ESDP: WHAT ADDED VALUE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT?

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Cornelius Jennings
6 years ago
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1 ATENA '09 CONFERENCE Athens (EL), 01 October 2009 Intervention of General Henri BENTEGEAT Chairman of the European Union Military Committee ESDP: WHAT ADDED VALUE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT? Let me begin by saying how happy I am to be taking part in this important seminar which will enable us to share our views on topics which are essential to the security and stability of our continent. For my part, I am pleased to be able to give you my answer to a question that has been constantly on my mind for the past three years, as I chaired the European Union Military Committee: what added value does the European Security and Defence Policy bring to crisis prevention and management? In other words, is the European defence that we have been building for the last ten years contributing to peace and security in Europe and in the world or not? Some commentators, perhaps ill-informed or disappointed because of excessive initial expectations, consider that the ESDP has not produced the effects expected when it was launched at the Cologne Summit in June In most cases they are unaware of the impressive figures for action taken by the Union since In six years we have launched 6 military operations and 17 civilian operations, most of them have been undeniable successes.

2 Yet can we simply be content with the figures, in military matters in particular? I should like to describe to you our contribution to taking up the military challenges and the benefits accruing to the international community from the European Union's specific position, but first I must say a word about the ESDP's mandate, which circumscribes and limits its field of action. 1. A field of action and capabilities limited by choice Critics of the ESDP never tire of arguing that the policy has failed because not even the embryo of a European army has been set up. But this charge is unjustified, because in Cologne there was never any question of creating a collective army to do that we would have needed a European federal government, something which was unthinkable ten years ago, and still is today. The Cologne summit's ambition was to give the EU a role and status as a global player on the international stage and hence the civilian and military resources to take action in defence of its interests and its values in preventing and managing crises. European States were very clear that the EU was not taking over the collective defence of its territory or envisaging intervening in armed conflicts. The framework of action defined, the Petersberg tasks, did, on the other hand, clearly envisage the use of force to restore peace. This choice, intended from the outset to complement NATO, limited the 2

3 Command and Control (C2) capabilities which would be available to the EU, in order to avoid duplication. From the outset it was clear that the Union could have recourse to the Alliance's common assets, structures and experience only to a limited extent, pursuant to the "Berlin plus" agreement. In addition to the lean structures and limited capabilities it opted for, the Union was faced from the beginning with a severe limitation on the civilian and military manpower available, both on account of the proliferation of crises occurring and because of some practical obstacles. Of those obstacles, the most often cited is a lack of political cohesiveness and solidarity between the Europeans. And it is true that the American leadership, which facilitates consensus within the Alliance, has no equivalent in the EU. On the other hand, it may be argued that while the operational decision-making process is longer and more laborious in the Union, the very rigorous planning which ensues, and particularly the obligation to clearly define an end state and an exit strategy, make a very significant contribution to the success of our missions. Yet the limitations I have referred to are real and justify the question I have been asking myself for the past three years: what is our added value? The first answer is strictly military. 3

4 2. The EU makes an effective contribution to improving European armed forces crisis management capabilities The European Union, NATO, and even the United Nations and the African Union, are now facing the same challenges: the deployment and sustainability of forces for external crisis management operations; the limitation on resources available the imperative need to adopt a global approach to crises. In those three areas the ESDP is making a significant contribution. With regard, first of all, to the capacity to deploy and sustain forces on external theatres, everyone remembers the official declarations made by the US authorities: we will support European defence if it contributes to strengthening European military capabilities. And the facts are there: experience acquired in European operations and the battlegroup dynamic has had a significant impact on transforming our armed forces. Much, of course, still remains to be done. Of 1,9 million European serving soldiers, fewer than 5 % are currently deployed on operations. But the obstacle to a higher rate of deployment lies more in the reluctance of the public opinion in Europe to have their countries involved in costly, risky expeditions in faraway places than in the European military capability. This problem of public perception is clearly far from confined to Europe and merits analysis in its own right. But let us keep to the military domain. If I take as an example our recent operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, two points immediately stand 4

