Annex 2: Egypt Case Study. Danida Evaluation of Programmatic Approaches to Support for the Environment in Africa

Transcription

1 Annex 2: Egypt Case Study Danida Evaluation of Programmatic Approaches to Support for the Environment in Africa August 2010

2 Table of Contents Executive Summary i 1. Introduction 1 2. Context 1 The Environment Sector and Policies in Egypt 1 Danida s sector programmatic framework for the original ESP 2 Danish-Egyptian environmental cooperation 3 The Danida programmatic framework for the adjusted ESP (2005) 4 3. Findings Relevance 5 M&E Design Efficiency Effectiveness 12 Quality of Evidence 12 Support to Decentralised Environmental Management 13 Achieving Compliance in Industry 14 Programme Management Unit Capacity Development 15 The Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) Impact 18 Poverty Alleviation. 18 Gender 19 Environment Sustainability Coherence Coordination Complementarity 22 Joint donor fora 22 Other donor interventions Workshop Results 23 Workshop Questionnaire Conclusions Lessons Learned 28 Sub-Annex 1. List of Stakeholders Met 32 Sub-Annex 2. Timeline 35 Sub-Annex 3. Egypt Logic Model And Indicators 38 Short 38 Medium 38 Long 38 Sub-Annex 4. Workshop report 41 Sub-Annex 5. Workshop Questionnaire Results 56 i i

3 Abbreviations ACI CDBA CEM CEO DAG-ENV DEM DKK ECO EEAA EIMP EMU EPAP EPF EREMIS ESP FEI GEAP GoE GPM LE M&E MSEA NBE NEAP PCR PEMA PSU RBO SEAM SDEM SMEs SOE SPS Achieving Compliance in Industry Central Department for Branch Affairs Communication for Environmental Management Chief Executive Officer Donor Assistance Working Group on Environment Decentralised Environmental Management Danish Kroner Environmental Compliance Office Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency Environmental Information and Monitoring Programme Environmental Management Unit Environment Pollution Abatement Project Environmental Protection Fund Egyptian Regional Environmental Management Information System Environmental Sector Programme Federation of Egyptian Industries Governorate Environmental Action Plan Government of Egypt Guidelines for Programme Management Egyptian Pounds Monitoring and Evaluation Minister of State for Environmental Affairs National Bank of Egypt National Environmental Action Plan Project Completion Report Program Evaluation and Macro-economic Analysis Programme Support Unit Regional Branch Office Support to Environmental Assessment and Management Support for Decentralised Environment Management Small and Medium Enterprises State of Environment Sector Programme Support i i

4 Map showing location of Regional Branch Offices Source: ESP at a Glance, Danida s Environmental Sector Programme , p.13 i v

5 Executive Summary S1. This evaluation of Danida s environmental support in Egypt constitutes the first of three country studies that form part of a wider evaluation into the experience of introducing programmatic approaches into Danida s support for the environment in Africa since The Environmental Sector Programme in Egypt (ESP) provides a valuable example of the relatively early introduction of a programme approach by Danida in the environmental sector. It was originally designed at a stage when the definition of programmatic approaches made no reference to Paris or other aid effectiveness principles and before Danida had decentralised its operations. It incorporated legacy projects that were not easily linked to a programme approach and underwent a major redesign to achieve a more streamlined approach. The objective of this evaluation is to distil lessons in order to understand the benefits and disadvantages of employing programmatic approaches in support of the environment. S2. The evaluation is based on an extensive literature review, interviews with key stakeholders carried out in November 2009 and the results of a workshop on January 14 th 2010 in Cairo. The evaluation framework was structured around the Danida s Guidelines for Sector Programme Support (SPS) 1 and are based on the following criteria: Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability, Coherence, Coordination and Complementarity. Compared to the project approach, SPS emphasizes a longer time frame for broader based Danish assistance to a national endeavour in a sector. This in effect means that assistance would be extended to the national policy and strategy level as well as to the programme implementation level..this represents a significant shift of emphasis in Danida s strategy compared to the traditional way of defining projects. The project approach focuses on short and medium term results and pays less attention to comprehensive and sector-wide policy development and institutional, organizational and financial management issues (the process and sustainability factors). SPS strategy emphasizes the processes necessary to achieve sustainable results and impacts 2. S3. The ESP in Egypt saw several iterations. In 1999 Danish- supported environmental projects operating throughout the 90 s were brought under a single programme umbrella that was launched in After a high-level consultation in 2003 and the Second Joint Sector Review in 2004, the ESP focused on three of its original seven project components. These were: the Programme Management Unit (PMU), Support for Decentralized Environment Management (SDEM) and Achieving Compliance in Industry (ACI). S4. The study found that the ESP was timely and relevant as it addressed the real needs of the both the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) and the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA) as well as that of Egyptian industry. In relation to EEAA and MSEA, ESP was effectively focused within these administrative entities, but there was little attention on building stronger linkages and harmonization either with other national entities in other sectors or with multi-donor coordination and cooperation. In terms of the industry, ESP was in line with growing trade and export requirements to comply with an equally growing trend internationally and, in particular, in Europe to maintain increasingly strict environmental standards in production. 1 Guidelines for Sector Programme Support, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Guidelines for Danida Sector Programme Support (SPS). i

6 S5. Implementation of ESP is judged as efficient in its use of a mix of complementary inputs and modalities, and in balancing public and private sector support. It strengthened work planning, communication and awareness raising activities on the one hand while also providing equipment and training on the other. In terms of using national procedures for programme implementation, the ESP strengthened EEAA s role in introducing legislation and overseeing Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), but attempts to use the existing set-up within the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) only succeeded to a limited extent. Likewise, limited synergy seems to have been generated between ESP Components. S6. Effective implementation of ESP is documented mainly around better services resulting from (i) raised capacity and improved legislative framework; (ii) various discrete environmental benefits from localized government, private sector and community investments; (iii) raised awareness from communication activities; and (iv) raised private sector consultancy capacity for advising industry on cleaner production and energy efficiency. ESP showed some concrete and immediate results, through co-funding of 86 community and demonstration projects, particularly in the area of waste management, while at the same time maintaining a coherent focus on strengthening and building up institutional structures and awareness. Under the ACI, 440 enterprises received assistance, 44 Small and Medium Enterprises from five sectors received support from the revolving fund, 93 enterprises implemented Environmental Management Systems and 2,740 companies participated in awareness activities. Under the PMU, 119 educational campaigns for children reached some 39,000 children across 24 governorates. Three State of Environment Reports (2005, 2006, 2007) has been supported though quality is affected by uneven data. S7. There is some evidence that the increased use of national systems, including local management arrangements, has helped improve the implementation of environmental programmes, compared with parallel management arrangements. As the EEAA capacity has grown, it has been able to take on a wider range of responsibility and build on the areas supported through ESP such as in information management, communications, reporting, inspections and EIAs. S8. Measurement of impact for ESP was marred by weak M&E data capture and reporting. Poverty, while a driving consideration for some activities, was weakly and only indirectly pursued as a strategy. Both poverty and gender impacts, which are mission goals of Danida-supported programmes, were not subjects of focus for the evaluation efforts carried out, even though reviews called for greater attention to the assessment of gender. Environmental impacts measured at the local level for ACI-supported projects could not be verified nor was there strong evidence of replicability of this programme component. S9. Sustainability of the ESP interventions was witnessed in the continued operation of ESP supported activities using local funds and personnel as well as supporting institutional changes. There were, however, some structural concerns impeding sustainability of the ESP supported initiatives. High staff turnover, limitations on recruitment of qualified staff and lack of continuous training constituted a serious risk for sustaining and upgrading of key capacities within certain areas of the decentralized environmental management system. Financial and administrative limitations have held back the mobilization of the EPF in support of the implementation and updating of Governorate Environmental Action Plans (GEAPs). Finally, the private sector revolving fund, managed through the ECO office, has not achieved traction through increased ii

7 investments or replicability to support greater environmental compliance of medium and small industrial operations. S10. ESP management was not shared with other donors but the ESP management staff met with e.g. World Bank and the EC on several occasions in order to coordinate activities. This contributed to some level of information sharing and avoidance of duplication of activities. S11. Some coherence and complimentarity was achieved by ESP following on from approaches developed under the Support to Environmental Assessment and Management (SEAM) project (funded by the United Kingdom), in terms of approaches to developing GEAPs and capacity building at governorate level. In addition, the ESP linked with the work on environmental information monitoring supported by Canada (under the Egyptian Environment Information System). S12. Overall ESP represented a transition from a classic project approach to a limited programmatic approach. The ESP successfully demonstrated how to bring together a number of ongoing projects into a single programme frame. It encouraged the integration of policy level work with capacity building at central, regional and local levels while, on the other hand, linking public sector interventions at national and local level with support for private sector initiatives. S13. The ESP has demonstrated positively the importance of introducing a mixed package of complementary inputs and modalities as part of the programme approach. A number of programme activities have reinforced each other and contributed to greater programme efficiency. S14. The decision to place the ECO office within a private industrial organisation instead of within a governmental institution (EEAA) turned out to be strategically right. In this way it became easier to establish trustworthy relations with private companies and to convince them that investments in environmentally friendly technology would be also economically beneficial. S15. Though the efficiency of disbursement has been high, the question of whether it made sense to invest DKK 367 million over eight years in supporting the evolution of a sector programme, before then closing support and exiting, can be questioned. In relation to sustainability and impact, the ESP would likely have been more effective if it had had a longer timeframe, broader stakeholder scope, better harmonizing with other (similar/parallel) donor interventions, and better integration between programme components. Although these issues would all have contributed towards a more complex programme intervention, this is a challenge that needs to be faced when preparing environmental programming. S16. The evaluation identifies 10 lessons of relevance to those considering introducing a more programmatic approach to their support to the environment: 1. Where a sector faces declining donor support, the appetite for strong coordination and for joint investment in programmatic or sector-wide approaches is likely to be weak. 2. A programme approach can through bringing together a number of ongoing projects into a single programme frame, help integrate policy level work with capacity building at central, regional and local levels, and link public sector interventions with support for private sector initiatives. 3. A programmatic approach may be more effective if it has a longer timeframe, broader stakeholder scope, better harmonization with other (similar/parallel) donor iii

