Executives and councillors: Power gap or different roles? Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Münster, March, 2010

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1 Executives and councillors: Power gap or different roles? Paper to be presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Münster, March, 2010 Dan Ryšavý Department of Sociology and Adult Education Philosophical Faculty Palacky University in Olomouc The Czech Republic Introduction Eastern Europe has completed twenty years of the difficult dual transition to democracy and markets (Centeno 1994). The renewal of local self-government after the fall of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was an expression of democratization, the antithesis of the former centralized state and institutions, which returned control to people over their lives and renewed the communities in which they lived (Campbell, Coulson 2008). After two decades, the local self-governments were able to or at least pressured into representing the interests of their community and providing them with a number of services. Sooner or later this had to lead to a tradeoff or a conflict between the requirements of democracy and its effectiveness (Kerstin and Vetter 2003). The question of effectiveness was not just a financial question (the consolidation of resources, respectively receiving a greater share of the resources), but also a question of the human resources, a lack of expert knowledge, relating to the need of specialization allowing for managing many tasks which the local administration has in both independent and devolved authority (see Guérin, Kerrouche 2008: 180). In conclusion, the beginning of the 1990 s was characterized primarily by a process of democratization. In the new millennium it has been moving more towards a process of professionalization (see Best and Cotta 2000). Among the impulses in studying the reforms of Western-European local governments and their introduction belongs the democratic deficit (the decreasing electoral participation etc.) on the one hand, and/or the criticism of the extensive welfare state, where the local governments provided or acted as an intermediary for services on the other hand. Reactions to these differing starting points must not necessarily always be homogeneous (Wollmann 2003); the differences are furthermore strengthened by the various traditions of local governments. A number of authors nevertheless agree on the fact that it has led to the strengthening of the executive (for example Larsen 2005, Steyvers and others 2008), that the mayors have become the chief executive function. They can more often rely on the legitimacy gained through direct elections, which is one of the clearest European examples of isomorphism (Magnier 2006: 354). This development is however not so unambiguous or one-way, but is path-dependent. For example, from the perspective of the mayors the largest movement of influence went from the councillors to the mayors and to the executive councils. To whom the influence moved depends most upon whether the mayor can be classified as a strong mayor, committee leader or collective leader (according to Mouritzen, Svara 2002; see Denters 2006). The aforementioned trends lead to the fact that the conventional dividing line of layman politician versus professional bureaucrat has moved more or less to the professional politiciansexecutives and members of the representative body. In some countries it has led to a strict and formalized division of the executive and the representative components of the local government. For example, in Poland the directly elected mayor is the only elected member of the executive organ (Swianiewicz 2005). In the Netherlands, the mayor is still named, but after the reform of

2 Aldermen are no longer members of the council, and may even be recruited from outside the council (Denters et al. 2005: 25). At the same time, one of the declared aims of the reforms was not to weaken the role of the municipal council, but to re-invigorate the council s position in local democracy in that the councillors would be more oriented to their representative role and would have more time to devote to their relationship with citizens. (Denters, Klok 2003: 69). The question therefore is whether the transformation of the systems of local governments led only to a quantitative strengthening of influence and power of the executive elements or if it also led to a qualitative difference in the roles and tasks of the executives on the one hand and the representative organs on the other hand. This text will focus attention on such type of local government, in which the local executive and the representative organs overlap in personnel. The center of focus will this time not be the mayors 1, but members of the collective executive organ, which are at the same time elected representatives of their municipalities. The main questions are therefore: Do the executives differ from ordinary councillors; are they different from the perspective of social demographic characteristics and political career? Do they perceive a difference in their influence? Is there a difference in what work the councillors consider to be important? Is the main differentiation characteristic a power gap between ordinary councillors and executives or are these groups aware of their different roles in representative democracy (representation vs. decision making)? Methods and collection of data Various forms of government reform on the local level is one of the key themes of the research of an international team, which from the end of the twentieth century prepared and gradually carried out three research projects. The first concentrated on the chief executive officers (the project UDITE Leadership Study, Klausen, Magnier 1998, Mouritzen, Svara 2002, Dahler- Larsen 2002); in the second mayors of the municipalities were surveyed (Political leaders in European cities, Bäck, Heinelt, Magnier 2006). In the following analysis, data is used from the third research project entitled Municipal Assemblies in European Local Governance ( which supplemented the original triad of local governments with a survey of the members of the local assemblies in towns with more than ten-thousand people. From the countries participating in the MAELG project, there have been selected those in which the members of the executive organs can be identified from the collected data. The national teams had the task of determining the most suitable method for their specification. The team from the Netherlands and Switzerland rejected the identification of the executives among the councillors. A similar division could not be carried out from a number of answers from Germany, Spain and Greece. However, it was possible to divide the executive out with little difficulty in the Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria, Belgium and Israel. Of the six countries which do not yet have the standpoint of the national team, only the data from Norway and France was included for the purposes of this study. The first table classifies the selected countries into three typologies of the local administration closely connected with the aforementioned projects. There is further presented positive answers to four questions, which could in a wider sense serve to differentiate the answers of the executives from the answers of the other councillors 2. 1 The divided opinion of the international team of MAELG was indicated in whether in the individual countries the mayors could or should not participate in the survey with the councillors. 2 Do you presently hold any of the following elective or executive offices? - Member of board of council-owned joint stock company or foundation (v205); Member of the executive board (v208); President of the council (v209); Delegate of the mayor (v210). 2

