Hazard Analysis. Techniques for. System Safety. Second Edition. Clifton A. Ericson, II Fredericksburg, Virginia. Wiley
|
|
|
- Brendan Atkins
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety Second Edition Clifton A. Ericson, II Fredericksburg, Virginia Wiley
2 Contents PREFACE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xxi xxiii 1. System Safety and Hazard Analysis Introduction / The Need for Hazard Analysis / System Safety Background / System Safety Overview / System Safety Process / System Safety Standards / System Safety Principles / Key Terms / Summary / 9 2. Systems System Concept / System Attributes / System Types / System Life Cycle / System Development / System Development Process / System Hierarchy / System Views / 18 v
3 Vi CONTENTS 2.9 System Development Artifacts / Systems Complexity and Safety / System Requirements / System Laws / Summary / Hazards, Mishap, and Risk 3.1 Introduction / Hazard, Mishap, and Risk Definitions / Accident (Mishap) Theory / The Hazard-Mishap Relationship / Hazard Risk / The Components of a Hazard / Hazard Triangle / Hazard Actuation / Hazard Causal Factors / Hazard-Mishap Probability Example / Recognizing Hazards / Hazard Description / Hazard Theory Summary / Hazard Analysis Features 4.1 Introduction / Types Versus Technique / Description of Hazard Analysis Types / Conceptual Design Hazard Analysis Type / Preliminary Design Hazard Analysis Type / Detailed Design Hazard Analysis Type / System Design Hazard Analysis Type / Operations Design Hazard Analysis Type / Human Health Design Hazard Analysis Type (HD-HAT) / Requirements Design Hazard Analysis Type (RD-HAT) / The Timing of Hazard Analysis Types / The Interrelationship of Hazard Analysis Types / Hazard Analysis Techniques / Hazard Analysis Technique Attributes / Primary and Secondary Techniques / Inductive and Deductive Techniques / Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques / Summary / 67
4 5. Hazard Recognition and Management 5.1 Introduction / Hazard Analysis Tasks / Plan the Hazard Analysis / Understand the System Design / Acquire Hazard Analysis Tools / Identify Hazards / Validate Hazards / Assess Risk / Mitigate Risk / Verify Mitigation / Accept Risk / Track Hazards / Hazard Recognition / Hazard Recognition Introduction / Hazard Recognition: System Perspectives / Hazard Recognition: Failure Perspectives / Key Hazard Recognition Factors / Hazard Recognition Basics / Hazard Recognition Sources / Describing the Identified Hazard / Hazard Types by General Circumstances / Hazard Types by Analysis Category / Modelling Hazard Space / System Mishap Model / System Mishap Model Examples / Summary / Functional Hazard Analysis 6.1 FHA Introduction / FHA Background / FHA History / FHA Theory / FHA Methodology / FHA Worksheets / FHA Example 1: Aircraft Flight Functions / FHA Example 2: Aircraft Landing Gear Software / FHA Example 3: Ace Missile System / FHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common FHA Mistakes to Avoid / FHA Summary / 108
5 Viii CONTENTS 7. Preliminary Hazard List Analysis 7.1 PHL Introduction / PHL Background / PHL History / PHL Theory / PHL Methodology / PHL Worksheet / Hazard Checklists / PHL Guidelines / PHL Example: Ace Missile System / PHL Advantages and Disadvantages / Common PHL Mistakes to Avoid / PHL Summary / Preliminary Hazard Analysis 8.1 PHA Introduction / PHA Background / PHA History / PHA Theory / PHA Methodology / PHA Worksheet / PHA Guidelines / PHA Example: Ace Missile System / PHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common PHA Mistakes to Avoid / PHA Summary / Subsystem Hazard Analysis 9.1 SSHA Introduction / SSHA Background / SSHA History / SSHA Theory / SSHA Methodology / SSHA Worksheet / SSHA Guidelines / SSHA Example: Ace Missile System / SSHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common SSHA Mistakes to Avoid / SSHA Summary / 162
6 10. System Hazard Analysis 10.1 SHA Introduction / SHA Background / SHA History / SHA Theory / SHA Methodology / SHA Worksheet / SHA Guidelines / SHA Example / SHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common SHA Mistakes to Avoid / SHA Summary / Operating and Support Hazard Analysis 11.1 O&SHA Introduction / O&SHA Background / O&SHA History / O&SHA Definitions / Operation / Procedure / Task / O&SHA Theory / O&SHA Methodology / O&SHA Worksheet / O&SHA Hazard Checklists / O&SHA Support Tools / O&SHA Guidelines / O&SHA Examples / Example 1 / O&SHA Example 2 / O&SHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common O&SHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Health Hazard Analysis 12.1 HHA Introduction / HHA Background / HHA History / HHA Theory / 200
7 X CONTENTS 12.5 HHA Methodology / HHA Worksheet / Human Health Hazard Checklist / HHA Example / HHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common HHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Requirements Hazard Analysis 13.1 RHA Introduction / RHA Background / RHA History / RHA Theory / RHA Methodology / RHA Worksheets / RHA Example / RHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common RHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Environmental Hazard Analysis (EHA) 14.1 EHA Introduction / EHA Background / EHA History / EHA Theory / EHA Methodology / EHA Worksheet / Example Checklists / EHA Example / EHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common EHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / References / National Environmental Policy Act / Environmental Protection Agency / Fault Tree Analysis 15.1 FTA Introduction / FTA Background / FTA History / FTA Theory / FTA Methodology / 244
