RUI ZHANG. FIELDS OF RESEARCH Macroeconomic Dynamics, Labor Economics, Political Economy of Unemployment International Trade

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1 RUI ZHANG B13, School of Economics Sir Clive Granger Building University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD +44(0) : ruizhangeco@gmail.com Homepage: Nationality: China FIELDS OF RESEARCH Macroeconomic Dynamics, Labor Economics, Political Economy of Unemployment International Trade EDUCATION Ph.D., Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, September Advisor: Professor Gilles Saint-Paul Dissertation: Essays in Matching, Outsourcing and Social Network Grade: The highest distinction with the congratulations of the jury European Diploma in Advanced Quantitative Economics, July M.A., Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, July B.A., Economics, Harbin Institute of Technology, July CURRENT POSITION The Globalisation and Economic Policy Centre (GEP), The University of Nottingham, Visiting Research Fellow, Academic year Professor Richard Upward and Professor Konstantinos Tatsiramos WORKING PAPERS Exposure to the New Wave of Offshoring, Unemployment and Welfare. (Job Market Paper) Getting a Job from My Unemployed Friends: A Social Network Perspective. (Under Review) Trading Tasks in a Social Network: The Role of Labor Market Inefficiency. Another Look at Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation Reforming: The Role of Labor Market Institutions. Joint with Sheng Bi Rigidities, Offshoring and Unemployment. Joint with Xintong Han

2 WORK IN PROGRESS An Estimation of Offshoring Cost Function in a Structural Model. Joint with Xintong Han and Martí Mestieri Firing or Stop Hiring? An Endogenized Downsizing Decision. Joint with Richard Upward The Second Order Impact of Unemployed Benefit on the Employment. AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS Visiting Fellowship for Research, The University of Nottingham, Fellowship for Research and Teaching, French Government, Jean-Jacques Laffont Fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics, Fellowship for Teaching, Université de Toulouse 1, TEACHING EXPERIENCES Toulouse School of Economics Macroeconomics (Undergraduate Level), Teaching Assistant, Fall 2010-Fall Microeconomics (Graduate Level), Teaching Assistant, Spring Labor Economics (Undergraduate Level),Teaching Assistant, Spring Master Thesis Instructor (Graduate Level), Instructor, Spring DESIRED TEACHING FIELDS Macroeconomics, Labor Economics, Political Economy of Unemployment, Trade PRESENTATIONS, SEMINARS, AND WORKSHOPS 2014:EEA-ESEM, Toulouse; GEP workshop, Nottingham. 2013:AMSE-Bank of France 2nd Labor Market Conference, Paris; GSS Seminar, Madrid; Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Singapore; Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association, Aix-en-Provence; Journées Louis-André Gérard- Varet, Marseille; 45th Money, Macro and Finance Annual Conference, London; 2012:Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association, Paris. OTHER ACTIVITIES Royal Economic Society Autumn School, University of Birmingham, Fall Exchange Student, the University of Hong Kong,

3 COMPUTER AND LANGUAGE SKILLS Computer Skills: Latex, R, Matlab, Mathematica, Eviews, Stata Languages: English, French, Chinese(Mother tongue) REFERENCES Gilles Saint-Paul (Chair) Paris School of Economics Toulouse School of Economics 48 boulevard Jourdan Paris +33 (0) Yann Bramoullé University of Laval Aix-Marseille School of Economics 2, rue de la Charité Marseille +33 (0) Martí Mestieri Toulouse School of Economics Stanford University (visiting) 366 Galvez Street Rm 326 Stanford +33 (0) Giammario Impullitti GEP, University of Nottingham Room B33 Clive Granger University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD +44 (0) Giammario.Impullitti@nottingham.ac.uk WORKING PAPERS (All Available Upon Request) Exposure to the New Wave of Offshoring, Unemployment and Welfare (Job Market Paper) This paper studies the impact of increasing service offshoring in a two-sector model. We find that it leads to lower domestic unemployment if the marginal task-specific offshoring cost in the service sector is sufficiently large. The intuition for this condition is that the jobs created due to enhancing productivity (cost-savings) outweigh the jobs destroyed. The reduction in unemployment increases the cost of hiring domestic workers, thus making firms in the manufacturing sector increase the extent of their offshoring. This, in turn, raises their cost-savings and may lead to a further decrease in unemployment. Hence, complementarity between two sectors offshoring activities may emerge. We calibrate the model using economic parameters from Belgium, and the calibration results predict varied unemployment trends with different task-specific offshoring cost schedules. We also conduct a social welfare analysis and propose a policy instrument to restore efficiency. In an extended two-country offshoring framework, we show that improvements in service offshoring technology reduce unemployment in the low-wage country, raise global welfare, and may raise workers welfare and global inequality.