3 Table 1: Number of answers, response rate; shares of four elective/executive offices and categorization in seven chosen countries Response Answer: Yes, today Typologies of local government Country N rate joint stock board president delegate Hesse Sharpe Mouritzen Svara Heinelt Hlepas Czech ,0% 29,0% Republic - 9,1% CEE Collective Collegial Sweden ,0% 40,7% 3,8% NME Committee Collegial 40? Councilmanager 36,5% 33,1% 2,7% 3,0% NME Norway 1134 Austria ? 12,4% 31,9% 6,4% 8,9% NME Strong Political Belgium ,1% 22,6% 3,7% 4,8% Franco Collective Collegial France ,6% 37,3% - 26,9% Franco Strong Political Israel ,5% 37,4% 0,7% 2,2% CEE Strong Executive The classification according to typologies comes from either the referenced sources (primarily Heinelt, Hlepas 2006) or was undertaken by the national team. Hesse/Sharpe: CEE Central East European (+ Israel); NME North and Model European. Mouritzen/Svara: Collegial Leader, Committee Leader, Strong Mayor; Heinelt/Hlepas: Collegial Leader, Political Mayor, Executive Mayor. The four questions mentioned offer an various and relatively wide specification of who could be included among the local executives. In comparing the positive responses of the answers in the selected countries, the most suitable tool for differentiating the executives from the ordinary councillors can be seen to be their membership in the executive council (v0208). Despite the fact that there were included only seven countries, it includes most of the variants of the three typologies of the local government. It is an internally highly differentiated collection of data. Therefore, in the analytical output there will primarily be studied the differences between the executives and the ordinary councillors in the individual countries, which may but do not necessarily reflect the generally valid relationships. The original proposal of the international project counted on the distribution of the questionnaire by post with appropriate supplements in the form of an internet survey and was aware of the risk of a low rate of return. The proposed selection procedure counted in the first step on a collection of data in municipalities with more than ten-thousand inhabitants and later a questionnaire of all of the councillors in the selected municipalities in such a manner so the national sample included approximately 2,000 respondents. The actual procedure was far from as unified and the success of the research work differed significantly among countries. The teams from the countries of Southern and Central Europe and Great Britain informed in a group workshop in June of 2008 that their rate of return varied from around 10 to 25 %, while some expected an increase in these numbers after repeated contact with the respondents. The response rate in Switzerland, in the Netherlands, and in Norway was around 40 %, while more than 60 % of the questionnaires were answered by only the Swedish colleagues. The relatively high level of success of the four mentioned countries offered a tempting interpretation. The low rate of return was not the fault of the researchers but rather the relevant politicians. In other words, the criteria of empirical investigation (for example response rate) does not reflect the quality of work of the research carried out, but rather the characteristic features of the Southern European and Northern European types of local governments (Page, Goldsmith 1987, adapted in Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). This tempting and thematic interpretation cannot replace a critical view of the research process. The national teams therefore should have along with the collected data also given the coordinators information about the progress of the research and assumed quality of this data. With 3