8 FT Building Blocks / FT Definitions / FT Construction: Basics / FT Construction: Advanced / FT Construction Rules / Functional Block Diagrams / FT Cut Sets / MOCUS Algorithm / Bottom-Up Algorithm / FT Mathematics / Probability of Success / Probability of Failure / Boolean Rules for FTA / AND Gate Probability Expansion / OR Gate Probability Expansion / FT Probability Expansion / Inclusion-Exclusion Approximation / Probability / Importance Measures / Cut Set Importance / Fussell-Vesely Importance / Risk Reduction Worth / Risk Achievement Worth / Birnbaum's Importance Measure / FT Example 1 / FT Example 2 / FT Example 3 / Phase-and Time-Dependent FTA / Dynamic FTA / FTA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common FTA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 16.1 FMEA Introduction / FMEA Background / FMEA History / FMEA Definitions / FMEA Theory / FMEA Structural and Functional Models / FMEA Product and Process FMEA / 283
9 Xli CONTENTS FMEA Functional Failure Modes / FMEA Hardware Failure Modes / FMEA Software Failure Modes / Quantitative Data Sources / Methodology / FMEA Worksheet / FMEA Example 1: Hardware Product FMEA / FMEA Example 3: Functional FMEA / FMEA Level of Detail / FMEA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common FMEA Mistakes to Avoid / FMEA Summary / Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis 17.1 Introduction / HAZOP Analysis Background / HAZOP History / HAZOP Theory / HAZOP Methodology / Design Representations / System Parameters / Guide Words / Deviation from Design Intent / HAZOP Worksheet / HAZOP Example 1/ HAZOP Example 2 / HAZOP Advantages and Disadvantages / Common HAZOP Analysis Mistakes to Avoid / HAZOP Summary / Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 18.1 ETA Introduction / ETA Background / ETA History / ETA Definitions / ETA Theory / ETA Methodology / ETA Worksheet / ETA Example 1 / ETA Example 2 / ETA Example 3 / 324
10 18.11 ETA Example 4 / ETA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common ETA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Cause Consequence Analysis 19.1 Introduction / CCA Background / CCA History / CCA Definitions / CCA Theory / CCA Methodology / CCD Symbols / CCA Worksheet / CCA Example 1: Three-Component Parallel System / CCA Example 2: Gas Pipeline System / Reducing Repeated Events / CCA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common CCA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Common Cause Failure Analysis 20.1 Introduction / CCFA Background / CCFA History / CCFA Definitions / Independent Event / Dependent Event / Independence (in Design) / Dependence (in Design) / Common Cause Failure / Common Mode Failure / Cascading Failure / Mutually Exclusive Events / CCF Root Cause / CCF Coupling Factor / Common Cause Component Group / CCFA Theory / CCFA Methodology / CCFA Process Step 2: Initial System Fault Tree Model / 347
11 XlV CONTENTS CCFA Process Step 3: Common Cause Screening / CCFA Process Step 4: Detailed CCF Analysis / CCF Defense Mechanisms / CCFA Example / CCFA Models / CCFA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common CCFA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Software Hazard Analysis 21.1 SwHA Introduction / SwHA Background / SwHA History / SwHA Theory / SwHA Methodology / SwHA Worksheet / Software Criticality Level / SwHA Example / Software Fault Tree Analysis / SwHA Advantages and Disadvantages / SwHA Mistakes to Avoid / SwHA Summary / Process Hazard Analysis 22.1 PHA Introduction / PHA Background / PHA History / Processing Mishaps / Process Safety Management / PHA Theory / PHA Methodology / PHA Worksheet / Supporting Notes / PHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common PHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Test Hazard Analysis 23.1 THA Introduction / THA Background / 390
12 23.3 THA History / THA Theory / THA Methodology / THA Worksheet / THA Considerations / Verification / Validation / Testing in the System Development Life Cycle / Types of Testing / Standard Development Test Types / Performance Tests / Software Performance Tests / Special Safety-Related Testing / THA Safety Goals / THA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common THA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Fault Hazard Analysis 24.1 FHA Introduction / FHA Background / FHA History / FHA Theory / FHA Methodology / FHA Worksheet / FHA Example / FHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common FHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Sneak Circuit Analysis 25.1 SCA Introduction / SCA Background / SCA History / SCA Definitions / SCA Theory / SCA Methodology / Step 1: Acquire Data / Step 2: Code Data / Step 3: Process Data / Step 4: Produce Network Trees / 422
