Wal-Mart Korea: Challenges of Entering a Foreign Market

Transcription

1 Journal of Asia-Pacific Business ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Wal-Mart Korea: Challenges of Entering a Foreign Market Renee B. Kim To cite this article: Renee B. Kim (2008) Wal-Mart Korea: Challenges of Entering a Foreign Market, Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, 9:4, , DOI: / To link to this article: Published online: 12 Dec Submit your article to this journal Article views: View related articles Citing articles: 6 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 24 June 2017, At: 11:22

2 Wal-Mart Korea: Challenges of Entering a Foreign Market WAPB Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, Vol. 9, No. 4, Sep 2008: pp. 0 0 Renee Journal B. of Kim Asia-Pacific Business Renee B. Kim ABSTRACT. Wal-Mart entered South Korea in late 1990s for its international expansion; however, IT had a major failure in this market and left Korea in 2005 as the American way of marketing did not translate well in Korea. Wal-Mart had critical shortfalls in enabling value exchange with the Korean consumers as the Korean consumers had significantly different taste and preferences compared to American consumers. Wal-Mart s Every Day Low Price (EDLP) strategy was not perceived to have the value in the minds of the Korean consumers, while its store locations were not strategically well positioned to create sufficient customer traffic. Wal-Mart s competitive advantage of low cost and low price was not suitable in the Korean competition and consumption context. Wal-Mart was not prepared to develop an effective localization strategy that might have stemmed from not having a clear projection of how much it was willing to invest and grow in this market. This Wal-Mart Korean case shows the importance of the compatibility of a corporate unique value proposition and strategic fit with the local market conditions. KEYWORDS. International market expansion, Wal-Mart, value exchange, strategic fit Address correspondence to: Renee B. Kim is an Associate Professor, Faculty of Business, Hanyang University, 17 Haendangdong, Seongsu-dong, Seoul, , Korea ( kimrby@hanyang.ac.kr). Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, Vol. 9(4) by The Haworth Press. All rights reserved. 344 doi: /

3 Renee B. Kim 345 INTRODUCTION Wal-Mart is the world s largest retailer, operating in 15 countries with 6,500 stores, and generating $62.7 billion in 2006 (Wal-Mart, 2006). By 2007 its stock price skyrocketed over 180,000% since its initial public offering (IPO) in Wal-Mart has been forced to initiate international expansion in the early 1990s due to changes in the U.S. market condition. Market saturation was becoming a problem in the U.S. market. With more than 200 new Wal-Mart stores being opened each year, the rapid growth in the number of stores in the United States placed new stores close to older ones, and the newer stores began cannibalizing the older ones. The demographics of the U.S. market were also evolving as the baby boomer segment was increasing and family sizes were decreasing, which led to slower growth of U.S. market on demand side. Dynamics of the U.S. retail industry has also changed significantly, posing a threat to Wal-Mart s market leader position. Wal-Mart disrupted the U.S. retail market with its aggressive price offering and has held market dominance for the past few decades. However, other major competitors in the U.S. retail sector have adopted strategies similar to Wal-Mart and learned to have a retail format with superior technology and lean business operations. Consequently, the retail price differences between Wal-Mart and other retailers have narrowed and weakened consumers incentives to visit Wal-Mart. All these factors have contributed to slowing of Wal-Mart s earning growth in the United States, and international expansions have become a strategic priority for further growth of Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart s international expansion showed mixed performance. Although the proportion of international sales has grown substantially from 9% of total sales in 1998 to 22% in 2007, Wal-Mart s market positioning in different markets resulted in a different outcome. Although it has had considerable success in Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, Wal-Mart failed to position itself in several overseas markets, including Germany and South Korea. In May 2006, Wal-Mart retreated from Korea by selling its 16 stores to a major local discount chain, Shinsegae Co., at U.S.$882 million, and exited from Germany in July Wal-Mart s stores in Korea lost approximately $10 million in 2005 on sales of $720 million (Ramstad, 2006b). Wal-Mart s exit from these two markets shows that the American way of marketing does not translate well in every market. These exits raise several important questions from an international marketing perspective: how can Wal-Mart localize its products and services to foreign market s tastes and preferences when the core existence of Wal-Mart is primarily associated with marketing and retailing the