4 certain exceptions there was no notification of fundamental problems with the level of representation 3. However, a number of teams did not have suitable tools for the preparation of a representative sample and following this to control the structure of the answers. The low response ate does not necessarily lead to an unrepresentative sample. Nevertheless, it is wise to be careful and especially in the case of tests founded on statistical significance. Socially demographic characteristics of the councillors and executives Social biased composition of (not only) local political elites is a very well- known and studied issue. Another focus of examination is the political relevance of different characteristics. The representatives social class, ethnic or racial background, age, and place of residence have all been considered by analysts and political actors as politically relevant social characteristics which affect descriptive representation. The social characteristics deemed politically relevant have no a priori standing, however, and in fact have changed considerably over time and from place to place. (Peterson 1970: 492). At the current time, the most discussed themes, conflict, and also suggestions for reform are the low level of representation of women in the decision-making bodies. At the same time, a number of authors both on the theoretical and the empirical level reject descriptive representation and the demands of the reformers associated with it as irrelevant (see for example Pitkin 1967, Rao 1998). Compared to the repeated mantra of the masculine character of politics, the representation of women in the executive of three of the countries analyzed are close to the proportional representation of women in the electorate. In addition to the gender progressive Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway), there can be seen the results of the introduction of quotas in the candidate lists in France, which concerns among others, the local elections in municipalities with more that 3.5 thousand inhabitants (see Hoffman-Martinot 2003). The opposite extreme is represented in the Middle-East by Israel with the lowest level of representation of women both among the councillors but also the executive; and the post-communist Czech Republic which is characterized by the biggest difference in the representation of women among the ordinary councillors and the executive. Among the various barriers preventing women from greater access to the position of decision makers (Inglehart, Norris 2003), institutional barriers play the greatest role in the case of the Czech Republic. Barriers in nominating, which were shown on the Parliamentary level by Saxonberg (2003), can be seen on the local level. It concerns both the female members of political parties, but also the low number of independent female councillors as candidates for political parties. An additional fact is that Czech female councillors are less often members of political parties. It seems that if the political parties do not take matters into their own hands then the representation of women in local executive stay rather lower. From the perspective of political career and political socialization, it can be expected that the members of the executive will be, on average, older than the ordinary councillors. In a majority of the countries selected this is indeed the case, yet even the greatest difference in average is usually not more than one election cycle. For the Czech exception where the ordinary councillors are older than the executive there is a simple explanation. Members of the Communist Party rarely become members of the executive in cities above 10 thousand inhabitants, and they are on average the oldest councillors in Czech cities and municipalities. In a number of municipalities, only this party remains in opposition, that is, outside of the coalition which elects and supports the executive board and the mayor. When the Communists gain a share in executive power, it usually occurs in peripheral areas or in structurally depressed regions. 3 An example of a significant variation is the almost zero representation of the Arab councillors in the collected data from Israel. The paper will further discuss the over-representation of university educated councillors in Israel too. 4

