What worked and what didn t:

Transcription

1 What worked and what didn t: The experience of Save the Children UK Ethiopia on piloting Community Based Early Warning Systems in 3 districts of Somali and Afar By Abdirahman Ali Issack and Ahmed Yusuf Study commissioned under Preparedness Improves Livelihoods and Resilience (PILLARII) PROJECT Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 5 th July, 2010

2 Disclaimer: This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission for Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The views expressed herein should not be taken, in any way, to reflect the official opinion of the ECHO. 2

3 List of acronyms CAHWs CAMELIS CBEWDC CBEWS CBEWI CICs DDC DEWC DPPA DRR ECHO EEC EW EWS EWI FAO FS GLCRSP HEA LINKS NGO LNIS PCDP PLI SC UK Community Animal Health Workers Capacity Added by Mending Early Warning and Livelihoods Information System Community Based Early Warning Data Collection Community Based Early Warning System Community Based Early Warning Information Community Information Centers District Disaster Committee District Early Warning Committee Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency Disaster Risk Reduction European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office European Economic Commission Early Warning Early Warning System Early Warning Information Food and Agriculture Organization Food Security Global Livestock Collaborative Research Support Program Household Economy Analysis Livestock Information network and Knowledge System Non Governmental Organization Livelihoods Nutrition Information System Pastoral Communities Development Program Pastoralist Livelihood Initiatives Save the Children United Kingdom 3

4 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary Introduction Overall Objective Methodology Limitations Review of CBEWS and Contingency Plans Historical chronology of CBEWS and CP in Save the Children UK Designing and Development of CBEWS and CP, Building Partnerships and Networks Training and Capacity Building Implementations challenges What Worked and What Didn t What Didn t Work (Lessons Learnt) What Worked (Best practices) Proposed CBEWS Implementation Approach Conclusion and Recommendations References Annex I. Questionnaire

5 1. Executive Summary During the past 3 years Save the children UK has been implementing PILLAR I&II projects in 6 drought prone districts of Somali and Afar Regions. The objective of the project was to improve drought preparedness through increased capacities of all stakeholders to prevent and respond to emergencies as well as by enhancing, protecting and diversifying livelihood assets of pastoralists in these Woredas. With the support of ECHO, Community contingency planning and Community based Early Warning Systems have been one of the exercises that leaded to the first steps of community level responses to emerging shocks and hazards in those pastoral districts. Thus, this work was commissioned in order to give an insight on the challenges faced by the activity during its implementation and draw lessons for future programming, advocacy and policy strategy development. Pastoral communities in Ethiopia are known to have been confronted by unprecedented losses of livelihoods sources and ecology in which they inhabited for generations. In response to these, governments and non governmental actors enacted different approaches to rehabilitate, protect and promote livelihoods from such losses. One of the approaches widely accepted was the development of early warning systems (EWS) that have the social capacity to collate diverse information on livelihoods and food security indicators; incorporated with analytical tools that can synthesis multidimensional information from different levels of community and administrative settings and finally come up with key messages that can be translated into warning before hazards occur on livelihoods. However, different governmental and non governmental institutions and departments have developed own versions of EWS which entirely differ in terms of methodology, variance in items and monitored indicators, complexities, timeliness and usability. For instance Save the Children UK and its partner were among the first pioneers of EWS in Ethiopia and Livelihoods Profiling in the pastoral regions which was later adopted across the entire country. Unfortunately, there were very limited updates done to improve the existing EWS for more than a decade, while convincing concepts and new approaches that have components of EWS such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Vulnerability Profiling (VP) were adopted locally and globally by partner organizations as a mechanism to value add Disaster Risk Management (DRM). Nevertheless, such concepts and approaches conferred the initiative of Save the Children UK s CAMELIS project that pioneered the development of Community Based Early Warning System in Ethiopia that was not well understood within the organization and its governmental partners. The initiative was suspected of replacing the nationally accepted EWS which was by then ailing with sufficient setbacks. The initiative was also forced to compromise its name as CBEWS to Community Based Early Warning Data Collection (CBEWDC). Under this new strategy, the perspectives of an effective CBEWS with locally coordinated responses would contribute to the strategies of DRR which focuses on community capacities to mitigate 5