4 346 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS American way? In other words, how can Wal-Mart strike the balance between localization of its service and products while maintaining its core competitive advantage that is ultimately American? How much of Wal-Mart s cookie-cutter model of everyday low prices and information technology (IT)-based centralized distribution system should be applied to a local condition? How much would Wal-Mart need to reinvent a localized strategy for consumers who are significantly different from American consumers? A retailer s decision to export a retail format to another cultural environment may require a drastic modification of initial competitive advantages (Dupuis & Prime, 1996). The ability to adapt to overseas market conditions largely determines success of international operations of these firms. The key question in this regard is how a multinational corporation (MNC) can convey its competitive advantages and experiences from domestic market to a new foreign market, which may have significantly different expectations and market conditions. This article attempts to address this question with a comprehensive analysis of the Wal-Mart Korea case. The first section identifies three aspects of Korean consumers preferences that do not match with Wal-Mart offerings and strategies. In the following section, three distinctive market characteristics of Korea are examined, which hindered Wal-Mart from having a successful implementation of its business model in Korea. The final section presents managerial implications for future retail internationalization. KOREAN VERSUS AMERICAN CONSUMERS PREFERENCES Grant and Schelsinger (1995) introduced the concept of value exchange, which highlights the importance of focusing on value determined by customers and tailoring products and service accordingly rather than focusing on the comparison of the previous year s figures as well as competitor-based performance. Wal-Mart s strategy fits well in North America where consumers are willing to compromise service and quality for low price. Wal-Mart s low-price offering is matched with customers definition of value creating value exchange between Wal-Mart and its customers. However, Wal-Mart had critical shortfalls in enabling this value exchange with the Korean consumers as the Korean consumers had significantly different tastes and preferences compared to American consumers.

5 Korean Consumers Taste and Preference Renee B. Kim 347 Korean consumers consider the freshness of food products very seriously and are willing to make frequent trips to supermarkets, corner stores, and traditional wet-markets to buy small volumes of fresh produce. American consumers, in contrast, make fewer frequent trips to supermarkets and purchase bulk-size products for longer storage. The Korean local retailers accommodate this preference for food product freshness of by transplanting the traditional outdoor market into a convenient indoors format in hypermarkets. The local retail stores have live seafood, local delicacies, and on-site packaging services that replicate the features of traditional outdoor markets, and their merchandise mix is heavily focused on food and beverages. The local retailers have extensively used a localization strategy that fits well with Korean consumers taste and preference. In contrast, Wal-Mart s merchandising mix offers everything from dry goods to electronics and clothing, which is viewed by Koreans to be more Westernized than those of its local competitors. Wal-Mart has uniform merchandising and distribution strategies that limit differentiation in its merchandize mix also a constraint in adapting to local tastes and preferences. Korean consumers viewed Wal-Mart as a store to visit when they needed to purchase large nonfood products and to see a variety of products, including foreign products. They prefer to visit local domestic supermarkets for food purchases and daily use items. Korean consumers also like to shop daily, instead of weekly or biweekly, and purchase small packages, given their small houses with limited storage and freezing spaces. Thus, Korean consumers shopping behaviors and preferences did not match with Wal-Mart s retail format, which was set up to serve consumers infrequent bulk shopping. The local retailers such as E-Mart, on the other hand, offer discounted pricing in smaller quantities and in familiar environments similar to conventional department stores rather than warehouses, while offering more fresh produce and feature special in-store events (Coyner, 2007). Mismatched merchandising, assortment, and marketing that missed local needs and context were other factors that contributed to Wal-Mart s failure in Korea. Tesco, a British origin global retailer, is a successful case that has an effective localization strategy for downstream activities. Tesco Korea has enjoyed significant success in the Korean discount retail market (see Table 1). Tesco entered the Korean market by forming a joint venture with a major local partner, Samsung, and leveraged on Samsung s knowledge and expertise of the local market condition. Tesco devoted

