UNICEF After Action Review Tropical Cyclone Pam & Typhoon Maysak. Sophia Dunn Independent Consultant

Transcription

1 UNICEF After Action Review Tropical Cyclone Pam & Typhoon Maysak Sophia Dunn Independent Consultant i

2 Table of Contents Executive Summary... viii 1. Background Context UNICEF organizational set up in the Pacific UNICEF response strategy Introduction The After Action Review UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action UNICEF Level 2 Emergency Procedure UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs Methodology Findings of the After Action Review The L2 declaration and the utilization of L2 emergency procedures UNICEF Headquarters and EAPRO support UNICEF Pacific Resource mobilization UNICEF response to TC Pam in Vanuatu Vanuatu Field Office preparedness Operational management UNICEF s operational commitments Media and communications Human resources Finance and administration UNICEF s programme commitments Rapid assessment Monitoring and reporting Supply and logistics Partnership and coordination Partnership and coordination with the Government of Vanuatu Partnership and coordination with other partners UNICEF response to TC Pam in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu Tuvalu Solomon Islands Kiribati UNICEF response to Typhoon Maysak in Federated States of Micronesia Conclusions Recommendations for improving UNICEF Pacific s disaster preparedness and response Bibliography Annexes ii

3 List of Tables Table 1: Overview of UNICEF emergency response in Vanuatu... 2 Table 2: Mandatory deliverables for a newly designed L2 emergency... 4 Table 3: Key actions taken in advance of TC Pam... 8 Table 4: Financial and administration emergency preparedness (EWEA Key Action 15) Vanuatu Field Office.. 17 Table 5: AAR recommendations and action plan List of Figures Figure 1: CO workflow processing arrangement commenced 4 May Figure 2: Humanitarian architecture, Vanuatu List of Annexes Annex 1: After Action Review Terms of Reference 41 Annex 2: UNICEF response timeline TC Pam & Typhoon Maysak 47 Annex 3: List of key informants (semi-structured interviews) 51 Annex 4: Semi-structured interview guide for key informant interviews 53 Annex 5: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Vanuatu Field Office) 55 Annex 6: After Action Review - Minutes of plenary (Vanuatu Field Office) 57 Annex 7: After Action Review - Preliminary Recommendations (Vanuatu Field Office) 60 Annex 8: After Action Review - Workshop Agenda (Suva Multi-Country Office) 61 Annex 9: After Action Review - Minutes of Suva Multi-Country Office Workshop 63 Annex 10: After Action Review - Preliminary recommendations (Suva Multi-Country Office) 68 Annex 11: CMT initial review of recommendations (Vanuatu & Suva) 69 Annex 12: Standard Operating Procedure - Business process: PA pool (Vanuatu office - Emergency Response) 71 Annex 13: Simplifications put in place by L2 designation 73 Annex 14: Lessons learned re Office in a Box 76 Annex 15: Country division of UNICEF HAC funding requirements for TC Pam response 77 Annex 16: Departure and arrival dates of supplies from Suva to Vanuatu, Kiribati and Tuvalu 77 iii

4 Acronyms AAR After Action Review NDMO National Disaster Management Office CCC Core Commitments for Children NYHQ New York Headquarters CDC CERF Community Disaster Committee (UN) Central Emergency Response Fund OCHA OSM (UN) Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Operations Staffing Matrix CFO Chief of Field Office PA Programme Assistant CMT Country Management Team PCA Partnership Cooperation Agreement COHA Cash On Hand Account PDC Provincial Disaster Committee CSO Civil Society Organization PERT Pacific Emergency Response Team DGMWR EAPRO EMOPS EPF Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources East Asia Pacific Regional Office Emergency Operations Emergency Programme Funds PHT PMO RD REMT Pacific Humanitarian Team Prime Minister s Office Regional Director Regional Emergency Management Team EPR EWEA FSM GSSC HAC Emergency Preparedness and Response Early Warning Early Action Federated States of Micronesia Global Shared Services Centre Humanitarian Action for Children SIFO SOP SSFA TC TEIMS Solomon Islands Field Office Standard Operating Procedures Small scale funding agreement Tropical Cyclone Tuvalu Education Information Management System HAP Humanitarian Action Plan UN United Nations HPM HR IMO IND IOM L2 MCO MEYS MoET MoH Humanitarian Performance Monitoring Human Resources Information Management Officer Immediate Needs Document International Organization for Migration Level 2 (Emergency) Multi-Country Office Ministry for Education, Youth and Sport Ministry of Education and Training Ministry of Health UNDAC UNDSS UNICEF VFF VFO VHT WASH WFP WHO United Nations Disaster Assessment & Coordination Team UN Department of Safety and Security United Nations Children s Fund Vanuatu Football Federation Vanuatu Field Office Vanuatu Humanitarian Team Water, sanitation and hygiene World Food Programme World Health Organization MoU Memorandum of Understanding iv

5 v

6 Map 1: UNICEF presence in the Pacific Source: vi

7 Map 2: Path of Tropical Cyclone Pam Vanuatu March 2015 Source: OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal 1 1 OCHA (2015) Flash Appeal Emergency response plan for Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam (March-June 2015) vii

8 Executive Summary The purpose of this After Action Review (AAR) was to examine UNICEF Pacific s use of disaster preparedness and emergency response systems for a Level 2 (L2) emergency, and to identify both successes and areas for improvement. 2 UNICEF Headquarters developed the L2 procedures in 2013 and this was the first time that an L2 emergency was declared in the Pacific, the first time the L2 procedures were used by UNICEF Pacific, and the first time the L2 procedures had been utilized within the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO). The AAR adopted a utilization-focused approach in order to boost participation and ownership of the process. The key components of the review were a home-based desk review, semi-structure key informant interviews with UNICEF and external partners, and workshops with UNICEF personnel in Vanuatu and in Suva, Fiji. The primary audiences are the UNICEF Pacific offices in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and the multi-country office in Suva, Fiji. The principle objective of the review is to share findings on what worked well and to provide guidance on how to better utilise UNICEF systems for preparedness and response to emergencies. The secondary objective is to provide feedback to the EAPRO and UNICEF HQ on which procedures worked well and which may need refinement. 3 One of the aspects of the UNICEF response that consistently received positive reviews during the AAR was the early action of the Country Representative and the EAPRO Regional Director. Early involvement of key UNICEF departments both in the EAPRO and in HQ, preparedness actions by the Suva Office, and the early deployment of an experienced Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office (Vanuatu) and a Communications Specialist resulted in an immediate start to the response. However, the AAR found a lack of preparedness by the Vanuatu Field Office and identified problems associated with having a preparedness system in place (EWEA) for which there is limited ownership and knowledge within the team. In future, Chiefs of Field Offices need to ensure that their Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans are reviewed, updated, actioned and shared with their team members. TC Pam struck Vanuatu on the night of 13 March causing widespread damage across the archipelago. Before making landfall in Vanuatu, TC Pam caused damage in the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati, from sea surges, flooding, rain and winds. The Governments of Vanuatu, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands declared States of Emergency after TC Pam; the Government of Kiribati did not. Then, between late March and May 2015, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was hit by three super typhoons (Maysak, Noul and Dolphin), cumulatively affecting more than 25,000 people, many, repeatedly. The Government of FSM declared a State of Emergency after both Maysak and Dolphin. Once TC Pam made landfall, the UNICEF L2 emergency procedures were quickly activated. It is clear that the emergency procedures made a significant positive difference to the UNICEF response: in particular, the release of the Emergency Programme Funds (loan mechanisms), fast tracking of human resources through multiple channels, immediate support from UNICEF Supply Division in Copenhagen, and the use of simplified procedures designed for use in emergencies. The involvement of headquarters level emergency fundraising ahead of the Government and OCHA appeal, and the presence of the Communications Specialist in Vanuatu, has contributed to an immediate start of a successful fundraising campaign. By late August, UNICEF Pacific had received 90% of the requested funding in the revised HAC 4 and had repaid the global Emergency Programme Funds. However, earmarking of funds by donors, including National Committees, and to some extent the UNICEF NY earmarking of funds for Vanuatu did not reflect the reality of the Pacific being a multi-country office, responding to an emergency situation in multiple countries. It was therefore difficult for UNICEF Pacific to find funding to support a response in the other affected countries. 2 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak. 3 Ibid. 4 US$919,0911 received as at 28 August 2015, out of US$10,170,000 requested in revised HAC. viii