5 out. Firstly, it provided invaluable experience, so complex and demanding were the mandate for EUFOR Tchad/RCA, its environment and the support it required. Secondly, that operation saw the first major participation by a very significant number of actors unaccustomed to collective action involving the use of force in a hostile environment. Contingents from 18 European countries, in all, learned more in 15 months than in 30 years of traditional peacekeeping missions. My second example is Atalanta, our counter-piracy operation. It is the first mission since the end of the Cold War to involve maritime resources in a non-benign context requiring tangible results. And I would point out that the first EUNAVFOR commander was a Greek admiral who was able to set up this delicate operation perfectly, in coordination with a large number of unusual partners. In addition to the experience acquired by our forces, a significant feature of their ability to adapt to crisis management is participation in battlegroups, our rapid response capability. First of all, the time constraints for battlegroup deployment are particularly demanding, in terms of preparation and readiness. In addition, battlegroups have a major impact on the interoperability of our European armed forces, particularly the armies. Low-level integration of units from different countries requires a major effort in terms of technical and tactical link-up. Training and evaluation to the standards agreed in the Military Committee have had a major impact both on forces and on headquarters. In addition, solutions systematically have to be found to the problems posed by long-distance projection, a major deficiency of our European forces. 5

6 Lastly, many small nations, hitherto accustomed to following or simply making up the big battalions, have taken command of battlegroups and come to grips with issues with which they were previously unfamiliar. It has reached the point where several countries, such as Sweden, have largely reorganised their defence system around this concept and this reality. Some will say that battlegroups are pointless and costly because they will never be deployed. To my mind, the charge does not stand. The case of Georgia in 2008 demonstrates that when there is an emergency in a region in which European interests are clearly at stake, the EU is able to take swift action. The second challenge facing NATO and the EU is the availability of resources. The real obstacle is budgetary. Operations are costly and, with a few rare exceptions, military expenditure is not considered a priority by European governments and parliaments. Experience shows that neither NATO nor the EU has the power to persuade governments to spend more on their armed forces. What the EU has to offer and particularly the European Defence Agency which was set up precisely for that purpose is better use of limited resources. That is the main objective of the Capability Development Plan which is being run by the Agency and with which the Military Committee is associated. Its purpose is to refocus Member States' efforts and financial resources on the real priorities, that is to say the deficiencies and inadequacies in our collective capabilities. In practice, that means all matters relating to transport, mobility, force protection and ISTAR. To achieve the objective, the Agency proposes cooperative equipment programmes, joint R&T programmes which would otherwise be inaccessible to small countries, and, 6

7 wherever possible, dual civilian/military programmes and pooling. Such action, although recent because the Agency was only set up in 2004, is beginning to bear fruit and will over time make a significant contribution to European military capabilities. The third challenge is the global approach to crisis management, which is a constant refrain at every seminar since the difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the area in which the EU contribution is most significant and most promising. Struck by the European Commission's capabilities for action and the impressive development of the civilian aspect of the ESDP, some would like to reduce the concept of the global approach to one simple equation: crisis management = NATO military capabilities + EU civilian capabilities. It's an interesting possibility and justified in situations such as Afghanistan and Kosovo, but it is not the only one. For a start, there are many instances in which autonomous civilian action is sufficient in itself, as is the case at the moment in Georgia, Palestine and Moldova. But the most effective and most promising model is one in which the EU activates all the crisis management levers at the same time financial, judicial, police, customs and development while deploying credible European military capability. That is the most fruitful approach because it enables crisis management to be planned and conducted in integrated fashion from beginning to end. And considerable progress has been made in this area over the last three years. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the activities of EUFOR and EUPM, the police mission, are 7

8 coordinated on a day-to-day basis by the EU Special Representative. For the operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, the Commission was involved in planning from the outset. It financed the UN police mission and organised the rehabilitation of villages to enable displaced persons to return home. The planning and conduct of Atalanta have been totally integrated between the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and OHQ, thus making it possible to deal in real time with the problem of bringing pirates arrested to justice. In Brussels, institutions and procedures have evolved very quickly, without waiting for the Lisbon Treaty to come into force: a single civilian and military watchkeeping centre has been set up, civilian and military intelligence have been merged, cooperation has been established between the EUMS and the CPCC (the permanent civilian OHQ). And the Council has decided to set up a single civ-mil Crisis Management Planning Directorate, the CMPD. If it is ratified, or if some of its provisions are realised, the Lisbon Treaty will allow further decisive progress by abolishing the institutional barriers between the pillars. The ESDP has thus made decisive progress as regards a global approach. Mental barriers in Brussels have fallen and everyone is convinced that this capability which the EU alone possesses is a major asset in its bid to be a global player recognised on the international stage. That is, if it has the opportunity to show what it can do in a troubled world in which organisations are plentiful and multilateralism is contested and badly organised. Which brings me to my last point. 8