8 interventions, and stronger generation of synergies between its components. Although these issues bring greater complexity, this is a challenge that needs to be faced when preparing environmental programming. 4. The ESP has demonstrated positively the importance of introducing a mixed package of complementary inputs and modalities as part of the programme approach. A number of the various programme activities have reinforced each other and contributed to greater programme efficiency. 5. When working with complex, centralised and hierarchical governmental structures, it is important to carefully identify, analyse and assess the scope and limitations provided by external factors (political power, budget allocations, staffing, legalisation and regulations etc.) in relation to expected programme achievements. The influence from such external factors on programme impact and sustainability can be significant. 6. Although it may be argued that impacts from environmental interventions can be generated faster through private sector support than from working with central governmental institutions, it would be wrong to conclude that all environmental support should then be allocated towards the private sector. It must be acknowledged that results and impacts from interventions within the governmental structures and systems may take longer to materialize compared to the private sector. In the longer term, however, the sustainability of the private sector interventions will often depend on the framework created by the public institutions. It is therefore important to understand public and private sector interventions as being mutually interdependent and that it is the specific mix and the synergies generated from these public - private sector interventions that will determine the longer term sustainability and impacts. 7. Measuring results requires more than devising good indicators and proposing that they are reported on. Resources and management plus development partner commitment are required if they are to be actually used. 8. Establishing a link to poverty alleviation is not easy in any sector, but in the environment it requires explicit linkages and means of verification. Where poverty reduction is seen as an indirect and longer-term consequence of support, it may not prove feasible to attempt to measure such reduction. But, as a minimum, the programme design needs to be specific on this. 9. Placing an advisory function concerning environmental compliance within a private industrial organisation instead of within a governmental institution helped build trustworthy relations with private companies and convinced them that investments in environmentally friendly technology would be also economically beneficial. Because of the innovative nature of this initiative, and the lack of a broad evaluation of the results and of the implications for opportunities elsewhere, the evaluation recommends that Danida (possibly with EEAA) considers undertaking an independent evaluation study of ECO/ACI. 10. The explicit focus in ESP on communication and awareness raising activities has been an effective means to break down existing communication/knowledge barriers between different entities. In particular, these efforts have been effective for establishing of public-private sector cooperation as well as to improve interaction between different levels of the governmental structure (from national to regional and governorate levels). iv

9 1. Introduction 1 The mission to Egypt was the first of three country field visits that formed part of the Evaluation into Programmatic Approaches for Support to the Environment in Africa. The Egyptian field mission took place between 14 th and 24 th November On 14 th January 2010, a follow-up workshop was hold in Cairo to discuss the preliminary findings from the Egyptian fieldwork. This was undertaken with stakeholders from government, development partners and civil society. This country case study was followed by visits to Zambia and Tanzania between January and March 2010, and then a synthesis workshop in Nairobi during May Context The Environment Sector and Policies in Egypt 2 At the highest levels of government, environmental matters fall under the mandate of the Minister of State for Environmental Affairs (MSEA), whose executive arm is the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA). EEAA has responsibility for setting national policy and co-ordinating environmental management activities, as well as for all aspects of the implementation and monitoring of environmental laws. At the regional level, EEAA has established Regional Branch Offices (RBOs), as part of its strategy of decentralisation. In each of the governorates (provinces), environmental management is mandated to Environmental Management Units (EMU) situated in the governor s office and funded by the governorate. 3 EEAA is also responsible for co-ordinating the activities of as many as 15 line ministries that share or exercise environmental management responsibilities, and also for encouraging civil society to play a role in the environmental field. 4 In 1992, Egypt issued its first National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) that gave an overview of environmental conditions and a first plan of action. Since then, the main legislation in the environmental sector comprises of: (i) Law 4/1994, which established the MSEA and the EEAA, and determined their roles; (ii) A set of policy directives issued in 1998, and which focused inter alia on setting up partnerships with other sectors and civil society, and the capacity development of EEAA and the governorates; (iii) A further key step in the issuing of Presidential Directives for , which gave a strong commitment to fresh water improvement, air pollution abatement and air quality monitoring, environmental impact assessment and monitoring and followup of environmental laws and regulations; and, (iv) A second NEAP published in 2002, covering the period to The Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI) is an independent entity formerly under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry, and represents small, medium and large industry. It is home to 16 industrial chambers, which include a total member base of around 40,000 industrial companies. 1

10 Danida s sector programmatic framework for the original ESP 6 In 1994, Danida introduced a new Sector Programme Support (SPS) strategy. 3 After the launch of the strategy, the first Guidelines for Danida Sector Programme Support (SPS) were published in April The first revision of the SPS Guidelines was done in 1998, and this document provided the framework for the formulation of the original ESP for Egypt. The main features of Danida s SPS Guidelines are set out in Box 1. Box 1. Main features of Danida s Sector Programme Support Strategy (1996) a) The measure of success is whether the SPS contributes towards strengthening the capability of the poor; b) SPS relates directly to established or emerging national sector policies, strategies and programmes. It is of major importance how these are related or linked to other sectors and to the overall national policy framework (macro-economic and budgetary framework); c) Focus on broader scale capacity development at central, regional and local level with a focus on national ownership. d) The time perspective for cooperation is years; e) SPS provides support to various levels in the sector, including the central (regulatory/policy) level as well as regional and local levels; f) Accountability. Transparent political, administrative and financial accountability is promoted by gradually, or from the beginning, making the partner institutions fully responsible for the use of the Danish funds; g) SPS applies various modalities of support in a dynamic manner. The support could include training, technical assistance, operation and maintenance support, investments, commodity and budget support in varying proportions throughout the SPS period; h) SPS offers room for flexibility within an agreed set of objectives, areas of support, and procedures. Greater attention will be given to building flexibility into the SPS concept, through for example continuous policy dialogue and regular joint reviews; i) SPS promotes effective coordination by the national partner of support from various donors. Established or emerging national sector policies, strategies or programmes should function as a framework for assistance from various donors. The SPS can therefore include assistance aimed at improving the coordination capacity of the national partner. 7 According to the SPS Guidelines (1998): SPS is the operational approach applied by Danida for providing sector-wide bilateral development support. The emphasis is on national ownership of development efforts, not only at the central government level, but also at other levels involved in SPS-related activities. The 1998 SPS Guidelines also emphasizes that: Compared to the project approach, SPS emphasizes a longer time frame for broader based Danish assistance to a national endeavour in a sector. This in effect means that assistance would be extended to the national policy and strategy level as well as to the programme implementation 3 Outlined in the Danida publication A Developing World, March Subsequent to this, Guidelines for Sector Programme Support were published in April

11 level..this represents a significant shift of emphasis in Danida s strategy compared to the traditional way of defining projects. The project approach focuses on short and medium term results and pays less attention to comprehensive and sector-wide policy development and institutional, organizational and financial management issues (the process and sustainability factors). SPS strategy emphasizes the processes necessary to achieve sustainable results and impacts. 8 The 1998 SPS Guidelines also emphasize that, It is recognized internationally that sector programme support is easier to implement in social sectors like health and education compared with the agricultural and environmental sectors. 4 Danish-Egyptian environmental cooperation 9 Environmental cooperation between Egypt and Denmark was initiated in 1991 with special emphasis on capacity building in the central institutions. In 1996, the environmental sector became a priority sector in the Egyptian-Danish development cooperation. Danida s decision to support Egypt s environmental sector through a sector programme approach took place in 1997 during annual inter-governmental consultations. 10 There had been a number of Danish-supported environmental projects in Egypt in the 1990s 5 covering a range of types of support from waste management, organisation support to coastal protection (See Sub-Annex 2: Timeline). These were streamlined in , and a concept for an Environmental Support Programme (ESP) was agreed that would encompass former projects such as the Kima Fertilizer and Ferrosilicon Plant (KIMA) and the Environmental Information and Monitoring Programme (EIMP), plus new components that would focus on supporting the EEAA and the decentralisation process for environmental management at regional and governorate levels. Originally the ESP comprised seven components: Decentralised Environmental Management (DEM), Communication for Environmental Management (CEM), Environmental Management for the Governorates (EMG), Achieving Compliance in Industry (ACI), Kima Fertilizer and Ferrosilicon Plant (KIMA), EIMP and Programme Support Unit (PSU). 11 The ESP was signed in 2001 following the elaboration of a programme document in The ESP Objective (2000 Programme Document) was: To contribute to the efforts of the Egyptian government to achieve its environmental objectives with particular regard to improving environmental conditions, developing environmental management capacity of institutions, which can support communities in maintaining a cleaner and healthier environment and by providing frameworks for compliance with environmental regulations. 12 After two years of implementation of the ESP, Denmark and Egypt held High Level Consultations in 2003, which resulted in a Danish decision to phase out all grant development assistance to Egypt by the end of This decision was not caused by anything in the ESP. The Second Joint Sector Review of the ESP (October 2004) then addressed the necessity for refocusing the ESP during the phasing-out period: 4 This same conclusion come out from the Aid Effectiveness in the Environmental Sector Focus on Ownership and Alignment (April 2009) 5 Organizational Support Programme to the EEAA (OSP) , Environmental In-formation and Monitoring Programme (EIMP) , Environmental Education and Training Programme (EETP) , Shore Protection Authority (SPA) , Health Care Waste Management, , Coastal Pollution (NOSCP) , Development of Governorate Environmental Action Plans, Environmental NGO Support Programme and others. 3