13 XW CONTENTS Step 5: Identify Topographs / Step 6: Perform Analysis / Step 7: Generate SCA Report / Example 1: Sneak Path / Example 2: Sneak Label / Example 3: Sneak Indicator / Example Sneak Clues / Software Sneak Circuit Analysis / SCA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common SCA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Markov Analysis MA Introduction / MA Background / MA History / MA Definitions / MA Theory / MA Methodology / State Transition Diagram Construction / State Equation Construction / MA Examples / Markov Chain / Markov Model oftwo-component Series System with No Repair / Markov Model of Two-Component Parallel System with No Repair / Markov Model of Two-Component Parallel System with Component Repair / Markov Model of Two-Component Parallel System with Component/System Repair / Markov Model of Two-Component Parallel System with Sequencing / MA and FTA Comparisons / MA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common MA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Petri Net Analysis PNA Introduction / PNA Background / PNA History / 447
14 27.4 PNA Definitions / PNA Theory / PNA Methodology / PNA Example / PNA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common PNA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Barrier Analysis 28.1 BA Introduction / BA Background / BA History / BA Definitions / Energy Source / Energy Path / Energy Barrier / BA Theory / BA Methodology / Example Checklist of Energy Sources for BA / BA Considerations / BA Worksheet / BA Example / BA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common Barrier Analysis Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Bent Pin Analysis 29.1 BPA Introduction / BPA Background / BPA History / BPA Theory / BPA Methodology / BPA Worksheet / BPA Example / BPA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common BPA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Management Oversight Risk Tree Analysis 30.1 Introduction To MORT Analysis / MORT Background / 483
15 xviii CONTENTS 30.3 MORT History / MORT Theory / MORT Methodology / MORT Analysis Worksheet / MORT Advantages and Disadvantages / Common MORT Analysis Mistakes to Avoid / MORT Summary / Job Hazard Analysis 31.1 JHA Introduction / JHA Background / JHA History / JHA Theory / JHA Methodology / JHA Worksheet / Example Hazard Checklist / JHA Tool / JHA Example / JHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common JHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Threat Hazard Analysis 32.1 THA Introduction / THA Background / THA History / THA Theory / THA Methodology / Cradle-to-Grave Sequences / Threat Scenarios / Characterization of Environments / Threats / THA Worksheet / THA Example / THA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common THA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / System of Systems Hazard Analysis 33.1 SoSHA Introduction / SoSHA Background / 521
16 33.3 SoSHA History / SoS Theory / SoS Safety and Hazards / SoSHA Tools / SMM / SoS Component System Matrix / SoSHA Methodology / SoSHA Example / SoSHA Worksheet / SoSHA Guidelines / SoSHA Advantages and Disadvantages / Common SoSHA Mistakes to Avoid / Summary / Summary 34.1 Tenets of Hazard Analysis / Description of Tenets / Hazards and Mishaps are Not Chance Events; Hazards Lead to Mishaps If Left Unchecked / Hazards are Created During System Design and Exist with the Design / Hazards are Comprised of Three Components: HA, IMs, and TTO / Many Hazards Cannot be Eliminated due to the Hazard Sources that are Required by the System / Hazards Present Risk; Risk is the Metric for Measuring the Criticality or Danger Level of a Hazard / Hazards can be Modified via Design Methods, which in Turn can Reduce Risk / Hazard Analysis is the Key to Preventing Mishaps; Hazard Identification and Mitigation Reduce Mishap Risk / The System Mishap Model is an Effective Hazard Analysis Tool / Hazard Analysis and Hazard Descriptions can Easily Become Abused, Confused, and/or Misused / Utilizing More than One Hazard Analysis Technique is Recommended / Hazard Mitigation is not Hazard Elimination / Hazard Risk is the Same as Mishap Risk / 546
17 XX CONTENTS There are Both Primary and Secondary Hazard Analysis Techniques / There are Pseudo-Hazards and Real Hazards / FINIS / 547 Appendix A List of Acronyms 549 Appendix B Glossary 552 Appendix C Hazard Checklists 567 Appendix D References 609 Index 613
COMPARISON OF PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODS
COMPARISON OF PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS (PHA) METHODS by Primatech Inc. The hazard and operability (HAZOP) study is the most commonly used process hazard analysis (PHA) method. However, there are many other
Hazard Analysis Technique Selection
Hazard Analysis Technique Selection Kelsey L. F. Curran, CIH, CHMM Principal Hazard Analyst and ES&H Specialist Clover Leaf Solutions Alliance of Hazard Materials Professionals 2016 National Conference
ELEMENTS OF A HIGH PERFORMING SAFETY PROGRAM
ELEMENTS OF A HIGH PERFORMING SAFETY PROGRAM OBJECTIVE To provide a basic framework for creating, improving or sustaining an Environmental Safety and Health Program System performing at its highest level.
Reliability Analysis Techniques: How They Relate To Aircraft Certification
Reliability Analysis Techniques: How They Relate To Aircraft Certification Mark S. Saglimbene, Director Reliability, Maintainability and Safety Engr., The Omnicon Group, Inc., Key Words: R&M in Product
RAM & LCC for railways Industry: What s really necessary to high performance achievement?