9 The UNICEF response in all the affected countries focussed on coordination, distribution of supplies and the provision of technical assistance to Government counterparts. This strategy leveraged UNICEF s longterm relationship with the affected countries governments, and the human resources/field presence of CSOs and various government ministries. Providing surge support to the Fiji Office and to Vanuatu required cooperation between HQ, the EAPRO, and the UNICEF Pacific HR teams. This cooperation worked well, and surge support was provided in a timely manner through multiple channels. With few exceptions, the surge support was experienced and with appropriate expertise for the work required. While the L2 procedures were quickly activated at the initiative of the EAPRO they were not fully utilized by UNICEF Pacific. The AAR found that many UNICEF Pacific staff that participated in this AAR did not know what an L2 emergency was or what procedures accompanied it even at the time of the AAR. This caused tensions between the Fiji Office and the Vanuatu Field Office when experienced surge personnel were deployed to Vanuatu, more familiar with the procedural simplifications than the Suva-based staff. This tension was exacerbated by a lack of clarity of management roles and reporting lines, specifically the relationship between the Emergency Coordinator, the Chiefs of Field Offices and the Chiefs of Sections. These management and reporting lines need to be clarified as a priority before the next emergency. UNICEF Pacific also encountered multiple issues with financial and administrative procedures. Simplified systems were not utilized immediately in the Suva Office, resulting in delayed payments to some vendors in Vanuatu. Similarly, VISION 5 access and authority was clearly an issue with financial transaction authority remaining in the Fiji Office and not being devolved to the Vanuatu Office. This ties in with the lack of clarity on the role of the Chiefs of Section vis-à-vis emergency staff in the field during an emergency. UNICEF should explore ways of making this possible in future. Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Vanuatu worked directly with the Government of Vanuatu, and had no prior contingency agreements with the private sector or with civil society organisations. This meant that once TC Pam hit, UNICEF started looking for partners for logistic support and for programme implementation. As a result of lack of training, the UNICEF Pacific team continued using the standard procedures, which were time consuming, had a higher administrative burden, and required authorization from Suva. When the new SSFA guidance became effective on 1 April, they provided a clear decision-making tree for the type of instrument that should be utilized. The new guidelines allowed for lower documentation requirements and for authorization at the field level, and as a result, were timelier than the standard PCA process. SSFAs were well utilized, and proved invaluable in the early days of the response when UNICEF was looking for new partnerships. Going forward, the new guidelines will be useful for UNICEF as they provide suggestions for preparedness commitments and activities. UNICEF offices in areas prone to emergencies are encouraged to put in place contingency agreements with non-governmental organisations that have humanitarian capacity, that can be quickly activated when an emergency occurs. If UNICEF Pacific also develop some specific emergency operating procedures relating to their financial and administrative procedures, these, together with the SSFA guidelines and training on emergency procedures should see the offices in a better position to respond more quickly and efficiently to the financial and administrative requirements of future emergency responses. Given the distances between countries in the Pacific, it was a good idea for UNICEF to have pre-positioned stock in multiple locations, as these were immediately distributed to affected communities. However there is no certainty that in future emergencies, that stock can easily be moved from one pre-positioned location to another. A strategic review of contingency stocks is therefore required, including consideration of incorporating contingency agreements with Pacific suppliers and/or suppliers in Australia or New Zealand. Discussion with other stakeholders with an interest in emergency response in the Pacific (including the Australian, New Zealand, French governments, UNICEF National Committees and other partners) would 5 UNICEF s financial and other business transaction system, linked to results. ix

10 be a good first step. This would enable the development of a more strategic approach to regional preparedness in the event of another emergency requiring a rapid logistics and supply response. UNICEF is in a unique position to build on the relationship with the Government of Vanuatu and the governments of other Pacific nations and continue to play interlocutor between government, national Red Cross Societies and Civil Society Organizations. There are multiple opportunities for UNICEF to support the Government of Vanuatu and its Strategic Action Plan including incorporating emergency preparedness and response work into previously agreed developed work. The lessons learned in Vanuatu will be useful for future emergencies in Pacific countries. It will also be important for UNICEF Pacific, together with other emergency partners such as OCHA and the Regional Pacific Humanitarian Team, to think strategically on how best to respond to emergencies in countries without permanent UNICEF (or UN) presence and/or limited communication infrastructure. The following eight recommendations relate to areas prioritized by key informants and workshop participants as having the potential to make the most difference to future emergency responses. It is recommended that action to address these recommendations start immediately with a view to completing the required actions within three months, six months or one year/ongoing. Priority 1: Completion by end of January 2016 (three months) i. All UNICEF Pacific offices to review and update their EWEA scenarios and re-examine their preparedness plans and identified actions, ensuring that all team members are aware of key actions to be taken in the event of an emergency. ii. iii. iv. UNICEF Pacific to clarify, articulate and share SOPs outlining clear roles and responsibilities of key UNICEF management staff during an emergency (both for countries with a Field Office, and for those without). UNICEF Pacific to review its processes for financial transaction authority during emergencies to enable decentralization to the Field Offices. This should include ensuring there is at least one VISION user with approval authority and one VISION user with transaction creation authority in the affected Field Office during the emergency response. NYHQ to review their financial tracking/management/fundraising and reporting systems to reflect UNICEF Pacific as a multi-country setting, especially when disasters affect more than one country. Priority 2: Completion by end of April 2016 (six months) v. UNICEF Pacific, with support from EAPRO to develop a comprehensive Emergency Training Strategy to ensure that all staff, including field office staff has access to basic emergency training. The training strategy should take into account existing UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response training provided by EAPRO and include practical scenarios, emergency procedures and a broad understanding of UNICEF s mandate and commitments during an emergency. Priority 3: Completion by end of October 2016 (one year) or ongoing actions required. vi. vii. viii. UNICEF Pacific to identify predictable humanitarian partnerships and ensure that contingency agreements are in place with civil society organisations, private sector and other relevant actors. UNICEF Pacific, with support from Supply Division and other actors, should strategically review their emergency logistics and supply capacity to ensure that good quality supplies can be provided quickly and efficiently. UNICEF Pacific in collaboration and coordination with humanitarian partners, to continue building the capacity of Pacific Island governments on emergency preparedness and response in maternal and child health, nutrition, education, child protection (including gender-based violence and violence against children). This should include a review of NDMO and line ministry emergency preparedness x

11 and response plans and capacity, and the development of relevant Standard Operating Procedures SOPs) covering both preparedness and response. xi

12 1. Background 1.1. Context The Pacific is one of the world's most disaster-prone regions. 6 People living in Pacific island countries are vulnerable to a wide range of natural hazards, including floods, droughts, cyclones/typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, king tides and tsunamis. As at mid-2015, there had already been seven typhoons (northern Pacific) and six cyclones (southern Pacific). In addition, the current El Niño event is forecast to be the worst since , with drought already declared in areas of Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu. Tropical Cyclone (TC) Pam struck Vanuatu on the night of 13 March The Category 5 cyclone caused widespread damage across Vanuatu and the eye passed close to Efate Island, where the capital Port Vila is located. Winds were estimated to have reached 250kmph with gusts of 320kmph. As a result, an estimated 166,600 people (more than half the population) required urgent humanitarian assistance. The Government of Vanuatu declared a State of Emergency in affected areas, with a request for international assistance. Before making landfall in Vanuatu, TC Pam and other storms caused damage in the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati resulting in damage from sea surges, flooding, rain and winds. The Governments of Tuvalu and Solomon Islands declared States of Emergency, however the Solomon Islands did not request international assistance. Soon after TC Pam, between late March and May 2015, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) was hit by three super typhoons (Maysak, Noul and Dolphin), cumulatively affecting more than 25,000 people. The Government of FSM declared a State of Emergency after both Maysak and Dolphin UNICEF organizational set up in the Pacific UNICEF Pacific is a multi-country office responsible for 14 countries and territories: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, FSM, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (Map 1). In addition to the Fiji Multi-country Office, UNICEF Pacific has Field Offices in three countries, three of which were affected by TC Pam: Vanuatu, Solomon Island and Kiribati, and has field based staff in Samoa and Tuvalu, which was also affected by TC Pam. Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF had been operating in all the affected countries through direct partnerships with various government ministries and departments. The UNICEF Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific (EAPRO) in Bangkok supports the multi-country office, which is based in Suva, Fiji UNICEF response strategy In response to TC Pam, UNICEF suspended its regular programmes in Vanuatu and focused specifically on emergency activities that were agreed with the government counterparts and their emergency partners. Regular UNICEF programmes continued in all other countries, including Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Solomon Islands albeit at a reduced pace, as emergency response activities took precedence. In some countries this required an expansion of activities into other sectors where UNICEF has a commitment through the CCCs. For example, in Tuvalu, emergency health and WASH supplies were distributed, even though UNICEF usually has an education focus. To ensure UNICEF added value to the overall emergency response, a coordination and supply strategy was agreed. The strategy utilized UNICEF s existing relationships with the governments of the affected countries (coordination), and leveraged the capacity of the Supply Division in Copenhagen and the capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) or the relevant line ministries to distribute supplies to the affected 6 1

13 areas (supply). The same strategy was employed across all the countries affected by TC Pam: Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati. The Government of Vanuatu s Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) covers the time period from 1 May to 30 July The timeframe was set by the Government of Vanuatu to allow for all life-saving humanitarian needs to be addressed through the HAP and to ensure an effective transition into the Government Strategic Action Plan (SAP). The SAP would then focus on medium and longer-term recovery and reconstruction. 7 The scale of the response required in Vanuatu meant that well-documented plans and targets were developed for work in each sector (Table 1). This was not the case for the other affected countries. Table 1: Overview of UNICEF emergency response in Vanuatu Sector Targets Total affected population: 166,000 Total affected children (<18): 82,000 Total population to be reached (2015): 129,350 including 82,000 children 70,000 people provided with safe drinking water per agreed standards WASH 70,000 people provided with sanitation and hygiene supplies 70,000 people benefiting from hygiene and sanitation promotion messages 25,000 children immunized against measles Health 31 national cold room and cold storage facilities restored 25 primary health facilities provided with adequate new-born care kits and services Nutrition Child Protection Education 12,500 children <5 years receiving micronutrient supplementation 6,500 caregivers of children 0-23 months counselled on appropriate infant and young child feeding practices 20,000 children access safe spaces for trauma relief through socialization, play and learning 22,500 school-aged children access quality education (through school supplies, temporary learning spaces, clean water, sanitation and restoration of solar power) Source: UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children (March 2015) Within the HAP, the Government of Vanuatu s exit strategy from humanitarian interventions was noted as a replacement of Cluster Coordination with Government led Sectoral Coordination in order to strengthen the sustainability and resilience of community programmes and infrastructure by building back better and strengthening the capacity of local institutions. 8 Similarly, UNICEF initially planned to return to their development work as quickly as possible after the HAP period was finished. However, in Vanuatu, this was not entirely possible as UNICEF Pacific began responding to El Niño-related disasters from mid Government of Vanuatu (2015) Tropical Cyclone Pam - Humanitarian Action Plan. May Ibid. 2