6 and respond to crises. Effective CBEWS not only save lives but also help protect livelihoods and development gains at grassroots levels. The major lessons learnt during this work is that, the experiences of Afar and Somali Regions in responding to hazards and shock indicate significant inadequacies as the existing EWS system lacks the basic local capacities of logistics, skills, and resources to implement regions wide monitoring and responses without external assistances. Most of the EWS operating in these regions undermine community capacities in contributing to various processes of EWS (data collection, analysis, crisis response decision making, and dissemination of warning information and contribution of resources). For about ten years, EWS was fully financed by donor agencies and its intended aim was to transfer skills and set up logistical capacities that would provide advanced warning which would also allow inclusive and appropriate preparation for timely responses. However, although most EW proposals bared clauses of community capacity building, the entire efforts focused on capacity building of non governmental, regional and federal staffs and failed to recognize and capacitate Woredas and community beneficiaries. As a result, the emerged professionalism from EWS investments viewed communities as deficient of resources, recipients and dependent of external supports. Thus, currently, the capacity gaps that exist at Woreda and community levels is one of the major reason that won t allow the system to be fully handed over to the regional government. For instance, Pastoral Early Warning System document (2006) testifies the weakest links of EWS as lack of information dissemination to communities: The community level is the first layer in the PEWS and is typically the level that is most under represented and under informed about the workings and uses of such information system (Pastoral EWS Operation manual PCDP/SC UK), In many times, disseminated EW information failed to trigger timely responses, due to the existence of different competing organizational EWIs that bewilders political commitment, weak coordination among the various actors, and lack of community awareness and participation in response operations. The best practices of establishing proposed Community Based Early Warning and Response System in Afar and Somali Regions should not to only focus on external support for the protection of livelihoods assets during emergencies but also establish mechanism in which communities contribute to responses. Such approach builds community trusts and ownership and provides bases for local capacity development while planning and addressing risk factors attributed to disasters at local level during normal times. The approach also serves as building blocks for establishing inclusive regional and country early warning and response mechanism. As Ethiopia continues to suffer from a plethora of natural hazards and disasters like droughts and floods that threatens the lives and livelihood of its citizens, effective 6

7 CBEWS should be people centered and integrate the four elements of viable EWS; (i) a knowledge of the risks faced; (ii) a technical monitoring and warning service; (iii) the dissemination of meaningful warnings to those at risk; and (iv) public awareness and preparedness to act both locally, regionally and nationally. Failure in any one of these elements can mean failure of the whole early warning system. Therefore, considerable progress need to be made in developing the knowledge and technical tools required to assess risks, generate information and communicate consensually built warnings, through the use of modern information and communication technologies. Although it requires improvements, the existing early warning tools (monitoring formats, analysis sheets and need estimation) should be the bases for improvement of CBEWS that is intended to be implemented at community level. Therefore, the recommendations addresses the need for a district plan, based on a survey of capabilities, vulnerability profiling, partnership and participation in decision making process by governments, non governmental partners and communities, a warning dissemination strategy, community based approaches in mobilizing resources and responding to crisis, and awareness creation exercises. The recommendation also highlights gaps and opportunities that deserve immediate concerted action, including the lessons learned from implementing such initiatives in districts of Somali and Afar regions of Ethiopia. 7

8 2. Introduction Like other developing countries, Ethiopia continues to suffer from a variety of natural hazards particularly drought and flood that threaten lives and livelihood of its citizens. These hazards pose serious threat to the economic, social and industrial development of the country. The human impact of natural disasters in Ethiopia dates back to famous famines of 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to recent years when about 16.3% (7,821,003 PSNP and 5,200,000 emergencies) of the country s population depend on food security programs for survival (Oxfam 2009). The history of drought and famine in Ethiopia dates back beyond 1972 when the frequency of drought tremendously increasing with no mechanism in place to manage disaster until when two hundred thousand Ethiopian peasants in central and northern highlands of the country were killed in 1974 by the famine (Kaplan 1988, 24). Then, a formal famine early warning system was established following the disaster. In 1975 Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was established to provide emergency assistance such food, shelter and medication to victims of natural disasters without regular drought monitoring mechanism in place and depended on reactive responses based on assessment after the occurrence of disasters. At the end of 1975 an inter ministerial Technical Working Group (TWG) was included to be part of the decisions of the commission and in 1977 the commission s mandate was extended to include rehabilitation of livelihoods, conserve degraded lands and open up new lands for farming. In early 1990s TWG was dissolved and EWS started to develop through the guidance of Early Warning and Planning Service under RRC until 1993 when National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management was developed, and the RRC became the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC) (Haan, N. et al 2006). The evolution of EWS gradually developed with changes of mandates and transformation of DPPC to DPPA which currently placed under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) under the directorates of Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Section (DRMFSS). However, one problem of the early warning system in Ethiopia is the lack of competence at the lower level of the government hierarchy (DPPC 1996). There are various institutions working independently to address the issues related to early warning and disasters management. However, the country lacks an effective unified community based warning approach to help reduce the loss of livelihoods resulting from natural hazards at community levels. Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Section (DRMFSS) spear heads programs geared towards Disaster Risk Reduction and food security in the country including Vulnerability Profiling (VP) at districts level. This approach is different from the existing Household Economic Analysis (HEA) based Livelihoods Profiling (LP) that clusters communities of different 8