RAM & LCC for railways Industry: What s really necessary to high performance achievement? Despite the very well organized and clear information in standard EN 50126, additional RAMS methods must be implemented,
Software System Safety
JOINT SERVICES SOFTWARE SAFETY AUTHORITIES (JS-SSA) Software System Implementation Process and Tasks Supporting MIL-STD-882E With Joint Software System Engineering Handbook References Developed by the
Automated System Validation By: Daniel P. Olivier & Curtis M. Egan
Automated System Validation By: Daniel P. Olivier & Curtis M. Egan In today s technical environment validation practices are both a requirement and an important tool in the medical and pharmaceutical industry.
List of Tables. Part I Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures
List of Tables Part I Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures 1.1 Popular Synonyms for Hazard Evaluation 12 1.2 CCPS Elements of Process Safety Management 13 1.3 Elements of Process Accidents 18 1.4
Software System Safety
JOINT SERVICES SOFTWARE SAFETY AUTHORITIES (JS SSA) Software System Implementation Process and Tasks Supporting MIL STD 882E With Joint Software System Engineering Handbook References JS SSA IG Rev. B
Dependability Assurance of Industrial Production Processes
Dependability Assurance of Industrial Production Processes Dr. Marianna Lendvay Associate Professor, Institute of Microelectronics and Technology, Budapest Tech Kandó Kálmán Faculty of Electrical Engineering
Risk Management from the Point of View of a Competent Authority
Risk Management from the Point of View of a Competent Authority Rudolf Völler GMP Inspectorate, Regierungspräsidium, Darmstadt (Germany) Summary A working risk evaluation system is a key element of drug
SIL Implementation on Safety Functions in Mass Transit System
SIL Implementation on Safety Functions in Mass Transit System James Li Centre of Competence for Mass Transit AME, Bombardier Transportation, Kingston, Canada E-mail: james.li@rail.bombardier.com (Received
Advisory Circular. Date: DRAFT Initiated by: AIR-110
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular Subject: DETERMINING THE CLASSIFICATION OF A CHANGE TO TYPE DESIGN. Date: DRAFT Initiated by: AIR-110 AC No: 21.93-1
CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION The Regulatory Focus on Quality Risk Management Objectives of Risk Assessment and Risk Management: The Key Concepts Key Terms in Relation to Risk and Risk Assessment Structure of
Safety and Security Process Measurement
Safety and Security Process Measurement Paul Caseley - DSTL Information Management, UK Graham Clark, John Murdoch, Tony Powell - Department of Management Studies, University of York, UK PSM Conference,
System Safety in Systems Engineering V-Charts
System Safety in Systems Engineering V-Charts System Safety is an integral part of the systems engineering (SE) process, providing specific inputs by activity and phase as illustrated in the five V-Charts
ADVANCED PROCESS HAZOP
SECTOR / HEALTH & SAFETY NON-TECHNICAL & CERTIFIED TRAINING COURSE It is universally recognised that for any Company to succeed it must take a proactive approach to risk management. Over the last few years
There s been an incident on the project now what?
There s been an incident on the project now what? It's fine to celebrate success but it s more important to heed the lessons of failure. Bill Gates Investigate only those incidents you want to prevent.
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR QUALITY CERTIFIED RELIABILITY ENGINEER (CRE) BODY OF KNOWLEDGE
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR QUALITY CERTIFIED RELIABILITY ENGINEER (CRE) BODY OF KNOWLEDGE The topics in this Body of Knowledge include additional detail in the form of subtext explanations and the cognitive
Safety Evaluation with AADLv2
Safety Evaluation with AADLv2 Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Julien Delange 09/24/2013 Agenda Overview of AADL Error-Model Annex Approach for Safety Evaluation
Risk Assessment Techniques
This article was downloaded by: [Stephen N. Luko] On: 27 May 2014, At: 08:21 Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer
Need for Hazard Analysis. Limitations of Formal Methods
4. Hazard Analysis Limitations of Formal Methods We have seen limitations of formal verification of computer systems. Formal methods don t take into consideration hardware aspects. E.g. that the wires
ROSAS Seminar RAMS in Railways. Wolfgang Berns 17 May 2017
ROSAS Seminar 2017 RAMS in Railways Wolfgang Berns 17 May 2017 15.02.2018 1 ROSAS Seminar Safety in Railways Fribourg, 17 May 2017 Agenda Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety of Rail Systems
Supporting Safety Evaluation Process using AADL
Supporting Safety Evaluation Process using AADL Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 Julien Delange and Peter Feiler 12/09/2013 Safety Analysis issues (aka the
Safety Analysis. Chapter 24. RAM Commander s Safety Module. Chapter 24 Safety Analysis 551