6 348 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS TABLE 1. Top five retailers in Korea by market share a Company 2003 Sales 2002 Sales LG Corp $7,499 $6,129 Shinsegae $5,804 $5,172 Lotte Shopping Co. Ltd. $3,330 $3,187 Tesco - Samsung $2,817 $2,147 Samsun Cheil Industries $2,086 $2,088 Source: Euromonitor International (2007). a. Sales are in South Korea only, in millions; in U.S.$ terms based on exchange rate for 2003 and considerable attention to transferring its core capabilities to this new market yet did not attempt to reiterate the British version of its retail format in Korea. For example, it preferred to hire local managers with only a few operational experts from the United Kingdom. Tesco learned to strike a balance between the Western-style hypermarket retail format and the Korean way of retailing, which entails extra services from its local partner. One key factor that contributed to Tesco s success was its ability to create value that is suitable for Korean tastes and preferences. For example, Tesco offers fresh produce that has been partially processed and repackaged into a form that is ready to cook or eat. Tesco also has a deli section that sells popular traditional Korean food items, while its meat section has sales staff that cuts and custom packages meat products according to each customer s preference. Wal-Mart, on the other hand, entered the Korean market without any local partner and implemented its original merchandise mix from the U.S. model, yet its global standardization strategy did not elicit sufficient responsiveness from the Korean consumers. This shows that the entry mode can have a significant impact on how an international retailer develops its strategy and on how the retailer positions itself in a foreign market. Perceived Value of Wal-Mart In North America, where consumers want low price, Wal-Mart s lowprice offering is matched with customers definition of value, resulting in effective value exchange between Wal-Mart and its customers (see Figure 1). However, Korean consumers in the discount retail market proved to have

7 Renee B. Kim 349 FIGURE 1. Seven Sources of Competitive Advantage. Superior Inputs Superior Technology Superior Operations Superior Offering Superior Access Superior Segments Superior Customers Enable a firm to create and capture value Source: Robert Lamb (2005). a different definition of value in the retailers product and service offerings. Korean consumers respond more to free products and promotional sales than to everyday low price and expect more customer service and a more tailored retail environment. Thus, Wal-Mart s EDLP strategy, which was its core competence and competitive advantage in other international markets, was not perceived to have the value that the Korean consumers expected from retail products. Several local Korean discount retailers offer cash or free product incentives worth up to $200 for spending a certain amount in the store. These promotions enhance perceived value of the stores among consumers and increase their visits to these local stores. The warehouse retail format was not well received by the Korean consumers who were used to the assistance of the salespeople who give out free samples and help package and wrap products in the store (J. O. Kim, 2001). Wal-Mart s lack of understanding regarding Korean consumers taste and preferences and the mismatched definition of value between the Korean consumers and Wal-Mart resulted in insufficient value exchange. Wal-Mart s

8 350 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS attempt to employ its standard EDLP strategy, lack of adaptation to the local supply chain conditions, and ineffective market entry time led to the failure in market penetration in the Korean retail sector. Location Preference To enter and consolidate a market position in a foreign market, it is strategically important to take over commercially crucial and high-traffic locations. In the Wal-Mart Korea case, the choice of store location was particularly important as Korean consumers shopping mostly takes place in the metropolitan areas because of strong preferences for the stores with close proximity. Korean consumers have substantially different shopping styles and preferences compared to North American consumers. They prefer to purchase smaller units on a more frequent basis and to have accessibility to a store in walking distance. Convenience and store location are major determinants of where a Korean consumer will shop. American consumers largely use vehicles to purchase large quantities of products on a less frequent basis, thus store location and distance is a far less critical factor. Wal-Mart attempted to penetrate the Korean market by building stores in distant areas where land prices were low, replicating the U.S. strategy of smaller city store build-up. Wal-Mart had only 16 stores in all of Korea with just one in the Seoul metropolitan area and could not achieve the economies of scale. Wal-Mart expected the Korean consumers to drive to its stores for price shopping as the American consumers do, and this expectation was not met. Wal-Mart failed to attract Korean consumers as the store locations were not strategically well positioned to create sufficient customer traffic. Local rivals, which built stores in the early 1990s, had the higher store traffic location advantage compared to Wal-Mart, which had stores mostly in distant, less crowded areas. This affected Wal-Mart s competitive position significantly, as the company had no alternative location strategies to compensate. KOREAN DISCOUNT MODEL VERSUS AMERICAN WAL-MART MODEL Wal-Mart s core competitiveness stems from having a low price/high volume orientation to dominate the discount retail sector. Wal-Mart implemented a superior IT system (see Figure 1) and established a centralized