9 administrative units of similar livelihood patterns under the same livelihoods zone. It follows an approach of understanding vulnerabilities within administrative boundaries. The former has been one of the major issues that constrained proper implementation of CBEWS at district levels. Resources mobilization between communities and districts within the same livelihood zone has been difficult as most of the time was consumed by solving conflict of interest between communities and administrations. Other challenges facing implementation of CBEW in pastoral regions of Ethiopia were identified in early stage of program implantation, during CAMELIS and PILLAR I. To mention few of these challenges, the existing EWS: 1. Lacks inclusive representation of community in participating routinely early warning data collection and analysis food security and livelihoods situations within each livelihoods zone varies according to the prevailing conditions of the communities entitlements and reciprocity. However, current EW data collection process involves community near urban centers within each livelihood zone and gives general conclusion about the situation of entire communities within livelihood zones; this approach compromised participation; 2. Externalized and professionalized early warning processes and the tendency not to share EWS information to districts and communities undermined local capacities; 3. Elongated processes of building consensus among regional and federal agencies and between federal and non governmental partners (NGOs, UN and Donors) always delayed responses and compromised its appropriateness; 4. Contingency plans developed for districts were not in line with the scale of responses external responses were based on the need of livelihood zone and not for specific needy districts which resulted erroneous targeting and exclusion of eligible beneficiaries. The sum of these challenges created more community dependency on external relief assistances and failed to harness capacities of middle and better off wealth groups to contribute to both emergency and recovery responses. The implementation of a community based early warning system designed within the CAMELIS, PILLAR I and II projects was aimed to serve as a role model in demonstrating functionalities of community participation in EWS information collection, analysis, decision making and responses locally without awaiting procedural and hierarchical bureaucracies that is preconditioned by formal appeals. The activities of community based early warning system in the piloted districts in Afar and Somali regions were in line with the core early warning program implemented by DRMFSS and SCUK, with some innovations incorporated. One was the collection of 9

10 quantitative information on the six key indicators (rainfall, pasture, livestock, milk, crop production and water) used on the PEWS. Then, monthly quantitative baseline and ACCESS database was developed for all the pilot districts which offer unique features that enable each district to compare baseline information to actual monthly values. The information generated at district level was assumed to be used as bases for making decision on interventions depending on which key indicators need to be addressed. However, it has been very few occasions when decisions were based on such information. This report provides explanation on the experiences of SCUK and its partner s on CBEWS and Contingency Planning (CP) in Afar and Somali Regions. It also highlights best practices, and lesson learnt and pinpoints the challenges that may affect future endeavors. It ends with actionable recommendations that need to be focused for future improvement on similar activities while linking the proposed approach to government policies towards disaster risk reduction Overall Objective The overall goal of the review is to establish a good understanding and experience of SCUK and its partners in implementing community based early warning system and contingency planning. To attain this goal, the assignment was entailed with the following specific objectives. To identify best practices in designing and conducting CBEWS and CP in Afar and Somali Region of Ethiopia. To provide concrete lessons learnt on CBEWS and CP to be share with relevant stake holders, To recommend specific and practical improvements to CBEWS applicable to SCUK s pastoral areas of interventions and bridge compatibility with national and regional polices of DRR. To achieve these objectives separate field visit were made to PILLAR project areas in Afar and Somali Region from 16th to 21st June The consultant team agreed prior to the field visit, the methods of data collections, sites to be visited and potential sources of information. The teams later convened to Addis Ababa for final discussion, analysis and write up of the report Methodology Prior to field trip, the consultants reviewed relevant literature, proposals and reports with regard to CBEWS and CP i. In the field Chifra and Shinile structured questionnaire, individual and focus group discussion were used to understand the procedure followed to build consensus between CBEWS stakeholders in collecting early warning information, analysis, resources mobilization and responses and the way CBEWS activities were implemented and 10

