DEIAgra Working Papers 2005, volume 1

Transcription

1 DEIAgra Workng Papers 2005, volume 1 WORKING PAPER DEIAgraWP AGRICULTURAL WATER MARKETS: EXPLORING LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ITALY AND SPAIN Joan PUJOL, Mer RAGGI, Davde VIAGGI March 2005 Language: Englsh DEIAgra DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA E INGEGNERIA AGRARIE Alma Mater Studorum - Unverstà d Bologna

2 DEIAgra Workng Papers are publshed wth the revew of an nternal scentfc commttee wthn the Department of Agrcultural Economcs and Engneerng of the Alma Mater Studorum-Unversty of Bologna. Informaton on other ttles n ths seres may be obtaned from: Dpartmento d Economa e Ingegnera agrare Alma Mater Studorum-Unverstà d Bologna vale Guseppe Fann, Bologna (Italy) e-mal address s: deagrawps@agrsc.unbo.t. Ths paper s avalable electroncally from AgEcon Search at Copyrght All rghts reserved by the authors. Readers may make copes of ths document for non-commercal purposes by any means, provded that ths copyrght notce appears on all such copes.

3 Authors Joan PUJOL a, Mer RAGGI b, Davde VIAGGI b Date March 2005 Ttle AGRICULTURAL WATER MARKETS: EXPLORING LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ITALY AND SPAIN Workng Paper No. DEIAgraWP Pages 1-13 Language Keywords JEL classfcaton Englsh Water, Irrgaton, Agrculture, Water markets, Water polcy, Mathematcal programmng Q18, Q25, Q28 Authors' afflaton a Unversty of Grona b Dpartmento d Economa e Ingegnera Agrare Unversty of Bologna Aknowledgements The paper s the result of the collaboraton of all authors. In partcular, J. Puol wrote secton 4 and carred out the elaboratons for the Lower Ter, M. Ragg wrote secton 5, and D. Vagg wrote sectons 2 and 3. The ntroducton and the dscusson are a common work of the authors. Contact Davde Vagg Dpartmento d Economa e Ingegnera agrare vale Guseppe Fann, Bologna (BO) - Italy tel fax e-mal: davde.vagg@unbo.t DEIAgra Workng Papers, 2005, volume 1 1

4 AGRICULTURAL WATER MARKETS: EXPLORING LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ITALY AND SPAIN Joan PUJOL, Mer RAGGI, and Davde VIAGGI Abstract Agrculture s the man water-usng sector n Southern European Countres, such as Span and Italy. Innovatve nsttutonal solutons for reducng water use or ncreasng ts effcency are pursued by recent legslaton concernng water, n partcular by the Water Framework Drectve (WFD). Even f not explctly consdered by the drectve, water markets may be seen as a knd of nstrument respondng to the gudng prncples of the upcomng water regulaton. The ssue of water markets s very much debated n the water economcs lterature and partcularly n the agrcultural water lterature. Water markets refer to a mechansm of water allocaton based on the exchange of rghts on water use. Water markets are proposed and supported by economc theory on the ground that they produce an effcent allocaton of water resources. Crtcsms to water markets may derve both on the ground of economc effcency tself (for example due to hgher transacton costs and expendture for wder water transport systems) and on equty consderatons (for example the concentraton of water on the more effcent farms that would specalse n ntensve producton, whle the others would retan less ntensve crops). The obectve of ths paper s to test to what extent water markets may contrbute to the mprovement of the effcency of water use. The analyss s based on a lnear programmng model appled at basn level, comparng the stuaton wth and wthout market and ncludng transacton costs proportonal to the amount of water exchanged. The model smulates the behavour of dfferent farm types, derved from cluster analyss on a sample of farms n each area. The model s tested n two areas n Southern Italy and Span. The paper confrms that water markets have the possblty to mprove water use effcency. However, the exchanges are very much affected by the amount of transacton costs, even for transacton costs relatvely low. In the case of Lower Ter, gross margn ncrease due to markets may be as hgh as 30% whch s rather a consderable amount. Instead, the hghest ncrease n Fogga s only about 10%, a result that may be regarded as hardly relevant. In Fogga the benefts of the water market collapse only when transacton costs are between 0,1 and 0,2 EUR/m 3 (that may be regarded as a farly hgh amount). On the contrary, Lower Ter s more senstve to transacton costs and 0,075 EUR/m 3 are enough to cause the market to shut down whatever the water quota. When potental mprovements occur, an addtonal ssue arses,.e. the nsttutonal acceptance of market crtera for water allocaton purposes. The general atttude n Europe stll appears aganst such a soluton. However, the changng economc context (agrcultural markets, demographc trends) tend to decrease rgdtes about water exchange, partcularly among farmers. 2 DEIAgra Workng Papers, 2005, volume 1