9 Renee B. Kim 351 automated distribution system that connects itself with suppliers through an Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system. The EDI system gives Wal-Mart access to information on the entire value chain, allows for maintaining constant cost cutting, and enables Wal-Mart to have superior productivity, significant reduction of operational costs, and an overall lean business model. Wal-Mart can therefore offer the lowest retail prices and preempt the U.S. market. Wal-Mart attempted to implement this business model in Korea, which was found to lack compatibility with the Korean retail market conditions. There are three distinctive market characteristics of Korea that hindered Wal-Mart from having a successful implementation of its business model: market penetration and positioning, pricing strategy, and the IT system. Market Penetration and Positioning One of the important aspects of Wal-Mart s successful business model in the United States is its unique approach to market penetration and positioning. Wal-Mart established itself in the U.S. market by penetrating small rural communities and spreading out its stores to nearby cities to form retail clusters. The retailing business incurs high levels of fixed costs, and the profit margins primarily come from sales volume and the efficient management of operating costs. Thus, minimization of the operating costs is important for the profitability of the retail business, which can be achieved when several stores in near proximity can share merchandising, distribution networks, and resources (J. O. Kim, 2001). These retail clusters became fundamental components of Wal-Mart s centralized distribution system that enabled the retail giant to have low inventory levels and cost control, and respond effectively to market demand and changes. Wal-Mart missed a strategic time to enter the Korean market and was unable to capture logistically efficient locations (those that can allow building an efficient distribution system with advantage of economies of scale that Wal-Mart enjoys in the U.S. market). Major Korean retailers had already located their stores in key commercial areas and developed their distribution networks to optimize the merchandising and the retailing operations prior to Wal-Mart s market entry. Wal-Mart was unable to consolidate its market position in the Korean discount retail segment and posted a net loss of $10 million in 2005 on revenue of billion won (Choe, 2006; Troy, 2006). The Korean discount market was estimated to be approximately at U.S.$26 billion (28 trillion won), with 300 stores nationwide in early

10 352 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS 2000s (Park et al., 2003). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Korean retail industry experienced globalization, industry consolidation, increased costs of procurement and merchandising, continued pressures on food safety and supply chain management costs, and an increasingly competitive marketplace, with an imperative for providing customer service and promotional campaigns. Major international retailers such as Price Club, Carrefour, Wal-Mart, and Tesco entered the Korean discount retail market in the late 1990s in response to the liberalization of the retail sector by the Korean government in 1997 (Kim, 2006). However, when the foreign retailers were allowed to enter the Korean retail market in 1997, the Korean retail market was already saturated. Strategically critical commercial areas for discount outlets had been mostly taken by the local retailers. Korean local food retailers such as Lotte, Shinsegae, Samsung, and LG developed their own discount retail outlets (see Table 1). Conglomerates called Chaebols own diversified business units, and all of them merchandise everything from discount items to luxury goods through various retail outlet options. For example, LG Trading Co., the largest Korean retailer, has four distinctive retail divisions, including LG Supermarkets, LG25 convenience stores, LG Department stores, and LG Mart (the discount chain). These four divisions comprise 1,600 LG stores in South Korea (Scardino, 2004). Shinsegea is the second best-performing Korean retailer, and its E Mart discount retail format has 86 stores, accounting for 30% of the Korean discount market. In terms of marketing, it is critical that the stores are built in lucrative locations such as residential and key commercial areas with high levels of consumer traffic. However, it appeared the foreign latecomers such as Wal-Mart were not able to capture strategically important retail locations in Korea that may be critical in effective market entry and positioning. Pricing System (EDLP) Wal-Mart s main competitive advantage has been its ability to offer the most competitive price to consumers by having a cost-efficient operating system that ensures low costs. Wal-Mart s expense structure, measured as a percentage of sales, was among the lowest in the industry (Shah, Phipps, & Offstein, 2005). These cost savings are used to promote its EDLP strategy that ensures the lowest price among competitors. The EDLP strategy led to a high volume sales, higher earnings, and company growth. The earnings were reinvested into further advancement of the operating system,