12 To refocus the programme and reallocate the budget within two major areas: (i) Capacity building for decentralised environmental management, and (ii) Cleaner Production, and to refocus the Programme Support Unit (PSU) into a more strategically oriented PMU with supports to the Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) and EEAA. 13 A new programme document in 2005 therefore streamlined the ESP into three main components: PMU, Support for Decentralised Environment Management (SDEM) and ACI. It stressed the need to ensure the sustainability of the components undertaken so far, increased physical implementation especially at decentralised levels, and the simplification of the programme. 14 The ESP closed in early The last joint review was in 2007, and Completion Reports were prepared for each of the three main ESP components in December No overall programme completion report was prepared 6 and no independent evaluation has been undertaken until this exercise now. The Danida programmatic framework for the adjusted ESP (2005) 15 Over the period when the ESP was redesigned, a new sector programme guideline was published in 2003, when Danida launched for the first time the Guidelines for Programme Management (GPM), which replaced the SPS Guidelines. In the GPM (2003), it was acknowledged that: Conditions for preparation, implementation and monitoring of Danish-supported programmes vary considerably among partner countries. In some cases, the application of the Sector Wide Approach is fairly advanced In other cases, the conditions for joint arrangements are not yet present, and more comprehensive activities are implemented in a manner very similar to the traditional project modality, where preparation, implementation and monitoring are separate Danida undertakings. 16 The Guidelines also highlight, the continuing effort to move from separate Danida activities towards the application of the Sector Wide Approach and alignment with procedures and formats of the national partner... and, in terms of monitoring, the guidelines stress the need to, integrate programme monitoring into the monitoring system of the partner According to the Guidelines, the key challenge for the future will be, to develop and adapt existing sector programme support, i.e. defining new phases of support, modifying existing components, adding new ones, modifying implementation modalities and/or incorporating Danish support into broader multi-donor support schemes. 18 Danida also introduced a more thorough Performance Management Framework in 2003, 7 which sought to increase the focus on the results of Denmark s development cooperation, improve management and continuous learning through better information and reporting, and strengthen accountability through performance 6 It was an embassy decision, together with the Chief Technical Adviser of the ESP, not to make an overall completion report. It was found that to make a Programme Completion Report supplementary to the 3 Component Completion Reports would have caused a lot of repetition, and with the alternative to have only one Programme Completion Report, it would then not have been possible to correctly reflect all the aspects and all results of the ESP. 7 Performance Management in Danish Development Assistance Framework and Action Plan Quality Assurance Unit, March

13 assessments and measurement. The key was to link individual interventions more effectively with Danida s broader poverty reduction goals. The Framework acknowledged that as Danida s support modalities move further towards sector programme support and budget support:...it is becoming increasingly difficult to prove a direct cause-and-effect relationship between Danida input and achievement of poverty reduction objectives as reflected by outcome and impact indicators. Nevertheless, analysis of the various performance information generated e.g. by Annual Business Plans (VPA) and PRS annual reviews combined with qualitative assessments (e.g. performance reviews) will indicate how Danida is contributing towards reducing poverty. 19 At the same time as these programming and performance guides were developing, the decentralisation of the Danish Aid Assistance took off from This resulted in a notable shift in authority and decision making from Danida HQ to the embassies for implementation and management of bilateral cooperation and sector programmes. 3. Findings 3.1 Relevance 20 While the definition of programmatic approaches has evolved over the last ten years, at the time of the initial ESP preparation in Egypt, the most relevant Danida corporate guidance was the Guidelines for Sector Programme Support first published in A number of elements of Danida s programmatic approach were followed at the time of its ESP formulation in : It brought together a number of ongoing projects into a single frame of bilateral cooperation, and sought to integrate policy level work with EEAA capacity building at central and regional levels, and governorate interventions. The approach was aligned around: (i) the stated decentralisation process of GoE, and, (ii) Government policy in the field of environment as captured by Law 4, 1994, and subsequently the NEAP. ESP responded to a moment when Egypt needed assistance to further strengthen and implement a fairly new and evolving legal and policy framework for the environmental sector, including the decentralization of environmental management. However, it was a general observation that the strategic policy framework was not particularly strong and supportive for the environmental sector at the point of time when ESP was originally designed. This finding is supported by an assessment carried out by the World Bank, where it was found that more promising steps towards the realization of a stronger GoE commitment at the 8 Guidelines for Sector Programme Support, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida,

14 highest levels only materialized in 2002, when clear Presidential Directives were issued. The Environmental Profile and National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) was updated in 2001 to cover the period Interviews carried out with EEAA management and development partners revealed however that the updated NEAP is considered to have limitations and is more a review of the situation than an implementable plan. 10 ESP also sought to align itself with national systems in terms of making use of and strengthening domestic financial and administrative structures within EEAA for programme management. ESP sought to link public action at national and local level with support for private sector initiatives to introduce cleaner production technology. ESP was timely in offering incentives for the private sector to comply (through ACI). It was in line with the growing strength of the regulating agencies to enforce environmental standards and regulations. There was also a gradual increase in public awareness over failure of industries to comply with cleaner production standards and environmental regulations. ESP was in line with growing trade and export requirements to comply with an equally growing trend internationally and, in particular, in Europe to maintain increasingly strict environmental standards in production. The targeting of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was also relevant as it was an important yet relatively unsupported sub-sector at the start of the ESP. 22 On the other hand, the ESP even following its re-design in , did not capture many of the features that Danida (and others) by 2003 considered to be important elements of programmatic approaches (such as use of local systems, donor harmonisation and pooled funding) as reflected in Danida s evolving guidance (see Table 1). The ESP only sought to a limited extent to harmonize interventions with other donors. While it would have lead to a more complex programme design and implementation scheme, this is what a programmatic approach is expected to consider and what often appears to make it particularly challenging for the environmental sector. 9 The most important features include: 1) Strong commitment towards the finalization of the fresh water improvement program through controlling industrial discharges according to a set phased plan presented, and stricter monitoring of all what may influence the quality of drinking water; 2) Development of a plan for air pollution abatement and consistent monitoring of air pollution levels in big cities; 3) Stress on the importance of environmental impact assessment studies for all projects, and prohibiting the establishment of any project that may negatively impact the environment, especially near tourism development areas and coastal zones and; 4) Developing the monitoring and follow-up bodies and units to ensure the rapid implementation of programs, environmental laws, regulations and international environmental protection protocols and conventions. 10 It was also raised as a concern during interviews with EEAA management that the NEAP is not sufficiently linked to the Governorate Environmental Action Plans (GEAPs). One reason might be that in 2001, the GEAPs were not sufficiently developed and not the strong management tool, which they became during the last years of the ESP period. 6

15 The reformulation of the ESP in 2004 was driven principally by the changing needs for Danida support in Egypt and the experience of the ESP to that point in time. The delays in implementation, the problems encountered with some of the non-programme components (such as the Kima fertilizer that had to be closed), and also difficulties in the leadership of the Ministry raised concerns in the 2003 Joint Review. This also, to some extent, reflected changing corporate guidance on programmatic approaches. This underpinned the narrowing of the components to just three, the stronger emphasis on environmental results at local level, and the drive to provide more strategic support, for example by seeking to help in the formulation of an EEAA Strategic Plan. The slow progress of decentralisation in Egypt was a concern for a sector programme built on the assumption that decentralisation will happen in reality as well as on paper. Several commentators noted that there has been limited progress in devolution of authority and financial resources. 11 The Adjusted ESP Programme Document (2005) makes reference to the Fifth National Five-Year Plan which committed to community participation and decentralisation in decisionmaking. Although it is further argued in the ESP Programme Document that current legislative framework allows a considerable amount of movement towards decentralization, the document concludes that, the majority of these powers are not yet transferred to local government levels. The ESP Programme Document (2005) does not include any explicit consideration of how the national policy framework for the environment is linked to other implementing sectors. The ESP design notes that, as many as 15 line ministries share and exercise environmental management responsibilities, but no holistic approach is discussed on how to tackle the influence and role of line ministries in environmental management within the framework of ESP. One example of this is the huge challenge EEAA faces in obtaining environmental data collected by other Ministries. In many cases, EEAA only gets such data by the end of the year for annual reporting, even though the data may be collected on a continuous basis. This makes it particularly challenging for EEAA to undertake holistic monitoring of the environmental situation in the country, as well as to plan timely interventions. A key principle of a programmatic approach is the longer time perspective. 12 However, quite soon after ESP launch, Danida took the decision to exit from the sector and from Egypt, which meant no possibility of extending the programme to fit the principle of years support. After the redesign in 2005, this left a period of only three years ( ) for implementation. 11 Indeed the EEAA has preserved some elements of control, such as the powers to undertake EIAs, whereby EMUs only process documents and do not undertake EIAs even though they were supposed to be able to undertake lower grade EIAs, termed Grade A small industry: see ESP At A Glance, 2008, p Danida s SPS Guidelines (1998) states that the..time perspective for programme co-operation is years. Danida s Environmental Strategy ( Strategy for Denmark s Environmental Assistance to Developing Countries ) emphasizes the importance that programme interventions will provide a sustained effort over a long period is necessary to ensure that results became rooted and are disseminated widely. 7

16 Finally, though poverty reduction is seen as the ultimate criteria for judging the success of all Danida aid, 13 ESP s relevance to Danida s poverty reduction objectives (though recognised as important) is largely indirect. 13 Guidelines for Sector Programme Support, p. 8. Furthermore, The measure of success is whether the SPS contributes towards strengthening the capability of the poor to access resources, to develop secure livelihoods, to increase their knowledge and to exercise their rights. 8