5 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span 1. Introducton Agrculture s the man water-usng sector n Southern European Countres, such as Span and Italy. The sector of water regulaton s undergong strong changes due to the ncreasng percepton of the ssue of water scarcty. Innovatve nsttutonal solutons for reducng water use or ncreasng ts effcency are pursued by recent legslaton concernng water. The legal framework n the EU s today faced wth the applcaton of the Water Framework Drectve (WFD) (OJ, 2000). The WFD ntroduces the prncple of Full Cost Recovery (FCR) and the Polluter Pays Prncples (PPP). It also proposes economc nstruments as recommended tools for the regulaton of water use and polluton (WATECO, 2003). Even f not explctly consdered by the drectve, water markets may be seen as a knd of nstrument respondng to the vew that water may be consdered as an economc good, or, at least havng an economc component that requres as much as possble an effcent use. The ssue of prcng polcy and water markets s very much debated n the water economcs lterature and partcularly n the agrcultural water lterature (Lee, 1997; Schffler, 1997; Easter et al., 2004). The obectve of ths paper s to test to what extent water markets may contrbute to the mprovement of the effcency of water use. The analyss s based on a lnear programmng model appled at basn level. The model s tested n two areas n Southern Italy and Span. The paper has the followng structure. Secton 2 shortly descrbes the theoretcal background for water markets. Secton 3 descrbes the methodology adopted. Secton 4 llustrates the characterstcs of the study areas. Secton 5 summarses the man results for the two study areas, followed by a bref dscusson n secton Theoretcal and polcy background forwater markets Water markets refer to a mechansm of water allocaton based on the exchange of rghts on water use. Water markets are proposed and supported by economc theory on the ground that they produce an effcent allocaton of water resources (Mllman, 1956; Lee, 1997; Schffler, 1997; OECD, 2003; Easter et al., 2004). Crtcsms to water markets may derve both on the ground of economc effcency tself and on equty consderatons. Economc crtcsms to market effcency can be based on the argument that market transacton costs may be hgher than those produced by other mechansm of water allocaton. Transacton costs nclude all costs made necessary by the carryng out of a transacton; they may emerge ex ante (for the collecton of nformaton, negotaton, contracts wrtng, etc.) or ex post (for contract enforcement, etc.) (Wllamson, 1985). The functonng of water markets requres farmers to fnd out partners n the transacton and some process for contract negotaton, that may be mplemented n varous ways. In many cases, the present system of water dstrbuton already causes hgh transacton costs (e.g. rrgaton boards costs for water management, defnton and enforcement of property rghts). It s not clear to what extent water markets would actually ncrease such costs. At the moment, data avalable are very lmted and transacton costs would, n any case, change very much from case to case and over tme. One maor ssue may be the cost of water transport, necessary for a market to exst, where possble traders are not already connected by water nfrastructures (canals, ppes). From the analytcal pont of vew, both the amount and the structure of market costs (transacton plus transport costs) may be relevant. In prncple they may be fxed or proportonal to water exchange. They can also be dfferentated between vendors and sellers, and depend on the sze of the farm and ts locaton. Markets may be crtcsed also on the ground of equty consderatons. Chan (1989) emphaszes ths problem, whch ncreases the more unequal are the partcpant agents n the market. Another problem s the possble exstence of negatve externaltes or thrd-party effects. Howe et al. (1986) emphasze as market defcences the changes n the amount and qualty of the return water volumes, although they rase solutons to mtgate these effects. DEIAgraWP

