Chief Review Services PROCUREMENT OF FRAGMENTATION GRENADE, ARMOURED VEHICLE. October (CRS) Canada

Transcription

1 Chief Review Services PROCUREMENT OF FRAGMENTATION GRENADE, ARMOURED VEHICLE October (CRS) Canada

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SYNOPSIS i PART I - INTRODUCTION 1 Background 1 Aim of the Review 2 PART II - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 3 Technical Consideration 3 COTS/Test and Evaluation 3 Contract Compliance 4 Project/Matrix Organization 4 Senior Review Board 5 NATO STANAGS 5 PART III - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 PART IV - LESSONS LEARNED 7 Update 7 Annex A - A-1 CRS - DND

3 SYNOPSIS This report presents the results of an independent review of the acquisition of a high explosive fragmentation grenade purchased from a European supplier. The grenade is intended to be launched from armoured vehicles as self-protection against dismounted troops and ambush. One and one-half years after payment in full, in the amount of $753K, the weapon has not been introduced into service Accordingly, there are.. unresolved concerns associated with the intended use of this grenade The conclusions of the review are presented at page 6 of this report. CRS - DND i/i

4 REVIEW OF PROCUREMENT OF FRAGMENTATION GRENADE, ARMOURED VEHICLE BACKGROUND PART I - INTRODUCTION s.15(1)(b) 1. The Canadian Forces has a requirement for a capability to provide self-protection of armoured vehicles against dismounted enemy personnel and ambush. A High Explosive (HE) Fragmentation Grenade that could be launched from the vehicle was viewed as a solution to this capability deficiency In the early stages of the subject acquisition it was learned that the only available... HE grenade was.... manufactured by a European firm. Its acquisition... would be consistent with the Department s preference for acquisition of commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) products. 2. Analysis by staff at PMO LAV and the Director Ammunition Engineering Services (DAES now Director Ammunition Program Management (DAPM)) raised safety and suitability concerns with respect to the HE ammunition. However, it was decided that the self-defence capability provided by the grenade outweighed potential risks to personnel, providing that the limitations of the grenade and proper, safe handling procedures were written and made known to the operators. Additional information on fuzing and safety was to be provided by the contractor. Under these conditional terms, the risk was assessed as low and a contract was let 11 October 1996, for the acquisition of $753, worth of initial provisioning stock, from the supplier. After contract award, the contractor provided additional data, which however served to heighten the safety concerns that were again raised by the staff. s.15(1)(b) 3. To date, safety procedures have not been finalized. Also, after contract award, the mmunition Safety and Suitability Board (ASSB) discussed the grenade..... It should be pointed out that between ASSB meetings, discussions were held between PMO and DAPM staff, with respect to the development of mitigation strategies for the concerns raised by the Board. CRS - DND 1/7

5 4. On 26 Nov 98, the board reconvened, to provide direction to the PMO LAV Ammunition Engineer regarding a response to a test plan proposed by Diehl. It was further noted by the Chair that with respect to technical issues expressed previously, New technical information was received since then, which may address those concerns. After a lengthy technical discussion regarding the contractor s test plan and other testing which might be considered, the Chair closed by noting, A plan for prioritization of effort and resources should become more apparent as a Hazards Analysis will identify risks which will need to be mitigated for the grenade to be usable in its intended role. The Chair then reiterated the decision of the previous year in stating that, no data had been presented that changed ASSB Decision The Board of 11 February 1999 finally concluded,..... AIM OF THE REVIEW 6. The aim of this review is to present the CRS Review Team findings concerning the acquisition of the subject munition by PMO LAV, Recommendations for a way ahead and lessons learned are also discussed. CRS - DND 2/7