17 Table 1. Assessment of use of Programme Approach in ESP Criteria Assessment Evidence 1. Strengthening the capability of the poor 2. National ownership 3. Capacity development 4. Long time perspective 5. Coordinated support 6. Works at multiple levels 7. Accountability & Transparency. Use of local systems 8. Common programme management and result structure 9. Integrated components 10. Allows Policy dialogue Limited Strong - fair Good Some investments at governorate level designed to benefit the poor, but most benefits are indirect and longer term. Limited evidence from programme reports or surveys as to demonstrate poverty impact Programme explicitly supports Law 4, and EEAA policy statements. However, Danida funding of activities was strongly seen as additional aid funds, and were tightly controlled by TA Capacity development took place at various levels Weak Programme ran for seven years with major redesign half way through, less than the preferred year timeframe and with Danida exiting from Egypt no possibility of extending support Weak Good Fair Poor Fair Initially weak but improved later. Limited EEAA coordination of donors not strong different projects run without complementarity (except for linkage between SEAM and ESP). Donor coordination essentially information exchange, with no joint analysis Provided support for national frameworks/ systems as well as components for sub-sectors (in private sector and governorates) and for local demonstration and capacity building Danida procurement and financial systems took precedence, though local financial and audit systems were used and local procurement for smaller purchases. Weak capacity of EEAA planning and M&E meant that ESP developed its own reporting system. ESP was managed with a PMU placed within EEAA, so operating as a normal project. But co-management between TA and EEAA was appreciated and seen as more integrated than other projects. Seven components at the start with little connection between some of them (e.g. Kima). Synergy expressed on paper (between the centre and local levels for example), but less integration in practice due to administrative and political differences between central government ministry and governorate systems and authority. EEAA maintained desire for full control throughout ESP, and early devolution has reversed (EIA s now not done by EMUs, EMU management unit in EEAA has been established formally, EPF has not delivered many projects to local level outside of Danida EMG. Few funds from EEAA reach EMUs, who largely depend on governorate for resources. No strong evidence that ESP was used by Danida for policy influence. Although support for a strategic plan for EEAA was proposed by ESP reviews, no such strategy was requested or prepared. M&E Design 23 Improvements in the ESP performance framework were addressed through an indicator review in This was a comprehensive study that suggested four strategic indicators for the whole programme and key indicators for each of four components. The four strategic indictors were: 1. No. of critical compliance and enforcement measures in place by year including effective attendance to the so-called hot-spots. 2. Public environmental awareness measured via a combination of survey and mass media content analysis. 9

18 3. The Quantity and Quality of GEAP Community-based environmental management projects including measures for their impact on better quality of life, poverty reduction and good governance. 4. The Saving of X Million Pounds via Cleaner Production Schemes in selected Egyptian Industries by 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, These indicators were endorsed in the 2005 re-design, and were to be reported on in the annual progress reports. However, no systematic data collation and reporting vis-à-vis these indicators were ever done by the programme. 3.2 Efficiency 25 Although there is limited documentary evidence around the question of improved efficiency under a programme approach, the evaluation finds that in general the efficiency of ESP was positive: ESP provided and promoted a mix of inputs and modalities that has been complementary. ESP also has successfully promoted a new culture of communication between public institutions (for instance between RBOs and EMUs). ESP has also successfully promoted cooperation between public and private industry, particularly within the ACI Component, where industries are now requesting more services from the ECO. Also at the RBO level, examples were found of public-private sector cooperation, in support of environmental management. The ESP Project Completion Reports (PCRs) refer to greater administrative efficiency following the merger of the DEM, CEM and EMU components so that the streamlining of the original programme design was an improvement on the earlier 2000 ESP design. The embedding of the PMU within EEAA has helped reduce transaction costs by having a single management structure. While ESP funds were managed largely under Danida rules, the use of the EPF as a channel to provide finance for local investment projects helped strengthen local financial systems. Nevertheless, the plan to use the EPF to strengthen a local fund that would attract other domestic funds and invest these in environmental projects has not so far been successful (see Effectiveness section). Most of the procurement processes have been carried out through international procedures, and financial payments are off-budget though using joint signatory arrangements (GoE and Danida). Following the decentralisation of Danish Aid Management in 2003, it was reported from interviews with key GoE management and staff, that Danish embassy staff became more flexible, timely and responsive to local needs. 14 This seems to have 14 This is in line with the overall findings from the Evaluation of The Decentralisation of Danish Aid Management (Goss Gilroy Inc./Orbicon A/S, 2009). 10

19 contributed to smoother working relations with National Development Partners and thereby to a more efficient programme implementation. The use by ESP of salary incentives to attract specialized staff to work within EEAA, RBOs and the EMUs expedited operations. This boosted the staffing and core expertise during ESP implementation. With the closure of ESP and ending of competitive salaries, however, there are now major challenges to the sustainability (see Sustainability section) and quality of some operations due to high staff turnover (a point re-emphasised in the workshop). 26 There is some evidence that the increased use of national systems, including local management arrangements, has helped improve the implementation of the environment programmes, compared with parallel management arrangements. As the EEAA capacity has grown (see Capacity Building below), it has been able to take on a wider range of responsibility and build on the areas supported through ESP such as in information management, communications, reporting, inspections and EIAs. 27 For the ACI component, the set-up is regarded as relatively efficient, because of the complementary role played by the different partners. This involves the Environmental Compliance Office (ECO) providing advisory services and the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) managing the revolving fund and all lending responsibilities for a small fee of 2.5%. The ECO office is efficiently managed by being housed in the FEI and benefits from cost-savings. 28 The efficiency of disbursement is high with all budgeted funds disbursed over the period (PMU DKK 53.5 million out of DKK 54.7 million, DKK out of DKK million for SDEM, and DKK out of DKK 140 million for ACI). Partner funding was higher than foreseen for SDEM (DKK 29.7 million instead of DKK 13.9 million). However, the first three years saw delays in disbursement as protocols had to be set up to support the EMUs and difficulties with the KIMA and the redesign of the SPA. The major expenditure took place in the final four years. A final financial audit is due in On the other hand, some areas of inefficiency can be identified: 29 The intensive support for the first two GEAPs in Beni Suef and Aswan were possibly over designed and over intensively supported by international TA, such that they were regarded as non-replicable. Later GEAPs were produced at much lower cost, using local staff and only local consultants, resulting in greater local ownership. 30 The PCR for the SDEM Component notes that:... the costs of developing GEAPs under the EMU (where basically only national consultants have been used for support and where far less training of Markaz level staff has taken place) is only 10% of the cost for the first two GEAPs in Beni Suef and Aswan. The six GEAPs prepared under the EMU are less perfect and sophisticated than Beni Suef and Aswan ones but nevertheless serve their purpose of enabling the EMUs to facilitate mainstreaming of environment into the overall Governorate planning process. 11

20 31 RBO managers have very limited influence on financial management and staff recruitment in relation to their respective RBO. This is still heavily centralized in EEAA. In terms of financial management, except for minor payments, RBO managers still have to submit a request to EEAA management for repairs or maintenance. From the RBO s perspective this system is very inefficient as it can take months to get an approval of requests. This, of course, interrupts RBO operations. 32 The role of the Danish Embassy, following the decentralisation of Danida s support in 2003, became increasingly critical. In spite of the positive observations noted above, the embassy had to handle an increased responsibility for programme management with limited resources. In this context, the technical and managerial capacity of the Embassy to oversee this complex DKK 367 million environmental support programme presented a very tough challenge and may have contributed to the failure in collecting the strategic M&E indicators, and the tendency in programme management to focus more on inputs, processes and outputs and less on outcomes and impacts in terms of policy and beneficiaries Though the efficiency of disbursement has been high, the question of whether it made sense to invest DKK 367 million over eight years in supporting the evolution of a sector programme, before then closing support and exiting, can be questioned. The answer lies in whether the relative achievement in the ESP period was sufficiently successful in meeting its objectives and whether what it left behind was sustainable. These questions are addressed in the next section. 3.3 Effectiveness 34 Positive results are documented around better services resulting from: (i) raised capacity and improved legislative framework; (ii) various discrete environmental benefits from localised government, private sector and community investments; (iii) raised awareness from communication activities; and, (iv) raised private sector consultancy capacity for advising industry on cleaner production and energy efficiency. Quality of Evidence 35 The effectiveness in terms of environmental outcomes is less clear due to lack of systematic evidence. Good indicators were devised, but weak M&E data capture and reporting has meant that outcomes and impact are unclear. Three PCRs were prepared one for each of the three main components but no overall completion report was published that sought to make an assessment of the achievement of programme outcomes. 36 The three Component PCRs are weak in providing evidence of outcomes, and focus mainly on inputs and outputs. The ESP re-design in 2005 proposed that a joint programme evaluation would be undertaken on completion, and each component would be jointly evaluated on completion but there is no evidence that these took place. 15 At the Danish Embassy one posted and one local staff (thus in total two persons) were responsible for managing all Danida s development programmes and projects in Egypt (ESP, water and sanitation, wind mill farms, electricity distribution control centre, grain silos, regional renewable energy centre, plus local authority grants, and during all the years also heading the DAC Donor Coordination Group for Environment, DAG-ENV). 12

21 37 Despite the lack of evidence of higher level results, the PCRs all claim A ratings (Highly Satisfactory) for all three main components (Table 2). The evaluation team would disagree with such positive ratings. In terms of poverty reduction, the ratings of A, B and B are also not easy to endorse as there is little firm and systematic evidence provided to support these satisfactory outcomes. Table 2. Project Completion Report Ratings 16 ESP PMU ESP SDEM ESP ACI Fulfilment of Intermediate Objective for Component A A A Fulfilment of the objectives concerning Poverty Reduction A B B Shore Protection Authority II A n/a Env. Information & Monitoring Project A* B Health Care Waste Management A/B** Organisational Support Programme B C Raise awareness of role of women B/C*** * out of five objectives, four were rated A and one B ** out of seven objectives, three were rated A and two B, and two no score *** out of three objectives, one was rated B and two C 38 Nevertheless, the evaluation finds that the use of a programmatic approach has been effective in a number of ways: Support to Decentralised Environmental Management 39 ESP has been successful in showing some concrete and immediate results (through co-funding of 86 community and demonstration projects, particularly in the area of waste management) while at the same time maintaining a coherent focus on strengthening and building up institutional structures and awareness. This has begun to see improved ownership by governorates and so to lead to a sustainability and replication of the short-term interventions. 40 The ESP was designed to work at all three institutional levels (central, regional and local) with a selective package of capacity building interventions. This seems to have generated synergy from a simultaneous enhancement of capacities and frameworks in different institutional sharing common responsibilities (for environmental management). 41 Through the support from ESP, a number of processes, leading towards more decentralised environmental management, have been initiated and supported. These initiatives have to some extent been strengthened through approvals of new decrees and law amendments (Examples: The plan for the reorganization of EEAA Amendments to 16 The assessment system has the following categories: a. Very satisfactory: No need to adjust plans and strategy. b. Satisfactory: Minor problems may arise and small adjustments may be necessary. c. Less satisfactory: Adjustments to plans and/or strategy are necessary. d. Unsatisfactory: The sustainability of the activities is questionable. Major adjustments/re-organisations will be necessary in a possible new phase or in the follow up by partner organisations. 13