14 2. Introduction 2.1. The After Action Review This After Action Review (AAR) is intended to be an internal review, primarily as a learning exercise for UNICEF. The knowledge and recommendations from this review are expected to be particularly relevant to preparedness and response in other small island states, which are increasingly vulnerable to more frequent and higher impact natural disasters. In Vanuatu, review exercises were carried out by every Humanitarian Cluster, as well as by the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT), 9 the Pacific Humanitarian Team, and by various CSOs. In these, substantive areas of the TC Pam preparedness and response were reviewed, including results and outcomes for affected people. This AAR therefore mainly examines UNICEF Pacific s use of disaster preparedness and emergency response systems for a Level 2 (L2) emergency, and by doing so, identifies both successes and areas for improvement. 10 UNICEF Headquarters developed the L2 procedures in TC Pam was the first time that an L2 emergency was declared in the Pacific and therefore the first time the L2 procedures were used by UNICEF Pacific. It was also the first time the L2 procedures had been utilized within the EAPRO. UNICEF has a number of procedures that guide their emergency response. These include the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, specific procedures related to Level 2 and Level 3 11 emergencies, and guidelines for small-scale funding agreements (SSFAs) effective as of 1 April 2015 that can be utilized in emergencies of any level. The UNICEF L2 emergency procedures are the main focus of this review UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action UNICEF s Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) is the pivotal policy document that defines UNICEF s emergency response. The CCCs are a global framework for humanitarian action, guided by International Human Rights Law, in particular the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In complex emergencies, International Humanitarian Law, 12 and International Disaster Response Law also provide guidance. The CCCs promote predictable, effective and timely collective humanitarian action, realised through partnerships with governments, humanitarian organizations and others, and mobilizing both domestic and international resources. 13 The CCC sector-specific programme commitments form part of a collective programmatic response for children affected by humanitarian crisis and are designed to support wider interagency cluster coordination. UNICEF has both operational and programme commitments within the CCCs UNICEF Level 2 Emergency Procedure UNICEF defines L2 emergencies as situations where the magnitude of the emergency is such that a Country Office needs additional, prioritized support from other parts of the organization 14 to respond, and for which the Regional Office (RO) must provide dedicated leadership and support. A determination of what constitutes a L2 emergency is based on analysis of five criteria: scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk. 9 The Vanuatu Humanitarian Team (VHT) is a network of agencies committed to effective humanitarian coordination, disaster preparedness and humanitarian response. 10 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak (Annex 1). 11 Classification of emergencies is done on the basis of scale, urgency, complexity, capacity and reputational risk. 12 UNICEF (2010) Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action. New York. 13 Ibid. 14 Headquarters, Regional and other Country Offices 3

15 The 2013 UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies 15 is designed to ensure that the UNICEF Country Programme s response is timely, appropriately assessed, and designed and executed according to the CCCs. To facilitate a timely response, an L2 declaration activates a number of changes to operational procedures: Prioritized support from UNICEF Headquarters, Supply Division, and the Regional Office Fast tracking of human resources Quick and easy application of Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) 16 Simplified operational (financial and administrative) procedures Automatic issuance of a US$2 million Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) 17 Deployment of RO staff, Emergency Response Team or similar, as required. CO leadership remains accountable for the L2 response but the RO plays a lead role in coordination of support and their usual oversight role is reinforced. A Regional Emergency Management Team (REMT) must be formed, that brings together relevant HQ divisions, the RO and CO. The role of UNICEF headquarters (HQ) is therefore also enhanced and support and coordination to the RO and CO is prioritized. The L2 declaration also requires some specific, mandatory deliverables as noted in Table 2 below. Table 2: Mandatory deliverables for a newly designed L2 emergency Action REMT ToR developed (including frequency of meetings) Integrated Programme Response Plan (supported by Operational Staffing Matrix and Supply Plan) Responsibility Regional Emergency Advisor Country Representative 2-3 Advocacy priorities defined and shared Regional Director L2/3 Humanitarian MoRES (Humanitarian Performance Monitoring) implemented including SitReps with at minimum, monthly monitoring and reporting. Updated key messages and UNICEF statement Country Representative Country Representative Source: Adapted from UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for L2 emergencies 18 At the time that TC Pam hit, UNICEF was in the final of developing new guidelines for small scale funding agreements (SSFAs). From 1 April 2015 the new guidelines became effective, superseding the 2009 PCAs and SSFAs Guidelines UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs The new UNICEF Procedure for Country and Regional Office transfer of resources to CSOs 20 outlines the requirements governing relationships between UNICEF and CSOs. Partnerships with CSOs that involve a transfer of UNICEF resources can be formalized using only the following two instruments: Programme Cooperation Agreement (PCA) - for when the transfer of UNICEF value is over $50,000. Small Scale Funding Agreement (SSFA) - used when the total cash transfer of UNICEF resources is $50,000 or less in a twelve months period. In a humanitarian response a SSFA may also be used to transfer to a CSO up to 3 months of supplies. 15 UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies Annex 1 to CF/EXD/ Ibid. 17 The EPF is a global, revolving UNICEF fund, aimed to provide countries in crisis with immediate funds. 18 UNICEF (2013) UNICEF Procedure for Level 2 Emergencies Annex 1 to CF/EXD/ UNICEF (2009) PCAs and SSFAs Guidelines (CF/EXD/ ) FRG/PROCEDURE/2015/ UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society Organizations 4

16 The new UNICEF guidelines allow for sub-office, field level authorization and reduced documentation and reporting. This makes the processing more timely than the previous process of documentation, and CO review and authorization. 3. Methodology This review is the first AAR conducted by UNICEF in the East Asia Pacific Region following the activation of L2 procedures and the second evaluation conducted in the Pacific following a disaster. 21 This AAR was funded and managed by UNICEF Pacific. An Independent Consultant conducted the AAR between 7 September and 12 October 2015, with support from an Evaluation Management Team (EMT) consisting of the UNICEF Pacific Country Representative, Regional Emergency Advisor, Regional Evaluation Advisor, and the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist. The Terms of Reference (ToR), which define the objectives and tasks of the consultant, are presented as Annex 1. The overall impact of UNICEF emergency programming is being considered through other, multi-agency processes. Instead, this review focused on UNICEF processes with a focus on learning around disaster response management, including preparedness for future responses. The review focused on the response to TC Pam in Vanuatu as the largest response conducted by UNICEF Pacific in many years. Typhoon Maysak was also included in order to consider the particular challenges of responding where UNICEF has no presence, in the north Pacific. The scope of this review is more comprehensive than a traditional AAR as it covers multiple UNICEF responses (TC Pam and Typhoon Maysak) and covers both the preparation and response phases in all five countries where UNICEF provided a response. The key questions of the AAR are: What worked well? What could have gone better? How can we improve? The review adopted a utilization-focused approach in order to boost participation and ownership of the process. The primary audiences are the UNICEF Pacific offices in Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and the multi-country office in Suva, Fiji. The principle objective of the review is to share findings on what worked well and to provide guidance on how to better utilise UNICEF systems for preparedness and response to emergencies. The secondary objective is to provide feedback to the EAPRO and UNICEF HQ on which procedures worked well and which may need refinement. 22 The review was carried out six months after TC Pam, and there was already considerable documentation and lessons learned activities carried out for the Vanuatu response, including a UNICEF Mid-Year Review and various cluster reviews. The key findings of those reviews have been incorporated into this AAR where relevant. The timing of the key lessons learned activities in Vanuatu can be found in the timeline in Annex 2. The key components of the AAR were as follows: A comprehensive, home-based desk review including key UNICEF programme and fundraising documents and existing lessons learned reviews. Key informant semi-structured interviews (n=58) were conducted throughout the review period (in person or by telephone or Skype) (Annexes 3 & 4). These included UNICEF personnel 23 at all levels (n=43), as well as external stakeholders (n=15). It total, they included 26 women (44.8%), and 32 men (55.2%). UNICEF Pacific prepared an initial list of key informants and other names were added during 21 The first evaluation in the pacific was of UNICEF s Response to Tropical Cyclones Vania & Atu, Vanuatu. 22 UNICEF Pacific (2015) Terms of Reference for an After Action Review of UNICEF Pacific s preparedness and response to Cyclone Pam and Typhoon Maysak. 23 Including staff, consultants, temporary appointments, and surge support from standby partners 5