11 Renee B. Kim 353 and resulted in further reduction of the operating cost. This productivity loop was a key driver in Wal-Mart s rapid success in the United States. Wal-Mart managed to set the competitive retail price with its EDLP strategy in the United States and acquired its market dominance in the U.S. retail industry for the past few decades. Wal-Mart is price competitive and successful in attracting price-conscious shoppers who are willing to compromise customer service and quality for low prices in the United States. Given its previous success in the U.S. market, Wal-Mart intended to employ this EDLP strategy in the Korean market as its core value proposition to the Korean consumers. Wal-Mart s EDLP strategy had lack of a strategic fit to the nature of Korean consumers. Korean consumers were quality conscious and tend to be more brand loyal, therefore less likely to switch to less-expensive products. Korean consumers are unwilling to compromise customer service and quality for low price, expect to see salespeople in each aisle of retail store, and expect aggressive promotion in the value of service and products offered by the retailers (Ramstad, 2006a). Korean consumers perceived Wal-Mart stores as a cheap marketplace with warehouse-style layout and poor-quality products (Kim, 2006). Wal-Mart s EDLP was perceived to be insufficient value in the minds of Korean consumers. IT System of Wal-Mart One of Wal-Mart s main competitive advantages is its superior information technology (IT) system (see Figure 1) that links the vendor supply operations with Wal-Mart s distribution network. This system creates a superior operation that compresses the cost throughout the value chain, maximizes operational efficiency, and enables Wal-Mart to have superior offering: (i.e., low prices). This integrated supply chain network enables Wal-Mart to understand and have access to the supplier operational process and the costs, and to negotiate the vendor prices. Information advantage lets Wal-Mart be the toughest negotiator in the world and have a superior input by purchasing its supply at the lowest prices, driving down the retail price to the lowest possible level (i.e., superior offering). Wal-Mart has superior access to American consumer market and is able to capture the value that is created with superior input, superior operation, superior technology, and superior offering (Figure 1). Wal-Mart faced serious challenges in implementing this core competence in South Korea. South Korea has market constraints, such as supply

12 354 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS chain fragmentation and local protectionism, which prohibited foreign companies market entry, as well as an inefficient food distribution system. Several layers of distributors exist between the manufacturer/ importer and the retailer, and each layer receives a markup, adding transaction costs for the retailers. The Korean vendors were reluctant to have an open information exchange EDI system with Wal-Mart, and they held certain an extent of seller market power as they had an option of supplying to other major local retail discounters. Thus, Wal-Mart could not enjoy its buyer power in the Korean vendor market as in the United States and had lack of control over its Korean supply chain and procurement. Given these local conditions of the distribution channel and of the vendor markets, Wal-Mart could not effectively develop a national distribution network in South Korea, resulting in fundamental default in the application of Wal-Mart business model to South Korea. This shows that effective channel mix organization was an important part of the competitive advantage that was missing in Wal-Mart s business model for the Korean market. In other words, Wal-Mart needed to build a strong alliance with local suppliers, as this facilitated effective merchandising and tighter integration along the value chain. Consequently, Wal-Mart could not obtain the ability to control all logistic phases, from sourcing to delivery, which dampened Wal-Mart s price competitiveness, which was its core competitive advantage in the U.S. market. LOOKING FORWARD In a general sense, the prospect for doing lucrative business in a foreign market depends on the size of the market, the present wealth of consumers in that market, and the likely future wealth of consumers (i.e., future economic growth of the market). However, it is more important for international business managers to recognize the importance of the compatibility of its unique value proposition and strategic fit with the local market conditions. Wal-Mart originally had a very clear definition of its strategic positioning in the U.S. market that brought a rapid growth and profitability. Its strategic positioning was derived from its core competence of EDLP and centralized distribution network that were considered to be unique and to have perceived value in the minds of American consumers. Wal-Mart was

