Cost Estimation of Implementing Safety Upgrading Measures for Khmelnitsky Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4

Transcription

1 INSTITUTE OF RISK RESEARCH OF THE ACADEMIC SENATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA Cost Estimation of Implementing Safety Upgrading Measures for Khmelnitsky Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4 P. HOFER W. KROMP E. SEIDELBERGER Report to the Austrian Government Vienna, October 1998 Risk Research Report Nr. 23

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3 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-3 Contents 2B Page COST ESTIMATION OF IMPLEMENTING SAFETY UPGRADING MEASURES FOR KHMELNITSKY UNIT 2 AND ROVNO UNIT B.1 Introduction B.1.1 Modernization Project Khmelnitsky Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4: Cost and Schedule Estimates B.1.2 Cost Structure of the K2/R4 Completion Project B.1.3 Approach B.2 Cost Estimation of Implementing the Safety Upgrading Measures for K2 and R B.3 Cost Estimates of Modernization Measures of Operating WWER-1000/320 Reactors Extracted from the MOHT EdF Modernization Programme B.4 Safety Measures Not Included in the Modernization Programme for K2/R B.4.1 Safety issues which require more comprehensive safety measures than the MP B.4.2 Safety measures identified by MOHT-EdF not included in the MP B.5 Temelin Example for a WWER-1000/320 Reactor Completion Project with Delay in Schedule and Costoverruns B.5.1 Date and cost of completion of Temelin construction B.5.2 Main causes of delay in the schedule B Process of prolongation of construction due to design changes B Elimination of the causes of construction delay B Individual dates for start up of Temelin NPP B Sources of possible jeopardising of the date of construction completion B.5.3 Increase of cost of construction B Table providing cost comparison (all prices are given in million of Czech crowns) B Cost indirectly related to start of operation of Temelin NPP (million of CZK): B Causes and amount of budget increase as against year B.6 Conclusions...23 Attachment Table 1: Costs of all modernization measures planned in the Modernization Programme for K2 and R Table 2: Costs of all modernization measures planned in the Modernization Programme for R4...44

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5 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-5 2B. COST ESTIMATION OF IMPLEMENTING SAFETY UPGRADING MEASURES FOR KHMELNITSKY UNIT 2 AND ROVNO UNIT 4 2B.1 Introduction 2B.1.1 Modernization Project Khmelnitsky Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4: Cost and Schedule Estimates There have been a number of cost estimates for completion, modernization, and commissioning of Khmelnitsky Unit 2 and Rovno Unit 4 (K2/R4). These estimates are listed below in chronological order: EBRD Study of Economic Aspects of Nuclear Generation and Safety Improvements in Eastern and Central Europe, June 1993, 0.92 billion USD USDOE/Minatom Study, July 1994, 0.98 billion USD Energoatom Project Presentation, August 1988, 1.25 billion USD In a project presentation to the EBRD the project sponsor estimated the overall project cost (see below). EBRD, September 1998, billion USD EBRD estimated the cost of completing both units and providing support to the Ukraine Nuclear Regulatory Authority at billion USD. 2B.1.2 Cost Structure of the K2/R4 Completion Project In the project presentation of Energoatom: "Completion of Rovno Unit 4 and Khmelnitsky Unit 2", in August 1998 the following contributors to the overall project costs were listed: Completion the completion of the units according to the original design. This work includes outstanding construction work such as completion of plant installation; completion of partial installations; electrical wiring; instrumentation and control equipment; plant cleaninless; and equipment commissioning and functional. Rehabilitation replacement of deteriorated equipment or its repair to the status good for operation. This work includes inspections to determine the equipment and civil works needing restoration to a state suitable for commissioning and startup, including repair and replacement tasks such as refurbishing, repainting, surface preservation, and repairs. Modernization upgrading of safety, quality of operation, and the availability of the units. This work includes the modernization programme, waste processing facilities at the plants; installation of a full-scope simulator at Khmelnitsky; and improvements to the switchyard at Rovno. The modernization programme includes 148 measures, 144 of which are common to the two units and two items each which are specific to Khmelnitsky Unit 2 or Rovno Unit 4. The modernization programme is intended to eliminate deviations from current Ukrainian national safety norms; to improve the reliability of safety-related equipment by upgrading the design quality, manufacture, and installation; and to improve operation quality. First Fuel Load Testing Commissioning Engineering Activities Project Management Licensing and Certification Miscellaneous Costs like customs, insurance, financial engineer for the banks.

6 2B-6 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B.1.3 Approach In chapter 2 of this report we will present cost estimates which were extracted from the last update of the Modernization Programme (MP) for K2/R4 (Rev. 2, Oct. 1996). The cost estimates cover only the modernization (safety upgradings, etc.) of the reactors. Other contributors to the total costs listed above (see 1.2) are not included. Considering the time development of cost estimates for K2/R4 (see 1.1) it should also be taken into account that the costs estimates for the modernization measures presented in the Modernization Programme are from the year In chapter 3 these modernization costs are compared with the costs for implementing a modernization programme for operating WWER-1000 units. This modernization programme and the cost estimates were set up in 1995 by the consortium of MOHT-EdF. Chapter 4 contains a list of modernization measures which are not included in the Modernization Programme for K2/R4. An implementation of these measures, which is highly recommended by the Institute of Risk Research, results in higher costs than those estimated in the MP. An evaluation of the costs for implementing these more comprehensive list of measures is beyond the scope of this report. Chapter 5 is an extraction of the most recent report on the status of the completion project: Temelin NPP. This report demonstrates cost overruns and time delays. 2B.2 Cost Estimation of Implementing the Safety Upgrading Measures for K2 and R4 The following table have been extracted from the Modernization Programme for Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (Rev. 2, Oct. 1996). Table 1 provides an overview on the costs for implementing the planned measures for different areas. Attachment 1 lists the costs of all measures which are planned to be implemented before and after start-up.