5 Much has been said about the complexity of tasks of the modern local administration. Usually this occurs in connection with professionalization, not with the simple question of education. The over-representation of councillors or executives with higher education was already repeatedly indicated, but does not belong among the subjects of criticism of supporters of descriptive representation or politics of presence (Phillips 1995). Similar to the mayors (see Steyvers, Reynaert 2006), the educational structure of the councillors in the countries compared is relatively diversified. The high level of tertiary educated individuals in France and Belgium, or in the Czech Republic is similar to the mayors, similar to the relatively low value in the countries of Central and Northern Europe (Austria, Sweden) according to the division of Hesse/Sharpe. Norway, from this perspective, to a certain extent goes beyond this. For the Israeli representatives, a university diploma is almost a necessary condition or such a high percentage is probably skewed because lowly educated councilors are far less likely to answer the long questionnaire by themselves (Razin 2009). The differences inside the individual countries do not surpass ten percent and only in the case of Norway and Belgium are they statistically significant. Employment together with class membership belongs among the longest monitored characteristics (not only) in the local representation. Together with age and also the representation of women, these have become the focus of attention for the debate on (the declining) quality of the councillors. J. L. Sharpe addressed a half-century ago the question of why retired or housewife status should be considered a possible disability for membership of a council (1962: 203). Councillors of the 21st century were asked about their employment before entering the councillor career and at the present time. Of the thirteen offered variations the table includes the three most stated. To this belongs the pairing of clerk and civil servants, and further teacher and liberal profession and engineer (technician) and business manager. 4 National specifics are represented by the high representation of laborers in Sweden and shopkeepers in Austria. In the case of current employment, there is significant representation for retired, (especially in France) and in the case of the executives in five countries also professional politicians (extremely high 29 % in the Czech Republic). Judging the differences between the councillors and the executives in the individual countries is not completely without difficulty. One of the possibilities is to use the ration of agreements and disagreements of the most often stated employment and the order in which they were achieved. For occupation in the beginning of councillor career there can be found only minimal differences in Norway and in Austria, where both groups agree on three types of employment, also according to its order. The highest differential from this perspective can be found in the councillors and executives from the Czech Republic, France and Israel. It is also interesting to compare this with current employment. The Norwegian and Austrian councillors and executives differ in their current employment much more than at the starting point of their careers. On the other hand a similar current employment position can be found in France and Israel. The councillors and executives of the Czech Republic remain relatively different. In both groups we find teachers and businessmen, but in a different order. 4 In employment before the aggregate percentage of the first three types of employment varies from 37 % (councillors in France) to 58 % (executives in Israel). In the current employment the three most numbered occupational positions accounted for 40 % (councillors in Austria) to 57 % (executives in the Czech Republic). 5

6 Table 2: The social background of councillors and executives in seven countries (rounded % and mean age) 5 Czech Rep. Sweden Norway Austria Belgium France Israel Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Women < > Mean age 52,3 50,3 54,0 54,4 49,9 50,5 48,3 52,4 49,1 51,9 52,2 55,7 52,3 53,8 University educ , st before Teach 17 teach 21 lab 24 lab 19 Civs 19 civs 25 civs + Civs 28 Clerk 25 clerk22 clerk18 teach 18 man 16 man 29 2 nd before Clerk eng 17 civs 16 Civs 15 Man 13 man 14 shopk shopk civs 15 teach 20 eng 10* clerk civs 16 15* * lib + 3 rd before lib 14* man 14* lib 8 Teach 10 teach 12 teach 12 clerk 14 Clerk 11 Teach civs 13 man 9* eng 11* eng 13* farm st present Busin 15 profi 29 retir 20 Profi 17 Civs 17 civs 21 civs 14 Civs 21 retir 19 profi 20 retir 29 retir 32 man 17* man 18 2 nd present Teach 14busin 16 lab 15 Retir 13 Retir 15 man 13* clerk + Clerk 12 Clerk 18 clerk 17 civs 14 civs 12 retir 14* lib 15 3 rd present lib 13 teach 12 civs 10* Civs 12 Man 12 profi shopk profi civs 15 retir 12 clerk 13 teach 11 lib 13* farm/ 11* 13 /retir 10 retir 13 Local roots Political family Notes: Occupation before: To which occupational category did you belong before your first mandate as a councillor? Occupation present: And to which occupational category do you belong today? 1 st before: The most numerous occupational category before first mandate as a councillor. Abbreviations: teacher labourer, civil servant, clerk, business manager (man), engineer, shopkeeper, liberal profession, farmer/fisher; professional politician, retired; (businessman CZ only); * This cells can be influenced by high % of others. Local roots they have been born or spent their childhood (up to 18 years) in the town they represent. The political family - any close relatives were elected for a political function in the two last generations. Age Occupation 5 Compare this table with table 1 of Steyvers, Reynaert (2006: 50) for mayors. 6

