4km. 1km. Precise Location Optical. Rain Fog Snow Urban Clutter. Detect Autonomous. Night & Day. Acoustic. Radio Freq (RF)

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1 Night & Day Rain Fog Snow Urban Clutter Wide Area Coverage Detect Autonomous Precise Location Optical Acoustic 100m-1km IR Radio Freq (RF) 4km Large Radar 1-3km Compact Radar 1km

2 Optical Acoustic Thermal Radio Freq Large Radar Compact Radar Main Limitations Narrow field of view and only works during the day Does not provide precise location data and does not work well in noisy urban environments, constant updates of acoustic profiles required Narrow field of view that is limited by moisture in the air Can not detect drones that are flying autonomously with no emissions and difficult to use in urban environments with many RF transmitters Unable to operate in urban environments and easily overwhelmed by bird detections and requires secondary sensor for identification Works well in urban environments but requires a secondary sensor for identification and evaluation of the threat

3 Combined Sensor Systems Primary Sensor: Radar for consistent detection over wide areas Secondary Sensors: RF Radios and Cameras for confirmation and evaluation Market Survey Report Sept. 2017

4 Response Technology

5 Counter-drone Technology Survey

6 Response Systems

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8 Sixty seven systems are advertised as being capable of both detection and response Of the 155 systems that are capable of detection, 95 appear to employ a single sensor While at least 60 employ a combination of one or more sensor types Sixteen systems employ a combination of four or five different sensor types. Roughly an equal number of systems (approximately 60) employ radar, RF detection, and EO sensors. Fifty three employ IR, while 21 systems employ an acoustic sensor.

9 CHALLENGES / LIMITATIONS of C-UAS Response Technologies Kinetic Counter Drone: Can be dangerous, when having flight interrupted by physical means will fall to the ground at considerable speed. Considered my many as inappropriate for use over crowds. RF Jamming Systems: work by disrupting the drone s communication; drones can be programmed to operate autonomously without an active RF link. Jamming systems could also interfere with legitimate communication. Drone technology itself is not standing still. Requiring constant response to advancing technology.

10 Legality Rob Ehrich

11 Overview of statutory and regulatory barriers to counter-uas interventions Many countermeasures for mitigating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)/drones are considered illegal under laws enacted prior to the advent of drones. Depending on the intervention (e.g., jamming, spoofing, kinetic, etc.), one or more of the following statutory or regulatory measures, and potentially others, may be violated: Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2511 FCC prohibition on unlicensed jammers, 47 C.F.R. Section Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C Electronic communications Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 1030 Access to protected computers FAA Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 32 Interference with civil aircraft

12 The timing is right There is a growing recognition in Washington of the urgent need to address the potential threat posed by unauthorized drone operations In 2017, Congress granted counter-uas authorities to two federal agencies:

13 Outlook for 2018 Which federal agency will be next to receive counter-uas authorities? Others? Administration is leaning forward Pursuing multi-agency authority Congress proceeding cautiously Seeking more targeted approach Path forward Several potential legislative vehicles for counter-uas authorities are currently in play, including DHS Reauthorization, FAA Reauthorization, stand-alone bills, appropriations bills, etc.

14 Appendix

15 Dedrone Spotter RF

16 Why the status quo is untenable the careless, clueless and criminal Proliferation of drones expected to give rise to incidents involving the careless and clueless. Over the next five years, the FAA projects that the hobbyist and commercial small UAS (suas)/drone fleets in the U.S. will increase exponentially: Type Percent change Hobbyist 1.1 million 3.55 million 222% Non-Hobbyist (Commercial) 42, , % Total million 3.97 million 247% Source: FAA Aerospace Forecast Capabilities of drones make them attractive for criminal use. "Terrorist organizations have an interest in using drones..i think the expectation is that it is coming here, imminently. - FBI Director Christopher Wray, testifying before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (9/27/17)

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19 Counter-drone Technology Survey

20 Counter UAS Product Catalog The Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College is an interdisciplinary research institution that examines the novel and complex opportunities and challenges presented by unmanned systems technologies in both the military and civilian sphere.

21 Counter UAS Directory

22 PUBLIC VENUES Commercial & Residential Drone Delivery