Berlin Blockade & Airlift

Transcription

1 Berlin Blockade & Airlift President Harry S. Truman United States of America SOURCE DOCUMENTS May May 1949 Background Information #1: A Divided Germany 1945

2 The Yalta and Potsdam conferences were called to help the Allies decide what would happen to Europe, and in particular Germany, at the end of the Second World War. This Revision Bite will help you understand the decisions made at these two important conferences and the differences that emerged between the allied leaders. Yalta - February 1945: Germany was not yet defeated, so, although there were tensions about Poland, the big three - Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill - managed to agree to split Germany into four zones of occupation, and to allow free elections in Eastern European countries. Russia was invited to join the United Nations, and Russia promised to join the war against Japan when Germany was defeated. Potsdam - July 1945: Germany had been defeated, Roosevelt had died and Churchill had lost the 1945 election - so there were open disagreements. Truman came away angry about the size of reparations and the fact that a communist government was being set up in Poland. Truman did not tell Stalin that he had the atomic bomb. Comparison of Yalta and Potsdam Yalta Potsdam Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin Germany to be split into four zones. Attlee, Truman and Stalin Arguments about the details of the boundaries between the zones. Germany will pay reparations. A government of 'national unity' to be set up in Poland, comprising both communists and noncommunists. Disagreements about the amount of reparations Russia wanted to take. It was agreed that Russia could take whatever it wanted from the Soviet zone, and 10 per cent of the industrial equipment of the western zones, but Britain and the US thought this was too much. Truman was angry because Stalin had arrested the noncommunist leaders of Poland. Free elections in the countries of eastern Europe. This part of the agreement was called the Declaration of Liberated Europe. America and Britain were alarmed because communists were coming to power in the countries of Eastern Europe. Russia would help against Japan when Germany was defeated. Truman dropped the atomic bomb so that Japan would surrender before Russian troops could go into Japan. America had the bomb in July 1945, but Truman did not tell Stalin about it. When he saw how he had been tricked, Stalin was furious.

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4 Background Information #2: Unrest between the Allies and Soviets Report from the desk of the President s Secretary's Files The Berlin Situation The discussions in Moscow have reached the crucial [important] phase. The fundamental [main] issue from which all the difficulties stem from is the Soviet insistence that the four-powered control over Germany has lapsed [happens at the same time] and with it all rights of the occupying powers in discussions, such as the four-power administration over the Berlin currency [money], stem from this basic issue concerning the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin. This point is so fundamental [basic] that it would probably require a further visit to Stalin before discussions end. Ambassador Smith and the French and British representatives are probably seeing Molotov today and if, as we anticipate, Molotov repeats the Soviet assertion [force] that we no longer have any rights in Berlin they will request an interview with Stalin. While the discussions have not yet broken down, if the Soviets maintain their position that we have no rights in Berlin and are their position that we have no rights in Berlin and are there only on Soviet sufferance [pity] and on the basis of such favors as the Soviet Government may choose to accord [offer] us, there will be a complete deadlock [no agreement] in the discussion.

5 We feel the Soviet position is unacceptable; (1) on the grounds that no one nation, party to a multilateral[many country] agreement, can unilaterally [only one country] by mere assertion of alleged violations by the other parties declare null and void such multilateral agreement. (2) to pass over in silence this issue would be in effect, to trade our rights in Berlin for the lifting or the blockade, which would render [make] our position in Berlin much more difficult in the future and would unquestionably be exploited [used] all over the world by Soviet propaganda as a great diplomatic victory (in this connection, you might care to mention that we have several reports from Europe that Russians are informing their followers that a major Soviet diplomatic victory is in prospect. This has come to us, among other sources, from the Prime Minister of Italy, himself.) It is the intention of all three Western Governments [U.S., British, and French], who are completely together on this, to stand firm in defense of their right to be in Berlin and to accept no agreement in Moscow which would imply any abandonment of those rights. We feel that the real Soviet purpose in the Berlin matter is to disrupt the recovery of the Western Zone in Germany and thereby European recovery [after WWII]. Day 1: 6/15/1948 German routes closed indefinitely The Russians [Soviets] were also concerned about a unified West Berlin: a capitalist city located right in the middle of their occupation zone that would likely be powerfully and aggressively anti-soviet. They decided that something needed to be done to stop this creeping unificationism [U.S., British and French all united their zones into one]. They [Soviets] withdrew from the Kommandatura and began a blockade of West Berlin, a maneuver [move] that they hoped would effectively starve the western powers out of Berlin. If West Germany was to become its own country, they argued, then Berlin, located more than 100 miles from its border, could no longer be its capital. On June 15, 1948, the Soviet authorities announced that the Autobahn, the highway connecting western Germany to Berlin, would be closed indefinitely for repairs. Then, they halted all road traffic from west to east, and barred all barge [big flat and rail traffic from entering West Berlin. Thus began the blockade of Berlin. As far as the western Allies were concerned, withdrawal [leaving] from the city was not an option. If we withdraw, said the American military commander, our position in Europe is threatened, and Communism will run rampant [everywhere]. President Harry Truman echoed this sentiment[feeling]: We shall stay, he declared, period. Using military force to strike back against the Soviet blockade seemed equally unwise: The risk of turning the Cold War into an actual war even worse, a nuclear war was just too great. Finding another way to re-provision [get supplies to] the city seemed to the Allies to be the only reasonable response.