17 the review, as key points emerged that needed further investigation or verification. The full list of key informants can be found in Annex 3. The consultant travelled to Vanuatu and to Suva and conducted two, half-day AAR workshops with UNICEF staff: o In Port Vila, Vanuatu on 22 September with 12 participants. The AAR Consultant and the Regional Evaluation Advisor facilitated the workshop jointly, with support from the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist. The workshop agenda, notes from the plenary session and the list of participants, and the preliminary recommendations can be found in Annexes 5,6 & 7. o In Suva, Fiji on 29 September with 25 participants. The AAR Consultant, the Regional Evaluation Advisor and the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist facilitated this workshop jointly. The workshop agenda, notes from the plenary session and the list of participants, and the preliminary recommendations can be found Annexes 8,9 & 10. o The workshops provided a forum for data collection and to validate findings from the key informant interviews. They also enabled the preliminary drafting of Specific, Measurable, Accountable, Reasonable and Time bound (SMART) recommendations. Small group discussions were also held with UNICEF personnel who could not attend the workshops or who wished to further discuss issues arising from the workshops. Following the Suva AAR workshop, the Country Management Team met with the consultant to discuss and agree on the key findings and preliminary recommendations, and to start the development of an action plan (Annex 11). Throughout the review period, the Consultant had regular communication and support from the EMT. The key activities conducted during both the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops were as follows: Preparation of a timeline of key events (Annex 2) to build consensus on timing. Small group discussions on each of the key areas of the response that were affected by the L2 declaration: human resources, finance and fundraising, logistics and supply, and operational management. Participants were also given an opportunity to discuss any other topics of importance. Plenary discussion on the key points from the above activity to identify key issues and to build a common understanding. Prioritization of points by participants to understand the most critical areas for improvement. Use of the prioritized points to develop preliminary recommendations for improving emergency preparedness and response. Where possible, data was triangulated using the multiple data collection methods. Additional documentary evidence from secondary sources was also gathered throughout the review, in order to help validate findings. Evidence included UNICEF operational documents including financial and fundraising data, human resource matrices, and supply data. Discussions with senior staff in both Vanuatu and Suva also helped build consensus on the findings. Findings and recommendations were then developed, validated, and prioritized by the consultant, with support from the EMT. Limitations The time frame for conducting face-to-face interviews in Vanuatu and Suva was limited (5 days and 2 days respectively). Conducting key informant interviews by Skype and/or providing input by helped to address this. The AAR took place more than 6 months after TC Pam therefore many of the staff deployed in the first stages of the response had left the region and could not participate in the workshops. To address this, some key surge personnel were identified for key informant interviews and handover notes were included in the desk review. Government of Vanuatu representatives were contacted to arrange key informant interviews while the AAR Consultant was in Vanuatu. However, the timing coincided with ongoing humanitarian and recovery response (El Niño and TC Pam) therefore some representatives did not respond to the initial request. Follow up s including the key AAR questions were sent, and some input was received in 6

18 this way. However, some sectoral gaps remain including the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Youth Development, Training and Sport. There were very few key informants for the response to TC Pam in Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, and likewise for the Typhoon Maysak response in FSM. There was no contact with affected communities to discuss the effectiveness of UNICEF programming, since this was covered during Cluster reviews and other lessons learned exercises. Ethics The methodology for this AAR was designed to provide a forum for UNICEF emergency personnel to discuss the preparedness and response in a non-judgmental, confidential way. Key informant interviews were carried out privately and without the presence of UNICEF management or staff when possible. The Independent AAR Consultant conducted the majority of interviews, which provided an opportunity for key informants to speak in an unbiased forum. The UNICEF Regional Evaluation Advisor and/or the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist also carried out or were present in some of the interviews. 24 Given that neither had been involved in the emergency response they were also able to discuss the response without bias. Key informant interviews were not recorded and no attribution has been made to any of the points raised. Although quotes from the key informant interviews can be found throughout this report, they are not attributed to a specific individual. In addition, the Vanuatu AAR workshop was carried out without the presence of senior management to provide an opportunity for open discussions about operational management and leadership. The AAR Consultant declares that she has no conflict of interest in conducting this review. Report structure The findings discussed in this report are based on the key informant interviews, the AAR workshops, and relevant findings from the other lessons learned activities conducted after TC Pam. The majority of this report focuses on the response in Vanuatu (Section 4.3). For ease of reading, the report is organized by UNICEF s CCCs. The first section (Section 4.3.1) focuses on some of UNICEF s operational commitments: media and communications, human resources, and finance and administration. The second section (Section 4.3.2) looks at some of UNICEF s programme commitments: performance monitoring, rapid assessment and supply and logistics, as well as partnerships with the Government of Vanuatu and with external stakeholders. Under each topic, aspects that were repeatedly identified by key informants or workshop participants as being useful or in need of improvement have been highlighted. The UNICEF response to TC Pam in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati is discussed in Section 4.4 and the UNICEF response to Typhoon Maysak in the Federated States of Micronesia is discussed in Section 4.5. The conclusions and recommendations encompass the key learning from the UNICEF response to TC Pam and Typhoon Maysak. 24 The UNICEF Regional Evaluation Advisor and/or the UNICEF Pacific Planning Specialist carried out or were present in 10 out of the 58 interviews (17%). 7

19 4. Findings of the After Action Review 4.1. The L2 declaration and the utilization of L2 emergency procedures Visionary leadership from the Country Representative pushed the Regional Office to be ready, which triggered early and immediate action. The presence of cyclones or storms often comes with early warning. In the case of TC Pam, early warning services indicated a week in advance that it would be a strong cyclone. This gave UNICEF Pacific the opportunity to contact the EAPRO Regional Director (RD) and discuss potential scenarios and discuss the way forward. Both the Country Representative and the RD have significant emergency experience and this enabled an early recognition of the potentially serious nature of TC Pam and the possibility that it might hit Vanuatu. They also recognized that the Vanuatu Field Office (VFO) lacked a Chief of Field Office (CFO) 25 and had limited emergency experience. As a result, some key decisions and actions were taken in advance of TC Pam making landfall through a no regrets strategy. UNICEF Pacific started preparedness activities on 8 th March (Table 3), contacting the EAPRO and HQ, providing a number of formal updates and activating an organization-wide alert before TC Pam made landfall. This early engagement enabled an immediate response to be activated. Table 3: Key actions taken in advance of TC Pam Action UNICEF Pacific alerted EAPRO and HQ to the potential emergency Approval given for Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office to be deployed to Vanuatu on a no regrets basis Initial surge deployment list of EAPRO staff and the Regional Rapid Response Roster is developed by EAPRO and shared with UNICEF Pacific Pacific Emergency Response Team (PERT) meets in Suva to coordinate preparations and response planning. An experienced Communications Specialist is deployed to Vanuatu from UNICEF Pacific. The Emergency Coordinator (with WASH expertise) arrives in Vanuatu. OIC contacts Regional Office Deputy Regional director for first teleconference 1st and 2 nd UNICEF internal updates circulated OIC activates organisation-wide alert through EWEA The set up of an emergency specific structure in system to enable immediate receipt and allocation of funds Date 8 March 8 March 9 March 9 March 10 March 12 March 12 March 12 March 12 March 13 March Adopting a no regrets strategy and sending in an experienced Emergency Coordinator to be in Vanuatu just in case, was one of the best decisions of the response. 25 The former Chief of Field Office passed away suddenly in February

20 UNICEF Headquarters and EAPRO support An L2 emergency affects office functioning at HQ, RO and CO levels, and in the case of the Pacific, down to the Field Office level. An L2 declaration also activates immediate access to emergency funding, fast tracking of human resources, and procedural simplifications to support the timeliness of the response. It is clear that at HQ and EAPRO levels, the L2 procedures were well understood. The early notification of the EAPRO and HQ meant that once TC Pam landfall, the relevant personnel were alerted and the necessary UNICEF emergency systems were immediately activated including: The release of emergency programme funding (US$1 million) on 14 March, in advance of an official emergency declaration (based on earlier request). REMT has first meeting on 14 March. UNICEF Pacific was prioritized for support from EAPRO/NY and SD. Human resource mobilisation was fast tracked through multiple channels. Within the EAPRO, personnel involved in the emergency response now reported directly to the RD in order to ensure oversight of the situation. The RD provided ongoing support to the Country Representative and Deputy Country Representative (initially acting as Officer in Charge). Back up support was provided to the EAPRO by NYHQ including drafting of documents on RDs behalf and attendance at REMT teleconferences as required. The formal L2 declaration was made on 20 March less than a week after TC Pam made landfall in Vanuatu (see timeline in Annex 2). The L2 procedures made all the difference. Without them UNICEF s contribution would have been much smaller UNICEF Pacific The emergency expertise within UNICEF Pacific was much more limited than at EAPRO and HQ level, as the Country Representative was one of only a handful of staff with significant emergency response experience. As a result, the oversight and support role played by the EAPRO was all the more important. Regular communication, and guidance and support from the RD in particular, provided a strong sense of leadership and confidence that UNICEF s strategic direction for the response was sound. While the L2 procedures were quickly activated at HQ and EAPRO level, they were not fully utilized by UNICEF Pacific. The AAR found that most UNICEF Pacific personnel contributing to this evaluation did not know what an L2 emergency was or what procedures accompanied it even at the time of the AAR. Likewise some senior staff were not initially aware of the specific, mandatory deliverables that accompany an L2 emergency until told by UNICEF HQ in early April (Table 2). However, with support from the EAPRO, HQ and the Pacific Emergency Response Team, all the mandatory deliverables were completed as required. Some UNICEF Pacific staff had attended Emergency Preparedness and Response training run by the EAPRO in Bangkok in The training includes the emergency procedures, as well as a simulation exercise and broader discussion of UNICEF s emergency mandate and responsibilities. This training helped staff respond more quickly, however not enough staff had attended. Similarly, although NYHQ provided training on the L2 procedures (through a webinar) in May, it was too late to have an impact on the initial response and most staff did not attend due the time difference and/or due to their ongoing emergency response commitments. The lack of awareness of the L2 allowable simplifications by some staff in the Fiji Office caused tension with the VFO when experienced surge support personnel arrived in Vanuatu, more familiar with the procedural simplifications and the flexibility that the L2 allows than some of the staff based in Fiji. Some of the issues faced in this regard are highlighted in the sections below. 9

