AYELET ISRAELI EDUCATION RESEARCH INTERESTS. PAPERS UNDER REVIEW (see appendix for abstracts) JOB MARKET PAPER (see appendix for abstract)

Transcription

1 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 1 AYELET ISRAELI Marketing Department, # Sheridan Road Mobile: Office: a-israeli@kellogg.northwestern.edu EDUCATION Ph.D Marketing,, June 2015 (Expected) M.Sc Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Master s Thesis: Characterization of Maintenance Activities Using Linux MBA Finance and Marketing, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Magna Cum Laude) 2007 B.Sc Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2006 RESEARCH INTERESTS Pricing, Channel Management, Online Marketing, Pricing and Return Policies PAPERS UNDER REVIEW (see appendix for abstracts) Ayelet Israeli, Eric T. Anderson, and Anne T. Coughlan, Minimum Advertised Pricing: Patterns of Compliance and Violation in Competitive Retail Markets, revising for invited 3rd round review at Marketing Science Meghan Busse, Ayelet Israeli, and Florian Zettelmeyer, Repairing the Damage: The Effect of Price Expectations on Auto-Repair Price Quotes, revising for invited 2nd round review at Journal of Marketing Research JOB MARKET PAPER (see appendix for abstract) Channel Management and MAP: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, working paper 2008 WORK IN PROGRESS Price Reaction and Competition in Durable Goods Markets: Evidence from Promotional MAP periods, data collection completed Identifying Consumer Types from Online Search Behavior, with Florian Zettelmeyer, data collection in progress Beyond Conversion Rate: The Value of an Online Lead, with Meghan Busse and Florian Zettelmeyer, data collection in progress

2 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 2 DISSERTATION Online Channel Governance and Pricing: The Case of MAP Chairs: Eric T. Anderson, Anne T. Coughlan Committee: Michael Mazzeo, Florian Zettelmeyer My dissertation studies the governance of the online channel via MAP (Minimum Advertised Pricing) policies and demonstrates that MAP is not merely a solution to a pricing problem, but is a part of a broader channel management problem. An online channel provides manufacturers with opportunities for broad distribution and improved provision of information about sellers, buyers, and other players in the market. However, this broad distribution also brings a new set of challenges, as manufacturers aim to protect their brand image and pricing and assume control over the distribution channel system. One solution that is widely used by manufacturers is a MAP policy, which allows manufacturers to unilaterally impose a lower bound on advertised prices and protect retail margins. However, compliance and enforcement are central since retailers often violate these policies and because the channel may include unauthorized retailers for which the policies do not apply. In the first essay, Minimum Advertised Pricing: Patterns of Compliance and Violation in Competitive Retail Markets (with Eric Anderson and Anne Coughlan, revising for invited 3 rd round review at Marketing Science), we study the nature of MAP compliance in an online channel of a durable goods manufacturer. We document how MAP violations vary by retailer, product, and market characteristics, and link our results to manufacturers common wisdom and extant academic literature on agency theory and price obfuscation. In the second essay, Channel Management and MAP: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (Job Market Paper), I study a manufacturer s ability to influence compliance rates among its authorized retailers. I exploit a natural experiment prompted by a change in channel policies. I find improvement in MAP compliance in the authorized retailer channel, which I attribute to customization of channel agreements and policies to the online retail environment and improvements in the credibility of punishment. In the third essay Price Reaction and Competition in Durable Goods Markets: Evidence from Promotional MAP periods (work in progress), I investigate how variation in the imposed MAP price affects pricing in the channel, by studying how retailers react when MAP policies are temporarily removed. OTHER PUBLICATIONS (Computer Science) Ayelet Israeli and Dror G. Feitelson (2010), The Linux kernel as a case study in software evolution, Journal of Systems & Software, 83(3), pp Ayelet Israeli and Dror G. Feitelson (2009), Characterizing Software Maintenance Categories Using the Linux Kernel, Technical Report , School of Computer Science and Engineering, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Ayelet Israeli and Dror G. Feitelson (2007), "Success of Open Source Projects: Patterns of Downloads and Releases with Time," In IEEE International Conference of Software Science, Technology & Engineering