11 perceived by different stockholders at district and regional levels. (See list of key informants in Annex II. note this will be submitted separately). Quantitative EW data collected for CBEWS activities were reviewed to establish crisis trends and response decisions in PILLAR project areas Limitations The timing of the field works in Afar and Somali and coincided with aftermath of general election where series of meetings were convened at Woredas and regional level to reposition and negotiate administrative job posts. Therefore, the amount of information required to be gathered was limited by the number of key informants met and the report focused on key issues to be addressed to future improvement. 3. Review of CBEWS and Contingency Plans It is generally recognized that the bases for CBEWS and contingency planning is to provide a simpler option of gathering and analyzing early warning information which can facilitate and guide appropriate responses at local levels. The usefulness of the system at both district, zonal and regional has increasingly gained acceptance in PCDP and PILLAR project areas, but progress has been slower in integrating CBEW information into the mainstream early warning system and triggering effective local responses. In terms of warning systems outputs (quantitative and qualitative information), majority of the information users preference goes for quantitative analysis which is changing the definition and measurement of problems related to drought hazards. The piloted approach uses quantitative means to gauge the scale of a problem of each indicator monitored which allowed quick mobilization and responses at local level to be more effective as compared to the standard EWS. However, as vulnerability to disasters is increasing, locally unmitigated disaster losses continues to rise due to increasing vulnerability arising from poverty and inequality, environmental degradation, population growth, urbanization, climate change and variability, lack of mitigation and institutional weaknesses. Currently, in the pastoral regions of Afar and Somali, EWS are remotely managed by very few professional staff from regional headquarters, while local entities (districts and communities) that owned the information and its management are bypassed and considered as response recipients. Thus, the mainstream EWS is still focusing on hazards management instead of emphasizing vulnerability and socio economic factors in risk management. 11

12 3.1. Historical chronology of CBEWS and CP in Save the Children UK More frequent droughts in recent years have lead to the establishment of generic pastoral EWS that monitors performances of seasonal rainfalls and its impacts on livelihoods and food security situations. However, linking such systems to pastoral communities has being and is still a challenge for system developers, implementers and funding agencies and as a result, pastoralists have often been the major victims of the effect of preventable events such as water scarcity, lack of pasture and diseases outbreaks (SCUK CAMELIS Report, 2007). Lack of linking EW information to responses through community participation was identified to be the missing link in EWS. Thus, Capacity Added by Mending Early and Livelihoods Information Systems (CAMELIS) projects and PILLAR I and II were formulated to address some of these gaps on a pilot bases so that lessons learnt would be used for future EW improvements. The former was implemented from October 2006 with specific objectives to harmonize the use of livelihoods approaches between different stakeholders that involved EWS in pastoral areas of Afar and Somali. It is also these project that initiated CBEWS and contingency planning activities in SCUK s early warning works. The later, was implemented between April 2008 to June 2009 with specific objective of improving drought preparedness through increased capacities of stakeholders in order to enhance, prevent, promote, respond to emergencies and diversify livelihoods assets. These projects however, continued implementing CBEWS and CP approaches without further improving the monitoring tools and scenarios developed for responding drought related crisis Designing and Development of CBEWS and CP, For the past few decades, application of communication and information technologies to early warning has been expanding which continually improved the technical monitoring of early warning indicators, modeling and forecasting of livelihoods and food security threats globally. However, advances in the application of these technologies in early 12

13 warning systems continue to be weak and localized at institutional levels in Ethiopia particularly pastoral areas of Somali and afar. Different pilot projects have been implemented to test new methods of involving communities in EWS process and disseminating early warning information. For example, the use of Community Information Centers (CICs) that used World Space radio technologies under Pastoralist Livelihoods Initiatives (PLI); CAMELIS project which initiated methods of linking community based early warning data collection to Community Animal Health Workers (CAHWS) and disseminated quantitative CBEW information through Community Information Centers (CICs); Enhanced Livelihoods in Southern Ethiopia (ELSE) /Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle (ELMT) that had components of indigenous early warning knowledge building; short text message on mobile phones in reporting livestock market price information of LINKS GLCRSP projects and other similar projects. However, most of these initiatives were limited by their heavy dependency on technological hardware and software instead of balancing their entire processes of collecting information, analysis and dissemination with social components that could have provided the flavor of stakeholders sustained acceptance. Lessons learnt from such past projects facilitated new approach that integrate traditional ways of getting information (Dagu in Afar and Sahan in Somali) and scientific ways of collecting early warning data through monitoring indicators and systematic analysis. The appropriate approach to involve communities in jointly collecting early warning information and deciding actions based on the analysis outcomes was designed and implemented on pilot bases in CBEWS as the data collection sheet and analysis sheet above indicates. Hazard scenarios were developed in consultations with stakeholders such as communities and other local and regional partners. The developed participatory contingency plans for pilot districts facilitated responses though late during project years. For example, in Shinile district of Somali region, the contingency plans developed for supplementary feeding, provision of Animal Health Services and Emergency Water Supply were used during 2009/10 (December February) drought by PILLAR project and a local NGO partners like Aged and Children Pastoralist Association (ACPA) in responding to feed water shortages respectively. In Chifra of Afar region, the existing contingency plans were used by FAO in developing livestock feed cooperatives. Such cooperative commercially avails the required amount of feed to its clienteles in more cost effective and timely Building Partnerships and Networks Decision making on threats of hazards at community level was considered as an integrative process that requires interaction between information sources, expert analysis, consensus building, development of contingency plans, mobilization of resources and then responses to the crisis at CBEWS designing stage. 13