21 Aspects to be replicated: Early, regular communication between Country Representative, Deputy Representative (initially acting as Officer in Charge) & Regional Director enabling early formation of the REMT and readiness at all levels of UNICEF. Early deployment of experienced emergency staff on a no regrets basis, especially to offices with limited emergency expertise. NYHQ support to EAPRO for administrative processes and ensuring endorsement of L2 memo. Suggested improvements: Training from HQ and EAPRO for more UNICEF Pacific staff on L2 and other emergency procedures including the specific, mandatory deliverables. This would help ensure full utilization of emergency procedures from Day 1. UNICEF Pacific to develop and document simplified Standard Operating Procedures to be utilized during emergencies Resource mobilization An Immediate Needs Document (IND) was published on 14 March for US$1 million, and updated/revised on 15 March for US$2 million. The IND facilitated immediate alert to UNICEF partners locally and globally, including National Committees. Given the expected intensity of TC Pam, and the likelihood of an L2 emergency, the EAPRO provided US$100,000 to UNICEF Pacific as immediate start-up funds on 14 March. The L2 emergency procedures also enabled an advance of US$2 million from the EPF the first tranche of which was available to the CO on 14 March (US$1 million). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with humanitarian partners launched the initial Flash Appeal for Vanuatu on 24 March, 10 days after TC Pam made landfall. The Flash Appeal requested US$29.9 million for a three-month emergency response (24 March to 24 June 2015) to support the Government of Vanuatu. The UNICEF component of the Flash Appeal was US$4.8 million, the second largest request after the World Food Programme (WFP). 26 On 27 March, US$5 million was released from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). UNICEF received the second largest allocation of the CERF funds (US$1,716,903), after WFP. 27 The funding was for water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), education, protection and health projects. In order to undertake a longer response covering both relief and recovery activities, and include the other affected Pacific countries, UNICEF Pacific prepared and issued a resource mobilisation strategy and donor mapping and launched a Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for funding on 31 March. The original HAC was for US$7.72 million which was revised to US$10.17 million at the mid year review and revision in July/August. The review is a standard procedure for all countries/emergencies in the HAC. Rapid onset natural disasters tend to attract a rapid inflow of funds, particularly from private donors. Media coverage showing the situation on ground is therefore particularly important. In this regard, a number of UNICEF actions positively impacted the fundraising efforts: Early involvement from NYHQ and EAPRO communications/fundraising teams. Presence of the UNICEF Pacific Communication Specialist in Vanuatu before and immediately after TC Pam made landfall, doing podcasts and conducting multiple interviews with global media. This resulted in National Committees (and citizens of Australia and New Zealand) being aware of the situation early on and immediately starting to fundraise. Presence of Country Representative in Regional Management meeting in Cambodia in March (at time of TC Pam) provided an opportunity to have direct contact with key, high-level UNICEF decision makers, including the Executive Director. 26 The WFP component requested through the Flash Appeal was US$8,268, WFP allocation from the CERF funds was US$1,831,

22 Direct engagement by OIC with local missions (Japan, France, UK, DFAT, MFAT). These actions combined to enable significant immediate fundraising, and ensured that money was raised rapidly. This was all the more important when the Nepal earthquake happened just a month later (25 April), which brought national committee fundraising for the Pacific Islands nearly to an end. Despite the influx of donations for Vanuatu, it was a challenge to raise money to support a response in Tuvalu, Solomon Islands and Kiribati, as they were less affected than Vanuatu and the media and national committee messages were almost exclusively focused on the Vanuatu situation. Funding for a response was only made possible by UNICEF Pacific bilateral fundraising efforts with the Governments of Japan, Estonia and Australia (DFAT). The positive fundraising results were however constrained by donor and to some extent, UNICEF NY earmarking of funds for Vanuatu not reflecting the reality of the Pacific being a multi-country office, responding to an emergency situation in multiple countries, despite documented attempts by the Representative and Deputy to encourage allocations to Pacific cyclone emergency. When Super Typhoons Maysak, Noul and Dolphin hit FSM, fundraising and the earmarking of funds again become problematic. FSM was not included in the HAC so no global fundraising was done. When the HAC had its annual review, UNICEF Pacific took the opportunity to modify the Pacific Islands HAC and identify the need for support in FSM and the potential need to response to the impact of El Niño in Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. As a result of this experience, and joint advocacy by UNICEF Pacific and the EAPRO, UNICEF HQ has recently endorsed the continuation of a sub-regional HAC profile for the 2016 HAC. By late August UNICEF Pacific had received over US$9 million in funding for the TC Pam response but nothing for the Typhoon Maysak response. However the Office was able to repay almost all of the $2 million advanced EPF. The difficulties in raising funds for the Typhoon Maysak response resulted in agreement from the RD and EMOPS that UNICEF Pacific could keep (not repay) up to US$300,000 of the EPF for an emergency response in FSM. Aspects to be replicated: Readiness of the NYHQ and national committees for fundraising due to the early formation of the REMT. Early deployment of a Communications Specialist supported fundraising and media visibility. Suggested improvements: Consider engaging a Financial Management Specialist during an L2 emergency to liaise with NYHQ on earmarking and financial tracking of donations, and/or UNICEF Pacific and NYHQ to discuss and agree on the procedures ahead of time. 11

23 4.3. UNICEF response to TC Pam in Vanuatu This section of the report specifically reviews the UNICEF response in Vanuatu. As with the sections above, actions that worked well and therefore could be replicated in future emergencies are highlighted, as are suggested areas of improvement. Vanuatu Field Office preparedness TC Pam was the first Category 5 cyclone to hit Vanuatu in recorded history, therefore beyond what anyone could have foreseen or prepared for. However, the response highlighted critical gaps in the VFO emergency response plans that need to be rectified. UNICEF s main preparedness tool is a platform called Early Warning Early Action (EWEA). The EWEA was introduced in 2009 replacing the former Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans and includes two main components: Early warning: enables assessment of risks to guide preparedness Early action: focuses on preparedness actions The EWEA system identifies 20 key actions for preparedness, of which ten are mandatory. The system is however, simply a tool to facilitate office planning and discussion around emergencies. Once gaps are identified in EWEA, it is the responsibility of each office to take action and rectify the gaps. The VFO last updated its EWEA in September 2014 and identified a number of gaps. However, it appears that no action was taken to address them. 28 Although UNICEF Pacific, the EAPRO and HQ were discussing early preparedness actions, very little preparedness occurred in the VFO. The Business Continuity Plan (BCP) Key Action 4 in EWEA - had not been updated since December 2008 and it was noted in June 2014 that an overall review was needed. In 2008 none of the areas for action met the standards. 29 Without the guidance of a CFO, and with limited staff training and awareness of the required actions, the office struggled to prepare themselves. The arrival of the Communications Specialist from the Fiji Office motivated the VFO to take action, and some office preparation took place including a post-cyclone meeting place and time organized. The issues related to financial and administrative preparedness are discussed in Section Financial and administrative procedures. Key office preparedness activities for next time: Ensure generator is functioning Ensure adequate fuel is available for generator and cars Ensure there is an undated inventory of contingency stock Protect office equipment and contingency stock Ensure adequate telecommunications equipment, SIM cards and phone credit is available for personnel (including potential surge support) Ensure staff have adequate time for personal preparedness: protection of homes, water storage, cash, food supplies etc. Aspects to be replicated: Allow time for staff personal preparedness. Identification of a staff meeting point and time after an emergency. Organization of a communication tree between UNICEF personnel. 28 This could not be completely verified as the former Chief of Field Office had passed away. 29 UNICEF Vanuatu Field Office Business Continuity Plan Key Performance Indicators. EWEA, 27 June

24 Suggested improvements: All CFOs to revisit their emergency preparedness plans and ensure they are up to date and actioned. All CFOs to ensure that the EWEA system is regularly updated and appropriate action taken to rectify gaps. Ensure offices have a clear and widely understood Business Continuity Plan. Ensure clearly defined and widely understood roles and responsibilities of key staff members in the event of an emergency. Ensure team members are aware of emergency plans on a regular basis. Regularly update the inventory of contingency stocks. Operational management The operational management of the Vanuatu response had two distinct phases: the first five weeks, when the roles of Emergency Coordinator and (Acting) Head of Office, were both filled by the same person deployed in advance from New York; and a longer second wave of support when the two positions were filled by two people. There is no doubt that the presence of an experienced Emergency Coordinator/ Acting Head of Office immediately after TC Pam was critical to the response. The Emergency Coordinator/ Acting Head of Office provided direction and leadership to the Vanuatu team, supported by more junior surge staff from EAPRO. This arrangement worked well. However, when a new temporary CFO arrived, along with a replacement senior Emergency Coordinator management issues arose and staff were confused about if and how their day-to-day management lines had changed: Did all programme staff in Vanuatu still report to the Emergency Coordinator? Did they maintain a relationship to the Chiefs of Section in Suva for reporting or for technical advice only? Was the Emergency Coordinator still in charge, or did the Chief of Field Office have a leadership role during the emergency response? This lack of clarity resulted in tensions and frustrations at both the Fiji Office and the VFO that had not been fully resolved at the time of the AAR. This issue was raised in multiple key informant interviews and during both the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops. During the difficult first stages of the response, visits to Vanuatu by the RD and multiple trips by the Country Representative and Operations Officer played a critical role in the motivation of the field staff. Their presence showed concern for the staff and helped assure staff that high-level leadership were aware of their situation and ready to listen to their concerns and discuss any issues as they arose. Aspects to be replicated: Early deployment of an experienced Emergency Coordinator to the affected country. Visits by Senior CO and RO staff to affected country/ies. Suggested improvements: Clear documentation of roles and responsibilities of management personnel including any differences between countries where there is a UNICEF Field Office, and where there is not. Clear distinctions between the role of the CFO and the Emergency Coordinator when two people take the roles. Clear roles and responsibilities of the Chiefs of Sections during an emergency and their relationship to management staff in the affected country/ies. 13

