub-system of the trans-european conventional rail system. Version 3.0 Commission decision 2008/163/EC of 20 December 2007 notified under document number C(2007)6450. Technical specification of interoperability relating to safety in railway tunnels in the trans-european conventional and high Page 83/111

84 Ref. N Author Title Last speed rail system Issue [9] European Commission Impact Assessment Guidelines. SEC(2005) [10] ERA Safety Unit Consultation of the National Safety Authorities and of the National Investigation Bodies about freight wagons derailments 2008 [11] ERA Economic Evaluation Unit Economic Evaluation: Methodology Guidelines 2007 References from OTIF Consultation [12] RID/CE A 81-03/ , Final report of the 39th session of the RID Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Berne, November 2002) [13] RID/CE INF.CH Press release of the Swiss Federal Department for the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (UVEK) from 27 June 2002 [14] RID/CE INF.CH Gemeinsame Erlärung der Schweizerisch Gesellshaft für Chemische Industrie (SGCI) und der Schweizerischen Bundesbahnen AG (SBB AG) sowie des Eidgenössischen Departements für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation (UVEK) über die Reduction der Risiken beim Tranosport gefährlicher Güter mit sehr grossem Schadenspotenzial wie Chlor und Schwefeldioxid [15] RID/CE A 81-03/ , Final report of the 40th session of the RID Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Sinaia, November 2003) [16] RID/CE CE_40/7b Derailment detectors Proposal transmitted by Switzerland [17] RID/CE A 81-03/ , Final report of the 41th session of the RID 2004 Page 84/111

85 Ref. N Author Title Last Issue Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Meiningen, November 2004) [18] RID/CE A 81-03/ , Final report of the 42th session of the RID Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Madrid, November 2005) [19] RID/CE OTIF/RID/CE/2006-A, Final report of the 43th session of the RID Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Helsinki, 2-5 October 2006) [20] RID/CE OTIF/RID/CE/2007-A, Final report of the 44th session of the RID Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. (Zagreb, November 2007). [21] RID/CE CE_ _E Safety device to detect derailments of rail tank-wagons Proposal submitted by Germany [22] RID/CE INF 2 Report on derailment tests carried out with goods wagons Transmitted by the Technical university of Berlin [23] RID/CE INF Derailement detectors Switzerland s position concerning an e- mail from the European Commission to the Member States [24] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_505_2002_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Bonn, April 2002 [25] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_508_2002_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Bonn, 5-6 September 2002 [26] RID/CE/WG INF_CH_1_E Press release of the Swiss Federal Department for the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (UVEK) from 27 June 2002 [27] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_504_2003_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Bonn, February 2003 [28] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_509_2003_ E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Bern, September Page 85/111

86 Ref. N Author Title Last Issue [29] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_507_2004_ E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Duisburg-Wedau, June 2004 [30] RID/CE/WG INF_CH_2_E - Derailment detectors Information transmitted by Switzerland [31] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_503_2005_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Bonn, April 2005 [32] RID/CE/WG INF_CH_2_ E - Derailment detectors for dangerous goods tankwagons Information transmitted by Switzerland [33] RID/CE/WG INF_UIC_1_D Sachstansberight des UIC-Unterausschusses Brenswesen zum pneumatischen Entgleiungsdetektor Mitteilung des Internationalen Eisenbahnverbands (UIC) [34] RID/CE/WG A_81-03_504_2006_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology London, 6-7 April 2006 [35] RID/CE/WG INF_CH_1_E - Derailment detectors for dangerous goods tankwagons Information transmitted by Switzerland [36] RID/CE/WG CE_2007-A_E Final Report of the RID Committee of Experts Working Group on Tank and Vehicle Technology Munich, June 2007 [37] RID/CE/WG CE_2007-B_E Report of the special meeting of the RID Committee of Experts working group on tank and vehicle technology Berlin, 12 October 2007 [38] RID/CE/WG 02-2_Vortrag-Buchmeier - Mechanische und elektronische Entgleisungsdetektion Transmitted by Oerlikon-Knorr Eisenbahntechnik AG [39] RID/CE/WG 03-2_Vortrag-Aubry - Betriebserprobung pneumatischer Entgleisungsdetektoren durch SBB Cargo Presentation presented by Christian Aubry, 14 June 2007 SBB Cargo References from the Switzerland consultation [40] UVEK Beurteilung von Massnahmen zur Reduktion der Risiken beim Gefahrguttransport auf der Scheine Ernst Basler & Partner 2003 [41] UVEK Personenrisiken und Wirkung von Sicherheitsmassnahmen beim Transport gefährlicher Güter auf der Bahn Ernst Basler Page 86/111