7 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-7 Table 1: Cost Estimation of Modernization K2/R4 K2: COSTS (USD96) R4: COSTS (USD96) 10 GENERAL REACTOR CORE AND FUEL HANDLING COMPONENTS INTEGRITY SYSTEMS MONITORING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY CONTAINMENT AND BUILDING STRUCTURES INTERNAL HAZARDS EXTERNAL HAZARDS ACCIDENTS ANALYSIS FUEL HANDLING PRIMARY CIRCUIT SECONDARY CIRCUIT MONITORING AND CONTROL SYSTEM ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM REACTOR CORE AND FUEL COMPONENTS INTEGRITY SYSTEMS CONTROL AND MONITORING SYSTEM INTERNAL HAZARDS OPERATION PROCEDURES CONTROL TEST AND DIAGNOSTICS PERSONNEL PROTECTION AND RADIATION SAFETY REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE PHYSICAL PROTECTION SUM TOTAL SUM FOR K2 and R4: USD96

8 2B-8 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B.3 Cost Estimates of Modernization Measures of Operating WWER-1000/320 Reactors Extracted from the MOHT EdF Modernization Programme The following table was extracted from the MOHT-EdF generic modernization program: MOHT- EdF, Generic Reference Programme for the Modernization of VVER V320, MOHT (Atomenergoprojekt, OKB Gidropress, Kurchatov Institute, VNIIAES, Zarubejatomenergostroy, Rosenergoatom, et al.) and Electricité de France (EdF), Revision 5, January The data presented in the table were extracted from a cost estimation of MOHT-EdF for modernization of two operating WWER-1000/320 units. The data for implementing modernization measures for reactors under construction were found to be incomplete and are not quoted here. MOHT-EDF Measures Costs for 2 Rectors in USD SAFETY 1.1. Measures related to design and construction/installation 1. ( ) DECREASE IN DROP TIME OF CPS CONTROL RODS (see also A) 145, ( ) REPLACEMENT OF ANALOG-DISCRETE TRANSDUCERS WITH UPGRADED UNITS, PROVIDING SIGNALLING FOR INTERLOCKING DEVICE ACTIVATION. 3. ( ) MODERNIZATION OF ICIS INCLUDING REPLACEMENT OF IN CORE NEUTRON MEASURING CHANNELS (NMC) BY NFTMC AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL DIAGNOSTICS SYSTEMS. 4. ( ) PREVENTION OF DAMAGE OF MORE THAN ONE STEAM LINE TO EXCLUDE NUCLEAR-HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 5. ( ) DEVELOPMENT AND INTRODUCTION OF MEASURES EXCLUDING POSSIBILITY OF BREAK OF MORE THAN ONE STEAM LINE OR FEED WATER PlPING WITHIN CIVIL STRUCTURES OF REACTOR COMPARTMENT 4,800,000 4,035,000 2,395, , ( ) MEASUREMENT OF B-10 ISOTOPE CONCENTRATION 4,700, ( ) NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING EQUIPMENT 3,750, ( ) SET OF EQUIPMENT FOR DETERMINATION OF REACTIVITY EFFECTS AND EFFICIENCY OF CONTROL ROD CLUSTERS, USING IN-CORE AND EX-CORE NEUTRON DETECTORS, AND FOR ITS METROLOGICAL CERTIFICATION 63, ( ) SEPARATION OF PRIMARY PULSE LINES TO I&C TRANSDUCERS 170, ( ) CONTROL OF THE REACTOR CORE SUBCRITICALITY 44, ( ) COMPACT STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL 13,536, ( ) POST ACCIDENT MONITORING SYSTEM 250, ( ) UPGRADING OF THE REACTOR POWER CONTROL SYSTEM 2,150, ( AND B) IMPROVEMENT OF NOISE IMMUNITY OF CPS EQUIPMENT 152, ( ) SYSTEM OF SAFETY PARAMETERS PRESENTATION 4,030, ( ) STANDARD SYSTEM OF REACTOR VESSEL RADIATION LOAD MONITORING 240,000 1 Comparison of average USD96 and USD95: 1 USD96 = USD95

9 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-9 MOHT-EDF Measures 17. ( ). TO MODERNIZE RADIATION MONITORING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE EXISTING PROGRAMME OF SURVEILLANCE SPECIMENS. TO PERFORM ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF SURVEILLANCE SPECIMENS TESTS TAKING ACCOUNT OF REVISIONS OF RADIATION MONITORING CHARACTERISTICS. 18. ( ). TO ELABORATE AND IMPLEMENT A NEW PROGRAMME OF SURVEILLANCE-SPECIMENS OF THE VESSEL MATERIAIL 19. ( ). TO DEVELOP AND INTRODUCE THE STANDARD PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF THE CURRENT RESIDUAL RADIATION LIFE OF SAFE OPERATION OF THE REACTOR 20. ( ) VERIFICATION OF THE DESIGN SERVICE LIFE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL Costs for 2 Rectors in USD , ,000 70,000 70, ( ) STEAM DETECTOR FOR RPV HEAD 300, ( ) ASSURANCE OF LONG-TERM REMOVAL OF REACTOR RESIDUAL HEAT 5,634, ( ) REDUNDANCY OF A GROUP SERVICE WATER SUPPLY FOR SEALING OF ECCS PUMPS 24. ( ) MODERNIZATION IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION FOR TEMPERATURE CONTROL 25. ( AND ) MODERNIZATION OF REACTOR VESSEL HEAD SEALING (MAIN SEALING AND SEALING OF PENETRATIONS) 26. ( ) MEASURES THAT EXCLUDE UNAUTHORIZED OVERFILL OF A GROUP SERVICE WATER TANKS IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF CHECK VALVE 27. ( ) IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATING RELIABILITY OF STEAM GENERATORS AND BLOWDOWN SYSTEM 293, , , ,000 2,074, ( ) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK CONCEPT 25,150, ( AND ) HYDROGEN REMOVAL FROM THE REACTOR PLANT PRIMARY EQUIPMENT AND ANALYSES OF HYDROGEN SAFETY 573, ( A) ON-LINE DIAGNOSTICS SYSTEM FOR PRIMARY CIRCUIT OF NPPS IN SERVICE 31. ( B) SYSTEM FOR PERIODICAL INSPECTION OF REACTOR EQUIPMENT (EXCEPT REACTOR VESSEL) AND PIPELINE METAL lntegrity 32. ( B) SYSTEM FOR PERIODICAL INTERNAL IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OF RPV METAL INTEGRITY 30-32: 20,133, ( ) FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 846, ( ) PROTECTION OF PRIMARY CIRCUIT AGAINST COLD 10, ( AND ) ASSURANCE OF DESIGN LIFE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL HEATING OF ECCS WATER 36. ( ) ORGANIZATIONAL-ENGINEERING MEASURES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ACCIDENTS INVOLVING PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY COOLANT LEAK UP TO DNOM 100 MM. 37. ( ) UPDATING OF PRESSURISER PSD TO IMPLEMENT FEED AND BLEED PROCEDURE 38. ( ) SYSTEM TO ENSURE SPENT FUEL POND COOLING AT FALSE CLOSING OF ISOLATING VALVE 39. ( ) SEPARATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM (MCR) AND RESERVE CONTROL ROOM (RCR) VENTILATION SYSTEMS 1,195, , , , ,800