Chapter 24 Safety Analysis 551 Chapter 24 Safety Analysis RAM Commander s Safety Module RAM Commander s Safety module is the latest addition to the unique scope of the RAM Commander features. It implements
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IEC 60300-3-1 Second edition 2003-01 Dependability management Part 3-1: Application guide Analysis techniques for dependability Guide on methodology Gestion de la sûreté de fonctionnement
Safety Management Center. DNV IT Global Services Safety Engineering / Management in the automotive industry. Content
DNV IT Global Services Safety Engineering / Management in the automotive industry Enhancing Trust and Confidence in IT Automotive SPIN Italia 4 Workshop on Automotive Software Torino, 11.12.2009 Dr. Klaus
Reliability Improvement of Electric Power Steering System Based on ISO 26262
2013 International Conference on Quality, Reliability, Risk, Maintenance, and Safety Engineering (QR2MSE) 2013 International Conference on Materials and Reliability (ICMR) 2013 International Conference
4. Hazard Analysis. CS 313 High Integrity Systems/ CS M13 Critical Systems. Limitations of Formal Methods. Limitations of Formal Methods
CS 313 High Integrity Systems/ CS M13 Critical Systems Course Notes Chapter 4: Hazard Analysis Anton Setzer Dept. of Computer Science, Swansea University http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/ csetzer/lectures/ critsys/11/index.html
Software Project & Risk Management Courses Offered by The Westfall Team
Software Project & Risk Management is a 5-day course designed to provide a knowledge base and practical skills for anyone interested in implementing or improving Software Project and Risk Management techniques
420 INDEX. Basic event, in FTA, see Fault Tree Analysis, glossary Bicycle examples, see All-terrain bicycle examples
Index Accelerated testing, 172 173 Access to failure information, 76 78 Action strategies to reduce risk to acceptable level, 108, 109, 163, 165, 250, 258 actions to reduce detection risk, 172 actions
Reliability Engineering
Alessandro Birolini Reliability Engineering Theory and Practice Sixth Edition Springer 1 Basic Concepts, Quality and Reliability Assurance of Complex Equipment & Systems.. 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Basic
Appendix. Process Inputs and Outputs
3601cA.fm Page 493 Wednesday, October 26, 2005 12:47 AM Appendix A Process and Throughout this book, PMP: Management Professional Study Guide, 3rd Edition, I ve discussed the inputs and outputs to the
Methods of Risk Assessment and their suitability in a logistic environment
Bemeleit, B.; Schumacher, J.; Hans, C.: Methods of Risk Assessment and their Suitability in a Logistic Environment. In: Symposium on Risk Management and Cyber-Informatics: RMCI \'05 in the Context of the
XA RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE (RCM) PROGRAM FOR CHASHMA NPP (CHASNUPP)
XA0054512 RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE (RCM) PROGRAM FOR CHASHMA NPP (CHASNUPP) S. KHALID, S.A. KHAN CHASNUPP, Chashma Nuclear Power Project, Islamabad, Pakistan Abstract This paper describes the proposed
Safety assessment methodology of railway signalling systems in Korea
Risk Analysis VI 503 Safety assessment methodology of railway signalling systems in Korea J.-G. Hwang, H.-J. Jo & Y.-G. Yoon Train Control Research Team, Korea Railroad Research Institute (KRRI), Korea
Aircraft Systems Mechanical, Electrical and Avionics.pdf Chap System Design and Development
UNIVERSITY OF SALENTO SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING DEPT. OF ENGINEERING FOR INNOVATION Lecce-Brindisi (Italy) MASTER OF SCIENCE IN AEROSPACE ENGINEERING PROPULSION AND COMBUSTION Aircraft Systems Mechanical,
International System Safety Training Symposium
International Safety Training Symposium Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) Tutorial 5 August 2014 Mr. Adam Scharl NSWCDD, 540-653-7940 adam.scharl@navy.mil Mr. Kevin Stottlar NSWCDD, 540-653-7301 kevin.stottlar@navy.mil
ABIOSH INT L CERTIFICATE IN HAZARD AND OPERABILITY -HAZOP- AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDIES - HAZOP/HAZIDCert
ABIOSH INT L CERTIFICATE IN HAZARD AND OPERABILITY -HAZOP- AND HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) STUDIES - HAZOP/HAZIDCert COURSE OVERVIEW This course is a dual certification course focusing on Hazard and
Changing the way the world thinks about software systems
Changing the way the world thinks about software systems Theorem Proving Conference Cambridge 9/10 December 2013 Sub-Topic 1 Standards Relationships Nick Tudor: njt@drisq.com ToRs Stream 1 Relationship
Applied R&M Manual for Defence Systems (GR-77 Issue 2012)
Applied R&M Manual for Defence Systems (GR-77 Issue 2012) Foreword GR-77 was the "traditional bible" of the AR&M community. As part of their remit to provide advice on "AR&M" the DGSS team extracted those
Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems. Introduction to ARP4754A
Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems Introduction to ARP4754A 23 July, 2014 Avionics Systems Evolution DO-178 ARP4754 ARP4761 DO-254 ARP4754A Early Aviation: mainly mechanical equipment
QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT (QRM) TOOLKIT
QUALITY RISK MANAGEMENT (QRM) TOOLKIT Amanda Bishop McFarland Senior Continuous Process Improvement Analyst Global Quality Risk Management Genzyme, A Sanofi Company Disclaimers The material and perspectives
Application of DO-254 Level A (Appendix B) Design Assurance Objectives of. Elemental Analysis. Mixed Signal (Analog/Digital) Discrete Circuitry
Application of DO-254 Level A (Appendix B) Design Assurance Objectives of Elemental Analysis To Mixed Signal (Analog/Digital) Discrete Circuitry By Dave Duncan Purple Seal Inc. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
Techniques and benefits of incorporating Safety and Security analysis into a Model Based System Engineering Environment
Techniques and benefits of incorporating Safety and Security analysis into a Model Based System Engineering Environment Gavin Arthurs P.E Solution Architect Systems Engineering IBM Software, Rational Common
IS DIGITALIZATION JUST A BUZZ WORD FOR PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT? Pascal Le Gal, PhD IIRSM Meeting, Abu Dhabi, April 4 th 2018
IS DIGITALIZATION JUST A BUZZ WORD FOR PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT? Pascal Le Gal, PhD IIRSM Meeting, Abu Dhabi, April 4 th 2018 Currently Sales Director at Insight Numerics (UAE). Speciliazing in fire and
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IEC 60300-3-1 Second edition 2003-01 Dependability management Part 3-1: Application guide Analysis techniques for dependability Guide on methodology Gestion de la sûreté de fonctionnement
Safety Process Measurement A Review
Safety Process Measurement A Review Report Authors Paul Caseley DSTL/CP06715 V1 6 May, 2003 Paul Caseley N133 DSTL Malvern St. Andrews Road Malvern WR14 3PS UK THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC
9. Verification, Validation, Testing
9. Verification, Validation, Testing (a) Basic Notions (b) Dynamic testing. (c) Static analysis. (d) Modelling. (e) Environmental Simulation. (f) Test Strategies. (g) Tool support. (h) Independent Verification
Contents. List of Acronyms Preface
Contents List of Acronyms Preface xi xv PART I Introduction 1 1 Introduction 3 1.1 The evolution of medical purpose software 3 1.2 Product quality and software quality 4 1.3 On the need for quality in
Expert judgements in probabilistic risk analysis issues in nuclear power plant applications Jan-Erik Holmberg Risk Pilot AB
Expert judgements in probabilistic risk analysis issues in nuclear power plant applications Jan-Erik Holmberg Risk Pilot AB COST Programme Building Expertise for Innovation - Conference on Innovation Decision
EUROCONTROL Guidance Material for Approach Path Monitor Appendix B-2: Generic Safety Plan for APM Implementation
EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR NAVIGATION EUROCONTROL EUROCONTROL Guidance Material for Approach Path Monitor Appendix B-2: Generic Safety Plan for APM Implementation Edition Number : 1.0
RISK MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF THE GAS TURBINE AND ITS OPERABILITY
RISK MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF THE GAS TURBINE AND ITS OPERABILITY Stefan JONAS - Karol BALOG ABSTRACT A risk can produce especially serious safety problems especially in the context of technical
TABLES OF CONTENTS CHAPTER TITLE PAGE
vii TABLES OF CONTENTS CHAPTER TITLE PAGE DECLARATION DEDICATION ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ABSTRACT ABSTRAK TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS LIST OF APPENDICES ii iii iv v vi
TECHNICAL PAPER. Selection of HAZOP or PHR for Retrospective Hazard Reviews (RHRs)
TECHNICAL PAPER Selection of HAZOP or PHR for Retrospective Hazard Reviews (RHRs) 2 SELECTION OF HAZOP OR PHR FOR RHRs TECHNICAL PAPER Many companies in the high hazard process industries have a requirement
R.Raffaelli Bologna 3 maggio 2017
R.Raffaelli Bologna 3 maggio 2017 The data are the end of pipe of a process based on security (data not numbers: accreditation and professional competence) traceability, repeatability and comparison (ex
STPA: A New Hazard Analysis Technique. Presented by Sanghyun Yoon
STPA: A New Hazard Analysis Technique Presented by Sanghyun Yoon Introduction Hazard analysis can be described as investigating an accident before it occurs. Potential causes of accidents can be eliminated
CERTIFIED RELIABILITY ENGINEER (CRE) BODY OF KNOWLEDGE MAP 2018
CERTIFIED RELIABILITY ENGINEER (CRE) BODY OF KNOWLEDGE MAP 2018 The Certified Reliability Engineer (CRE) Body of Knowledge () has been updated to ensure that the most current state of reliability practice
Risk Management Tools and Techniques
Risk Management Tools and Techniques In supply chain management, the industry has shown that survival of the unexpected is not an accident. - IBM Risk Management study The Supply Chain Leadership Forum
A Comparison of STPA and the ARP 4761 Safety Assessment Process 1