7 Large differences between countries were found in the question of local roots. More than ¾ of the councillors in Austria and less than 1/3 in France were born in or by the age of 18 moved to the city in which they are representing. The difference of the councillors and the executives do not exceed the margin of statistical error. Similar to this is the case of the political families, that is, the percentages of close relatives elected for a political function in the last two generations. Norway is an extreme case, where more than ½ of the councillors have this work as a family tradition and only 1/10 are of a similar situation in Israel. The personal biography and history of the country can jointly affect the decision to enter the path to local politics. The following table summarized various tests of the significance of the differences between the councillors and the executives. 6 The most significant difference between the councillors on the one hand and the executives on the other were found in Belgium and the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic the greatest difference that stands out is the type of profession 7. It is also the only one of the countries monitored with a significantly smaller percentage of women in the executive, where the members are moreover significantly younger than the ordinary councillors. The lowest difference can be seen in Sweden, Israel, and Austria. In the last case, this was with a significant exception of age. Table 3: The social background - significant differences (adjusted residual, bivariate relations, (non)parametric mean tests, rough test of agreements) Czech Republic Swede n Norwa y Austria Belgium France Israel N of sig. differences Women (+) 2 Mean age University educ Local roots (+) 0 Political family 0 Occupation before (5) present (7) N of differences Notes: Signs of significant differences: +++ = approx. level p < 0,001 (or adjusted residual > 4); ++ = p < 0,01 (asresid > 3); + = p < 0,05 (asresid > 2); (+) = close to p = 0,05. Direction of differences: +/- = higher/lower than null hypothesis expected for executives. Rate of occupational agreement: 6 = maximal agreement in the categories and order of first three occupations = no difference; 0 = maximal difference, six different occupation. 6 As was mentioned above, when interpreting the data it is necessary to take into account that the collected data cannot be carried out in a manner to exactly control the level of representation. E.g. the relatively small collection of data from Israel hinders the identification of statistically significant differences. 7 A certain influence could have a version of the Czech questionnaire. There was offered two more categories (private businessman and unemployed) in occupational questions. 7

8 The political career characteristics of councillors and executives This study among other things will address the question of whether the differences between the councillors and the executives can be conceived primarily as quantitative (more influence, power, esteem ) or qualitative (differing roles, focus). It is however logical to assume that the usual path to the executive is preceded by a shorter or longer councillor career. In other words, one can expect on average longer seniority in the executive than among ordinary councillors. This is valid more or less in all the countries with the exception of France. The unusual nature of the French situation can be explained as a side effect of the introduction of the quotas for the candidates, which either moved out a number of existing councillors or did not allow younger men with shorter careers to enter. Among the ordinary councillors remain more often men with longer careers. In the period when the research was carried out the male councillors had 15 years of experience in their political path. Among female councillors this was only a four-year career. The differences in the executive were not so significant. The career of the men was on average 10 years, while for the women it was three years less. In aggregate this led to a shorter length of the councillor path to membership in the French municipal councils. The percentage of party members among the councillors and the executive has a similar character, which was referred to by Fallend, Ignits and Swianiewicz (2006) in the case of the mayors. In addition to the countries with almost 100 % participation of party members, those which had between ½ and ¾ percent of party members also were selected. The percentage of Czech and French party members among councillors is ten percent lower that in the case of mayors of the given countries. More significant differences not only between the individual countries, but also between the councillors and the executive is shown in how large a part of the representatives career in the council is connected with a higher party career, whether on the local or a higher level. Party and councillor careers are evidently divided in France. Theoreticians of democracy often perceive it to be problematic when a large part of the representatives do not want to defend their mandate in the following elections. A number of concepts assume that the politicians adapt their behaviour to the fact that they want to be reelected and with this assumption they also adapt their behaviour to the citizens. Aars and Offerdal (1998) offered a different and original explanation for the high level of resignation to continue their local political careers and on the basis of the comparison of the local representation in Norway and Finland. They do not perceive the high rate of refusal to be a candidate again in the Norwegian municipal elections as a danger to democracy. The rotation of the elected positions can lead to a diffusion of political competence, which puts the local political elite under a stronger control of the citizens. Opinions about what the local councillors would do after their mandate ended was dealt with by Offerdal and his colleagues in the framework of the study of the early stages of renewing the local municipalities in the post-communist countries of Central Europe (see Offerdal and others 1996). The questions posed to the councillors emerged from three types of ambitions (discrete, static and progressive), as was differentiated by Schlesinger (1966). As compared to the questions as a part of the project POLLLEADER the respondents could moreover choose between one of two possibilities of a progressive career: I would like to continue my political career in a higher political office at the local level or I would like to continue at the regional or national level. The form of such a progression to a higher position varies from country to country. This is also why the results of the research differ among the councillors from that of the mayor as was described by Kjaer (2006). What is more significant for this study is that in a 8