10 2B-10 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study MOHT-EDF Measures 40. ( ) EXTENSION OF THE TIME OF STEAM GENERATORS MAKE-UP (SAFETY UPGRADING FOR BEYOND-DESIGN ACCIDENTS) 41. ( ) UPGRADING OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE AUTOMATIC AND/OR AUTOMATED DIAGNOSIS OF THE STATE OF HARDWARE Costs for 2 Rectors in USD , ,500 14,300, ( ) NPP LOCAL CRISIS CENTRE 6,400, ( ) INCREASE OF BATTERIES DISCHARGE TIME. 175, ( ) INTEGRATION OF GENERAL PLANT DIESEL GENERATOR 7,383, ( ) CONTROL OF INDICATION OF POSITION OF THE MAIN VALVE OF THE PRESSURIZER 46. ( AND ) PROPOSALS FOR ARRANGING CONNECTIONS BETWEEN POWER UNITS BY 6 KV NETWORK PROVIDING FIRE PROTECTION OF ONE POWER UNIT WHEN FIRE OCCURS ON THE OTHER ONE. 380,000 5,100, ( ) UPGRADE THE FIRE EMERGENCY DOORS 940, ( ) REACTOR COOLANT PUMP FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM 600, ( ) INSTALLATION OF FIRE GATE VALVES IN VENTILATION DUCTS. 885, ( ) IMPROVEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY OF CABLE EQUIPMENT. 1,635, ( ) ENHANCEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY OF DIESEL-GENERATORS OF RELIABLE POWER SUPPLY 44, ( ) THE SMOKE REMOVAL SYSTEM 909, ( ) THE GAS FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS IN ROOMS WITH ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 466, ( ) CABLE ROUTING AND PENETRATIONS. 1,750, ( AND ) IMPROVEMENT OF BRU-A RELIABILITY 100,000 + costs to be determined later 56. ( ) PROVISION OF CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT 347, ( AND ) UPDATING OF GTSN-195M RCP 1,343, ( AND ) REPLACEMENT OF INVERTERS 1,520, ( AND ) REPLACEMENT OF 6 KV BREAKERS 13,400, ( AND ) UPGRADING OF EMERGENCY AND SCHEDULED COOL DOWN PUMP TSNR , ( AND ) UPGRADING OF SPRINKLER PUMP TSNSA , ( AND ) UPGRADING OF EMERGENCY BORON INJECTION PUMP TSN , ( ) SYSTEM FOR CONTROL AND REMOVAL OF HYDROGEN 970, ( ) INSPECTION OF INTEGRITY OF COLLECTORS AND HEAT EXCHANGING TUBES OF STEAM GENERATORS 580, ( ) AUTOMATIC SYSTEM FOR RADIATION SITUATION MONITORING (ASKRO) 4,900, ( ) PREVENTION OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT DURING ENCLOSURE UNSEALING OF HEAT EXCHANGER OF RCP SELF-CONTAINED SYSTEM 51,800

11 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-11 MOHT-EDF Measures Costs for 2 Rectors in USD ( ) IMPROVEMENT OF RELIABILITY OF THE PROCEDURES OF REFUELLING 215, ( ) REMOVAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM THE REACTOR HALL a) 530,000 b) 1,550, ( ) IMPROVEMENT OF REFUELLING PROCEDURE RELIABILITY 540, ( ) WITHDRAWAL OF DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY 590, Analysis and Expert Assessment 71. ( AND ) QUALIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT 1,750, ( ) FIRE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT 260, ( AND ) ANALYSIS OF NPP SEISMIC STABILITY 1,500, ( ) TO COMPILE SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (SAR) WITH CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BEFORE UNIT COMMISSIONING 75. ( ) TO ELABORATE PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS (PSA) WITH CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES IMPLEMENTED BEFORE UNIT 76. ( ) OVERALL ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL FLOODING IN THE REACTOR BUILDINGS AND TURBINE HALL 12, ( ) ANALYSIS OF FEASIBILITY OF INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS FOR MANAGEMENT OF BEYOND-DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS 78. ( ) STRENGTH RECALCULATION OF SAFETY RELEVANT PIPELINES 320, ( AND ) DESIGN ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 1,900, ( ) TO PERFORM THE ANALYSIS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIRED MEASURES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INADVERTENT DECREASE OF ABSORBER CONCENTRATION IN THE PRIMARY CIRCUIT 81. ( ) ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTAINMENT ABILITY TO WITHSTAND POSSIBLE AIRPLANE CRASH LOADS UP TO 20T 82. ( ) ELABORATE DESIGN CRITERIA ON PROTECTION OF CONTAINMENT SHUT-OFF VALVES AGAINST INTERNAL MISSILES 83. ( ) ADDITIONAL SAFETY ANALYSES FOR BEYOND-DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS 84. ( ) MONITORING OF THE CORROSION-PROOF PROTECTION STATE FOR THE CONTAINMENT PRESTRESSING SYSTEM AT OPERATIONAT. NPPS EQUIPPED WITH WER ,000 85,000 25, ,000 90, ( AND ) SUBSTANTIATION OF REACTOR TOP HEAD RELIABILITY 575, ( A) EXPERIMENTAL-CALCULATIONAL ANALYSIS OF STRENGTH OF STRESS-RELIEVED COLLECTORS TO-MCP AND TO-PGV-lOOOM STEAM GENERATOR VESSEL WELDS 87. ( B) CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE MOMENT ON THE WRENCH DURING THE REMOVAL OF STUD FROM THREADED FLANGE JOINTS OF STEAM GENERATOR 88. ( ) ANALYSIS OF ULTIMATE STRENGTH OF THE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE AND ITS PENETRATIONS DEPENDING ON INTERNAL PRESSURE 89. ( ) TO PERFORM ANALYSIS AND TO IMPLEMENT, IF NECESSARY, MEASURES FOR SAFETY IMPROVEMENT OF CONNECTION OF SCHEDULE COOLDOWN LINE OVER THE PRIMARY CIRCUIT. 120, , , , ( ) LIST OF NUCLEAR-HAZARDOUS WORK 25,000