3 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 3 INVITED TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS Asymmetric Spillovers in MAP Violations, with Eric T. Anderson, and Anne T. Coughlan, Marketing in Israel, The Technion and Ben-Gurion University, December 2012 Marketing Science Conference, Boston University, June 2012 Reducing MAP Violations, with Eric T. Anderson, and Anne T. Coughlan Channel IQ 2012 Channel Summit, Chicago, September 2012 Determinants of MAP Violations, with Eric T. Anderson, and Anne T. Coughlan Conference of Empirical Legal Studies,, November 2011 Marketing Science Conference, Rice University, June 2011 "Success of Open Source Projects: Patterns of Downloads and Releases with Time," with Dror G. Feitelson IEEE International Conference, 2007, Herzliya, Israel HONORS AND AWARDS AMA Sheth Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2012 Marketing Science Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 2011,2012 Travel Grant, The Graduate School,, 2012 Graduate Fellowship and Full Tuition Scholarship,, 2009-Present Gal-Ed Fund Award, Best Graduate Marketing Seminar Paper, Hebrew University, 2008 TEACHING INTERESTS Marketing Management, Channels, Marketing Analytics, Pricing, Marketing Research TEACHING EXPERIENCE, Teaching Assistant: MBA, Part Time MBA, Executive MBA, International MBA Marketing Channel Strategies, Prof. Anne Coughlan Marketing Strategy, Prof. Gregory Carpenter Marketing Management, Prof. Anne Coughlan, Prof. Kent Grayson, Prof. Eyal Maoz Market Research, Insights and Intelligence, Prof. Eyal Maoz Launching New Products and Services, Prof. Eyal Maoz Israel Defense Forces Unit training course coordinator and instructor ACADEMIC SERVICE Doctoral Student Seminar Series Coordinator, Marketing Department Admit Visit Host, Marketing Department, 2012, 2013 Student Panel Member, Kellogg PhD Admit Visit, 2012, 2013

4 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 4 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Intel Corporation Test Engineer and Automation Developer Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd Programmer Assistant Engineer and Satellite Experiment Director Israel Defense Forces (Mandatory Military Service) Lieutenant, Commanding officer in the intelligence corps

5 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 5 DOCTORAL COURSEWORK Marketing Quantitative Models in Marketing Marketing Strategy Behavioral Decision Making Advanced Marketing Models Analytic Models in Marketing Consumer Culture Theory Information Processing Quantitative Marketing and Economics Economics Decision Theory Econometric Analysis of Panel Data Empirical Industrial Organization Identification Industrial Organization Applied Econometrics Advanced Applied Microeconomics Empirical Issues in Strategy Game Theory Statistics & Methodology Hierarchical Models Philosophy of Science Quasi-Experimental Design Multivariate Statistics Bayesian Methods and Computation Applied Bayesian Inference Eric Anderson Gregory Carpenter Alexander Chernev Pradeep Chintagunta Anne Coughlan Kent Grayson Angela Lee Aviv Nevo Eddie Dekel Eric French Igal Hendel, Aviv Nevo Charles Manski Robert Porter, Michael Whinston Yi Qian Yasutora Watanabe Yasutora Watanabe Michael Whinston Ulf Böckenholt Bobby Calder Thomas Cook Lakshman Krishnamurthi Blakeley McShane Martin Tanner

6 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 6 REFERENCES Eric T. Anderson Hartmarx Professor of Marketing Phone: eric-anderson@kellogg.northwestern.edu Anne T. Coughlan John L. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Marketing Phone: a-coughlan@kellogg.northwestern.edu Florian Zettelmeyer Nancy L. Ertle Professor of Marketing Phone: f-zettelmeyer@kellogg.northwestern.edu Michael Mazzeo Associate Professor of Management & Strategy Phone: mazzeo@kellogg.northwestern.edu Jacob Goldenberg Professor of Marketing Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel and Visiting Professor Columbia University, New York, United States Phone: (US) Phone: (Israel) jgoldenberg@idc.ac.il