A Comparison of STPA and the ARP 4761 Safety Assessment Process 1 MIT Technical Report 2 Nancy Leveson, MIT Chris Wilkinson, Honeywell Cody Fleming, MIT John Thomas, MIT Ian Tracy, MIT June, 2014 1 This
Test Workflow. Michael Fourman Cs2 Software Engineering
Test Workflow Michael Fourman Introduction Verify the result from implementation by testing each build Plan the tests in each iteration Integration tests for every build within the iteration System tests
INCLUSION OF HUMAN FAILURE IN RISK ASSESSMENT
INCLUSION OF HUMAN FAILURE IN RISK ASSESSMENT Alan G King ABB Engineering Services, Pavilion 9, Belasis Hall Technology Park, Billingham, Cleveland TS23 4YS, UK; Tel.: þ44 (0) 1642 372252, Fax: þ44 (0)
Dealing with chance Four strategies. Simple, direct Absolutes. Persuasion Top management support. Training. Corruption Alienation. 3 lines of defense
Hazard avoidance overview Concepts of Hazard Avoidance Dealing with chance Four strategies Enforcement Psychological Engineering Analytical ١ ٢ Enforcement approach Simple, direct Absolutes Judgment Corruption
Preliminary Investigation on Safety-related Standards
Preliminary Investigation on Safetyrelated s Christian Esposito and Domenico Cotroneo Consorzio Interuniversitario Nazionale per l Informatica (CINI), via Cinthia, Campus Monte S. Angelo, Napoli, Italy
Research and Application of Coal Mine Enterprise Risk Information. Database. Prof. CHEN Quan, JIA Li-meng
Applied Mechanics and Materials Submitted: 2014-09-12 ISSN: 1662-7482, Vol. 696, pp 301-306 Accepted: 2014-09-26 doi:10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.696.301 Online: 2014-11-14 2015 Trans Tech Publications,
RISK MODELING, ASSESSMENT, AND MANAGEMENT. Fourth Edition
RISK MODELING, ASSESSMENT, AND MANAGEMENT Fourth Edition YacovY. Haiines Lawrence R. Quarles Professor of Systems and Information Engineering and Civil and Environmental Engineering Founding Director (1987),
This document is a preview generated by EVS
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IEC 60300-3-1 Second edition 2003-01 Dependability management Part 3-1: Application guide Analysis techniques for dependability Guide on methodology Gestion de la sûreté de fonctionnement
OWNER USER INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM WRITTEN DESCRIPTION CHECKLIST AB-512(b)
Company Name: Written Description of QMS Title and Rev. Status: Person who is responsible for preparing the owner s QMS written description: Name: Title: Telephone No.: ( ) Fax No.: ( ) Cell No.: ( ) E-Mail:
An approach to allow safety requirements to be efficiently decomposed, traced, and validated
An approach to allow safety requirements to be efficiently decomposed, traced, and validated Achille Penna Master Student Software Engineering Internal Supervisor Barbara Gallina Post-Doc Researcher, Mälardalens
PMP TRAINING COURSE CONTENT
PMP TRAINING COURSE CONTENT SECTION1: INTRODUCTION PMI, PMP AND PMBOK What is PMI, PMP, and PMBOK? What do I get out of PMP? How do I get certified? Exam qualifications and PM experience Guidelines to
Risk Management: FDA and Industry Experience. Dan Snider, Ph.D Vice President Morgantown RD Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Risk Management: FDA and Industry Experience Dan Snider, Ph.D Vice President Morgantown RD Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. Disclaimer This presentation contains a summary of the opinion and perspective from
PROCESS SAFETY CODE OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
RESPONSIBLE CARE PROCESS SAFETY CODE OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES Developed by Chemical Industries Council of Malaysia (CICM) (Company No: 82699T) c/o Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers Wisma FMM, No. 3,
COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 1.1 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING
1 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING AND PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 1.1 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING Reliability has a broad meaning in our daily life. In technical terms, reliability is defined as the probability that a product
Software Quality Engineering Courses Offered by The Westfall Team
Building Skills is a 3-day course that is a subset of our course. The course is designed to provide a fundamental knowledge base and practical skills for anyone interested in implementing or improving
26 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
26 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT QUIZ 1 (20 POINTS) True/False (5 points) 1. SARA Title III required companies to develop emergency preparedness plans; recognition, knowledge, and inventories of hazardous
Software Quality Engineering Courses Offered by The Westfall Team
Courses is a 2-day course that is a subset of our course. The course is designed to provide an overview of techniques and practices. This course starts with an overview of software quality engineering
The role of risk and uncertainty in Asset Management.