13 Renee B. Kim 355 able to create and capture this value from the consumers that led to its impressive profitability and rapid profit growth. Thus, its strategic positioning fit with the U.S. demand market conditions. The timing also seemed to be working for Wal-Mart as its high-growth period matched with the period of the U.S. retail sector restructuring and consolidation. Wal-Mart s attempt to employ this business model in the Korean market resulted in failure. Wal-Mart s competitive advantage of low cost and low price was not suitable in the Korean competition and consumption context. Prior to the market entry, Wal-Mart should have asked the following questions: whether the timing of the market entry was appropriate; whether to have a joint venture with a local partner; how to project or employ its core competence to the Korean market; how to develop and execute a business strategy for long-term growth in the Korean market; how much of Wal-Mart s American cookie-cutter model of EDLP and low cost centralized distribution system should be applied; how much Wal-Mart should develop a localized identity in Korea; how fast Wal- Mart should expand and allocate its investment capitals among the target markets. Wal-Mart appeared to have lack of preparation in answering above key questions in entering the Korean market. Wal-Mart has miscalculated the market prospects in Korea by focusing too much on prospective macro environmental factors such as the liberalization of the retail sector in South Korea and the favorable economic growth of the Korean economy. However, Wal-Mart might have underestimated the extent of the differences in the Korean retail market condition. The Korean retail discount sector had high level of pressure for local responsiveness and cost reduction, as the Korean consumers had significant different taste and preference compared to American consumers, and as the competition among the major retailers were already intense when Wal-Mart entered the market. This implied that Wal-Mart needed to invest significant resources to strike a balance between cost compression and margin expansion by working upstream and downstream of the value chain in Korea. When an international business identifies a foreign market with a high potential for growth and profit, the firm must consider the scale of entry and strategic commitments. A large-scale market entry involves the commitment of significant resources and enables the firm to capture firstmover advantages that are associated with demand preemption, economies of scale, and switching costs. If a firm decided to be a late entrant to a foreign market, it should be well prepared to deal with late mover

14 356 JOURNAL OF ASIA-PACIFIC BUSINESS disadvantages. When the Korean retail market opened its door to foreign retailers in late 1990s, it was already saturated with highly competitive domestic players. Wal-Mart entered the Korean market on relatively small scale and did not obtain a rapid entry. Prior to the market entry, Wal-Mart should have defined its strategic commitments for the Korean market. In other words, Wal-Mart should have asked whether Korea was a strategically important market to enter for its international expansion and whether it was worthwhile to allocate significant capital resources to capture customers and distributors in Korea. Wal-Mart was not prepared to develop an effective localization strategy that might have stemmed from not having a clear projection of how much it was willing to invest and grow in this market. REFERENCES Alexander, N. (1990). Retailers and international markets: Motives for expansion. International Marketing Review, 7(4), Carrefour. (2006, October 1). Annual report. Retrieved from Choe, S. H. (2006, May 23). Wal-Mart selling stores and leaving South Korea. The New York Times (Late Edition), p. C5. Colla, E., & Dupuis, M. (2002). Research and managerial issues on global retail competition: Carrefour/Wal-Mart. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 30(2/3), Coyner, T. (2007, 19 April). Korean retailers undergo upgrading. Korean Times, Seoul, Korea. Retrieved from Dupuis, M., & Prime, N. (1996). Business distance and global retailing: a model for analysis of key success/ failure factors. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 24(11), 30. Euromonitor International (2007). Consumer Foodservice in Malaysia. Available at: Grant, Alan W. H., & Schelsinger, L. (1995, September-October). Realize your customers full profit potential. Harvard Business Review, pp Kim, J. H. (2006, May 26). M&As in Korea s discount store chains. Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI). Kim, J. O. (2001). Korean consumers patronage of discount stores: Domestic vs. multinational discount store shoppers profiles. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 18(3), Lamb, R. (2005). Seven Sources of Competitive Strategy. NY: New York University. Park, C., Kim, D., Kim, I., Ahn, S., Oh, C., Son, I., et al. (2003). Korea s retail industry in the new millennium. Seoul: Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry. Ramstad, E. (2006a, August 10). South Korea s E-Mart is no Wal-Mart, which is precisely why locals love it. Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition.), p. 1.

15 Renee B. Kim 357 Ramstad, E. (2006b, May 23). Wal-Mart leaves South Korea by selling stores to local rival; Sale to Shinsegae follows April pullout by Carrefour as domestic firms prevail. Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), p. A2. Scardino, E. (2004, December 13). Mass merchant breaks new ground in profitable South Korean market. DSN Retailing Today. Shah, A., Phipps, T., & Offstein, E. (2005). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc Case. In F. David (ed). Strategic management cases (10th ed.). NY Prentice Hall. Troy, M. (2006, June 12). Wal-Mart cuts losses, exits South Korea. Retailing Today, 45(11), Wal-Mart. (2006, October 1). Annual report. Retrieved from