6 Puol J., Ragg M., Vagg D. In addton, t s lkely that water markets would produce a concentraton of water on the more effcent farms that would specalse n ntensve producton, whle the others would retan less ntensve crops. Ths phenomenon has been observed n Australa, Chle and the Unted States. Whle ths mples an ncrease of heterogenety across farms, t also contrbutes to the ncrease of the total agrcultural producton and the number of agrcultural obs (Sumps et al, 1998). The contrbuton to effcency s a relevant pont for agrculture. Most of European agrculture s undergong maor changes wth abandonment by some farmers and an attempt by others to recover compettveness n the global market. Hence there are a number of farms that do not fully use they rghts on water, whle others are ncurrng hgh costs to gan (more or less legally) access to addtonal water resources. Water markets may be mplemented only when a legal bass exsts. In ths sense, Span adopted a normatve that allows for the exchange of water rghts. In Italy the legal bass for proper water markets s usually consdered not to exst. However, there s evdence of formal or nformal markets for water n the south and, to a lesser extent, n the north, even f ther sze s almost mpossble to assess. A key ssue for the settng of water markets s the exstence of well defned property rghts on water and the avalablty of low cost water transport nfrastructures. On the other hand, water markets may be smply represented by transfers of rghts, wthout real movement of water n excess wth respect to the stuaton wthout market. Exstng experences around the world (USA, South Afrca, Australa) also show that water markets are acceptable n a mature legal system and n communtes wth hgh degree of trust. Ths s made necessary by the fact that the sellng of the rght may be assocated to expectatons of losng the rght. In addton, water exchanges need to be supported by trustable systems for contract enforcement. 3. Methodology The methodology s based on the use of a lnear programmng model at basn level. The reference model s gven by well establshed basn level modellng such as those llustrated by Tsdell (2001) and may be seen as the transposton at basn level of wdely used farm level lnear programmng models (see for example Gomez-Lmon et al., 2000; Berbel and Guterrez, 2005; Bazzan et al. 2005). Smlar models have already been used n semnal analyss of water markets n Italy and Span (Arraza et al., 2002; Bazzan, 2004). The man contrbuton of ths paper s to enrch such models by explctly takng nto account transacton costs. The model, when water market s not allowed, has the followng structure: Max λ GM x (1) s.t. x x c z v w a z where: λ = surface proporton of the farm typology (weght); GM = gross margn for crop on farm ; x = crop surface for crop on farm ; c z =techncal coeffcent for crop, on farm, for constrant z; v z = other resources avalablty on farm, for constrant z; 4 DEIAgraWP

7 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span w = water use for crop (m 3 /ha); a = water quota avalable on farm. The model runs per hectare of land, so that the land used for each crop s expressed as a fracton of 1. Ths knd of model s relatvely smple and often used for the economc analyss of rrgaton at basn level. It allows to dentfy optmal solutons and reactons of farmers to water polcy changes. The basc structure llustrated n the model refers to the hypothess of dfferent water endowments n dfferent farms; wth no water exchanges allowed. When water tradng s allowed, the models changes n two ways. On one sde, water avalablty n each farm s gven by the ntal quota, plus the water purchased, mnus the water sold. Ths have to be connected to an addtonal complementary constrant sayng that water purchased must be equal to water sold by farms. Secondly, market lkely would mply (addtonal) transacton costs. In the present model only transacton costs proportonal to water exchanges are assumed to exst. The resultng model has the followng structure: s.t. x x c z w v a z p λ w = x p w s w p p s s GM x ( t w + t w ) Max λ (2) + w p λ w w where: w = water purchased by farm ; p s w = water sold by farm ; t p = transacton cost of purchasng water; t s = transacton costs of sellng water. s s The gross margn accounts for gross revenues mnus all varable costs, ncludng eventual costs related to the acquston of water. In the case wth water market, the gross margn of each farm typology changes further as a functon of revenues or payments due, respectvely, to water sellng or purchasng. A key factor n determnng the proftablty of water markets s the actual level of transacton costs. In absence of relable estmates of such costs, a senstvty analyss has been carred out n order to quantfy the thresholds above whch the market s not economcally feasble. There are some man assumptons of the model that need to be clarfed. Frst the sequence of actons: the farmer knows hs water quota, then decdes about water rghts exchange, then takes all hs farmng decsons after knowng water avalablty. All farmers act n a context of perfect nformaton about the techncal possbltes (cost, producton) gven by the total water avalable after exchange, but s not fully nformed free of costs about other farmers DEIAgraWP