14 Participation, partnerships and community involvement were crucial aspects for proper implementation of CBEWS and Contingency planning for responses at PILLAR project level. In line with this approach, initial phase of implementing CBEWS and Contingency planning activities, SCUK strategy included involvement of all stakeholders at district level including communities in the development and implementation of CBEWS and contingency response plans so as to institutionalize emergency response structures at the community level. Active participation of different segments of the communities (elders, women groups and community animal health workers), full co operation of civil society, partnerships among various interest groups, including the private sectors, and training at district levels were done for the effectiveness and sustainability of the CBEWS and CP activities. For example, about 20% and 25% of the interviewees such as districts early warning experts, community elders, CAHWS and NGO partners operating in Shinile and Chifra conferred their participation in trainings aimed to build partnership and local networks for CBEWS during the early (2007 and 2008) phase of the initiative. However, in the later phases of the project, the established partnership and network between the project s CBEWS component and its stakeholders such as government (district), communities and civil society partners (NGOs) started to loosen due to intertwined multiple challenges that would be explained in the later sections. Figure1, below indicates the relationship between different stockholders that were initially proposed in order to implement community based early warning system in PILLAR project areas. 14

15 Figure1: Conceptual Framework Information Flow Interventions Conceptual Framework DPPFSB/SC UK/FVIRegional bureaus, (Water, Health, Agriculture..etc) EWFS Desk + CIC Manager Woreda Admin. Pharmacy Community CAHWS CAHWS to collect EWI data from the community on monthly bases and kept it with district pharmacists. The DEWE takes the data for analysis and output share with Woreda administration. Then warnings summarized and submitted to DPPFSB for dissemination either through WorldSpace radio or other means. CBEWS initiative aimed to create local partnership and sustainable network for the CBEWS processes. This piloted framework was aimed to empower local stakeholders including communities, CAHWs, EW Experts, community information centre manager, woreda administration and other interested actors. It also aims to expose community potential in responding to crisis with credible primary data to rely on for analysis that facilitates targeting intervention and decision making at local (Woreda) and regional levels. This exercise was also a primary condition towards designing a contingency plans and funds at woreda level. Source: SCUK CAMELIS project report, 20 th December In Somali Region, community animal health workers (CAHWs) that were used as an entry point to community participation and tasked in collecting early warning information, demanded incentive for their contribution while in Afar region, the partnership still loosely existed. In response to the CAHWS discontinuation in collecting CBEW information, Save the Children office in Somali Region tasked the project staff and districts early warning experts in Shinile and Dambel to collect both quantitative and standard EW data by interviewing communities during their visits at the district towns. However, although the project maintained partnership with the community, government and others non governmental partners, important parts of the network for the continuation of quantitative EW information and CBEWS implementation were lost after the end of PILLAR I as indicated figure 2 below: Each of the above stakeholders (communities, districts, civil society and donors) as a separate entity have a virtual and courtesy kind of relationship with each other in general (as indicted by the outer blind arrowed lines) but in practical implementation of specific project activities, these partnerships gets loosened and commitment to contribute to the objectives of a project gets nothing more than a leap services (as indicted by the inner dotted arrowed lines). 15

16 Figure 2: CBEWS and CP network and partners Communities Districts SCUK CBEWS Civil Society Donors Partners Practically, there was lack of understanding among stakeholders and even with the project staff on the implementation mechanisms of CBEWS and contingency response plans particularly at Woreda level. Knowledge gaps emerged after the first PILLAR project phase out. Experienced project staff were not fully retained but only partially seconded to CBEWS activities that required full commitments and engagements with different partners. The mechanism in which CBEWS information was collected and processed further sidelined government partners at Woreda and community level. For instance, project staff in Shinile zone of Somali region unlike the staff in Chifra of Afar, practically abandoned collecting information on quantitative indicators used by CBEWS during PILLAR II due to lack of dedicated early warning staff at project level. These discouraged the continuity of Woreda EW expert partnership in collecting, computing data into the ACCESS database, analyzing and disseminating CBEW information at district level. Nonetheless, early warning experts in Shinile zone continued filling and submitting early warning data sheets for the national early warning system to zonal early officer for decision making. The information collected and analyzed for the Woredas were not shared with government partners and communities at districts levels but directly channeled to zonal headquarters and regions including Save the Children UK regional office. Disseminated early warning information simply created more distrust and disputes between stakeholders at district, zonal and regional levels. Most stakeholders at each level rarely share sectoral information among themselves and any information individually shared without consensus to each level creates competition for recognition and thus undermines timely interventions. Stakeholders that lack part of the information are asked to make decisions on an output of process they do not understand its contexts, the way the information was gathered and analyzed. Therefore, early warning information from zonal and regional systems needs to be interpreted within local 16