9 3. The very nature of the EU and the place it occupies ensure that it has a significant and useful part to play in the international community Some critics of the EU doubt the usefulness of its international role on the grounds that it has a "no war culture" and is prone to internal disagreement on diplomatic options. As the Eurosceptics see it, the EU is paralysed by its alleged pacifism and the lack of a common strategy. That caricature is clearly far from the truth. As I have already said, the Union has launched six military operations in six years and it is common knowledge that our forces' rules of engagement (ROE), concepts, doctrines and standards are the same as NATO's. And the policy disagreements between Member States did not prevent the European Security Strategy, a substantial platform for effective action, from being adopted in 2003 and updated in In reality, it is precisely the nature of the EU and the place it occupies that make its intervention more acceptable and more desirable in crisis regions. It is its values and principles, the same as those which underpin the UN charter, and a humanist culture dearly won after centuries of strife. There is, too, its reassuring approach to the issues: first civilian, diplomatic and economic, before envisaging the use of military force. There is its involvement in the least-favoured regions where crises arise and where the EU has been carrying out development programmes and humanitarian support programmes for decades. Its knowledge of the people, the culture and the 9

10 place is also a considerable advantage. And also, let's be honest, some governments do not favour United States or NATO involvement in their countries for political or ideological reasons. We saw that recently in Chad. The fact is the EU can be perceived as a more neutral, more impartial actor than NATO in some crises, and more powerful and more effective than the UN in others. Look at Georgia in 2008, for example. However, let us not delude ourselves: in crises and conflicts requiring major military and political commitment, the EU will never be able to replace NATO and the American leadership. WE should not forget that our basic, fundamental security relies on the Transatlantic link. On the other hand, in less heated situations the EU offers an alternative which is attractive to the international community. I should add that in today's crisis situations, one organisation seldom acts alone. And it is precisely the EU's position that facilitates the establishment of fruitful partnerships with the UN, the African Union and other regional organisations. We all know how the partnership with the UN has developed on the basis of practical experience in the Congo in 2003 and 2006, then more specifically in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 and With the OSCE there is a permanent cooperation in the Balkans and in Central Asia. A similar partnership with the African Union is in place, both in current operations and in the building up of African peacekeeping capabilities. I should, however, like to emphasise the importance and significance of the 10

11 EU/NATO partnership. For us in the military, that is no mere form of words: essentially, it is the same European forces which must step up under either of the two flags. Permanent dialogue and transparency are essential if we are to exploit every possible synergy and avoid pointless competition and duplication. For when you come to think of it, the EU's contributions and action capacity perfectly complement those of NATO. When NATO takes on the military commitment, the EU can take on the civilian aspect of international action. But in a certain number of cases the EU, as a global player, will be best placed to meet the international community's expectations. That is an important element of flexibility for all our political leaders when a crisis is looming or has occurred and action needs to be taken. Conclusion The added value of the ESDP is therefore multifarious and greater than one might suspect. In the military field, the cost-efficiency ratio is excellent, given the leanness of the permanent structures. But the most striking thing for me, after three years in Brussels, is the expectations that people increasingly have of Europe in the most troubled regions in the world. We cannot answer every call. Yet in an increasingly multipolar world, it is in our interests and in the interests of each of the European States to develop our action capability so that our voice is heard, so that our interests are taken into account 11

12 in order to develop effective multilateralism, as advocated in the European Security Strategy. As emphasised by the President of the United States, a strong Europe is a major asset for the peace and stability of our planet. The EU's potential is considerable and the Swedish Presidency is endeavouring to develop it, particularly in crosscutting operations, civilian/military cooperation and maritime surveillance being just two examples. Other areas of activity are already up and running, such as fighting terrorism and the repercussions of climate change for our security. But we must remain vigilant because the economic crisis has upset all projections, prompted a drawing-in of horns, and played havoc with defence budgets. It has hit the least-favoured regions hard, sowing the seeds of violence and confrontation. When the crises come, we will ignore them only at our peril. Thank you. 12

INSTITUTE REPORT. ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond OPERATIONS INSTITUTION CAPABILITIES

INSTITUTE REPORT. ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond OPERATIONS INSTITUTION CAPABILITIES Giovanni GREVI Daniel KEOHANE Gustav LINDSTROM INSTITUTE REPORT ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond OPERATIONS INSTITUTION CAPABILITIES Berlin, 29/30 January 2007 The German Presidency of the European