9 Table 4: The political career characteristics of councillors and executives in seven countries (rounded % and mean seniority) Czech Rep. Sweden Norway Austria Belgium France Israel Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Mean seniority 7,6 8,1 9,3 11,4 6,7 9,4 8,5 13,0 8,5 14,5 9,7 8,5 5,8 7,2 Political party Local level Upper level Party position Ambitions Static Local progress , High progress , Regressive Table 5: Political career - significant differences (adjusted residual, (non)parametric mean tests) Czech Republic Sweden Norway Austria Belgium France Israel N of sig. diff. Mean seniority Political party + (+) 1 Local (+) * 4 Party position level Upper level * ++ 4 Static Local progress (-) - 3 High progress Regressive - 1 N of sig. diff * = cells with asresid > 2 combined categories executives and Yes, previously in case of party position. Ambitions 9

10 number of countries there were identified significant difference between the councillors and members of the executive. The countries differ more significantly from the standpoint of the political career of the councillors and the executive than they do from the standpoint of socio-demographic features. Six of the eight differences were significant in Norway, and five were significant in Belgium and the Czech Republic. Not one of the significant differences (certainly because of the size of the sample too) was found in Israel. The French councillors differed only from the executives due to their lower ambition to advance to a higher post in local politics. Executives in a number of countries more often hold a leadership position in their parties, whether on the local or national level. This is most valid in Scandinavia. From the data collected in MAELG, it is not evident whether the party career precedes or follows the accession to the executive position. It, however, appears that where the executive position are held by long-term councillors (Scandinavia, Austria, Belgium), the newcomers have a chance to advance if they are persistent and gain experience. Conclusion I The two graphs summarize the number of significant differences in both dimensions. In case of every item there were usually more differences between countries than within countries (councillors vs. executives). Pair of similar countries form one point of view looks very different from other point of view. However, the placement of the countries according to sums of differences shows the connection with the typology of the Mouritzen, Svara (2002). That is, the typology focusing on the horizontal power relations at the local level between the council, the mayor and the administrative executive (Heinelt, Hlepas 2006: 30). In the lower left quarter, with the lower values in both dimensions, three countries can be seen with similarities to the ideal type of strong mayor. In the opposite quarter, there can be seen two countries with the collective type of local government (the Czech Republic and Belgium in the identical position). Norway, which according to Mouritzen, Svara (2002) is most similar to the type of council-manager, and Sweden with committee leader form represent border types. Figure 1: Placement of seven countries according to number of differences between councillors and executives Political career differences Swe Aus Isr Nor F Cze Bel Political career differences Swe Isr Aus F Nor Cze Bel Social background differences Social background differences 10

11 Among the strong mayor types the elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is legally and in actuality in full charge of all executive functions (Mouritzen, Svara 2002: 55). This is one more reason why the members of the executive do not differ too much from the ordinary councillors. Just the opposite is true for the Norwegian municipalities where features from all the forms of government other than the strong-mayor form are present The council can decide to delegate authority over specific matters to the executive council. In this respect Norway s government is similar to the collective form. (Mouritzen, Svara 2002: 65, 66) In the case of the committee-leader for (Sweden), one person is clearly the political leader but executive powers are shared (Mouritzen, Svara 2002: 56). The distance between collective local governments (the Czech Republic and Belgium) and Sweden on social background dimension can be explained by the size and character of executive body/bodies. There is a single and usually smaller collegiate body on the one hand and a multiplicity of committees on the other hand. See the percentage of executives in the data of MAELG: Belgium 23 %, the Czech Republic 29 %, compared to 41 % in Sweden. To sum up, reasons for partial country dissimilarities are particular but magnitude of dissimilarities in the whole are explicable with help of the horizontal power relations typology. Power gap and/or different goals and orientation? From the time of the famous conflict between the studies of Hunter (1953) and Dahl (1961), much attention has been devoted to the possibilities and limits of the various methods mapping the division of power and the influence in the community. In the simple version of the reputation method belongs the question in which the individual respondent must judge the level of influence of a certain individual, group of people, organs, organizations etc. In the research for MAELG, the respondents among other things evaluated the influence of the executive board, single councillors and Myself. The influence of the entire municipal assembly was not evaluated. As was stated in the introduction, the difference in influence can but does not necessarily unite with the orientation of other aims and interest groups. As a reminder, one of the explicitly formulated aims of the reforms of the local government in the Netherlands was not the weakening of the role of the municipal council, but a movement of its attention towards its representative role and oriented towards the people. Can signs of such an orientation be found in the countries examined? The simplest indicator is the percentage of time spent in public debates, meeting with citizens, etc. In a majority of countries, on average a much higher influence was assigned to the executive board than to the individual councillors. In countries with a strong mayor (France, Austria, and Israel) a lower evaluation was given. The executives of these countries themselves stated that the influence of this collective organ is approximately the same as their own, individual influence. In other cases the executive board was evaluated with a relatively high influence, whereas the average evaluation of the influence of individuals ranged from the evaluation of little influence and some influence. Understandably, members of the executive attributed higher influence to themselves that do the ordinary councillors. 11