6 Day 10: 6/25/ 1948 Telegram from Alfred M. Bingham to President Harry S. Truman New York, NY Jun The President The White House Russian efforts to drive Western powers from Berlin are a crucial [necessary] challenge to American Foreign Policy. Surrender [giving up] would deliver to Russian vengeance two million Germans who have defied [avoided] communist totalitarianism [government]. There are disturbing rumors of plans to evacuate Berlin because of Russian blockade against German civilian supplies, essential [important] supplies for the German population can be delivered by air and if necessary must be at whatever cost. We urge you to make this country s position unmistakable by declaring that under all circumstances short of war we will remain in Berlin and maintain supplies for the civilian population nothing less can adequately reassure democratic forces in Germany and elsewhere that this country will not desert them. Alfred M Bingham American Association for a Democratic Germany Iston Oak Managing Editor

7 Murray Baron New York County Chairmen Liberal Party August Claessens National Secretary Social Democratic Federation Louis P Goldberg Member, New York City Council George N Shuster President of Hunter College Milton Stewart New York Executive Director Americans for Democratic Action Respectfully referred to the Department of State. William D. Hassett, Secretary to the President Day 13: 6/28/1948 Airlift Begins The United States launched Operation Vittles on June 26, with the United Kingdom following suit two days later with Operation Plainfare. Despite the desire for a peaceful resolution to the standoff, the United States also sent to the United Kingdom B-29 bombers, which were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The beginning of the airlift proved difficult and Western diplomats [representatives] asked the Soviets to seek a diplomatic [peaceful] solution to the impasse [blockade]. The Soviets offered to drop the blockade if the Western Allies withdrew the Deutschmark from West Berlin. Even though the Allies rebuffed [did not accept] the Soviet offer, West Berlin s position remained precarious [uneasy], and the standoff had political consequences on the ground. In September 1948, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the German Communist Party of the Soviet zone of occupation, marched on the Berlin City Council and forced it to adjourn [stop meeting]. Fearing that the Western Allies might halt the airlift and cede [give up] West Berlin to the Soviets, 300,000 West Berliners gathered at the Reichstag [government building] to show their opposition to Soviet domination. The turnout convinced the West to keep the airlift and the Deutschmark.

8 Day 15: 6/30/ 1948 Letter from R.H. Hillenk oetter (Direct or of CIA) to Preside nt Truman MEMORANDUM [message] FOR THE PRESIDENT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington 25, D.C. Information has been received that a conference was held in Karlshorst on 28 June 1948 between Russian officials, headed by Marshal Sokolovsky, and German members of the German industrial committee. Sokolovsky opened the conference by asking the German industrialists what influence on the Eastern Zone of Germany would exist because of the blockades from the Western Zone. A German representative stated that being cut off from the West meant a complete stoppage of production in sugar refineries [factories] for lack of 50,000 meters of steel piping on order in the Western Zone; it also meant a complete closing down of canneries since the entire raw material was received from the West; and a certain discontinuance [stopping] of the Baltic fishing fleet within a short time because of the lack of machinery parts. Sokolovsky evidenced a great consternation [surprise] at this statement, replying the Russians had been led to believe the East could be independent of the West. The German member then stated that the heavy industries, particularly the steel mills in Hennigsdorf, could not produce without the West and that other heavy industries in the Eastern Zone would be equally affected.