12 2B-12 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study MOHT-EDF Measures 91. ( ) IN ORDER TO CLASSIFY NPP COMPONENTS, SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES AS TO THEIR EFFECT ON SAFETY 92. ( ) SEISMIC STABILITY CALCULATIONS FOR COMPONENTS OF THE DECONTAMINATION SYSTEM OF RADIOACTIVE AEROSOLS 93. ( ) TO PERFORM ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATION OF SVO-1 FILTER STRENGTH 94. ( ) CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A TUBE IN TUBE STRUCTURE ( DOUBLE ENVELOPE ) FOR PIPELINE TO REMOVE COOLANT FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP. Costs for 2 Rectors in USD ,000 15,000 85,000 15, ( ) STUDIES TO SHORTEN THE CABLING LENGHT FROM DIESEL GENERATOR 96. ( ) DETERMINATION OF CRITERION FOR STEAM GENERATOR UTUBES PLUGGING 270, ( ) SAFETY ENGINEERING FACTOR 200, ( ) DESIGNING OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING. DESIGN CALCULATIONS 190, ( ) DESIGNING OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING. DESIGN AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS 100. ( ) SAFETY LIMITS FOR THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. MONITORING OF THE BUILDING 101. ( ) SAFETY LIMITS FOR THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. MONITORING SEQUENCE 70, , , ( ) PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS 8,645, ( ) DETERMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF A PRZ PULSE-SAFETY DEVICE (PSD) OPENING ON PRZ EQUIPMENT AND PIPELINES 60, ( ) PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF FIRE SAFETY 1,200, ( , AND C) DECREASE OF PRIMARY CIRCUIT LEAKS PROBABILITY 106. ( ) DRAW UP A LIST OF PERSONNEL ERRORS ON THE BASIS OF STATISTICAL DATA. REVISE DESIGN OPTIONS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES AS PER RESULTS OF ANALYSIS, IF NECESSARY 107. ( ) ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF BUILDINGS AND STRUCTURES DISPLACEMENT ON SAFETY SYSTEMS OPERATION 108. ( ) ANALYSIS OF TIME DURING WHICH SPRAY PONDS MAINTAIN SERVICEABILITY IN THE CASE OF FAILURE OF A MAKE-UP SYSTEM FAILURE 121,000 15, , , ( ) SEVERE ACCIDENT ANALYSES FOR WER 1000 NPP S later 110. ( ) CORRECTION OF CRITERIA FOR INTRODUCTION OF THE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN 111. ( ) PERFORM A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS WITH PRIMARY LEAKS INVOLVING A POSSIBLE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE BEYOND THE CONTAINMENT BOUNDARIES (CONTAINMENT BYPASS). 100,000 85, Operating Upgrading 112. ( AND ) DEVELOPMENT OF NORMAL AND OF STATEORIENTED REACTOR EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 8,020, ( , AND ) MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR 1,769, ( ) STAFFING AND TRAINING 75,000

13 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-13 MOHT-EDF Measures 115. ( ) SYSTEM (SET) FOR HUMAN RELIABILITY ASSURANCE DURING NPP OPERATION 116. ( ) DEVELOPMENT OF A QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM (3-5 YEAR PROGRAMME) 117. ( ) SYSTEMS FOR ECCS HEAT EXCHANGERS MONITORING AND CLEANING FROM THE SERVICE WATER SIDE 118. ( ) OPTIMIZATION OF METHODS AND FREQUENCY OF PRESSURIZER PSD INSPECTIONS Costs for 2 Rectors in USD , , , , ( ) REGISTRATION OF EMERGENCY EVENTS 530, ( AND C) REVAMPING OF THE SYSTEM FOR SG LEVEL VARIATION 1,255, ( A) MULTICHANNEL SYSTEM FOR RECORDING AND ANALYZING ELECTRICAL TRANSIENTS DURING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 122. ( B) STATIONARY AUTOMATIC MONITORING SYSTEM FOR THE MAIN ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 135,000 82, ( ) RECORDING DEVICES IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM. 200, ( ) UPDATING OF EMERGENCY LIGHTING (EMERGENCY EXITS DURING PERFORMANCE OF EMERGENCY WORK). 115, ( ) IDENTIFICATION OF EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY EQUIPMENT 200, ( A) ELABORATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGN DOCUMENTATION RESTORATION OF THE CLADDING OF PGV-1OOOM STEAM GENERATORS SEALING SURFACES 127. ( B) SPECIFICATION FOR TEMPORARY SEALING OF THE SG PRIMARY COLLECTOR WITH THE WATER-FILLED REACTOR REFUELLING POOL 128. ( ) REPLACEMENT OF WIRING UNIT ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF ELECTROTECHNICAL SYSTEMS 129. ( ) IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY TO DETERMINE THE CORRESPONDING REFERENCE ISOTOPES BETWEEN DAMAGED FUEL OPERATIONAL LIMIT AND PRIMARY COOLANT ACTIVITY 130. ( , , AND ) WRITING A SET OF DOCUMENTATION FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF POWER TRANSFORMERS, MOTOR 6 KV, UKTS CUBICLES ETC 230, ,000 2,450, , , ( A, B AND C) OPTIMIZATION OF FUEL LOADS 240, ( ) OPTIMIZATION OF POWER UNIT OPERATION UNDER TRANSIENTS WITH VARIATION OF LOAD 133. ( ) OPTIMIZATION OF FUEL CYCLES MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT POWER UNITS 2,600,000 60, ( ) REVISION OF THE LIST OF MEANS FOR PERSONNEL PROTECTION 30, ( ) REVISION OF THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR PERFORMANCE OF RADIOLOGICALLY HAZARDOUS WORKS 136. ( ) REVISION OF THE DUTY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY SERVICES 137. ( ) IMPLEMENTATION OF PERSONAL DOSIMETERS WITH AUDIBLE AND VISUAL SIGNALLING 138. ( ) MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF THE BREATHING DEVICES USED ON SITE 40,000 30,000 20,000 20,000