25 UNICEF s operational commitments Media and communications As previously noted, the UNICEF Pacific Communications Specialist was deployed into Vanuatu ahead of TC Pam. The Communications Specialist conducted an average of 80 international interviews a day during using two phones and Skype. During this time, invaluable support was provided by the Communications Team at UNICEF New Zealand, and by the EAPRO. A subsequent review 30 found that UNICEF led global coverage of the cyclone, with 34% of international coverage (compared to other agencies) and nearly 800 news articles in the first month, as well as 14,140 twitter mentions in the first hours. The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) in Vanuatu also had a communication plan in place that was supported by the Communications Specialist. The plan included: Radio: pre-recorded messages for national radio TV: advertisement for airing on national television once functional Mobile phones: 166 Emergency text messages with updated information were sent to all users of both Telecom Vanuatu and Digicel. The Communication Specialist was also providing support to the NDMO on other issues including handling of international media, communication challenges, opportunities for strengthening linkages and information flow from Community Disaster Committees (CDCs) to Provincial Disaster Committees (PDCs) and to NDMO, and for better understanding of the coloured alert system, strengths of cyclone categories, and location of Evacuation Centres and support services. Aside from the media and external communication work described above, UNICEF staff was also involved with Communication for Development to support widespread multi-media and interpersonal campaigns to inform affected families on essential precautionary measures to protect their health and safety. UNICEF partnered with a local youth media group, Further Arts to interview 100 children affected by the cyclone. These videos form the basis for child-centred advocacy and communications, and were also featured at the World Humanitarian Summit Pacific consultations. UNICEF also recently appointed the Vanuatu Women s Beach Volleyball team as UNICEF ambassadors to help raise awareness of UNICEF s aims, objectives and priorities. UNICEF and the Vanuatu Football Federation (VFF) are also collaborating through the Just Play programme to use existing networks and sport to assist with emergency relief activities in Vanuatu. The main concerns related to external communication raised during the AAR were as follows: Insufficient advice given from the EAPRO or HQ in terms of the exact UNICEF requirements for communications after an emergency. This would have been helpful during the preparatory lead-time. With the UNICEF Pacific Communications Specialist in Vanuatu, there was a gap in communications in the Fiji Office. Insufficient communication equipment to enable videoing, uploading etc. in a context of low Internet capabilities. The EAPRO communications/fundraising team were able to fill the gap left in Suva, liaising between Vanuatu and HQ and managing the different expectations regarding the information coming out of Vanuatu. Significant support was also provided in terms of editing and formatting. Required kit for communications personnel in future: Satellite phone (including charger and car charger), fully charged and with key phone numbers entered in advance. SMART phone for communication and podcasts, photos, videos etc. Power bank Began or similar to be able to send documents and videos without telecommunications 30 UNICEF (2015) Snapshot report: Cyclone Pam online media, broadcast and social media. 26 May

26 Waterproof bag Aspects to be replicated: Early deployment of communications personnel to support fundraising efforts. Support from NZ National Committee and EAPRO for editing, formatting etc. Regular calls involving all UNICEF communications teams UNICEF Pacific EAPRO, HQ and National Committees. Suggested improvements: A clear brief on specific communication outputs required. Provision of dedicated communication kit to ensure that required information can be provided in all conditions. Surge support or agreements in place with photographers, videographers and writers. Inclusion of more community and children s voices in external communications. Human resources L2 becomes most effective when you have a highly trained core set of skilled and trained staff who are able to be deployed at short notice. Prior to the TC Pam response, the VFO operated with nine staff, with limited experience of emergency responses. Emergency surge support was therefore critical. UNICEF has multiple avenues for providing staff including surge support to an L2 emergency including from the Emergency Response Team in New York, internal deployment of experienced UNICEF staff from the EAPRO, a Regional Rapid Response Roster, multiple international standby partners with people who are ready to deployed to emergencies, engagement of consultants or individual contractors through the emergency roster, or external recruitment of people on temporary appointment. 31 Providing surge support to the Fiji Office and to Vanuatu required cooperation between HQ, the EAPRO, and the UNICEF Pacific HR teams. This cooperation worked well, and surge support was provided in a timely manner. With few exceptions, the surge support was experienced and with appropriate expertise for the work required. Within the first week, surge support was provided through the immediate release of regional roster personnel from the EAPRO and from multiple Country Offices in the region. 32 Immediate deployment of support from Supply Division, and extension or change in deliverables for consultants in Vanuatu also contributed to surge support being available within a few days of the cyclone. Support coming in from other channels took longer. A review of the Operations Staffing Matrix (OSM) shows an average of 8 days between CO request for staff and the selection of candidate, 33 and a further 18 days on average between selection and deployment. 34 The main concerns related to Human Resource support highlighted during the AAR workshops were as follows: UNICEF Pacific operations staff, including HR did not feel they had adequate basic emergency training Some surge support did not have adequate contextual knowledge of the Pacific and therefore what items would be appropriate, and what programmatic direction the emergency should take. The NYHQ HR department reported that they refer all surge deployees to review before their deployment, both for UNICEF structure and procedures, CCC s e-learning and links to information of the country they are deploying to. However, lack of 31 UNICEF (2010) Recruitment and staffing in emergency situations - CF/EXD/ Regional roster support was provided by UNICEF Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Myanmar. 33 UNICEF Operation Staffing Matrix Cyclone Pam workbook, version at as 27 April Ibid. 15

27 induction was an ongoing finding of the AAR. Similarly, a briefing package was developed by UNICEF Pacific but not issued to all incoming staff (and did not include procedural aspects). Lack of handover notes from all surge personnel left gaps in institutional knowledge. The OSM proved too complex and time-consuming for the limited UNICEF Pacific capacity to maintain daily. To compensate, the CO designed a simplified matrix that was efficient at keeping track staffing and HR requests and was well utilized. Despite the above issues, the dedication and commitment of the response personnel is clear. In many cases, the experienced surge support provided learning experiences and counter-parting opportunities for existing staff that was greatly appreciated. Another positive aspect of the HR response was the presence of a staff counsellor in a private space within the VFO, provided by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Staff found this service invaluable, particularly because the counsellor was a foreigner (and therefore not known to family or friends) and the informal mechanism for uptake (no appointment needed). Although free counselling was also available to Suva staff it was available through a more formal (local) mechanism and had zero uptake. Aspects to be replicated: Fast tracking of HR procedures with cooperation at all levels of UNICEF. Experienced, technical staff deployed through multiple avenues of surge support. Utilization of existing personnel in country with Pacific experience and knowledge. Utilization of in-situ consultants with change of ToR and deliverables. Utilization of the services of a staff counsellor using an informal mechanism for visits. Regular updating and sharing of the simplified HR matrix designed by UNICEF Pacific. Suggested improvements: UNICEF Pacific to conduct an annual revision of emergency skill set within the team in order to quickly identify potential HR requirements in the event of an emergency. UNICEF Pacific to provide opportunities for Field Office staff to attend UNICEF Program, Policy and Procedures training. HQ, EAPRO and UNICEF Pacific to provide clear and widely circulated ToRs to Field Offices for all incoming people (surge, UNICEF staff, consultants ). UNICEF Pacific to ensure additional HR and administrative support is provided for the Suva Office if there is another L2 emergency. EAPRO to ensure that Regional Rapid Response Roster includes a wide range of skills including coordinators, information officers, reporting officers and communication staff. Establish SOPs for surge staff handover processes (including briefing and handover notes). Finance and administration At the Country Office level there was not enough flexibility to allow for the level of reactivity that is required in an emergency. Financial and administrative preparedness Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Vanuatu worked directly with the Government of Vanuatu, and had no prior agreements, or contingency agreements with the private sector or with CSOs. This meant that once TC Pam hit, UNICEF had to start looking for partners for logistic support (including transporters, warehouse, casual labour etc.) and with civil society organizations, for programme implementation. The EWEA outlines a number of specific actions to be taken under Key Action 15 Financial and administrative emergency preparedness. These include internal control measures, pre-establishing cash resources, and identifying alternative office arrangements in the event of an emergency. However, as with office preparedness, the VFO has completed the review in the EWEA system (September 2014) but it 16