4 Getting a Job from My Unemployed Friends: A Social Network Perspective(Under Review) This paper aims to learn the role of social networks formed by unemployed workers in job transmission. We develop a model with an endogenous reservation of workers job dissatisfaction. This reservation depends on parameters that are related to working conditions, and it affects the frequency of job transmission. Compared with the case in the absence of social networks, it is shown that when social networks are equal in size, unemployed workers welfare is higher and unemployment rate is lower. In terms of social welfare, social planner prefers the workers to become more selective than the decentralized equilibrium. When social networks differ in size, increasing the size difference is beneficial for unemployed workers with large social networks but detrimental to those with small networks; in addition, the unemployment rate decreases with the size difference. However, because of the dilution effect, as the proportion of unemployed workers with large networks increases, it eventually results in losses for all unemployed workers, and the unemployment rate may follow a non-monotonic pattern. Finally, we analyze the social network investment s strategy and conduct the comparative statics. Trading Tasks in a Social Network: The Role of Labor Market Inefficiency We develop a simple task trade model which allows workers to perform multiple tasks and trade them through social contacts. Our objective is to study how the emerge of social networks affect the allocation of tasks in the labor market as well as workers behavior. We characterize the equilibrium and find that when the labor market is efficient, the equilibrium is unique. But when the labor market becomes inefficient, complementarity between the social network intensity and market inefficiency arises, and can yield multiple equilibria. In terms of social welfare, however, the social planner prefers there be no social network given that there are no market frictions. Another Look at Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation Reform: The Role of Labor Market Institutions (Joint with Sheng Bi) This paper analyzes the importance of labor market institutions, more specifically how the wage is set, in determining the impact of two-tier unemployment compensation reforming. We construct a stylized search model where wages are respectively set through collective and individual Nash bargaining. The model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of US (12% of workers are covered by collective bargaining) and French labor market (95% of workers are covered by collective bargaining). We first show that reducing the contribution time of gaining eligibility or increasing the unemployment assistance reduces the unemployment rate when the wage is determined through collective bargaining, but raises the unemployment rate when the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining. We second show that reducing the

5 unemployment insurance duration or increasing replacement rate raises the unemployment rate no matter how wage is determined. Last, by doing a counterfactual simulation, we find that the welfare is lower, wage is lower and unemployment rate is higher when the wage is determined through collective bargaining than when the wage is determined through individual Nash bargaining in both US and France. Rigidities, Offshoring and Unemployment (Joint with Xintong Han) This paper analyzes the role of labor market rigidities in determining the impact of increasing offshoring activities. We mainly focus on the two types of rigidities, minimum wage and rigid wage. We find that when the wage is rigid, the impact of increasing offshoring scale on domestic unemployment will be amplified. However, when the government imposes a minimum wage which is higher than the initial equilibrium wage, the impact can be either amplified or reduced. WORKING IN PROGRESS An Estimation of Offshoring Cost Function in a Simple Structural Model (Joint with Xintong Han and Martí Mestieri) This paper tries to use the history data of several countries to back out the offshoring cost functions in different industries in a structural model. Our objective is to figure out whether the more convex function of offshoring and more advanced offshoring technology lead to higher domestic hirings. Based on this, we would like also to undertake some counterfactual exercises to illustrate the role of institutions and policies. Stop Hiring or Firing? An Endogenized Downsizing Decision (Joint with Richard Upward) In this paper, we try to conduct an analysis which can explain why separations increase almost one-for-one in shrinking establishments while hiring does not change based on the empirical evidences found in almost all the countries with different labor market institutions. Our basic argument is that the rigid wage renegotiation makes firms fire old workers and fill some important positions by hiring new workers who ask for lower wages. The Second Order Impact of Unemployed Benefit on Employment The common wisdom believes that the higher unemployment benefits implies lower labor market tightness. We show that when the unemployment benefit increases, workers become more selective and only accept the good jobs with higher matching quality. This pushes up the productivity and can make firms create even more jobs, leading to a higher labor market tightness.

Kassahun Melesse Curriculum Vitae 2 of 5. Urban Agriculture in Ethiopia: The Case of Addis Ababa, Senior Essay, Addis Ababa University, 2000

Kassahun Melesse Curriculum Vitae 2 of 5. Urban Agriculture in Ethiopia: The Case of Addis Ababa, Senior Essay, Addis Ababa University, 2000 KASSAHUN MELESSE Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics One Shields Avenue Davis, CA 95616 ktmelesse@ucdavis.edu (530) 554-5105 Education Ph.D., Agricultural and Resource Economics, expected June