22 94 Law, Decree of roles and responsibilities of EEAA, RBOs and EMUs and Decree on establishing of EMU support office within EEAA). 42 ESP delivery has been intensive, in some cases probably too intensive, to be fully absorbed by the system and institutions involved. The Egyptian system was, prior to the ESP interventions, already known as extremely centralized and hierarchical. This in itself indicates that a long-term strategy would be required to sustain the capacity building and institutional strengthening efforts in order to achieve expected medium to long-term impacts. Achieving Compliance in Industry 43 The ECO office is now able to serve not three but six sectors and 680 client industries have in one way or another been assessed for possibilities for implementing cleaner technology. In terms of sustainability, ACI appears successful as the ECO office now is a formal office in FEI. By Nov 2009, 88 loans totalling LE 94 million have been disbursed, with a reported 100% repayment level. The ECO Office has prepared 230 proposals for funding. 44 The ACI component closed in December The Component PCR states that: 440 enterprises received assistance from ECO. 44 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from five sectors have received support from the revolving fund. 93 enterprises have implemented Environmental Management Systems. 2,740 companies have participated in awareness activities. Communication, media and marketing plans have been prepared Egyptian consultants have participated in 12 training sessions covering CP, Energy Efficiency, EMS, Occupational Health and Safety, Food, Chemicals in industry, Marketing & Communication, and Reporting. In total, 60 Egyptian consultants are active on contracts with ECO, and 41 Egyptian consultants have been short-listed for further service. 46 The environmental effectiveness of ACI activity is captured in a study reported in the ESP at a Glance report. The study reports that cleaner production actions provided total annual earning of EGP 40 million together with reductions in energy consumption (4,050 ton oil equivalent), wastewater (117 m 3 ) and carbon dioxide emissions (50,000 t/year of CO 2 ). These numbers however could not be ascertained by the evaluation, as the supporting documents could not be obtained, and it is unclear if they are actual measurements following use of the technology, or theoretical figures based on brief assessments at the time of installation. 47 Two Value for Money studies were conducted shortly after the investment was completed and before sustained production had taken place to be able to measure changes in actual pollution or energy consumption over a period of time. The focus instead was on whether the correct technology has been installed in an efficient manner and as intended in the proposal. In the absence of firm and representative data on the benefits of the use of the cleaner technology, in the view of the evaluation team it would now be a good time to carry out a study on an independent basis, so as to guide the future direction of this ACI initiative. 14

23 Programme Management Unit 48 The PMU s principal task was to build the capacity of EEAA and the EPF, and its effectiveness is discussed in this area under the Capacity Development section 3.4. Besides this, other results areas concern communications and reporting. 49 Communications. A range of positive results can be identified here, but the child educational cartoon character Bezra, has been the main focus of the CEM. In 2007 for example ESP conducted: 119 Bezra campaigns for children with a total number of beneficiaries reaching 39,405 children. The campaigns covered 24 governorates in Egypt. Produced and distributed four issues of the Bezra magazine (20,000 copies of each issue) and also circulation with Mickey magazine (3 issues distributed, 60,000 copies per issue). Website visitors have increased from 316,195 in July 2007 to 520,321 in December Reporting. The production of three State of Environment Reports (SOE) (2005, 2006, 2007) has been supported which are well presented documents that exceed the normal four yearly period of such reports. This was intended to improve the national reporting on environmental trends. However, the incompleteness of data is evident in these reports, because of the unreliability of submission both from concerned line ministries and from the Governorates and RBOs. Also, limited analysis weakens the value of these reports and raises the question of whether producing them annually makes sense given the current capacity in EEAA and also the expense of such a pace of publication. 51 PMU supported the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Central Department in EEAA to enhance the EIA system, which has been updated and brought it to international EIA standards. 3.4 Capacity Development 52 ESP has undertaken a wide range of capacity development support. A useful comparative study on EEAA capability was prepared in 2008 that reviewed the situation in 2001 and in This noted that overall EEAA staffing in 2001 was around 600 (one third of which were park rangers): There were 2 sectors, the CEO Secretariat, and 10 central departments, a number of general departments, and many departments and sections. However, many departments and sections were only one person, and some had no staff at all. By 2008, EEAA has about 2700 employees including support staff (corresponding to an increase of 350%), of which about 1400 are in Cairo at central level. 18 About 700 are located in the RBOs, and about 600 are located in various national parks. In addition to EEAA staff, there are about 400 employees at EMU level and 2000 environmental officers at the Markaz and village level. Although autonomous of EEAA, they do contribute to environmental planning and implementation because of delegation to that level a major achievement one could say even if still imperfect. 17 Comparison between EEAA capability in 2001 with EEAA capability in 2008, Annex 11, Decentralisation Completion Report, EEAA, In contrast, the MSEA (the secretariat of the Minister of State), is very small, with about 40 employees. 15

24 53 After 10 years of existence with no major change in structure, EEAA underwent reorganisation in 2005, and was divided in five sectors: the Nature Protection Sector, the Regional Branch Office Affairs Sector, the Environmental Management Sector, the Environmental Quality Sector, the Financial and Administrative Sector, plus the Secretariat of the CEO with a number of important central departments and general departments under it, including the Information Technology, Environmental Disasters, Awareness, and Environmental Inspection. Improved linkages have been seen between the RBOs and EEAA technical departments. 54 ESP provided an extensive programme of training and exchanges, with a particular focus on three selected RBOs (Cairo, Assuit and Suez) and Aswan and Beni Suef Governorates. Capacity building at the RBOs and EMUs has resulted in a higher performance level in terms of processed complaints and EIA inspections. Information centres are implemented in the three selected RBOs, and an environmental database (EREMIS) is implemented within all RBOs and is considered an important part of the IT communication between EEAA and the RBOs. 55 Decentralisation: In 2001, no strategy for decentralization had been prepared. Five RBOs had been established, of which two were fully operational, and some cooperation with EMUs had been established. At the local level, each of the 26 governorates had an EMU but their organization and operation varied across the governorates. Many EMUs were poorly staffed and had poor facilities, and not in a position to have a larger role in environmental management. 56 By 2008, eight RBOs and 26 EMUs were functional and staffed, even though some EMUs still do not have vehicles. Each EMU has an average of 15 staff and a number for environmental officers at the Markaz and village level. A decree concerning roles and responsibilities of EEAA HQ, RBOs and EMUs in decentralized environmental management has been drafted, but not approved. ESP-targeted support has raised capacity in Greater Cairo, Suez and Assiut RBOs, service quality has been raised and ISO certification achieved in most RBO labs. 57 In terms of staff recruitment, the RBOs are essentially a branch of the EEAA and so have limited influence on recruitment and allocation of staff for their respective offices. Decisions on staff recruitment are managed centrally within EEAA. This obviously makes work planning a difficult task for RBO managers. 58 Preparation of GEAPs: environmental profiles for all governorates have been completed, and GEAPs prepared for 16 governorates (as of 2008). 59 Upgrading of EMUs: Several EMU s have been, or are currently in process to be, upgraded from Offices to Departments or General Departments. The Environmental Protection Fund (EPF) 60 In 2001, the EPF was established under Law 4/94 with the aim of mobilizing investments in the environmental sector. The financial resources of the EPF include revenues from the national protectorates and fines on environmental violations. The year 2000/01 was the pilot year for the EPF. A total of 177 applications were received by the EPF, and after assessment, just eight projects were supported. The low number reflected the cautiousness of the newly established fund in their pilot phase. Five of the projects 16

25 were within the solid waste area and three were interest subsidies dealing with recycling of waste oil and wastewater. 61 Since 2001 there have been several changes of management and other personnel in EPF and there has been a slow build up in public confidence by creating an independent Board, transparent procedures, sound documentation and qualified staff. Over the period , the ESP has supported the EPF by merging its secretariat with the EPF staff, introducing new competences and conducting on-the-job-training and has provided considerable expertise on screening and implementing environmental investments in the governorates. 62 Significant achievements regarding improvement of the functioning of the EPF included: A business plan with key performance indicators Updating of the administrative procedures through the preparation of a complete Project Cycle Management Manual Progress reporting system and web site updates Extensive training in finance and monitoring and evaluation Creation of two important project pipelines, one through the GEAPs and another through the Environmental Compliance Office at the Federation of Egyptian Industries, through support from the ESP. 63 These functional improvements have certainly provided potentials for improving the EPF procedures, but have not yet been reflected in: 1) the speed of processing applications; 2) a better hit rate due to more information on how to make proposals/projects; or, 3) attracting more funds because the EPF is recognised as an accountable and efficient entity. 64 The EPF has not been supporting GEAP projects as originally anticipated by the ESP. EPF was expected to be a main funding source for prioritised projects from the GEAPs. In practice however, only a very few GEAP projects have obtained funding through EPF. While 60% of the EPF was planned for projects, the bulk of funds have been used for EEAA support. According the ESP Progress Report 2007, EPF had grown to LE 80 million 2006/7 but only LE 2.3 million had been disbursed on grants over the period 2004/5 to 2006/7. 65 Interviews carried out by the evaluation revealed a general concern over EPF performance and transparency. In particular, EPF application processes are considered too complicated and too slow, and the EPF staff has insufficient technical capacity to evaluate the proposals. 17