17 contexts and utilized in conjunction with district level information to be effective, adapt to local circumstances and to prevent misinterpretation, and negative impacts Training and Capacity Building Successful community based early warning involves continuous learning. The practice of data collection, accuracy of analysis and effectiveness of the early warning as a risk reduction tool would be greatly enhanced by documenting events, analyzing and creating a knowledge base that compiles experiences during past projects, and, through effective networking by connecting people to ideas and linking institutions to institution to access information and participate decision making processes. The generic mitigation components of district contingency plan was made clear, ready and known to end users. Public knowledge of CBEWS, including response mechanisms, through information, education and communication initiatives was initiated and enhanced during PILLAR I. Community representatives, CAHWS, early warning experts, veterinary pharmacists, Woreda administrators and members of Woreda sectoral offices were trained to be part of the CBEWS and CP process. Thus, this was meant to most appropriately and effectively respond to hazards and shock at district level. During the development of such response plans, the probabilistic nature of hazards have been made clearer in scenarios and target populations educated on how to interpret early warnings information. However, the challenges faced in collecting CBEW data, analysis and dissemination in Afar and Somali were not addressed gradually and it has been difficult to contextualize specific hazard events and contingency plans were like revelation books that were hard to be challenged and changed. This indicates that the training and capacity building efforts were more theoretical and generic than in practical and achievable events Implementations challenges As clearly clarified in SCUK CAMELIS report (2007), if the CBEWS owners are the users of its information, then response decisions are easier to make and quicker. Interviews with different stakeholders indicated CBEWS information owners been considered as not users but recipients of external responses. The guiding framework (figure 1) for implementing CBEWS is not strictly used and the weakness that emerged during implementation is not properly addressed although the cost of running CBEWS is relatively less than that of mainstream EWS (See opportunities and strengths of CBEWS in SCUK CAMELIS 2007 report). Therefore, the following are some of the major challenges documented during the field work in Somali and Afar regions: a) There exists limited understanding of the concept of community Based EWS and contingency planning among majority of the communities interviewed during the field visits. Only about 40% of those interviewed heard about CBEWS and Contingency plan, while only 20% of these have used CBEWS information and less than 5% have involved in contingency planning processes. A sample size of 20 17

18 individual interviews, 2 focus group discussions and 4 Woreda and 3 key informants from each region (Somali and Afar) were involved in understanding CBEWS stakeholders perception and participation. This indicated significant gap in educating stakeholders on this two activities. b) Most of the districts have EW experts at Woreda level, but those in Shinile zone of Somali region lack competence despite continuous training provided for years. It has been notable during the interviews that, among 4 Woreda early warning experts, only 1 was able to understand the benefits of EWI and the rest perceived it as a tool to generate relief food and important only during droughts. Thus, negligence in EW data collection from these important partners may lead to the widening of the gaps in reporting early warning information. This will also make analysis of CBEWS information more difficult and the use of such information would lead to wrong response decisions. c) Weak linkages between community early warning and regional EWS still exist. The information generated by CBEWS are rarely used for decision making both at district, zonal and regional level except for Afar region where the information is directly send to Save the Children Office, which is then shared to the regional DPPB. There is a general perception within Save the Children staff and the early warning staff at Somali and Afar regions that, CBEW activity of PILLAR project and EWS within PLI 1&2 as two different systems. Very few people understand the value of CBEW quantitative indicator for analysis. d) There is still no mechanism established to hold district EW experts accountable in case they fail to submit EW information to district level supervisors for analysis. Zonal EW officers summarize and submit monthly report to regional DPPFSB and SCUK for analysis particularly for Somali Region. Therefore, monthly food security reports lack solid quantitative bases for reflecting facts on the ground and subject to misleading and erroneous information. e) The existing structure of Livelihoods Nutrition Information System section poses constraints to the implantation of CBEWS and CPs. There are very few staffs in assigned for supporting PILLAR project at country head office who are strategically viewing CBEW as an essential component of LNIS. Similarly, at districts level, there are dedicated staff working entirely on other pillars (activities) but less concerned about CBEWS activities and procedures. The project also lacks public relation officers at regional level who could establish new partnerships and strengthen existing ones between different stakeholders at districts and regions. f) Linkages between Woreda/Zonal and regional EWS activities only exist through technical and logistic supports provided by SCUK in all pilot Woredas. The EW staffs at Woreda level are rarely engaged in EW processes except very few 18