8 Puol J., Ragg M., Vagg D. actons and purposes. Ths gve rse to the possblty of transacton costs, both ex ante and ex post. The contract conssts n the engagement by a farmer not to use ts rght on water (seller) and n ganng the possblty to use the same amount of water by the counterpart (buyer). A system of water dstrbuton reachng all farmers s supposed already to exst, so water dstrbuton does not have any mplcaton n terms of transport costs. 4. The study areas and model valdaton The models (1) and (2) have been constructed for two case studes. The man features of the two study areas are llustrated n table 1. Table 1 Man features of the two areas Lower Ter Fogga Water supply Dams, Ter rver, prvate wells Dams, Ofanto rver, prvate wells Water dstrbuton system Canals, ppes and drans (not pressure) Pressure ppes Irrgaton system Superfcal rrgaton Drp rrgaton Water prce Varable from 6.18 to EUR/hectare 0.09 EUR/m3 Prevalng tarff system Area payment based on rrgated surface Volumetrc Agrcultural surface n the RIB (ha) Area n the sample (ha) Number of farms n the sample Average farm sze n the sample (ha) Methodology for the dentfcaton of farm types Cluster analyss Cluster analyss Number of typologes modelled 4 3 The frst one s the Communty of Irrgants of Lower Ter n Catalona (n the Northeast of Span). A Communty of Irrgants s a groupng of all the owners of a same rrgable zone, who are unted by law for the ndependent and common admnstraton of publc waters. The area s charactersed by the cultvaton of corn, frut trees, alfalfa and other mnor crops. In addton n the zone there are bovne farms wth cultures for anmal feedng. The samplng was wthn the rrgaton communty by quotas. The parameter used n the defnton of the quotas was the farm s surface. The sample conssts n 60 farms, dvded n 4 farm types. It was chosen n such a way as to reflect the same dstrbuton of farm surface as n the whole area. The second case study s located n the South of Italy (Pugla), n the Reclamaton and Irrgaton Board (RIB) of Captanata (Provnce of Fogga) 1. The RIBs (Consorz d Bonfca e Irrgazone) are publc bodes managed as assocatons of landowners, that control land reclamaton and the dstrbuton of water over a certan area. Agrculture n the study area s based on the combnaton of hgh ncome ndustral tomato and hghly subsdsed locally tradtonal crops, such as ranfed durum wheat. The development of hgh value added crops, such as tomato and other vegetables s counterbalanced by a hgh mpact on the envronment and s dependent upon a suffcent water avalablty. The sample conssts n 131 farms, dvded n 3 farm types, one based on tomato-durum wheat and the other two cultvatng a more wde range of vegetables. Farm typologes n each study area were selected on the bass of Cluster Analyss on a data set derved from a representatve sample of farms, valdated through ntervews wth local experts. For each cluster we consdered dfferent constrants such as crop rotaton, labour 1 The models used n the case of Fogga where based on data collecton and valdaton carred out durng the proect WADI Sustanablty of European Irrgated Agrculture under Water Framework Drectve and Agenda 2000 (EVK ) (Berbel and Guterrez, 2005). 6 DEIAgraWP

9 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span avalablty, land, etc. that refer to specfc characterstcs of each farm typology. Four clusters where dentfed for Lower Ter and three for Fogga (table 2). Table 2 Types of farms dentfed by means the cluster analyss Zone Short name Farm typology LT.1 Productve orentaton extensve- mxed crops ( Mxed ) Lower Ter LT.2 Productve orentaton frut ( Frut ) LT.3 Productve orentaton lvestock ( Lvestock ) LT.4 Productve orentaton extensve-corn ( Corn ) Fg.1 Small farm - Productve orentaton extensve-tomato ( Small extensve ) Fogga Fg.2 Small farm - Productve orentaton vegetables ( Small vegetables ) Fg.3 Large farm - Productve orentaton extensve-tomato ( Large extensve ) Models were calbrated usng prmary data collected from the surveyed farms. Constrants nclude standard constrants such as land, labour, commercal constrants and rotatons. Labour constrants have been constructed by perod (table 3). Table 3 Man features of the models Lower Ter Fogga Model LT.1 LT.2 LT.3 LT.4 Fg.1 Fg.2 Fg.3 Average farm sze (ha) 7,52 7,71 31,36 Obectves * Gross Margn X X X X X X X Constrants: - Land X X X X X X X - Water X X X X X X X - Labour X X X - CAP (set-asde) X X X X - Market X - Rotatons X X X X X X X - Specfc type of sol X X - Cattle feedng X Cluster weght 0,34 0,19 0,12 0,35 0,365 0,361 0,274 Models were valdated aganst the actual crop mx seen as a combnaton of farmng actvtes (tables 4 and 5). Table 4 Devatons between real and smulated values of the percentage crop surface (Lower Ter) LT.1 LT.2 LT.3 LT.4 Corn -6,00-0,97 0,98-1,00 Sunflower 4,00 0,93 0,00 0,14 Other gran cereals 3,00-1,90 1,00-0,07 Wnter forage 0,00 1,85-0,45 0,07 Alfalfa 0,00 2,94 0,30 2,00 Frut trees 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 Poplars 2,91 0,00 0,00 0,30 Set-asde -1,00-1,88-0,82-1,52 Other gran cereals (non rrgated) -3,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 Total devaton 19,91 10,49 3,54 5,11 DEIAgraWP