The role of risk and uncertainty in Asset Management. Achieving a desired balance of performance, cost and risk ISO 55000 James (Jim) Kennedy CPEng, CFAM, CAMA Jim.kennedy1@optusnet.com.au Presentation
Work Plan and IV&V Methodology
Work Plan and IV&V Methodology Technology initiatives and programs should engage with an IV&V process at the project planning phase in order to receive an unbiased, impartial view into the project planning,
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IEC 60812 Second edition 2006-01 Analysis techniques for system reliability Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) This English-language version is derived from the
Space product assurance
ECSS-Q-ST-30-02C Space product assurance Failure modes, effects (and criticality) analysis (FMEA/FMECA) ECSS Secretariat ESA-ESTEC Requirements & Standards Division Noordwijk, The Netherlands Foreword
HOW TO AVOID FAILURES-(FMEA and/or FTA)
HOW TO AVOID FAILURES-(FMEA and/or FTA) "It is the responsibility of the practicing engineer and scientist to understand failures and their role in discovery, invention and design in order to minimize
Process Safety Management (PSM)
Process Safety Management (PSM) General Awareness Training By Gary Whitmore 1 This book is intended to provide the reader with a basic general awareness of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY. Risk analysis of complex technological systems, using the methods listed below:
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY Risk analysis of complex technological systems, using the methods listed below: Risk Identification Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP, using conventional methods, such as guide-words,
Available online at Procedia Engineering 45 (2012 ) Peter KAFKA*
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com Procedia Engineering 45 (2012 ) 2 10 2012 International Symposium on Safety Science and Technology The Automotive Standard ISO 26262, the innovative driver for
Knowledge Areas According to the PMBOK edition 5. Chapter 4 - Integration
Knowledge Areas According to the PMBOK edition 5 Chapter 4 - Integration 4.1 - Develop Project Charter Process Project statement of work Expert Judgment Project charter Business case Facilitation techniques
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARD PRACTICE SYSTEM SAFETY
NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE MIL-STD-882E 11 May 2012 SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-882D 10 February 2000 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STANDARD PRACTICE SYSTEM SAFETY AMSC N/A AREA SAFT FOREWORD 1. This Standard is approved
CORE TOPICS Core topic 3: Identifying human failures. Introduction
CORE TOPICS Core topic 3: Identifying human failures Introduction Human failures are often recognised as being a contributor to incidents and accidents, and therefore this section has strong links to the
Methodology for Selecting the Preferred Networked Computer System Solution for Dynamic Continuous Defense Missions
Methodology for Selecting the Preferred Networked Computer Solution for Dynamic Continuous Defense Missions San Diego Dr. Glenn S. Tolentino Command & Control and Enterprise Engineering Department SPAWAR
Risk Analysis of a Chlorine Handling Facility
Risk Analysis of a Chlorine Handling Facility Dennis C. Hendershot Rohm and Haas Company Engineering Division P.O. Box 584 Bristol, PA 19007 Presentation to the Technical Seminar on Safety and Health in
AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION OF SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM IN CHEMICAL PROCESSES
AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION OF SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM IN CHEMICAL PROCESSES Jinkyung Kim, Younghee Lee and Il Moon Department of Chemical Engineering, Yonsei University, 134 Shinchon-dong Seodaemun-ku,
PtDA Program That Fits All OSHE Fields
PtDA Program That Fits All OSHE Fields Dr. GeorgiPopov, QEP, CMC PtDPrinciple We take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussions: the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences
Modeling and Simulation for System Reliability Analysis: The RAMSAS Method
IEEE SOSE 2012 7th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING July 16-19, 2012 Genoa, Italy Modeling and Simulation for System Reliability Analysis: The RAMSAS Method Alfredo Garro Andrea
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis. ASQ/APICS Joint Meeting May 10, 2017
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis ASQ/APICS Joint Meeting May 10, 2017 FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Agenda What is it? Motivation FMEA Methods Examples What
Risk Management. Welcome to. an indispensable endeavour to build and to ensure safe operation of installations. Peter Kafka. Peter Kafka.
Welcome to 欢迎 Risk Management an indispensable endeavour to build and to ensure safe operation of installations RelConsult 1 List of Item What we should know What we should ask What we should do How we
WHY RISK MANAGEMENT?
WHY RISK MANAGEMENT? 1. LEGISLATIVE DEMANDS 2. IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY AND WORKING CONDITIONS 3. LOSS PREVENTION 4. IMAGE AND COMPANY CULTURE 5. INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE DEMANDS 1. Not observing of legislation
Applying System Safety Methodologies to Consumer Product Safety
Proc. of the Australian System Safety Conferrence (ASSC 2012) Applying System Safety Methodologies to Consumer Product Safety Zhuojun LIU 1 Yongguang ZHANG 1 Peng YU 1 Huina MU 2 1 Academy of Mathematics
CHAPTER 4 EXAMINATION OF THE OVERALL R&M ACTIVITY CONTENTS
Applied R&M Manual for Defence Systems Part A: General CHAPTER 4 EXAMINATION OF THE OVERALL R&M ACTIVITY CONTENTS Page 1 Introduction 2 2 The Generalised R&M Activity 3 3 Decomposition 5 4 Techniques 12
Human Reliability Analysis
Human Reliability Analysis Presented by: Tibor Szikszai Ri-man Consulting, Hungary t.szikszai@riman.hu Joint ICTP-IAEA Essential Knowledge Workshop on Deterministic Safety Analysis and Engineering Aspects
Contents List of figures xxv List of tables xxvii List of exhibits xxix Preface xxxiii Part I The practice of human resource management 1 01 The essence of human resource management (HRM) 3 Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION TO PSA. 1.1 Historical Background
1. INTRODUCTION TO PSA 1.1 Historical Background Around the middle of this century, up to the 1950s, the main improvements in the reliability and safety of complex technological systems came from the application