7 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 7 APPENDIX: SELECTED ABSTRACTS Ayelet Israeli, Channel Management and MAP: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Job Market Paper Minimum Advertised Price (MAP) is a pricing policy widely used by manufacturers to influence prices set by their downstream partners. A MAP policy imposes a lower bound on advertised prices for retailers. Retailers that advertise prices below the MAP price violate the policy and are subject to a punishment such as termination of the distribution agreement. Despite this threat, a central issue with MAP policies is compliance. Violations are often attributed to lack of monitoring by manufacturers, poor incentive mechanisms or poor partner selection. In this paper, I show that the mere fact that manufacturers monitor pricing and have a contractual threat to terminate distribution may be insufficient in achieving MAP compliance, and that the context and terms of the policy affect manufacturers ability to govern MAP. To demonstrate this point, I analyze the pricing, enforcement and channel management policies of a manufacturer over several years. I show that initial investments in monitoring and enforcement are ineffective in reducing MAP violations. In response, the manufacturer introduces new channel agreements and policies, which provides a natural experiment. These policies address the challenges of the online retail environment and credibly signal to retailers that the manufacturer is willing to enforce the MAP policy. I show that under the new channel policies, investments in monitoring and enforcement lead to a sustained 50%-80% reduction in violations. This effect is economically meaningful and is robust to a variety of tests and specifications. With increased compliance channel prices increase by 2% but there is no loss in volume. My analysis uncovers two key elements of successful channel policies to improve MAP compliance: customization to the online retail environment and credible punishments. Ayelet Israeli, Eric T. Anderson, and Anne T. Coughlan, Minimum Advertised Pricing: Patterns of Compliance and Violation in Competitive Retail Markets, invited for 3rd round review at Marketing Science Manufacturers in many industries frequently use vertical price policies, such as minimum advertised price (MAP), to influence prices set by downstream firms. While manufacturers expect vertical partners to comply with MAP policies, violations of MAP are common in practice. In this research, we document and explain both the extent and the depth of violations of MAP policies, as well as shed light on how retailers vary in their propensity to violate MAP policies and the depth by which they do so. While the academic literature on MAP is limited, manufacturers have strong beliefs about how markets with MAP policies function. In this paper, we take an inductive research approach that documents managerial wisdom about the practice of MAP as well as manufacturer beliefs about the nature and extent of MAP violations. We then confront these insights from practice with a large empirical study that includes hundreds of products sold through hundreds of retailers. Consistent with managerial wisdom, we find that authorized retailers are more likely to comply with MAP than are unauthorized partners. In contrast to managerial wisdom, we find that the authorized and unauthorized markets are largely separate, and that violations in the authorized channel have a small association with violations in the unauthorized channel. Lastly, we link our results to the literatures on agency theory, transaction cost analysis and theories of price obfuscation.

8 JUNE 26, 2014 AYELET ISRAELI 8 Meghan Busse, Ayelet Israeli, and Florian Zettelmeyer, Repairing the Damage: The Effect of Price Expectations on Auto-Repair Price Quotes, invited for 2nd round review at Journal of Marketing Research In this paper we investigate whether sellers treat consumers differently on the basis of how wellinformed consumers appear to be. We implement a large-scale field experiment in which callers request price quotes from automotive repair shops. We show that sellers alter their initial price quotes depending on whether consumers appear to be well- informed, uninformed, or poorly informed about market prices. We find that repair shops quote higher prices to callers who cite a higher expected price. We find that women are quoted higher prices than men when callers signal that they are uninformed about market prices. However, gender differences disappear when callers mention an expected price for the repair. Finally, we find that repair shops are more likely to offer a price concession if asked to do so by a woman than a man.