26 66 The recently passed amendments to the 94 Law, includes clauses that places EPF outside the EEAA Organisational Chart, as a semi-independent organization, with the Minister for the State of Environmental Affairs as Chairman for the Board (the Board will also have representation from line ministries). At the same time financial procedures have also been changed, so that EPF can now disburse funding directly from accounts in commercial banks. Likewise, the evaluation team was told during interviews in EPF that the Business Plan, prepared through ESP support, is currently being updated, to also reflect the organisational changes. In view of this, EPF may create new opportunities in the future. However, EPF will be facing a huge challenge in terms of establishing a new image as an efficient, transparent and effective institution in order to play a role as a key funding source for environmental projects at the local level Impact Poverty Alleviation. 67 Danida s strategy documents such as A World of Difference emphasise the close relationship between development and environmental problems, and thus provides the rationale for provision of support to the environmental sector within this framework. 68 In terms of ESP, the connection between environmental management, productive activities and livelihoods and poverty alleviation is not easy to analyse, and indeed was not the main objective of the ESP. The evaluation has the following main findings: Some of the Community and Demonstration projects supported by ESP under the EMG show a poverty dimension, although the evidence from ESP reports is limited: for example only one project is cited in the PCR in Fayoum. The evaluation team visited projects in Beni Suef, and one criterion for selecting of projects here had been level of poverty. Interviews carried out with staff in EEAA and RBOs confirmed that poverty had also been used as selection criteria for demonstration projects in other areas. There is no survey or other data to illustrate the relative benefits of these projects on the poor however. More widely, GEAPs use poverty as one of the criteria for weighting environmental interventions, 19 though there is no systematic analysis available of how well the resulting GEAPs then succeeded in addressing poverty. The evaluation workshop did produce several examples where poverty was addressed (through employment, better water and sanitation): see Sub-Annex 4, Appendix 2. The Bezra magazine has been targeted to poorer communities in Manshiet Nasser and Upper Egypt. Other ESP interventions have a less obvious poverty focus. For instance, the process of selecting those EMUs that would be the main beneficiaries of ESP support was done on a competitive basis, driven by the EMUs capacity and willingness to provide counterpart inputs in line with those provided by ESP. It may even be argued that this process was in favour of the more capable EMUs with more resources. While every EMU would contain populations classified as 19 The others being cost, gender, environment and health, sustainability and demographics (ESP at a Glance, 2008). 18

27 poor, EMUs (or their Governorates) were not selected by these criteria. Likewise, the criteria for selecting demonstration projects for the ACI component from the revolving fund, selected by the ECO in the FEI and with funds managed by the NBE, was based on a financial and environmental assessment of the proposed project, not particularly related to any poverty indicators. Gender 69 Gender is an important crosscutting issue for Danida but the ESP programme documents do not have a particular gender objective, and rather refer to the programme providing indirect benefits to women. The ESP revised programme document aims for training to be given to 50% women and there are commitments to undertake gender analysis and to monitor the gender balance of investments. 70 But action appears to have been slow in following up on intentions to monitor poverty and gender. The last Joint Review in 2007 still calls for immediate action for the ESP management to compile the recording of the number of beneficiaries and expenditures of GEAP projects disaggregated with respect to gender and poverty, in order to assess the outcome of the activities related to enhancing empowerment of women and poverty eradication in quantitative terms in progress reports. There is no evidence of these data having been collated at the time of the evaluation. Environment 71 The first SoE report was issued in 2004 and has since been issued on an annual basis. Further than to implement an important article in the Environmental Law 4/94 and its regulations, 20 the objective of the SoE is to delineate a clear and accurate picture of positive and negative changes within one particular element of the environment (land, air, water or urban environment) as well as a brief presentation of changes that have taken place in the other three elements. 72 From the SoE, it is not possible to attribute any national or local environmental improvements to ESP. Although the SoE is rich on data information and graphics, it lacks consistency as well as an overview and interpretation of the presented content Sustainability 73 Already prior to the ESP, a framework for the environmental sector had been established through the 94 Law as well as through a number of policy directives and the first NEAP. This legal and policy framework provided an initial platform for the design of ESP interventions. Some further developments seem to have led to increased sustainability of the ESP supported interventions: The establishing of new EEAA offices and the upgrade of Units to Departments and General Departments, both within EEAA and in RBOs and EMUs, has provided a basic financial and organizational sustainability of the decentralised environmental structure supported through ESP. 20 Law no.4/94 on Environment, and its amendment law no.9/2009, stipulates that an annual State of Environment report is to be developed. 19

28 During and after implementation of ESP, amendments to the 94 Law as well as supporting directives have contributed to some sustaining of ESP supported interventions. The ECO Office, established within FEI through the ACI Component, has since component completion in early 2008, managed to build up the number of in-house consultants due to high demand for these services and support to the industry, introduced through ESP. The Bezra children s programme for environmental awareness is being handed over to EEAA s Central Department for Environmental Communication Affairs, and funds are being sourced to fund another issue of the successful magazine. The ECO is a financially sustainable entity after one year of independent operations. The ECO has added internal technical coordinators in the term of one every year since 2005 and has continued to do so up until 2009, the office has nine technical staff, up from the original five. This was to respond to the increasing number of sectors being served and increasing number of clients. 74 On the other hand, the evaluation has identified some areas of concern in terms of the sustainability: Staff turnover, due to loss of qualified specialists to the private sector and other public agencies, has reduced capacity. Based on our evaluation field visits to Suez and Cairo, this is a particular challenge in RBOs, in particular among staff members with specialized technical skills (IT /GIS system experts), after completion of ESP. Reportedly, more than 50% of this staff category has now left the RBOs, mostly for (higher paid) jobs in the private sector. Through ESP implementation, many of these staff members that have now left were paid well above the civil servants level (through ESP). This is critical from a sustainability perspective, and although strong intents reportedly were done to ensure that staff contracted through ESP could be transferred to EEAA after programme completion, this would have meant a significant salary decrease for the staff. In terms of staffing, the combination of highly centralized, lengthy and unpredictable staff recruitment process, together with a high staff turnover and difficulties in attracting new qualified experts within some key operational areas, has caused staff gaps within the RBOs and, as a direct consequence of this, decreasing capacity for managing certain operations and systems. 75 Some EMU operations are dependent on the goodwill of the Governor. The upgrade of EMUs from Units to Departments, and some even to General Departments, during ESP, has been a major step towards sustaining the EMU offices, mainly in terms of staffing levels. With regards to operational expenses, the EMUs depend on the willingness of the Governor to provide funding for maintenance and repair of equipment, transport services, as well as to support operational costs on demonstration projects (for instance, waste collection). 76 The EREMIS database system is facing certain challenges in order to become fully operational and a reliable management and planning tool. EREMIS is now implemented in all RBO offices and at the CDBA office in EEAA. The purpose of 20

29 EREMIS is to provide environmental data and to share data between EEAA staff and managers and to be able to disseminate environmental information in general. EREMIS is the backbone in a complex IT system involving many users not only in terms of technical and administrative staff but are also involving many different offices inside and outside EEAA. In order to be able to gain information from the system it is important that the system is understood by all stakeholders and that all stakeholders follow the same rules and regulations. 77 Although, EREMIS seems well-designed in terms of functionality and application, not all RBOs are entering and submitting data through EREMIS to the CDBA office. The above mentioned staffing issue, where RBOs have experienced high staff turnover in particular among technical specialists and no immediate replacement, provide one key explanation. Another explanation provided by the RBOs was that not all those departments within the RBOs, that are supposed to enter data into EREMIS, are doing this on a regular basis. This leads currently to an under-reporting of actual RBO performance through EREMIS, a point endorsed during the evaluation workshop. 78 The EMUs are facing difficulties in obtaining funding for the proposed and prioritized projects from the GEAPs. In the ESP design, EPF was expected to be a major funding source for GEAP projects. In practice however, only a very few GEAP projects have been accepted for funding through EPF. From the interviews carried out by the evaluation team, it became clear that there seems to be a general mistrust in relation to the management, performance and transparency of EPF. In particular, it was claimed that EPF application processes are too complicated and in-transparent, takes too long, and that EPF is not capable of evaluating the received proposals. 79 EPF: A recent amendment to the 94 Law seems to provide an opportunity to relaunch the EPF. The new amendment includes clauses that place EPF outside the EEAA Organizational Chart, and instead as a semi-independent organization, with the Minister for the State of Environmental Affairs as Chairman for the Board, where also line ministries are represented. At the same time, EPF financial procedures have also been changed, and EPF can now disburse funding directly from accounts in commercial banks. The evaluation team was told that the EPF Business Plan, prepared through ESP support, is currently being updated, to also reflect the recent organizational changes. It is however obvious that EPF is facing a huge challenge in terms of establishing a new image as an efficient, transparent and effective institution in order to play its role as a key funding source for environmental projects at the local level. 80 It is unclear whether updates of the GEAPs will takes place as planned and needed. At a time when the first of those GEAPs prepared with support from ESP (Beni Suef and Aswan) are supposed to be updated, there seem to be no concrete planning within the governorates on how and when this would take place. In Beni Suef, it was a clear concern within the governorate how sufficient funding could be raised to contract international and/or local technical expertise to assist with the GEAP update. In that respect, it may be argued that the more advanced and sophisticated GEAPs for Beni Suef and Aswan, both prepared with extensive support from international technical experts contracted through ESP, may be more difficult for the governorates to update and therefore also less sustainable than the more simplified versions prepared in other governorates. 21