19 occasions such as training workshops and assessments of major hazards such as floods. Sustainability to such approach may not last long while Woredas are entirely excluded from the EWS processes. To this effect, EW experts at Woreda level literally stay idle for the entire year and wait for their pay. This is thought to be one of the reasons why they are not always available at their duty stations (Woreda). g) Excessive emphasis on technology in community based early warning is at the expense of its other social and economic interface of the system. It negates efforts aimed at ensuring cost and the system s effective outcome. It was also observed that there is excessive dependency on computer software (access) in analyzing district early warning information. Computer viruses and crash completely halted data entry and analysis. In the future, excel application should complement current ACCESS application or any other more friendly software applications and mobile phone Short Message System (SMS) could be used for disseminating important warnings of community based early warning information. These information communication technologies can be used as a clearinghouse of information exchanges, repository of information, and a medium for alerting external actors on community needs. 4. What Worked and What Didn t 4.1. What Didn t Work (Lessons Learnt) Community Based Early Warning and Contingency Planning is a component of risk management: it is important to recognize CBEWS and CP as part of a comprehensive disaster risk reduction and management systems in order to ensure effectiveness of all components of risk management activities at local level. Success of community based early warning is determined largely by the extent at which the assessed risk in the contingency plans are regularly updated based on continues monitoring of CBEWS indicators with a mechanism and capabilities to respond to disaster risks. However, early warning information alone is not able to achieve everything, other livelihoods based safety net programs and risk reduction and mitigation interventions are needed to ensure effective risk mitigation. The following are some of the lessons learnt on why the implementation approach of CBEWS did not work well for PILLAR Project: a) Participation, coordination of activities and partnerships across sectors and institutions (community, government and partners) were ineffective and only stressed on external and regional networks, capabilities and consensus rather than focusing more on local networks, capacities and consensus. Currently inadequate decentralization of early warning practice brought about fragmented 19

20 understanding of EWS as an agency centered and top down process with inadequate partnerships with community involvement that undermined CBEWS activities. b) Lack of proper accountability to ensure effective data collection, information processing, knowledge and experience sharing and skills transferring at Woreda level. Thus, the process of interfacing technology systems and people is probably the weakest link in the community based early warning chain; such activities were implemented by the project but its target groups were regional and federal partners and Woreda were entirely excluded. These activities has been very weak in the project sites particularly Shinile of Somali Region, while Chifra of Afar region focused on data collection with limited processing. c) Inadequate Woreda level institutional capacity, including financial and human resource endowment, to provide effective early warning services. The focus on issues of institutionalization in developing EWS is important because it is how people respond to warning that determines its effectiveness. However, the focus should not be strengthening bureaucratic procedures although necessary to ensure authenticity of information, but to also ensure each EWS partners play their roles and responsibilities more efficiently while contributing to the common object of EWS. d) The institutionalization of community EWS is hampered by the lack of clarity of responsibilities among stakeholders, including lack of a clear chain of command for community based early warning functions. Often, EW information come from various sources, thereby creating confusion as to the authenticity, effectiveness and trustworthiness of each early warning information as well as the proper response. Unclear administrative responsibilities also result in inadequate integration and coordination of different EWS for the same hazard and of key institutions and actors involved in early warning and disaster prevention and mitigation. This has delayed effective response and weakened the impacts of early warning and other risk management activities. e) High level of community awareness of risks and early warning advice through public education and training facilitates every aspects of CBEWS process of data collection, analysis and usage. While inadequate community awareness of EWS and dominance of scientific and technological dependency for community based early warning information and socio cultural exclusion of Woredas and its communities undermined consensus building and mobilizing resources for responses. This is one of the major problem facing both Afar and Somali Region, f) Effective communication of CBEW information to wider communities at district and zonal level enables stakeholders to get prepared in order to minimize risk associated with warned hazards. There has been no time when CBEW 20