14 2B-14 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study MOHT-EDF Measures 139. ( , , , AND ) WATER CHEMISTRY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CIRCUITS Costs for 2 Rectors in USD , ( ) DEVELOPMENT OF DATA SHEETS ON EQUIPMENT FAILURES 10, ( AND ) DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORY OF NPP EQUIPMENT OPERATION INFORMATION SYSTEM 142. ( ) INSPECTIONS AND TESTS SPECIFICATION FOR REACTOR SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT FOR SAFETY 100, , ( ) UPGRADING OF COMMUNICATIONS 500, AVAILABILITY 2.1 Measures related to Design and /Installation 144. ( A) TO REPLACE THE CPS DRIVE AND POSITION INDICATOR WITH A DRIVE PROVIDING LARGE PULL FORCE AND A SERVICE LIFE OF AT LEAST 30 YEARS 145. ( A) MODERNIZATION OF I&C. PROCESS SIGNAL COMMUTATION DEVICES (UKTS) 10,660,000 20,000, ( B) MODERNIZATION OF I&C SYSTEMS. MECHANICAL PART 890, ( C) MODERNIZATION OF I&C SYSTEMS. ELECTRIC PART (CCS) 1,600, ( D) MODERNIZATION OF I&C SYSTEMS. SECONDARY INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSDUCERS 149. ( E) UPDATING OF SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT OF BLOWDOWN PROCEDURE FOR MEASURING SET PULSE LINES IN TURBINE PLANT EQUIPMENT 150. ( ) MODERNIZATION OF THE MAIN TURBINE CONDENSERS. STUDY OF TUBES DAMAGE AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY 19,800,000 43,000 10,320, ( ) UPDATING OF THE GENERATOR PARAMETER MONITORING SYSTEM 203, ( ) PERFORMANCE OF ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES TO DECREASE THE BEARING VIBRATION LEVEL IN TURBINE K / , ( ) UPGRADING OF THE RCP MOTOR COOLING SYSTEM 100, ( ) UPGRADING OF CONDENSER PUMP KSA , ( ) UPGRADING OF CONDENSATE PUMP KSVA , ( ) UPGRADING OF CONDENSATE PUMP KSVA , ( ) UPGRADING OF CONDENSATE PUMP KSVA , ( ) UPGRADING OF HIGH PRESSURE HEATERS OF PV-2500 TYPE , ( ) UPDATING AND ELABORATION OF A SET OF nor:itmf`ntatlon ON FAST-ACTING ISOLATION VALVE OF BABCOCK TYPE ( ) UPDATING AND ELABORATION OF A SET OF DOCUMENTATION ON MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF THE /350-E TYPE ISOLATION THROTTLE VALVE 76, , ( ) UPDATING OF BOOSTER FEED WATER PUMP PTA , ( ) UPDATING OF MAIN FEED WATER PUMP PTA , ( A) DEVICE FOR ISOLATION OF DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATORS FROM THE MAIN COOLANT PIPELINE (MCP) 65,000

15 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-15 MOHT-EDF Measures 164. ( B) DOCUMENTATION FOR TIGHTNESS CHECK OF SG HEAT EXCHANGING BUNDLE BY PNEUMO-AQUARIUM METHOD Costs for 2 Rectors in USD95 1 5, ( ) REPLACEMENT OF 24 KV BREAKER 3,740, ( ) UPGRADING OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP 170 DPV12/22EG-1 340, ( ) UPGRADING OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP OPV10-185EG 275, ( ) INTEGRATION OF LEAK CHECK SIPPING METHOD IN THE FUEL HANDLING MACHINE MAST (FHM) 169. ( ) COLLECTION OF BORON-CONTAMINATED WATER LEAKS FROM THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT 170. ( ) SYSTEM OF MECHANICAL ALIGNMENT FOR THE INTERNALS INSPECTION WELL see item ( ) INFORMATION SYSTEM TITAN-2 25,920, ( ) REPLACEMENT OF 220 V DC SWITCHES 90, ( ) SELECTIVITY OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES 80, ( ) DETECTION OF GROUND FAULT IN 220 V D.C. MAINS 346, ( ) UNINTERRUPTED ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY OF COMPUTER CONTROL SYSTEM AND RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY MONITORING EQUIPMENT 176. ( ) REMOVAL OF «LOUVRES» STEAM SEPARATOR FROM STEAM GENERATOR 2.2. Ananlysis and Expert Assessment 54,500 10, (2.2.1) DYNAMIC UNIT STABILITY IMPROVEMENT 130, (2.2.2) SUBSTANTIATION OF SECONDARY PIPELINE STRENGTH WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TURBINE HALL 179. (2.2.3) POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM -ANALYSIS OF CHANGE OVER FROM MAIN -ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY TO STANDBY SUPPLY 135,000 65, (2.2.4) GROUNDING SYSTEM DESIGN 10, (2.2.5) ANALYSIS OF ROUTING OF THE TURBINE DRAINING AND BLEEDING PIPELINES 8, Operation Upgrading 182. ( ) ELABORATION OF THE DOCUMENTATION FOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF DRIVING TURBINE TYPE OKA-12A 183. ( ) SCHEDULING OF THE PREVENTIVE REPLACEMENT OF THE GENERATOR AUXILIARY SYSTEM COMPONENTS 184. ( A AND ) STATIONARY AUTOMATIC MONITORING SYSTEM PDA-1GMSM OF NPP UNIT 185. ( B) CONTROL SYSTEM OF INSULATION RESISTANCE OF GENERATOR VOLTAGE CIRCUITS GROUNDING 186. ( C ) A SET OF TECHNICAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE FIRE AND EX- PLOSlON SAFETY OF HYDROGEN COOLED TURBO-GENERATOR 187. ( ) AUTOMATED INFORMATION-SERVICE SYSTEM FOR CONTROL AND DIAGNOSIS OF UKTS (ASKD) BLOCKS 51,000 27,000 95, ,000 80,000 95,000