28 appears to have been only a paper exercise, as the team were not aware of the simplified procedures available. As a result, when power and telecommunications went down, and banks, including ATMs closed, the office had limited opportunities for purchasing items required for operations. Even in normal times, Vanuatu does not have mobile money facilities as in other countries of the world, which further constrains options for moving cash. A Cash on Hand Account (COHA) of US$5,000 was authorized for the first incoming Emergency Coordinator/Acting Head of Office on 17 March however the process for the release of funds was inappropriate for an emergency context, especially when banks are closed: a cheque prepared in Suva, that needed to be signed and cashed at a bank in Vanuatu. The requirement of multiple signatories further complicated this process, when local signatories were away conducting rapid assessments. Without access to cash, UNICEF could only operate in the early stages through the good will of UNICEF staff and consultants who utilized their own funds for the response, and through the good will of local suppliers/business owners and casual labourers (for loading and unloading) who agreed to provide services and goods based on informal, verbal credit agreements. Even when banks opened, reducing the need for COHA in Port Vila, cash was still needed for payment to vendors without bank accounts, especially for casual labour payments outside of Port Vila. Emergency response requires experienced, judgement-based decisions in a cash-based context. Table 4 below shows the specific actions outlined in the EWEA under Key Action 15, whether they were actioned in EWEA and what action was actually taken. Table 4: Financial and administration emergency preparedness (EWEA Key Action 15) Vanuatu Field Office EWEA Specific Actions Internal control mechanisms Done pre-tc Pam? Action taken Fast tracked issuance of TAs in emergencies (to be done in 1 hour max) Table of Authority identified and preapproved Y Y Done ToA was amended and those concerned were informed accordingly. Manual financing system available Y Staff not aware but utilized to some extent because of experience of Emergency Coordinator Systems are pre-agreed for issuance of new phone and IT equipment for surge staff and consultants Cash resources Petty cash account pre-established up to US$1000 A special cash account preestablished for between US$ ,000 A special cash account preestablished for between US$10,000+ Y Y N/A N/A Action done through good will of telecommunications company on informal verbal agreement post-cyclone. Petty cash available up to a value of 70,000 Vatu (US$700) COHA account up to US$5,000 approved for Emergency Coordinator. However, it was a cheque that required multiple signatories and needed to be cashed when banks were not open. 17

29 Third party cash providers preidentified N/A Emergency field office establishment Guest-houses/locations pre-identified Y Done Draft lease established for alternative office Agreements are pre-established for the relocation of staff to these offices An office in a box is available with all necessary IT equipment Y Y N The two pre-identified locations were affected by TC Pam and not able to be used. An alternative location was identified (the Melanesian Hotel) and utilized with agreement with the management. Office in a Box was ordered and delivered but was found unsuitable for Vanuatu context. No emergency IT equipment in place. One of the EWEA specific activities (Table 4) is a readiness to fast track issuance of travel authorizations (within 1 hour). However, when this did not happen and the Fiji Office utilized the same process as in normal times, instead of delaying programme implementation, staff, consultants and surge staff in the VFO utilized their own funds for travel. This situation became critical when Air Vanuatu declared that it would no longer be accepting local procurement orders and would be requiring cash payments for air travel. The CO procedures for handling emergency requests from the FO were simplified in early May with a Finance Officer becoming an Emergency Workflow Manager and the work of the Programme Assistants (PAs) was rearranged. Using the new workflow system (Figure 2), financial requests could be more easily tracked, and the Vanuatu team had a single focal point for enquiries. Figure 1: CO workflow processing arrangement commenced 4 May 2015 Source: UNICEF (2015) Standard operating procedures - Business process PA Pool (Vanuatu Office, Emergency response) DRAFT. V.1 18

30 Between 4 May and 28 September, the new workflow arrangements averaged a processing time of 3.5 days. 35 In future emergencies, consideration should be given to modifying the new workflow arrangement to include PAs dedicated to the emergency response while others continue with the normal work. The current Standard Operating Procedures for this aspect of the response can be found in Annex 12. Financial authority In normal times, financial transaction authority is held in Suva. Chiefs of Sections have financial responsibilities for the programmatic spend within their sector and this continued during the emergency. When experienced emergency support surged into Vanuatu, the lack of financial authority at field level led to a myriad of issues that hindered operations and resulted in frustrated, disempowered staff in Vanuatu. VISION (UNICEF s financial and other business transaction system, linked to results) access and authority was one such issue and was citied in both the Suva and Vanuatu AAR workshops. There was also a general concern of a perceived disconnect between programme budgets (held in Suva with the Chiefs of Section) and programme planning and implementation (done at field level). This ties in with the lack of clarity on the role of the Chiefs of Section vis-à-vis emergency staff in the FO during an emergency as mentioned earlier. Partner Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and Small Scale Funding Agreements (SSFAs) The L2 procedures enable simplification of the PCA and SSFA procedures (Annex 13). The new SSFA guidance 36, which officially became effective on 1 April, provided UNICEF Pacific with documented procedures that could be used in the emergency response. These guidelines were utilized earlier than their official start date and provided a clear decision-making tree for the type of instrument that should be utilized. Since the new guidelines enable lower documentation requirements and authorization at field level, they were more timely that the PCA process. SSFAs were therefore well utilized, and proved invaluable in the early days of the response when UNICEF was looking for new partnerships. Aspects to be replicated: Utilization of the new guidelines on SSFAs. Utilization of the revised workflow management process for financial tracking. Suggested improvements: Establish contingency agreements or agreements with contingency clauses with potential implementing partners as part of preparedness. Clearer (and common) understanding of PCA simplifications for UNICEF Pacific staff. Explore options for decentralizing fund management and positioning VISION rights and access in the affected FO. Consider deploying PAs to affected country immediately to help give the response team access to programming details. UNICEF Pacific to develop customised financial and administrative SOPs UNICEF s programme commitments Rapid assessment Multiple rapid assessments were carried out in Vanuatu after TC Pam including aerial assessments, community assessments, and provincial assessments. Supported by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team, the NDMO organized and conducted a Joint Rapid Needs 35 UNICEF Pacific SOP - PA pool Vanuatu emergency response monitoring sheet (version as at 28 September 2015). 36 UNICEF (2015) UNICEF Procedure for County and Regional Office transfer of resources to Civil Society Organizations 19

31 Assessment. 37 Some clusters and working groups including Telecommunications, Utilities, Agriculture, WASH and Infrastructure also carried out detailed technical assessments. UNICEF provided support to the Vanuatu Humanitarian Team and contributed staff and consultants to the NDMO led assessment process. There was a general agreement within the humanitarian community that coordinated assessments were preferable, in order to reduce assessment fatigue for respondents and communities and to increase the speed of implementation. UNICEF contributed to the UNDAC and WASH technical assessments by providing sectoral assessment tools. This was possible because UNICEF had pre-prepared rapid assessment questionnaires and had conducted training of enumerators in a number of sectors. The cluster lessons learned exercises highlight a number of common challenges to the assessment process. 38 The need for coordination between clusters The need for consistent methodology across assessment forms to make consolidation easier The need to ensure greater involvement from Provincial Authorities and CDCs Logistical constraints for transporting assessment teams to affected islands The challenge of inconsistent and out of date community level baseline data was highlighted by a number of clusters. Although there is a plethora of information available, personnel were not aware of where to find it or what figures to use. In most provinces, census data had not been updated, even by simple projection, and this led to challenges in determine appropriate response targets. While there was an opportunity to update programme targets in the HAC in July/August, not all sectors took up this option. Within UNICEF, programme staff felt that they had utilized the assessment data well for programme planning and design. Like the clusters, UNICEF also recognized they needed to have greater levels of communication and coordination between sectors and ensure that all responses (and supply orders) are based and designed on verified needs assessments. The need for strong Information Management Systems was another key area of learning by the clusters. Some clusters prioritized information management staff, and these clusters had stronger information management and information consistency. 39 In future responses, information management and information dissemination systems must be strengthened to enable clusters to make informed programming decisions and provide clear guidance for transitioning from relief to recovery. Lastly, there was a clear interest in making greater use of mobile technologies for assessments. Other clusters admired the WASH smart phone system, providing opportunities for UNICEF to engage with other clusters on similar systems. Aspects to be replicated: Preparation of sectoral assessment forms/questions ahead of time. Pre-emergency training of government and UNICEF staff on rapid assessment tools. Participation in joint assessments. Use of mobile technology for assessments (WASH Cluster). Suggestions for improvement: Updated population data at hand to enable swift initial response while assessments are ongoing. Greater focus on information management during both preparedness and response. Better utilization of verified assessment data to update the HAC during its annual review. 37 OCHA (2015) End of Mission Report - United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) Tropical Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu 16 March 4 April Government of Vanuatu, National Disaster Management Office - Lessons learned presentation 39 For example, the WASH and Shelter clusters 20