12 Table 6: Influence and time for citizen (means, hours, percentage) Czech Rep. Sweden Norway Austria Belgium France Israel Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Coun. Exec. Influenc Board 3,4 3,4 3,3 3,1 3,0 3,1 2,4 2,3 3,4 3,5 2,2 2,3 2,4 2,1 e Single c. 1,7 2,0 1,4 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,8 2,0 1,4 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,2 1,3 Myself 1,5 2,3 1,5 2,1 1,8 2,2 1,6 2,2 1,3 2,7 1,5 2,4 1,4 1,9 Average hours/month Citizen time (%) No citizen time (%) Influence: Averages on ordinal scale 0 (no influence) to 4 (very high influence) executive board, single councillors, Myself. Average hours per month: Sum of seven items in question: How much time do you spend in the following activities? Citizen time: Percentage of overall time devoted to public debates, meetings with citizens etc. No citizen time: Percentage of non-answering on items public debates Table 7: Influence, time and goals - significant differences (parametric or nonparametric mean tests) Czech Republic Sweden Norway Austria Belgium France Israel Sum of sig. differences Mean Board influence Single c Myself Average hours/month G Defining o Representing + 1 a Publicizing l Reinforcing s Promoting (+) - (+) 1 minor Notes: Goals: In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you as a councillor: Defining the main goals of the municipal activity; Representing the requests and issues emerging from the local society; Publicising the debate on local issues before decisions are taken; Reinforcing the executive; Promoting the views and interests of minorities in the local society. Tests of means calculated on ordinal answering scale from none to very great. 12

13 The strengthening of the executive goes hand in hand with the growing professionalization (Quérin, Kerrouche 2008). One of the results is a diametrical difference in time possibilities of the councillors on the one hand and the executives on the other hand. It is not suitable to overestimate the precision of the declared number of hours spent each month with various activities including council and committee meetings, party activities, meetings with administration employees, visits to city facilities and meetings with citizens. 8 The difference, however, between the total time the councillors and the executives spent is despite these reservations unambiguous. More significant is the knowledge that the percentage of time devoted to public debates, meeting with citizens etc. does not differ practically between the councillors and the executive. It therefore does not appear that the ordinary councillors, with the strengthening of the executive, spent relatively more time in their representative role and in contact with the citizens. A similar conclusion can be reached from other questions regarding attitudes. In none of the countries examined do the councillors attribute a more important role to representing the requests and issues before decisions are taken. Only councillors in Belgium and in Israel in comparison with the attitudes of the local executives consider other tasks as more important, publicizing the debate on local issues before decisions are taken. In Sweden and in Norway this was however the opposite. Again in Belgium, there was identified a significant difference in the answers of the councillors and the executives in the case of promoting the views and interests of minorities in the local society. Executives in comparison to the councillors in five of the seven countries assigned a significantly higher importance to the task of defining the main goals of the municipal activity and in four of the countries to the task of reinforcing the executive. Conclusion II Quérin and Kerrouche wroted: A gap can now often be perceived between ordinary local government councillors and those who have been assigned a specific responsibility: generally speaking, deputy mayors and executive officers and, of course, mayors (2008: 183). This statement can be supported by MAELG data from seven countries where the executives and the assembly members overlap in personnel. In all these countries the executives have assigned themselves significantly higher influence than ordinary councillors has done it. However, in average there were councillors with little influence on one hand and individual executives with some influence. Time spent in council work is key indicator of professionalisation in local government and the differences from one post to another especially between that of simple town councillor and bourgemestre is more a result of a difference in nature than of degree (Quérin, Kerrouche 2008: 193-4). There have been indicated very significant differences of total time spent between councillors and executives in all countries, but Israel. Only these two variables (influence of Myself and total time) from more than twenty included into three tables showed so obvious division between councillors and executives. The question arises: Do differences in influence and time mean that councillors and executives are groups of different people? 9 Answer on this question is more complicated. However, Mouritzen, Svara typology can be helpful here. 8 This is why in the total of time spent there was left off the entry other important activities as councillor, which showed the greatest standard deviations and the highest numbers of answers not completed. 9 See e.g. another statement Quérin and Kerrouche (2008: 192) linked with time: the increasing difficulty of juggling this activity [exercise of office] with an ordinary job has thus had an impact on the type of person standing for election to local government. 13