30 81 Lack of is continuous training may become a risk for sustaining and upgrading of key capacities within certain areas of the established decentralized environmental management system. The Unified Training System, established within EEAA to ensure continuous training and capacity building of staff working at central and decentralized levels, seems not to be able to provide sufficient training opportunities. It was raised as a main concern in most of the offices visited by the evaluation team, that in particular the more technical and specialized hands-on training courses were not available to the staff anymore after completion of ESP. 82 The private sector revolving fund channel has been effective in introducing cleaner production to 80 SMEs, and has leveraged other funding. The fund itself will not be sustained due to negative real interest rates. The EPF on the other hand, though a substantial asset, has not been effectively used and has suffered from changes to management and procedures. New legislation in 2009 may lead to improved performance. 83 Following an Administrative Decision of the FEI Chairman, the Environmental Compliance and Sustainable Development Office (ECO Office) was established in January 2008 as a Department in FEI to provide technical consultancy services in environment and sustainable development areas on fee paying basis. The Office has its independent financial and administrative regulations 21. By the start of 2009, the Office had a turnover that resulted in a profit. Financial reserves grew from LE 400,000 in 2005, to LE 2.5 million in Coherence 84 Overall, the ESP has a high coherence with national policy frameworks. It has supported the national laws and policies in the environmental sector and has contributed to their further evolution. It has supported the strengthening of the EEAA and Governorate environmental agencies. ESP has not been so relevant or effective in improving environmental policy and management in line agencies Coordination 85 There is a moderate level of coordination amongst donors in the sector in terms of exchange of information. A matrix of donor engagement has been prepared. A formal division of labour does not exist, but there is reportedly an informal division of labour, and the EEAA. ESP s management was not shared with other donor activities 22, and the tendency is for donors to implement projects in parallel in the sector Complementarity Joint donor fora 86 There is a donor working group on environment (DAG-ENV), with the main donors being Denmark, Germany, UK, Spain, Japan, Italy and UNDP. Danida has been 21 Approved from the Steering Committee formed by the Administrative Decree No. 66 issued on 19/11/ Though ESP management was not shared with other donors, the ESP management met with e.g. World Bank and the EC on several occasions in order to coordinate activities. 22

31 the chair from The main function of the group appears to be information sharing around the discussion of different programmes. Through the ESP programme period the EEAA chaired bi-monthly donor coordinating meeting, and was reported to be quiet active in these meetings. While the group is reported as active, the scope of donor coordination has not extended to areas of improved harmonisation such as joint analysis, missions or steps towards a sector wide approach. The most advanced programme is EPAP II which is joint-funded by four lending agencies (World Bank, African Development Bank, Japanese Bank for International Cooperation and the European Investment Bank). Other donor interventions 87 In general, the ESP has operated independently of other donor initiatives in the sector and project generally operate in parallel even within EEAA. The Environment Pollution Abatement Project II (EPAP II) has a separate office in EEAA for example. 88 Some efficiency gains were made by ESP following on from the approaches developed under the Support to Environmental Assessment and Management (SEAM) project (DFID-funded), in terms of approaches to developing environmental action plans and profiles and delivering joint-funded investments and capacity building at governorate level. In addition, the ESP linked with the work on environmental information monitoring supported by CIDA (Egyptian Environment Information System). But in general different donor projects operate in isolation from each other and do not share management systems or approaches in order to help reduce overlapping of interventions and create smoother implementation of programmes. 4. Workshop Results participants attended the workshop organised by the evaluation to discuss the preliminary findings on 14 th January There was a good attendance that included senior EEAA managers, the Danish Ambassador, the Program Evaluation and Macroeconomic Analysis (PEMA) Unit of the Ministry of International Cooperation, RBO and EMU Governorate staff, NGOs and consultants. See Sub-Annex 4 for a summary of the workshop. The team presented their preliminary findings 23, while EVAL from Danida gave a presentation on the background to the evaluation, and PEMA also made a presentation on the issues around environmental mainstreaming in line ministries. 90 The workshop participants endorsed many of the findings of the evaluation. The working groups in general produced positive findings over the results of the ESP. The groups did not produce any substantially new evidence for the evaluation to use unfortunately. A questionnaire was circulated and the summary results 91 In terms of relevance, there were comments that ESP: Did try to harmonize with some donors (JICA and Italy) but with limited success No disagreement was heard over the team s findings over slow pace of decentralisation, weak linkage to other line ministries, and that links to poverty were indirect 92 In terms of efficiency: 23 The presentation is available on the evaluation blog: 23

32 It was noted that significant funds from KIMA were transferred to the ACI component (DKK 40 million), which indicated good linkages and efficient use of resources from a poor performing intervention to one that was performing well. No disagreement was made over the team findings around the over-design of the BS and Aswan GEAPs, weak linkages with other donor projects, and the over-centralised nature of EEAA. 93 In terms of effectiveness: The details of the outputs of the components were endorsed Limitations over the information system results (EREMIS and data unreliability) were considered to be serious. A Strategic Plan for EEAA has been produced, though only in Arabic to date Some debate over the SoE reports that they are produced annually is an achievement but perhaps the quality has suffered as a result. Lack of evidence of results was acknowledged, and PEMA note this was a common problem. The EEAA data portal was felt to be a positive tool that should be further strengthened. No disagreement was heard concerning the team s judgement that the EPF had been slow to disburse over the evaluation period. 94 In terms of impact: Evidence of reduction in pollution seems to exist (rice straw burning, less garbage, cleaner production) but on a rather piecemeal, undocumented basis though some studies were mentioned by ACI but these have not been obtained so far. Numbers of beneficiaries were discussed but it was agreed in the working group on poverty impact, that the basis for the figures needed more careful analysis before these could be accepted. In other areas in legal prosecutions EEAA now has the ability to bring more scientific evidence. Workshop Questionnaire 95 A questionnaire was also administered at the workshop to capture individual responses to the questions concerning the general improvement in environmental regulation in Egypt, the success of the ESP, and the performance of Danida compared to other development partners. 23 responses were collected and detailed results are given in Sub-Annex The results gave an overall positive impression of environmental trends over the past five years, with 83% stating that enforcement of environmental legislation had shown major improvement, and that there had been improvement in cooperation between ministries (though only 57% felt the improvement had been major). The SOE report was felt to be useful by 70% of the respondents and 74% stated that public awareness of the environment had shown major improvement. On EMU and RBO capacity, a slight majority regarded these agencies as having sufficient capacity to fulfil their roles (although one third chose not to answer the question). 97 Of the three ESP components the most successful in achieving its objectives was the ACI component (74% regarded it as satisfactory or highly satisfactory), followed by 24

33 SDEM (69%) and then PMU (61%). There was no particular pattern between the scoring and the type of institution to which the respondent belonged. In terms of sustainability, the results were less positive (although 45% of respondents left this section blank). For those that answered, the results of SDEM and ACI components were seen as most likely to be sustainable (43% and 44%), while 26% felt the results from PMU were likely to be sustained. 25

34 5. Conclusions The main conclusions of the country visit are: 1. ESP provides a valuable example of the relatively early introduction of a programme approach by Danida in the environment sector (earlier than the other focus countries in Africa to be evaluated under this exercise). It was originally designed at a stage when the definition of programmatic approaches made no reference to Paris or other aid effectiveness principles 24, and before Danida had decentralised its operations. It incorporated legacy projects that were not easily linked to programme approach and was revised to be more streamlined. 2. Evolution of Danida s guidance on programme approach supported some principles that the revised ESP found hard to follow (around poverty reduction, aid harmonisation, policy dialogue and long-term engagement for example). 3. Indicators and Monitoring. Due to weak M&E data capture and reporting, outcome and impacts from ESP become unclear in general and attribution becomes mostly impossible. Although good impact indicators were devised by an external study previous to the ESP redesign in , these indicators were never operationalised by the programme. 4. Relevance: The Evaluation find that the relevance of the ESP was high at the time of its formulation: Firstly, ESP brought together a number of ongoing projects into a single frame of bilateral cooperation, and sought to integrate policy level work with EEAA capacity building at centre and regional level, and governorate interventions. Secondly, ESP responded to a moment when Egypt was in need of assistance to further strengthen and implement a fairly new and evolving legal and policy framework for the environmental sector, including decentralization of environmental management. Thirdly, ESP sought to link public action at national and local level with support for private sector initiatives to introduce cleaner production technology. On the other hand, ESP did not include any explicit consideration on how the national policy framework for the environment is linked to other implementing sectors and ESP interventions were only to a limited extent harmonized with other donors. 5. Efficiency. The evaluation finds that in general the efficiency of ESP was positive. In particular, the programme has succeeded in providing a mix of complementary inputs and modalities that has shown to be successful, for instance the balance between public and private sector support and between establishing of work planning, communication lines and awareness raising activities on the one hand with provision of equipment and training on the other hand. In terms of using national procedures for programme implementation, a number of attempts were made to use the existing set-up within EPF, this however only succeeded to a limited extent. Likewise, limited synergy seems to have been generated between ESP Components. 24 Although other initiatives such as the Marrakech Declaration in 2003 signed by the G77 were in place. ( ) 26

35 6. Effectiveness. Positive results are documented mainly around better services resulting from (i) raised capacity and improved legislative framework; (ii) various discrete environmental benefits from localised government, private sector and community investments; (iii) raised awareness from communication activities; and (iv) raised private sector consultancy capacity for advising industry on cleaner production and energy efficiency. 7. Impacts. Evidence of ESP impacts from available reports, surveys and other data sources is limited and has not been collected on a systematic basis. It is evident that both the Bezra magazine campaigns and the GEAPs used poverty as a guiding intervention criterion. However, the selection of EMUs for ESP support was done on a competitive basis, favouring capable EMUs with more resources. Likewise, the criteria for selecting demonstration projects for the ACI component from the revolving fund was based on a financial and environmental assessment of the proposed project, and not particularly related to poverty. In terms of gender there is no evidence of data having been collated to measure impact. Some environmental impacts are reported from the cleaner production projects, funded through the revolving fund under the ACI component, but it has not been possible for the evaluation to validate these findings or determine any replication effects. Finally, no attempt was made by ESP to provide a systematic overview of the environmental impact from the 86 demonstration projects, cofunded through ESP. 8. Important sustainability aspects of the ESP interventions have been strengthened by legal and institutional developments before and after ESP completion (initiatives that were initially supported through ESP) including reorganisation of EEAA and upgrade of EEAA, RBO and EMU offices; amendments to the Environmental Law 94; expansion of the ECO office; as well as approval of continued funding for communication/awareness raising activities (the Bezra figure). The evaluation however also identified areas of concern in terms of sustainability: - A combination of highly centralized, lengthy and unpredictable staff recruitment processes within the governmental system, together with high staff turnover (in particular within specialized, technical staff categories, that have been trained by ESP) and difficulties in attracting new qualified experts, has caused gaps in qualified staff within EEAA, RBOs and EMUs. One area seriously affected is the EREMIS data system (established and implemented through heavy ESP support) where EEAA, RBOs and EMUs are now facing huge challenges to operate the system and make real use of its potential as an efficient and reliable data management system. - EMUs are facing serious challenges in implementing and updating the GEAPs (prepared through ESP support). The EPF still has not functioned as a major funding source for GEAP projects, as expected. In addition, GEAP demonstration projects, funded through ESP funding, appear not to be financially sustainable but are depending on the goodwill of the Governors to cover costs for maintenance and repair of equipment, transport services as well as some operational costs. Finally, it is doubtful whether an update of the GEAPs will take place, in particular of the more sophisticated GEAPs prepared for Beni Suef and Aswan Governorates. 27