32 Monitoring and reporting The programme commitments of the UNICEF CCCs in humanitarian action are premised on corresponding benchmarks derived from global standards in the respective programme areas. The benchmarks are the globally accepted performance levels for humanitarian response drawn inter-agency standards, including International Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards, the Sphere Standards, and the outcomes of discussions in inter-agency and cluster forums. 40 During emergencies, UNICEF s CCCs outline the indicators for Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM). HPM surge personnel into Vanuatu immediately after TC Pam provided support to all programme sections ensuring that HPM was used from the beginning of the programme. Key indicators for each sector, along with both Cluster and UNICEF targets, were incorporated into the HAC and followed by all programme sections. In Vanuatu, partner CSOs were assisted by UNICEF staff in their monitoring of UNICEF supported projects to ensure that UNICEF targets and indicators were used. Aside from HPM, for the TC Pam response, UNICEF engaged field monitors for the first time, in order to ensure that UNICEF supplies reached affected children and families and were utilized. It was widely recognized that field monitoring was an important part of UNICEF s emergency response. However, the design and management of the field monitors needs to be reconsidered in future. A clear field monitoring strategy is needed ahead of time that defines the scope for monitors, together with clear objectives. Draft monitoring tools are needed that can quickly be adapted as required. Local personnel should be utilized as much as possible in order to maximise acceptance and communication with affected communities. International personnel should only be considered for coordination roles, if at all. A monitoring template, developed in collaboration with the relevant programme sections would be useful, to enable programme staff to follow up on monitoring findings. Field monitoring and all related activities should be managed by a trained M&E focal point. UNICEF reporting requirements during an emergency are significant. Regular, detailed situation reports (SitReps) are required. UNICEF templates are available for the SitRep to ensure that all information required by the different levels of UNICEF, for fundraising, communications, programming etc. is available. These templates were utilized, but to complete the SitReps in a timely manner, to the standard required, is a full time job but this was not recognized during the TC Pam response. In future responses a full time Reporting Officer should be employed. Ultimately, the UNICEF SitReps have been well received, both internally and externally, and the UNICEF format and information was copied by other agencies and even by NDMO. Aspects to be replicated: Sharing and utilization of UNICEF SitReps. Support to CSOs for reporting on UNICEF targets and indicators to enable utilization of HPM from the beginning of the response. Presence of UNICEF field monitors responsible for distribution and programme monitoring. Suggestions for improvement: Engage a full time Reporting Officer in future L2 emergencies. Prioritise third party monitors from Day 1 and utilize local capacity where possible. Increase the capacity of the office and the field monitoring teams on HPM and field monitoring. 40 UNICEF (2010) Core commitments for children in Humanitarian Action. UNICEF, New York 21

33 Supply and logistics There were some delays getting appropriate goods into Vanuatu. Partner agencies had structured their plans around our incoming supplies but they might have been quicker if running independently. Logistics in the Pacific is very difficult and expensive as there are large distances between countries, limited locally available transport for fast movement of supplies between islands and limited logistic infrastructure and resources. Prior to TC Pam, UNICEF Pacific had limited logistics and supply capacity and no dedicated logistics/supply staff in Vanuatu. There was only a small storage space, and no identified warehouse space or agreement in place to use one in an emergency. There were also no agreements with any logistics services such as transporters or forklifts, or casual labourers. However, very early in the response, UNICEF decided that it could make the biggest contribution to the overall response by utilizing the services and expertise of the UNICEF Supply Division (based in Copenhagen) and having the supplies distributed by CSO partners and/or government ministries. Supply Division responded to the UNICEF Pacific request and quickly provided surge staff both to the Fiji Office and to the VFO. Experienced logistic support followed in April through a standby partner (MSB). 41 Both the support from Supply Division and MSB were instrumental to the success to the UNICEF response. With this support in place, UNICEF was able to review contingency stock, work on supply plans, establish a large warehouse in Vanuatu, establish systems for stock management, and develop a system of supply tracking. It also freed up the time of programme staff to be able to concentrate of the programme planning and implementation. UNICEF had some contingency stock pre-positioned in a number of locations including Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, and this was distributed immediately, while awaiting additional supplies. Ultimately, additional supplies arrived into Vanuatu through Supply Division, from Manila and from Suva but not without incident. In some cases, inappropriate supplies were ordered, supply arrival was delayed, and some poor quality supplies arrived, much of which was not distributed. Goods also arrived without distribution plans in place, making dispatch difficult. Some goods also arrived into Vanuatu that was inappropriate for the Pacific context (see example in Annex 14). In future Pacific emergency responses, Supply Division and other UNICEF offices sending goods need to be aware of the specific Pacific context: Restricted size of airports and seaports Absence of bulk unloading equipment at seaports and at airports Recognition that items will be transported to affected islands by small boats Limited in-country capacity for fast transport Limited logistical infrastructure and equipment. UNICEF Pacific had initially requested WFP support on logistics and believed that Supply Division and WFP could collaborate on logistics and supply. However this did not happen, and resulted in some duplication of efforts and parallel logistics and supply systems being established. Some CSOs were able to obtain stock faster than UNICEF because they had agreements in place with governments such as Australia, New Zealand or France to pre-position supplies and utilize military assets. Most also had distribution plans in place when ordering their stock, which speeded up their dispatch and distribution process. UNICEF (and other UN entities) did not have any such agreements, and therefore missed opportunities to bring in stock through government channels. When strong sea surges caused delays in the arrival of goods being transported by ship, CSO partners distributed their own stock with a view to eventually replenishing when UNICEF stocks arrived. To support the government with incoming supplies UNICEF provided logistics support to the NDMO and to the Central Medical Stores of the Ministry of Health. The relevant government representatives positively reviewed both these roles during the AAR. The government was overwhelmed by the large quantities of 41 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 22

34 unsolicited goods coming into the country so the ongoing support to NDMO logistics and emergency support to the MoH was much appreciated. It was a risk for UNICEF to employ a supply strategy when the logistics and supply capacity of UNICEF Pacific and the Vanuatu Field Office was weak. However, the supply strategy has worked well and in general, partners 42 spoke highly of the UNICEF logistic effort during the AAR. Aspects to be replicated: Contingency stock located in multiple Pacific locations for immediate distribution. Immediate request for support from Supply Division to support logistics and supply. Follow up request to standby partners for logistics and supply support Suggestions for improvement: Increase understanding of specific logistic issues in the Pacific. Review prepositioning of contingency stocks with other stakeholders taking into consideration quality of the goods and ease and speed of transport into the Pacific. Identify logistic suppliers and service providers and prepare contingency agreements ahead of time. Identify service providers in multiple locations that can do pre-packing of supplies. Ensure linkage of supply ordering with programme distribution plans Partnership and coordination Partnership and coordination with the Government of Vanuatu UNICEF has a long-term relationship with the Government of Vanuatu, and works closely with a number of Ministries and Departments. 43 Over the years, UNICEF has seconded staff into various Government ministries and departments, some of which are now fully paid by the Government. UNICEF also provides direct funding to ministries and departments, based on agreed work plans that are updated annually. In Vanuatu, UNICEF is the focal point for UN agencies in emergencies as it has the largest UN footprint. UNICEF is also one of the few UN agencies in Vanuatu to work in both emergency and development contexts. As a trusted government partner, UNICEF was able to build on their relationship with the Government and support the design and implementation of emergency programmes in a number of key sectors: WASH, Health and Nutrition, Education and Child Protection. In addition, UNICEF made significant effort to communicate directly with the Prime Minister s Office and with the NDMO for general emergency coordination. Government representatives, and external agencies were certainly appreciative of the efforts UNICEF staff went to in supporting the government in cluster coordination, and to coordinate the emergency response in general. To this end, the presence of an experienced Emergency Coordinator in Vanuatu during and immediately after TC Pam was vital. The importance of having an experienced Emergency Coordinator on the ground who could provide some leadership and guidance to the government, cannot be overstated. The NDMO, OCHA and the VHT activated the cluster coordination mechanism in Vanuatu in The Government of Vanuatu leads each cluster, co-lead by a UN or CSO partner (Figure 2). The Cabinet of Vanuatu (formerly known as the Council of Ministers), reports to the Prime Minister s Office. UNICEF is heavily involved in multiple clusters and working groups in Vanuatu. UNICEF co-leads (with Ministry of 42 Multiple government ministries and departments and CSO partners 43 Including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Land, water, resources and the Ministry of Interior. Within these Ministries, UNICEF works closely with the Department of Geology, Mines and Water Resources, the Department of Nutrition, the Department of Reproductive Health and the Civil Registry. 23

35 Lands, Water and Natural Resources) the WASH Cluster and shares the co-lead (with Ministry of Education and Training) responsibilities for the Education Cluster with Save the Children. UNICEF also leads the Nutrition Working Group (under the Health Cluster, co-led by Ministry of Health and WHO) and the Child Protection Working Group (under the Gender and Protection Cluster). UNICEF s attendance and active participation in these multiple clusters and working groups gave them a strong platform for engagement with the cluster system, enabling them to quickly establish working relationships with many emergency partners. Figure 2: Humanitarian architecture, Vanuatu Source: Government of Vanuatu (2015) Humanitarian Action Plan A number of these clusters have already completed lessons learned workshops, 44 so the findings described here, are a compilation of findings from the cluster reviews, key informant interviews and the Vanuatu and Suva AAR workshops. The lessons learned documents indicate that some clusters worked better than others. It appears that some government officials were unaware/not interested in humanitarian architecture until it was required. High government staff turnover also meant that despite multiple emergency preparedness training by the VHT and others, 45 some key government staff, particularly those with decision-making authority and responsibility, did not understand humanitarian architecture, how it was activated, and the coordination role that would follow. However, once activated, with support from the co-leads, the clusters played a critical role in coordinating humanitarian response. The work of the WASH, and Health and Nutrition Clusters among others, were considered lifesaving and therefore prioritized by the Government and by UNICEF. These clusters were therefore necessarily coordinating and responding more quickly than others. Other sectors such as Education and Child Protection responded, but more slowly. Likewise, there were differences in coordination between the clusters, with notably less actors in education and child protection, and less specific funding. 44 The full list of lessons learned documents can be found in the bibliography. 45 Training was done by OCHA, UNICEF, SPC, and INGO led trainings (including through the VHT) 24