Antitrust Economics Law 237 Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University Fall 2017, Wednesdays 6 7:50 p.m.

Transcription

1 Antitrust Economics Law 237 Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University Fall 2017, Wednesdays 6 7:50 p.m. Professor John M. Yun Hazel Hall, Office 411 (703) jyun9@gmu.edu Welcome to Antitrust Economics: The goal of the course is to teach the underlying economic foundations that drive antitrust analyses, and to apply economic theory to the facts of real antitrust cases, particularly at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Broadly, each class will be combine teaching the core economic concepts with using actual antitrust cases to illustrate the principles. Students are expected to come to class prepared and ready to discuss the assigned readings. Office Hours: Thursdays 2-4 p.m. and by appointment. I am also available via . Text: John Kwoka and Larry White (eds.), The Antitrust Revolution (6 th edition). Supplemental readings will be made available on TWEN. Course Requirements and Grading: I write to discover what I know. Flannery O Connor Written Assignments: There will be two homework assignments. Each assignment will involve writing on a specific topic, e.g., critiquing expert testimony; offering advice to policy makers on the merits of an antitrust case; and devising a divestiture package to best address a problematic merger. The goal of each homework assignment is to replicate the type of memos produced at both U.S. antitrust agencies and at law firms specializing in antitrust. Each assignment is worth 20 percent of your overall grade for a total of 40 percent. All submissions are via no later than midnight EDT on the due date of the assignment. Late submissions will receive zero credit. Class Participation: Participation in class will count for 10 percent of your grade. (Quality of participation is weighed more heavily than quantity.) Final Exam: The final exam will be administered on Wednesday, December 6 PM (there is no make-up exam) and will count for 50 percent of your grade. The final exam is closed book/notes. It will consist of short answer questions and multiple-choice. 1

2 Tentative Syllabus: We may deviate from the tentative syllabus for reasons including current events, new cases, scheduling, et cetera. Please make sure you are signed up to receive updates via TWEN. Intellectual Property: I own all course content that is created (e.g., slides), regardless of form (electronic, print, audio, video). You are forbidden to use them with, or distribute them to, anyone other than your classmates in this course. 2

3 Class Schedule 1 Microeconomic Foundations (August 23) Optional: Steven A. Greenlaw and Timothy Taylor, Principles of Microeconomics, OpenStax. 2 Basic Models of Competition (August 30) Kwoka & White: Introduction (pp. 1-6). Benjamin Klein (1993), Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, Supreme Court Economic Review 3, pp [Read only ] Randal C. Picker (1994), An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 22. Optional: Steven A. Greenlaw and Timothy Taylor, Principles of Microeconomics, OpenStax. 3 Horizontal Mergers Overview (September 6) Kwoka & White: pp. 8-29; Case 3: Sirius/XM Satellite Radio Merger (2008) U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) Kenneth Heyer (2014), Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, Journal of Law and Economics 57, pp Carl Shapiro (2010), The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in 40 Years, Antitrust Law Journal 77, pp Michael Vita and F. David Osinski (2016), John Kwoka s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Critical Review, SSRN. 4 Horizontal Mergers Market Definition (September 13) Gregory J. Werden (2013), Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor Kaplow Antitrust Law Journal 78, pp Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro (2003), Critical Loss: Let s Tell the Whole Story, Antitrust Magazine, pp

4 FTC v. Ardagh Group, Saint-Gobain Containers: i) FTC s Complaint (2013), ii) Ardagh s Answer and Defenses (2013), and iii) Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright (2014). 5 Horizontal Mergers Unilateral Effects (September 20) Kwoka & White, Case 5: Oracle/PeopleSoft (2004). Carl Shapiro (1996), Mergers with Differentiated Products, Antitrust, pp Charles River Associates (2010), Scoring Unilateral Effects with the GUPPI: The Approach of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, CRA Competition Memo. Ken Heyer (2012), Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers, Antitrust, pp FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright (2015), Statement on Dollar Tree Family Dollar. 6 Horizontal Mergers Retail (September 27) Kwoka & White: Case 6: Staples/Office Depot (1997). Thomas A. Lambert (2008), Four Lessons from the Whole Foods Case, Regulation, pp FTC Statement on Office Depot OfficeMax (2013). FTC v. Staples-Office Depot Complaint (2016). 7 Coordinated Effects (October 4) Kwoka & White: pp Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover (2013), Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory, working paper. Dennis W. Carlton and Sam Peltzman (2010), Introduction to Stigler s Theory of Monopoly, Competition Policy International 6, pp

5 George Stigler (1964), Theory of Oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy 72, pp Joseph Harrington (2013), Evaluating Mergers for Coordinated Effects and the Role of Parallel Accommodating Conduct, Antitrust Law Journal 78, pp Vertical Conduct (October 11) Kwoka & White: pp , Case 12: Google-ITA. James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O Brien, and Michael G. Vita (2005), Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, pp Jonathan B. Baker (2011), Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical Merger Analysis, Antitrust 25, pp Ronald Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica 4, pp Exclusionary Conduct (October 18) Kwoka & White: pp , Case 16: U.S. v. Dentsply (2005). J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen (2014), Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond, Journal of Law and Economics 57, pp. S145-S160. Dennis W. Carlton and Ken Heyer (2008), Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, Competition Policy International 4, pp Tying & Bundling (October 25) Kwoka & White: Case 20: U.S. v. Microsoft (2001). International Competition Network (ICN) (2015), Chapter 6: Tying and Bundling, Unilateral Conduct Workbook. Michael Whinston (2001), Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, pp

6 11 Economic Expert Reports (November 1) Ken Heyer (2006), Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to Customers, Department of Justice Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper Direct Testimony of Orley C. Ashenfelter, United States v. Apple Inc. (2013). Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright (2011), Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, Journal of Law and Economics 54, pp Opening Presentation, Department of Justice, United States v. Apple Inc. (2013). 12 Multi-Sided Markets & Google (November 8) Statement of the FTC Regarding Google's Search Practices. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1994), Systems Competition and Network Effects, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, pp Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright (2015), Multi-Sided Platforms, International Journal of Industrial Organization 43, pp Antitrust & Intellectual Property (November 15) 2017 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. FTC v. Qualcomm: (i) FTC complaint and (ii) Qualcomm s motion to dismiss. Dennis W. Carlton and Robert H. Gertner (2003), Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Strategic Behavior, Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 3, pp Course Review (November 29) 6