16 2B-16 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study MOHT-EDF Measures 188. ( ) REVISION OF SERVICE MANUALS FOR EQUIPMENT AND TURBINE PLANT SYSTEM 189. ( ) DEVELOPMENT OF SCHEDULED PULSE LINE BLOW DOWN IN THE TURBO-PLANT EQUIPMENT MEASURING SETS 190. ( ) IMPROVEMENT OF IN-SERVICE INSPECTION OF TURBINE PlPELINE METAL Costs for 2 Rectors in USD ,000 40, , ( ) CONTROL OF RESIDUAL LIFE OF NPP CABLES 1,600,000 ADDITIONAL MEASURES: REDUCTION OF PROBABILITY OF LEAKAGE FROM MAIN JOINT SEALS IMPROVING RELIABILITY OF AIR DUCT BEND SUM: 220,000 85, ,338,100 USD95 2B.4 Safety Measures Not Included in the Modernization Programme for K2/R4 2B.4.1 Safety issues which require more comprehensive safety measures than the MP The Institute of Risk Research has identified important safety relevant issues which require more comprehensive measures than those proposed in the Modernization Programme (MP) for Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (Rev. 2, Oct. 1996). A solution of these safety relevant issues results in higher costs than those evaluated in the MP. An evaluation of the costs for implementing more comprehensive measures is beyond the scope of this report. Important safety relevant issues not adequately addressed in the MP AREA: 1. General Preservation and Mothballing Qualification of Post-TMI Requirements (NUREG-0737) AREA: 2. Reactor Core Issues Control Rod Insertion Reliability/Fuel Assembly Deformation Xenon Oscillations and Power Density Control System AREA: 3. Component Integrity Issues Reactor Pressure Vessel Embrittlement Steam Generator (SG) Collector Integrity and Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seals AREA: 4. Systems Issues ECCS p Screen Blocking SG Safety and Relief Valves Qualification for Two-Phase and Water Flow SG Feedwater Capacity ECCS p Capacity

17 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-17 AREA: 5. Instrumentation and Control Issues Reactor Vessel Head Leak Monitoring System Instrumentation & Control Replacement AREA: 6. Electrical Power Supply Issues Emergency Battery Discharge Time Replacement of 6 kv Switchgear AREA: 7. Containment Issues Containment Structure and Containment Bypass Accidents Containment Ultimate Capacity Pneumatic Containment Isolation Valves AREA: 8. nternal Hazards Issues Fire Prevention Pipeline Break Impacts Inside the Reactor Building and Turbine Building AREA: 9. External Hazards Issues Extreme Weather Conditions, Low Temperatures Man-Induced External Hazards Seismicity and Geological Hazards AREA: 10. Accident Analysis Issues Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) Rapid Reactivity Increase/Control Rod Ejection AREA: 11. Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management Issues Spent Fuel Management Risks for WWER-1000 Reactors (Spent Fuel Pools Inside Containment) AREA: 12. Operating Procedures Issues Implementation of symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures (EOPs) AREA: 13. Logistics and Infrastructure Issues Financial and infrastructural preconditions for implementation of the MP AREA: 14. Additional Safety Issues Attempted Application of Leak-Before-Break (LBB) to Secondary PipingComplete Loss of Heat Sink (Loss of ESW) 2B.4.2 Safety measures identified by MOHT-EdF not included in the MP The MOHT-EDF consortium identified two groups of proposed upgrades based on PSA and severe accident insights for VVER-1000/320 reactors, most of which are not included in the K2/R4 upgrade programmes. The items recommended by MOHT are as follows (MOHT- EdF, "Generic Reference Programme for the Modernization of VVER 1000"-V320, MOHT (Atomenergoprojekt, OKB Gidropress, Kurchatov Institute, VNIIAES, Zarubejatomenergostroy, Rosenergoatom, et al.) and Electricité de France (EdF), Revision 5, January 1996: Part 1/A2, pp. 2-4; Part 3, pp ): Upgrade pressurizer relief valves for two-phase and water flow to allow for performing feed and bleed (i.e., removal of decay heat from the primary system by bleeding primary coolant from the pressurizer relief valves and providing makeup with the high pressure injection system). [Included in the upgrade programme as technical measure 13411, with implementation before startup; KIEP 1996:67-68.]