36 - Lack of continuous training constitutes a serious risk for sustaining and upgrading of key capacities within certain areas of the established decentralized environmental management system. In particular, a number of technical, hands-on training courses seem not to be offered anymore to the staff after completion of ESP. The Unified Training System, established within EEAA, is currently not able to satisfy training demand from the decentralised offices. - The private sector revolving fund, managed through the ECO office, will not be sustained in the long-term due to negative real interest rates. 9. Coordination, Coherence and Complimentarity. There is a moderate level of coordination amongst donors in the environmental sector in terms of exchange of information. A matrix of donor engagement has been prepared. A formal division of labour does not exist, but an informal division of labour has been agreed. The tendency is for donors to implement projects in parallel in the sector. In general, ESP has operated independently of other donor initiatives in the sector. Other projects are operating in parallel even within EEAA (the Environment Pollution Abatement Project II has a separate office in EEAA for example). Some coherence and complimentarity was achieved by ESP following on from approaches developed under the Support to Environmental Assessment and Management (SEAM) project (DFID-funded), in terms of approaches to developing GEAPs and capacity building at governorate level. In addition, the ESP linked with the work on environmental information monitoring supported by CIDA (Egyptian Environment Information System). 6. Lessons Learned 1. Donor Coordination and Harmonization. Where a sector faces declining donor support, the appetite for strong coordination and for joint investment in sector wide approaches is likely to be weak. 2. Programme Approach: Through ESP it was successfully demonstrated how to bring together a number of ongoing projects into a single programme frame, and at the same time, on the one hand, integrate policy level work with capacity building at central, regional and local levels while, on the other hand, link public sector intervention at national and local level with support for private sector initiatives. 3. Programme Coverage. In relation to sustainability and impact, the ESP would have been more effective if it had had a longer timeframe, broader stakeholder scope, better harmonizing with other (similar/parallel) donor interventions, and more clear generation of synergies between the programme components. Although these issues would all have contributed towards a more complex programme intervention, this is a challenge that needs to be faced when preparing environmental programming. 4. Programme Input and Modalities. The ESP has demonstrated positively the importance of introducing a mixed package of complementary inputs and modalities as part of 28

37 the programme approach. A number of the various programme activities have reinforced each other and contributed to greater programme efficiency. 5. The Influence from External Factors. When working with complex, centralised and hierarchical governmental structures, it is important to carefully identify, analyse and assess the scope and limitations provided by external factors (political power, budget allocations, staffing, legalisation and regulations etc.) in relation to expected programme achievements. The influence from such external factors on programme impact and sustainability can be significant. 6. Short-Term vs. Long-Term Impacts from Private and Public Sector Interventions. Although it may be argued from ESP interventions that impacts from environmental interventions can be generated faster through private sector support than from working with central governmental institutions, it would be wrong to conclude that all environmental support should then be allocated towards the private sector. It must be acknowledged that results and impacts from interventions within the governmental structures and systems may take longer to materialize compared to the private sector. In the longer term, however, the sustainability of the private sector interventions will often depend on the framework created by the public institutions. It is therefore important to understand public and private sector interventions as being mutually interdependent and that it is the specific mix and the synergies generated from these public - private sector interventions that will determine the longer term sustainability and impacts. 7. Indicators and Monitoring. Measuring results requires more than devising good indicators and proposing that they are reported on. Resources and management plus development partner commitment are required if they are to be actually used. 8. Poverty Reduction. Though the underlying reason for Danish aid, was not the principle stated objective of the ESP. Furthermore, establishing a link to poverty alleviation is not easy in any sector, but in the environment it requires explicit linkages and means of verification. Where poverty reduction is seen as an indirect and longer-term consequence of support, it may not prove feasible to attempt to measure such reduction. But, as a minimum, the programme design needs to be specific on this. 9. Private Sector Involvement. The decision to place the ECO office within a private industrial organisation (FEI) instead of within a governmental institution (EEAA) turned out to be strategically the right thing to do. In this way it became much easier to establish a trustworthy relation to private companies and to convince them that investments in environmentally friendly technology would be also economically beneficial. Because of the innovative nature of this initiative, and the lack of a broad evaluation of the results and of the implications for opportunities elsewhere, the evaluation recommends that Danida (possibly with EEAA) considers undertaking an independent evaluation study of ECO/ACI. 10. Establishing of Public-Private Sector Cooperation and improved Interaction between different Levels of the Governmental Structure. The explicit focus in ESP on communication and awareness raising activities has been an effective means to break down existing communication / knowledge barriers between different entities. In particular, these efforts have been effective for establishing of public-private sector cooperation as well as to improve interaction between different levels of the governmental structure (EEAA, RBO s and EMUs). 29

38 30

39 Sub-annexes 1. List of Stakeholders met 2. Time line 3. Logic Model 4. Workshop Results 5. Workshop Questionnaire Results 31

40 Sub-annex 1. List of Stakeholders Met Organization Name Position Date of meeting Danida Bente Schiller Senior Technical Advisor/UFT 22/10/2009 Danida (former) Anders Ex-Chief Technical Advisor, Bjørnshave ESP 22/10/2009 Embassy of Denmark Cairo Ministry of International Cooperation PEMA Ministry of International Cooperation PEMA Danida Anne Louise Winslov Amr Saleh Ambassador Mahmoud El Said Margrethe Holm Andersen Deputy Head of Mission, First Secretary Researcher and Evaluation Officer 3/11/2009 3/11/2009 Executive Director 3/11/2009 Deputy Head/Evaluation Department 3/11/2009 Embassy of Denmark Cairo Ministry of International Cooperation PEMA Ministry of International Cooperation PEMA EEAA EEAA Dina Hamed Commercial Advisor 15/11/2009 Sally George Sally Tanani Moheeb Abdel Sattar Mouneer Labeeb Researcher and Evaluation Officer Researcher and Evaluation Officer Director of information and Computer Center 15/11/ /11/ /11/2009 Climate Change Consultant 16/11/2009 EEAA Salah El Sherif EMU General Department Manager 16/11/2009 Eco Con Serv Mogens Dinesn Monitoring Consultant 17/11/2009 EEAA Said El Dalil EPF Executive Director 17/11/2009 EEAA Ali Abu Sedra Secretary General Head of the sector for Branches Affairs 17/11/2009 EFI ECO Ahmed Kamal ECO Manager 18/11/2009 EEAA Suez RBO Layla El Kholy Regional Branch Office Director KFW Office Cairo Waleed Abdel Rehim 18/11/2009 Deputy Director 19/11/

41 Organization Name Position Date of meeting KFW Office Cairo Beni Suef Governorate EMU Andreas Holtkotte Medhat Awad Director 19/11/2009 General Manager Environmental Management Department in Governorate 19/11/2009 Chemonics Ahmed Gaber Director 22/11/2009 Environics Yasser Sherif General Manager 22/11/2009 EEAA PPSI Technical Assistance EEAA EEAA Greater Cairo RBO UNDP Ministry of International Cooperation PEMA Ministry of International Cooperation Philip Jargo Project Coordinator 22/11/2009 Ekhlas Gamal El deen Atwa Hussein Mohamed Bayoumi Amr Saleh Mustafa Talaat Abdel- Malek Head of Central Department for Water Quality Regional Branch Office Director Environmental Specialist Assistant Resident Representative Researcher and Evaluation Officer Economic Adviser to the Minister of International Cooperation,Co-Chair, OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, Paris 22/11/ /11/ /11/ /11/ /11/2009 Italian Cooperation Andrea Sogno Assistant PCU Coordinator 23/11/2009 EEAA EEAA Gharbeya RBO EEAA Regional Branch Office Qalubeya Governorate Fatma Abu Shouk Gamal El Saedy Ibrahim Hamza Raafat Fatthy Head of Department Evaluation of Environmental impact and head of the Environmental management Sector Regional Branch Office Director Greater Cairo Regional Branch Office General Manager Environmental Management Department in Governorate IFC Selcuk Tanatar Program Manager, Advisory Service MENA 23/11/ /11/ /11/ /11/ /12/09 JICA Osamu Tanaka Representative 23/12/09 JICA Sherif Yousry Senior Program Officer 23/12/09 EEAA Fouad Megahed Environmental Awareness 24/12/09 33

42 Organization Name Position Date of meeting Consultant EEAA EEAA Engineering Industries Co Manal El Tantawy Tahra El hefnawy General Director Marine Pollution and Ports 24/12/09 Foreign Projects Evaluation 24/12/09 EEAA Haitham Kamal Awareness and Public 24/12/09 Eng. Ahmed El-Bially CEO 13/1/10 Engineering Industries Co Eng. Ibrahim El-Bially Partner 13/1/10 World Bank Maged Hamed Senior Environmental Specialist, MNSSD EEAA Mawaheb Abu El Azm 19/1/10 CEO 25/1/10 Chloride Egypt Walid Eldowdi GM 2/2/10 34

43 Sub-annex 2. Timeline 35

44 36

45