10 Puol J., Ragg M., Vagg D. Table 5 Devatons between real and smulated values of the percentage crop surface (Fogga) Fg.1 Fg.2 Fg.3 Tomato 6,70 6,93 2,22 Durum wheat -2,58-9,36-2,22 Durum wheat and broccol -0,39 2,72 0,00 Asparagus -3,72-0,28 0,00 Total devaton 13,39 19,29 4,45 5. Results Gan from markets for dfferent levels of transacton costs and quota n the two areas are reported n fgures 1 and 2, expressed as a percent ncrease of total gross margn of the area. In the case of Lower Ter benefts may be as hgh as 30% whch s rather a consderable amount. Instead, the hghest ncrease n Fogga s only about 10%, a result that may be regarded as hardly relevant. In both cases, the advantages n terms of ncrease of gross margn appear lmted to low levels of transacton costs and ntermedate levels of water avalablty. In Fogga the benefts of the water market collapse only when transacton costs are between 0,1 and 0,2 EUR/m 3 (that may be regarded as a farly hgh amount). On the contrary, Lower Ter s more senstve to transacton costs and 0,075 EUR/m 3 are enough to cause the market to shut down whatever the water quota. The quotas correspondng to the hgher ncrease n gross margn are respectvely 2000 m 3 /ha for Lower Ter and 1000 for Fogga. Both amounts are actually very close to real amounts dstrbuted n the drought years. Partcularly n the Lower Ter, however, the volumes provded n the last years has been enough hgher. Also, n the case of Lower Ter restrctons to water avalablty or, possbly, ntersectoral water exchanges, may derve from a strong ntersectoral competton on the use of the resource, for example by the neghbourng golf courses or the close tourst zones (Costa Brava). 8 DEIAgraWP

11 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span Fgure 1 Gan from markets for dfferent levels of transacton costs Lower Ter DEIAgraWP

12 Puol J., Ragg M., Vagg D. Fgure 2 Gan from markets for dfferent levels of transacton costs Fogga Fgure 3 and 4 show the total water exchange among clusters as a functon of the water quota. Agan the exchanges are very much affected by the amount of transacton costs (TC), even for transacton costs relatvely low. 10 DEIAgraWP

13 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span Fgure 3 Water exchanges among clusters Lower Ter (TC=0 and TC=0,05 EUR/m 3 ) watert exchange (m3) quota (m3/ha) LT.1_TC=0 LT.2_TC=0 LT.3_TC=0 LT.4_TC=0 LT.1_TC=0.05 LT.2_TC=0.05 LT.3_TC=0.05 LT.4_TC=0.05 Fgure 4 Water exchanges among clusters Fogga (TC=0 and TC=0,15 EUR/m 3 ) water exchange (m3) quota (m3/ha) Fg.1_TC=0 Fg.2_TC=0 Fg.3_TC=0 Fg.1_TC=0.15 Fg.2_TC=0.15 Fg.3_TC=0.15 The fgures hghlght the strongly dfferent poston of dfferent knds of farms wth respect to water markets. In Lower Ter, cluster 1 and 4 are the man sellers, whle cluster 3 and, to a lesser extent cluster 2 are the buyers. Ths denotes a clear polarsaton for water towards lvestock and frut farms. In the same way, n the case of Fogga, cluster 2 s the man buyer, denotng a strong concentraton of water resources towards ntensve vegetable growers. DEIAgraWP