21 information was communicated to either the communities or the Woredas in the project areas particularly during PILLAR II. Interviews during the field visits confirmed the information generated by the system was mainly used either by the at project level or Regional Early Warning projects of Save the Children g) Good planning for implementation of the system, including contingency planning facilitates effective and efficient responses. There was limited long term interest and commitment to continuous development of CBEW services at Save the Children UK s LNIS strategy when there has been favorable government policies and program that availed opportunities such as Woredas taking responsibilities of their development endeavors and PCDP program in both Afar and Somali Regions. Efforts to implement the initiative were localized at project level. h) Establishing mechanisms for reviewing outcomes and outputs, including sustainability of the system. Livelihood Nutrition and Information System section lacked promotional strategy for CBEWS which undermined partnership building at regional and Woreda levels. As a result, there is limited regional (Afar and Somali) understanding on CBEWS that often lead to inadequate regional commitment to continuously supporting the development and maintenance of CBEWS at districts level What Worked (Best practices) There are good practices that are emerging from the implementation of CBEWS and Contingency planning at districts level in the Somali and Afar region. Intensive efforts are underway by different organization in laying foundation for sustainable CBEWS. Activities of PILLAR project and the World Bank (WB) funded Pastoral Community Development Project (PCDP) are committing more resources to scale up community capacity building at local level. A good example of such capacity building activities includes training of Kebele leaders and operators of telecommunication centers on reporting EW information by PILLAR project in Shinile zone, while PCDP established and trained EW focal persons and key informants at Woreda level. These activities will require harmonization in order to build synergy as current approaches will potentially undermine the viability and sustainability of the system in the future. Situations where PCDP provides good incentive for EW officers while not having a standard EWS in place, PILLAR projects strives to establish ownership at local level without much incentive. Currently community participation is divided between these two projects and temptations to exploit the resources of the competing partners dominate local actors commitment to establish a viable system. However, the following issues were noted as some of the best practices for CBEWS: 21

22 a) There is general regional initiative to establish new District Early Warning Committees (DEWC) in every Woreda and strengthen the existing ones established by PILLAR and PCDP projects, b) The initiative of decentralizing development responsibilities to districts, empowered lower level administrative units (Kebeles) to be proactive in participating and contributing to local partners activities. For instance, kebele heads and telephone operators are taking the lead in reporting on key early warning indicators, hazards, livelihoods and food security concerns to zonal headquarters in the Shinile zone of Somali region, c) Continuation of CBEW data collection in PILLAR project Woredas facilitated better understanding of the quantitatively measured indicators in the CBEWS. The responses and the use of contingency plans during November 2009 to February 2010 drought in Shinile zone was triggered by the analysis provided by CBEWS. However, data collection was later discontinued after good rains were received in the project districts. Similarly, continuation of CBEW data collection and analysis was one of the evidence that was used in identifying the existence of livelihoods stresses as a result of pasture and water scarcity in the region between October 2008 to April 2009 (see graphs below) S o u r c e s : C Chifra SCUK PILLAR Project, CBEWS Data Base Proposed CBEWS Implementation Approach There is an urgency to understand why pastoralists exposure to disaster risks is increasing in Ethiopia? National trend indicates that one of the reasons for the increases is due to the growing importance of vulnerability factors (VAM unit of WFP, 2003). These factors include: reduction in livestock holdings (poverty), expanding rangeland degradation and worsening conditions of the natural resource base, population growth that constrains access to resources and displacement due to increasing conflicts, urban expansion to rangeland areas, weak formal and informal institutional capacities to mitigate disaster, high climate variability and changes. 22

23 Optimism in achieving Livelihoods and food security improvement in pastoral areas of Afar and Somali is possible when the current Woreda development plans are incorporated with plans to effectively reduce damage from hazards. However, as the frequency of disasters are increasing parallel with increasing resources used to reduce increasing vulnerabilities, amalgamated efforts should be the way forward to reduce pastoral vulnerabilities through establishing local ownerships in disaster risk reduction activities. I. Establishment of workable CBEWS and Local Response Mechanism Currently, the existing CBEWS in PILLAR II project areas can serve as a base for future improvements. However, the activity lacked essential elements of partnership, information sharing and recognition of local capacities among local stakeholders. This has undermined practical implementation of CBEWS and local responses. Therefore, the figure below provides a comprehensive implementation framework for a practical CBEWS and responses mechanism and rather focuses on the processes and procedures of implementing CBEW activities than technically explaining the way monitoring indicators and analysis were developed which is bound for improvement (SCUK CAMELIS 2007 report can be referred for this). Monitoring of Indicators: It is the responsibility of the early waning experts at project or field levels to collect information on key early warning indicators from the community and other stakeholders in a systematic way that can allows analysis. However, since CBEWS in PILLAR project used a quantifiable approach of collecting monthly information on six key indicators, the continuity of collecting such data set was difficult at district level, due to fewer people trained for data collection and very little advocacy work done on the importance of such data set to the communities and district government sectors. There had been restructuring of lower level administrative units in the whole country that reduced the number of kebeles in a Woreda to a manageable sizes. These provided a new opportunity that allows kebele heads and other responsible partners such as project/district early warning expert and other extension agents to contribute to the monthly CBEW data collection. Analysis: The analysis of CBEW information depends on the availability of the monthly EW data and dedicated persons to compute the data into password protected access database that compares baseline information against current quantitative information of each district. The database provided printable option of monthly situational summary report in a quantitative format that required narrative interpretations. These tasks are expected to be done by experts and not to be done by the community. However, the genuineness of the outcome of the analysis could then be verified through community 23