14 In countries with strong mayor type (France, Austria) there were found rather small differences between these two groups of local politicians. The influence of executive board as a group formed from these similar people hasn t been evaluated much more higher than impact of every single executive. In case of countries with collective type (the Czech Republic, Belgium) councillors and executives are much more different from the social background point of view and political career characteristics. The influence of executive board formed from these non-ordinary dissimilar people has been evaluated much more higher than impact of every single executive. Executives from countries of this type (Belgium, the Czech Republic) and from the closest relative (Norway) have paid much more importance to goal reinforcing of executive. Not the qualities of individual but collectiveness seem to be source of influence. And what about councillors, are they opened to stress representational role? Shortly speaking, lack of time was found but no special importance dedicated to citizens. Some of the councillors can choose role of store of next cadres. Intra-party career can help them in effort to gain executive position in future. Somewhere pulling vacancies can appeared when present executives fulfil their ambitions to move on higher position without trying to cumul des mandates. Another part of councillors will resign because of lack of influence. Finally, sometimes new system arrangement (e.g. direct election of mayor, entering quota system etc.) can quickly change individual political careers and put an old question again: What about power gap? Literature: Aars, Jacob, Audun Offerdal Local Political Recruitment in Crisis? A Comparison of Finland and Norway. Scandinavian Political Studies 21(3): Berg, Rikke, Nirmala Rao Institutional Reforms in Local Government. Pp in Berg, Rikke, Nirmala Rao. Transforming Local Political Leadership. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Centeno, Miguel Angel Between rocky democracies and hard markets: Dilemmas of the double transition. Annual Review of Sociology 20: Bäck, Henry, Hubert Heinelt, Annick Magnier (eds.) The European Mayor. Political Leaders in the Changing Context of Local Democracy. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Best, Heinrich; Cotta, Maurizio Parliamentary Representatives in Europe Oxford: Oxford University Press. Campbell, Adrien; Coulson, Andrew Into the Mainstream: Local Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Pp in Coulson, Andrew; Campbell, Adrian (eds.). Local Government in Central and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. Dahl, Robert A Who Governs? New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Dahler-Larsen, Peter (ed.) Social Bonds to City Hall. Odense: Odense University Press. Denters, Bas Duo or Duel? The Relations between Mayors and Councils in Democratic Local Government. Pp in Bäck, H. et al. (eds.). Denters, Bas; Pieter-Jan Klok A new role for municipal councils in Dutch local democracy? Pp in Kersting, Vetter (eds.). Denter, Bas; Klok Pieter-Jan; van der Kolk, Henk The Reform of the Political Executive in Dutch Local Government. Pp in Berg, R., Rao, N. (eds.). Transforming Local Political Leadership. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Denters, Bas; Rose, Lawrence E. (eds.) Comparing Local Governance. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 14

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16 Transformation. Local Government Studies 34(2): Swianiewicz, Pawel Poland: a time of transition. Pp in Denters, B., Rose, L.E. (eds.). Wollmann, Hellmut German local government under the double impact of democratic and administrative reforms. Pp in Kersting, Norbert, Angelika, Vetter (eds.). Reforming Local Government in Europe. Opladen, Leske+Budrich. 16