9 The Russians appeared greatly shocked, and a Russian General, in charge of trade and supply, said, We had no idea of this situation; Russia is suffering from heavy droughts and is counting on German food supplies this year. Food supplies must be maintained, come what may. If we had known this we would not have gone so far. During the meeting Sokolovsky stated that three possibilities were available: a. Start a war. b. Lift travel restrictions on Berlin. c. Leave entire Berlin to West, giving them the rail line. After meeting Tulpanov, who was also present, said the war was impossible due to bad harvest prospects and that lifting travel would make the Russians lose face. The third possibility was that the West would have to feed all of Berlin and would have more on their hands than they bargained for. He stated that 2,000 tons of food would be needed daily to sustain the Germans in the Western sectors, but he thought the Western Powers could feed their zones by extensive [a lot of] import of concentrated foods. (The above information has been disseminated to Mr. Murphy and General Walsh in Berlin and to the Armed Services and State Department in Washington. Its evaluation is: the source is very reliable and the content is possibly true.) R.H. HILLENKOETTER Read Admiral, USN Director of Central Intelligence

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11 Day 138: 10/21/1948 Summary of Berlin Airlift developments MEMORANDUM Stating Mr. Ayers announced the following: The President today authorized General Lucius Clay to draw up to 66 additional C-54 type aircraft for service in connection with the Berlin airlift. On 12/17/48, Stephen F. Leo, Department of the Air Force sent memo to Colonel Landry attaching a revised message approved by the White House and is suggested for a scroll to be prepared by the Air Force for the President s signature by Dec. 20. The message, dated 12/21/48 signed by the President, to the Men and Women of the Berlin Airlift stating this visit to Germany by Vice President-elect Barkley gives him ideal opportunity to express to them his appreciation of their outstanding service. Says the Berlin airlift, under the direction of our Air Force is an achievement of historic and far-reaching significance, by the joint efforts of our Army, Navy, and Air Force together with the forces of Great Britain and France. It expresses the unity of the western nations in the cause of peace. Says OPERATION VITTLES [code name of the Berlin airlift] has assured the world of our faith in our ideals and at this Christmas Season the American people are thinking of them and their loved ones and wished for them a very Merry Christmas.

12 Day 223: 1/24/1949 One day s work during the Berlin Airlift At the airlift s best, one plane landed every 45 seconds at Tempelhof Airport. This rather battered document is a bill showing the amount of

13 material and supplies airlifted to West Berlin. This bill shows that in total tons of goods had been dropped in Berlin with 396 Dakotas (planes) in one day. a Dakota plane The British operation was called Operation Plainfare. With so many aircraft flying so many flights it was a complex and dangerous operation. The relentless [constant] flying also took its toll on the pilots, the aircraft and even the runways. One US air base actually had to have 200 engineers running constant repairs. The Americans moved the most goods because they had more planes and bigger aircraft. They also expanded into one of the British air bases near Munich. The RAF [Royal Air Force- British] tied up most its fleet of transport aircraft in the Berlin Airlift. There were also private contractors hired by the government to help with the operation. Day 341: 5/12/1949 By spring 1949, it was clear that the Soviet blockade of West Berlin had failed. It had not persuaded West Berliners to reject their allies in the West, nor had it prevented [stopped] the creation of a unified West German state [U.S., British, and French zones uniting to create West Germany]. (The Federal Republic of Germany was established in May 1949.) On May 12, 1949, the Soviets lifted the blockade and reopened the roads, canals and railway routes into the western half of the city. The Allies continued the airlift until September, however, because they wanted to stockpile supplies in Berlin just in case the blockade was reinstated [happened again]. Most historians agree that the blockade was a failure in other ways, too. It amped up Cold War tensions and made the USSR look to the rest of the world like a cruel and capricious [bad tempered] enemy. It hastened [hurried] the creation of West Germany, and, by demonstrating that the U.S. and Western European nations had common interests (and a common foe [enemy]), it motivated the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance that still exists today.

14 A note from the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs congratulating the U.S. on their success in the Berlin Airlift.