18 2B-18 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study Development and implementation of additional means of steam generator supply from reliable sources (due to the limited capacity of the emergency feedwater system, which in the basic design is limited to 8-10 hours of heat removal). [Included in the upgrade programme as technical measure 13311, but only after startup; KIEP 1996:63-64.] Provision of an additional common diesel generator. [Included in the upgrade programme as technical measure 24411, with implementation before startup; KIEP 1996: ] Provision of an automated algorithm of protective actions in case of large primary-to-secondary leak. Upgrading of the suction pipelines of the primary circuit heat removal system to improve its reliability. [Included in the upgrade programme.] Introduction of a passive decay heat removal system (SPOT; consisting of a heat exchanger to dump steam to the environment via natural circulation with the primary circuit intact). Implementation of additional, higher pressure (15 bar), hydroaccumulators to provide for extended (several hours) passive injection in case of failure of active emergency core cooling system. Modernization of the area under the reactor vessel to accommodate core melt accidents, and provision of additional borated water inventory to flood the area under the reactor vessel in case of core melt. Implementation of filtered vented containment for severe accidents. Installation of passive hydrogen recombiners for severe accident hydrogen loads. [Included in the upgrade programme as technical measure 16211, but only analysis is included before startup; equipment installation is after startup; KIEP 1996: ] Implementation of containment penetration room leakage collection system, processed through the filtered venting system. 2B.5 Temelin Example for a WWER-1000/320 Reactor Completion Project with Delay in Schedule and Costoverruns The following text has been extracted from a report which was presented by the Czech minister Karel Kühnl in August 1998: 2B.5.1 Date and cost of completion of Temelin construction According to the current calculations, the cost of Temelin NPP construction will reach 98.6 billion Czech crowns and the date of completion of Unit 1 fuel load to the reactor was set to the end of August year If this date is met, the first Unit of Temelin NPP could be commercially operating in the beginning of May The last official fuel load date accepted by the whole system of suppliers was September 1997 and the cost of Temelin NPP construction completion was given in the amount of 76.2 billion Czech crowns. As of June 30, 1998, of the total budget of 98.6 billion crowns, 63.3 billion crowns was spent for the supplied equipment and work. Another 35.3 billion Czech crowns is still to be expended for the completion of construction.

19 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-19 2B.5.2 Main causes of delay in the schedule The main cause for delays in completion of construction are the accepted changes in the design of Temelin NPP. These changes which are continuously being incorporated in the design of Temelin NPP are divided into three categories. a) System changes accepted with the objective to enhance technical, operational and safety level of the power plant. These changes were recommended by international institutions, by Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety and also by CEZ, a.s. experts. As an example we could mention substitution of the original instrumentation and control system for Westinghouse system. b) Changes which inevitably resulted from the changes of category one. Example is modification of electric parts, HVAC system or fundamentally more rigid requirements for implementation of cabling caused by a substitution of the instrumentation and control system. c) Changes caused by close down of production of certain equipment or change of production programme of some suppliers. not delivered for these reasons must have been substituted by another piece of equipment which is more modern but require a change in the original design. 2B Process of prolongation of construction due to design changes Each additional equipment or more modern equipment (with other parameters) must be incorporated in the power plant design, including a new design of instrumentation and control system provided by Westinghouse. A major part of the delay in the date of construction completion is therefore attributed to design work resulting from the changes described above. One of the direct causes of delay of final date is the delay of cabling (design and physical cable pulling) which is impacted by a majority of changes and where it is most complicated to incorporate the changes. Delay in cable pulling (stop of pulling for the reason of completion of the design change or its slow progress for the reason of complicated design) is directly reflected in the date of power plant completion (cabling is on so-called critical path of the construction schedule). 2B Elimination of the causes of construction delay The number of accepted changes which may provoke major intervention in the design, is strictly limited during the change proceedings in the scope of which it is assessed whether the proposed change is inevitably necessary for bringing of the power plant to a safe operation. If not, the change is rejected.

20 2B-20 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study changes implemented from 1990 to 1998 Year Changes influenced by Note 1990 Decision about substitution of cables for non-flammable and fire-superior cables 1991, 1992 Russian design change of substitute deliveries 1992, 1993 Enhancement of nuclear safety on the basis of international audits 1994, 1995 Calculations of strength and lifetime 1994, 1995 to this date Substitution of instrumentation and control system Westinghouse Seismic calculations 1994 Enhancement of fire protection in the Russian design zone, change of fire sections 1995 to the beginning of 1998 Segregation and separation of cabling 1998 Extension of number of changes for Unit 2, civil completion, changes from start-up of the individual systems start to show their impact Impact on changes from 1996 to 1998 (cable supports, penetrations) IAEA, NUS Halliburton... End of extreme growth of the number of change proceedingsmaximum at the turn of Note: Most significant increase of the number of design changes occurred in late 1996 when there were approximately 22 process changes a week. Most of them were important changes impacting the work schedule. In the second quarter of 1998 there were about 4 changes a week. These were less important changes resulted especially from during start-up of the individual systems. 2B Individual dates for start up of Temelin NPP Activity Preparedness of the instrumentation and control system for test of technology from the control room Date June 30, 1999 Start of fuel loading (start of physical ) August 31, 2000 Start of complex successful test of 144 hours is followed by commercial operation of unit April 30, 2001

21 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-21 2B Sources of possible jeopardising of the date of construction completion 1. Other changes in the power plant design (risk declines with a decreasing number of significant changes). 2. Possibility of delay of suppliers work which are on the critical path of power plant construction completion (Westinghouse, ElektromontÆn zævody Praha). 3. Necessity of implementation of partial changes which might result from the results of tests conducted during commissioning of the power plant. 4. Other requirements of supervisory bodies which might prolong the approval proceedings for start of operation of the power plant. 2B.5.3 2B Increase of cost of construction Table providing cost comparison (all prices are given in million of Czech crowns) 1 Cost 2 SR 95 3 SR 12/97 4 SR 03/98 5 Difference Cost of research and design work Cost of technological Cost of civil Other cost including interest Reserve Total SR without a reserve Column 2 shows division of total cost of the budget accepted in Column 3 shows in which way the reserve of 1995 was used from 1995 to Column 4 shows assumed total cost for completion of both Temelin NPP units (March 1998). Column 5 shows the total increase of cost. 2B Cost indirectly related to start of operation of Temelin NPP (million of CZK): Liquidation of site facilities with a subsequent technical recultivation Procurement of fixed assets in reserve Total Cost of liquidation of site facilities was not taken into account in the budget for 1995.