14 Puol J., Ragg M., Vagg D. Postons, even the role as buyers and sellers, may reverse dependng on the water quota avalable. Hgh transacton costs may cause some farms to ext the market (e.g. cluster 3 n Lower Ter). Water exchange tends to ncrease and then to decrease as a functon of the quota. However, where the ext pont from water use at prce zero (lower pont of the demand curve) s very dfferent among clusters, a certan amount of exchange may be proftable even for plenty of water avalable. The results llustrated here were complemented by a short survey carred out among farmers n Lower Ter and by ntervewng the responsble of the rrgaton boards n Fogga. The general atttude s clearly aganst market, partly for equty consderatons, partly because a dscusson about water market s perceved as beng poltcally dffcult and potentally able to produce conflcts. Where farmers where ntervewed, they showed a general nterest towards buyng water, whle they are less wllng to sell water. One possble explanaton s n the fear of loosng the rght to water use over tme, so that the expected gans from market would be only temporary, and markets would actually lead to a deprecaton of ther assets. 6. Dscusson The paper confrms that water markets have the possblty to mprove water use effcency. However t also hghlghts that ths potental strongly depends on the nsttutonal ablty to allow exchange wth reasonably low transacton costs. Part of the ssue s to be connected to the actual nature of the transacton costs consdered: are they actual costs (tme spent by the farmers, true legal costs) or costs lnked to rsk percepton and uncertanty about the future allocaton of water rghts? Are these costs due to the form of exchange and can be lowered by a revson of water nsttutons? Are lmts and guarantees to the partcpants on the market the rght ones, n order to avod excessve rsk percepton and non-partcpaton? Answers to these questons may derve from further research on ths feld. They would partcularly beneft from a more detaled modellng of the nformaton asymmetres and from a combned approach lnkng more drectly modellng wth an nsttutonal, and possbly a partcpatory, approach. Also, farmers atttudes and obectve could be analysed more n detal trough multcrtera analyss, n order to mprove the actual degree of partcpaton and utlty derved from water markets. Other lkely ssues of nterest would be the degree of specalsaton brought about by the market and the sde effects on equty ssues. 7. References Berbel J., Guterrez C. (2005). Sustanablty of European Agrculture under Water Framework Drectve and Agenda Bruxelles: European Commsson. Arraza M., Gomez-Lmon J.-A., Upton M. (2002). Local water markets for rrgaton n southern Span: a multcrtera approach. The Australan Journal of Agrcultural and Resource Economcs, 46(1): Bazzan G.M. (2004). Mercat per l acqua ad uso rrguo. uno strumento d supporto e prme applcazon, XLI Convegno d Studo SIDEA, Roma, settembre Bazzan G.M., D Pasquale S., Galleran V., Morgant S., Ragg M., Vagg D. (2005). The sustanablty of rrgated agrcultural systems under the Water Framework Drectve: frst results. Envronmental modellng and Software, 20: Chan, A.H. (1989). To market or not to market: allocatng water rghts n New Mexco. Natural Resources Journal, 29: Easter K.W., Moretto M., Smth R. (2004). Insttutonal arrangements are crtcal for effectve water markets, 9th Jont Conference on Food, agrculture and the envronment, Coneglano, August 28th- September 1st. Howe Ch.W., Schurmeer D.R., Shaw W.D. (1986). Innovatve approaches to water allocaton: the potental for water markets. Water Resources Research, 22 (4): Gómez-Lmón J.A., Arraza M., Berbel J. (2002). Conflctng mplementaton of agrcultural and water polces n rrgated areas n the EU. Journal of Agrcultural Economcs, 53 (2): Lee T.R. (1999). Water management n the 21st century: the allocaton mperatve. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publshng. 12 DEIAgraWP

15 Agrcultural water markets: explorng lmts and opportuntes n Italy and Span Mllman J.W. (1956). Commonalty, the prce system, and use of water supples. The Southern Journal, 22: OECD (2003). Water: Performance and Challenges n OECD Countres. Envronmental Performance Revews. Pars: Organsaton for Economc Cooperaton and Development. OJ (2000). Drectve of the European Parlament and of the Councl 2000/60/EC establshng a framework for Communty acton n the feld of water polcy, Offcal Journal L 327, 22/12/2000, pp Schffler M. (1997). Intersectoral water market: a soluton for the water crss n ard area?, n Kay M., Franks T., Smth L. (eds). Water: economcs, management and demand. London: Chapman & Hall. Sumps J.M., Garrdo A., Blanco M., Varela C., Iglesas E. (1998). Economía y Polítca de Gestón del Agua en la Agrcultura. Mund-Prensa: MAPA-Ed. Tsdell J.G. (2001). The envronmental mpact of water markets: an Australan case-study. Journal of Envronmental Management, 62: WATECO (2003). Common mplementaton strategy for the Water Framework Drectve (2000/60/EC). Bruxelles: European Commsson. Wllamson O. (1985). The economc nsttutons of captalsm. New York: Free Press. DEIAgraWP