87 Ref. N Author Title Last Issue & Partner [42] UVEK Pilotrisikoanalyse für den Transport gefährlicher Güter - Fallbeispiel Bahn Ernst Basler & Partner [43] UVEK Pilotrisikoermittlung für den Transport Gefährlicher Güter - Fallbeispiel Bahn Anhänge Ernst Basler & Partner [44] UVEK Utilisation de détecteurs de déraillements pour les wagons de marchandises, notamment ceux de marchandises dangereuses. Office Fédéral des Transport Suisses [45] UVEK Risques pour la population liés au transport ferroviaire de Marchandises dangereuses - Estimation actualisée des risques sur l ensemble du réseau (Screening 2006) Ernst Basler & Partner 2007 Other references [46] OTIF COTIF - Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail of 9 May 1980 in the version of the Protocol of Modification of 3 June [47] OTIF (RID) 2007 Appendix C of the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail [48] OTIF A 81-03/ /Add Generic guidelines for the calculation of the risk inherent in the carriage of dangerous goods by rail [49] UIC UIC CODE (OR), 4th edition, June [50] Technical University of Berlin [51] French Transport and Environment Ministries Brakes Regulation concerning the manufacture of the different brake parts Derailment Detectors for wagons Bericht 20/07 Durchführung von Entgleisungsversuchen mit Güterwagen Développement d un modèle d évaluation multi-modale des risques pour le transport de marchandises dangereuses - INERIS Page 87/111

88 Ref. N Author Title Last Issue [52] Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstraat [53] Imperial College London Consultants & Lloyd s Register Quantitative risk analysis NL Presented during the meeting of the RID Working Group on Standardized Risk Analysis June 2008 The Hague ERA/2007/SAF/OP/01 - A study to develop an historical database (archive) of serious train accidents in the Countries of the European Union, Norway and Switzerland from 1990 to the present day Terms and definitions Table 1 : Terms and definitions Term CBA CST DDD DG Hazard IM Risk Risk management RU Safety measures Safety requirements SD, NSD Definition Cost-Benefit Analysis Common Safety Targets (see definition in Directive 2004/49/EC) Derailment detection device Dangerous Goods See Recommendation for the 1 st set of Common Safety Methods for the definition used Infrastructure Manager (as defined in Article 3 of Directive 91/440/EEC) See Recommendation for 1 st set of Common Safety Methods for the definition used See Recommendation for 1 st set of Common Safety Methods for the definition used Railway Undertaking (as defined in Directive 2001/14/EC) See Recommendation for 1 st set of Common Safety Methods for the definition used See Recommendation for 1 st set of Common Safety Methods for the definition used. Severe derailment, Non severe derailment Page 88/111

89 11. LIST OF ANNEXES Ref. N Author Title Last Issue [1] RID/CE Text provisionally adopted during the 44 th session of the RID Committee of Experts meeting in Zagreb 2007 [2] ERA Safety Unit Consultation questionnaire on derailments of freight wagons & Recording of answers 2008 [3] ERA Safety Unit Formulas for Event tree analysis of the Derailment Detection Device 2008 [4] ERA Safety Unit Synthesis of answers on freight derailments received from National Safety Authorities and National Investigation Bodies 2008 [5] ERA Safety Unit List and values of parameters included in the Min-Max sensitivity analysis of quantified risk assessments 2008 [6] ERA Safety Unit Analysis of the application scope of the RIDCE proposed provision 2008 [7] [8] ERA Safety Unit Detailed results on severities calculation for the Options 2 and ERA Safety Unit Results on the formal consultation of social partners 2009 Page 89/111

90 11.1 Annex 1 Text provisionally adopted during the 44th session of the RID Committee of Experts meeting in Zagreb The adopted new provision was the following: [6.8.4 (b) Insert the following new special provision TE xx in (b) (left-hand column only): TE xx Tank-wagons for substances carried in the liquid state and gases, and batterywagons shall be equipped with a derailment detection device. This device shall provide an immediate and clear signal to the locomotive driver that a derailment has occurred. Venting of the main brake pipe shall be considered as a clear signal. The requirements shall be considered to have been fulfilled if the device is approved in accordance with UIC leaflet (version applicable as at June 2007, 4 th edition). With a following transitional provision: [1.6.3 Add a new transitional provision to as follows: x Tank-wagons and battery-wagons - for gases of Class 2 with classification codes containing the letter(s) F, T, TF, TC, TO, TFC or TOC, and - for substances of classes 3 to 8 carried in the liquid state and to which tank code L10BH, L10CH, L10DH, L15CH, L15DH or L21DH is assigned in column (12) of Table A of Chapter 3.2, constructed before 1 January 2011 which do not, however, conform to the requirements of (b) concerning special provision TE xx applicable from 1 January 2011 may continue to be used.] Page 90/111

91 11.2 Annex 2 Consultation of NSA and NIB Networks on derailments of freight wagons & Recording of answers Page 91/111

92 Page 92/111