22 2B-22 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B Causes and amount of budget increase as against year 1995 Extension of supply SÚJB, IBP IAEA, OSART, NUS CEZ Westinghouse* Expertise Prolongation of construction Price escalation 13.7 billion CZK (98) 2.3 billion CZK 1.9 billion CZK 2.8 billion CZK 6.3 billion CZK 0.4 billion CZK 5.2 billion CZK 5.7 billion CZK Total 24.6 billion CZK * This supply reflects all three causes of increase of budget, including the change of Czech crown exchange rate. Causes of increase of budget for Temelin NPP construction are directly related with the described mechanism of its prolongation. Most significant increase of cost was caused by changes accepted for enhancement of safety and reliability of power plant operation and changes resulting therefrom. Extension of the supply by the additionally ordered pieces of equipment and work increased the total cost by an amount of 13.7 billion Czech crowns. The amount can be divided between companies and institutions which provoked the changes by their recommendation (IAEA, OSART) or requirement (SÚJB, IBP). To this category we can also include increase of the price of Westinghouse supply caused by additional changes in the design and prolongation of the construction. A number of changes which caused the increased of cost were provoked also by CEZ by its own decision to improve a certain part of power plant. Examples of extension of : Requirements of SÚJB and other legislative requirements Examples of the most important projects: preparation of independent verification and validation of safety software of instrumentation and control system of Westinghouse demonstration of safety and lifetime of steam generators and reactor pressure vessels preparation of safety evaluation of containment preparation of conclusive documentation of calculation of strength and lifetime Recommendations of international and Czech bodies (Audit of company Halliburton NUS, recommendation of IAEA, OSART mission,... ). Examples of the most important ones are as follows: substitution of instrumentation and control system building of the system of emergency accident facilities adding of filtration stations into the HVAC system preparation of probabilistic safety analysis preparation of analysis of design basis and beyond design basis accidents

23 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B-23 Improvement based upon the decision of CEZ, a.s. The most important improvements are as follows: implementation of group control of voltage preparation of analysis for modification of steam generators preparation of programmes of controlled ageing of selected components evaluation of calculations of strength and lifetime Other causes of increase of budget are extra costs related to control of construction and preparation of power plant operation and increase of prices of supply of equipment and services which occurs as the time goes by. Increase of cost of construction completion was also caused by exchange rate changes of Czech crown against USD (in 1995 the exchange rate was 28 CZK/USD, in 1998 it is 36 CZK/USD). As a consequence of that, the cost was increased by 2.5 billion Czech crowns and their hedging was not possible. This increase of cost is not given separately, it is contained in the cost contained in the Table. 2B.6 Conclusions 1. The cost estimates of the modernization measures to be implemented at K2/R4 NPPs were presented in the MP in the year 1996 and they cover only modernization upgradings. 2. The cost estimates quoted in the MP (327 million USD96) are in the same range as cost estimates for the modernization of operating WWER-1000 reactors (314 million USD95 or 330 million USD 96) presented by MOHT-EdF in Significant safety issues, which have been identified by IRR (see above) are not adequately addressed in the K2/R4 Modernization and Upgrade Program. A comprehensive treatment of these issues is a precondition to reach the minimum acceptable safety level, formulated by IAEA in the INSAG-3 goals for core damage frequency and frequency of large releases or in NUSS codes. Implementation of measures to solve these issues and additional measures proposed by MOHT-EdF will result in higher costs than quoted in the present MP. 4. Technical and organisational problems in the Temelin completion project caused considerable costoverruns and time delays in this project. A similar development could be expected for K2/R4. 5. Up to now no information about cost estimates of completion and rehabilitation of K2/R4 is available. Attachment 1

24 2B-24 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study Attachment Table 1: All costs quoted in this table are costs in USD 96. Costs of all modernization measures planned in the Modernization Programme for K2 and R4 10 GENERAL 10.1 Components Qualification Develop materials on equipment qualification 19 month 30 month (correction required) 49 month USD USD USD96 TOTAL REACTOR CORE AND FUEL HANDLING 11.1 Neutronic characteristics of the core Equip the reactor power unit with technical devices for control of subcriticality of reactor core 3 equipment have been taken into account in measures and Core structure Study of a new controll strategy and replacement of control rods: improve Xe and power distribution control system Study of a new controll strategy and replacement of control rods: increase service life and enhance control rods efficiency 6 During normal cyclic replacement of control rods. During normal cyclic replacement of control rods To provide design drop time of CPS control rods. Estimate loads onto supporting frame of FA During preventive maintenance To provide design drop time of CPS control rods. Introduce "heavy weight" control rod of FA The cost of a component of the new heavy shafts; the price ignores the cost of the heavy CPS AR s. (the cost deals with operation expenses) TOTAL

25 Report to the Austrian Government on NPP Khmelnitsky 2/Rivne 4 Least Cost Study 2B COMPONENTS INTEGRITY 12.1 Primary circuit system Carry out measures to protect primary circuit from excessive moulding under cooldown conditions via ECCS and primary circuit from excessive pressure in cold conditions To be defined more exactly by result study To be defined more exactly by result study corrected to finished Safety important systems under pressure Providing "rigid" embedding of steam and feedwater pipelines and the outlet of reactor compartment To develop and implement the necessary means and systems for realization of LBB concept Reactor (with vessel) Insufficient accuracy on assessment of fluence build-up by critical zones of reactor vessel. To design and introduce standard system for continous monitoring of radiation load (accumulated fluence) in order to estimate the residual life of the reactor vessel. The scope of the work is the following: - calculational and experimantal studies; development of the monitoring methodology; development of the design and manufactoring the system; delivera of the NPP; pilot operation; turning over the system for commercial operation including 374,400 experimental verifivcation Assembling during adjustment works. Pilot operation: 1 to 2 life times Implement preheating up to 55 C of water supplied to reactor by ECCS passive accumulator tanks The cost shown are included into the price of the unit completion The cost shown are included into the price of the unit completion Implement preheating up to 20 C of water supplied to reactor by ECCS active part During maintenance outage To modernize radiation control, within the scope of present programme of surveillance-specimens with the purpose of enhancing representativeness of test results of surveillance-specimens: - to develop and substantiate calculational- and experimantal methods for determination of irradiation conditions and radiation load of surveillance-specimens