6 PART II - FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION 7. Minutes of the ASSB meetings provide detailed information... One of the greatest concerns arises from the fact that this grenade was not designed for the proposed Canadian operational scenario. That is, the grenade might be loaded and unloaded in the launch tube several times over the course of numerous patrols and stored under field conditions between patrols after having been removed from the original packaging. During each patrol, the grenade would be subject to mechanical shock and vibration, which could affect the internal fuzing arrangement (a cutaway view of the grenade is included in Annex A). In other words, at the end of a patrol, the operator would have no way of knowing the status of the grenade; whether it had been rendered subject to misfire or whether it could potentially be inadvertently initiated in some way. This uncertainty was a factor in the decision not to train with live ammunition, but rather to rely on videos. 8. If not launched, the operator would then have to remove the grenade manually from the launch tube and render it safe for storage by reinsertion of the safety pin originally removed prior to loading. According to the ASSB, reinsertion of the pin, and misalignment of the pin s shorting brackets can lead to serious consequences, including safety hazards while in storage. In addition, a risk of accidental initiation from electromagnetic interference (EMI) has been noted. A fix against EMI and a more robust safety pin have been proposed but it comes after the fact and will likely be installed at additional cost to the Crown. A further concern is that if repeated patrols damage the internal arrangement rendering the grenade subject to misfire, soldiers may have false expectations of protection. COTS/TEST AND EVALUATION 9. The DND Acquisition Reform Guide stresses that COTS procurement should be the norm and this was reflected in comments from the PMO. According to the guide, a COTS procurement is possible if, the required goods have already been brought to production status at the time of contract award and have a proven performance. The guide further states that a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) is one previously developed to meet government needs. Military products could fall under this category. There is also discussion that the COTS product must be evaluated against the military environment before being accepted. An example of this is the Clothe the Soldier project. Several COTS items of clothing and equipment were tested and deemed unsuitable, resulting in a development effort by that PMO As a product currently not in the CF inventory and as a product to be used in a new role, extensive test and evaluation should have been performed prior to its procurement. The PMO now faces the task of having the product rigorously tested in a scenario that will replicate operational conditions and at potential cost to CRS - DND 3/7

7 Procurement of Fragmentation Grenade, Armoured Vehicle the Crown. Test results at this stage should provide greater knowledge of what can happen to the grenade after it has been subjected to shock and vibration and related conditions, but will still leave uncertain the status of any given grenade. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE 11. Compliance of the product with the performance specification in the contract was an issue, particularly given the concerns with this grenade. Contract lot acceptance testing and demonstration was performed December 1997 and was witnessed by Departmental personnel. The trip report from this lot acceptance test noted that unless additional information and test results were provided concerning electromagnetic susceptibility of the igniter, the,.at a meeting of 13 February 1998, some additional information was presented by the contractor. On the issue of electromagnetic susceptibility, however, it was stated that a test plan could be made available by April. Still, with the testing pending, it was agreed at this meeting, to pay the contract and this was done on 23 March PROJECT/MATRIX ORGANIZATION 12. Two organizations have been directly involved in this acquisition. These are PMO LAV and DAES, now DAPM. PMO LAV provided a military position to DAES in order to have ready access to technical expertise in ammunition acquisition. DAES was subsequently designated as the technical authority in the contract and duties fell to the position of DAES 2-3. The Review Team has noted that much of the discussion between the Department and government contract authorities and the contractor, was with the PMO and not DAES 2-3, later DAPM The CRS Review team was advised in writing by DAPM staff that despite documentation to the contrary, in practice, the DAES PMO sponsored position reported to the PMO and not DAES; therefore, the role of DAES as technical authority seems to have been in question. For example, the DAES technical authority has stated that he was unaware the decision to effect payment of the contract would be made at the meeting of 13 February. It was also understood that additional data was to be provided, as noted in those same minutes. Still, the decision that payment in full would be made was taken. For their part, the PMO assumed there was concurrence by all as the meeting minutes record no objections to payment, as having been raised by DAPM representatives. All this is to say that clear lines of authority must be established and adhered to. Also, responsibilities must be well understood and that contractual documents must accurately reflect the position of those in authority. CRS - DND 4/7

8 SENIOR REVIEW BOARD 13. Concerns over the safety and suitability of a munition potentially lethal to the troops using it has been an issue for approximately three years. Furthermore, the ASSB has considered the case on several occasions, reporting negatively in ever-stronger terms. Yet, the SRB was first advised of the situation on 15 Feb It has been stated that the SRB was not advised earlier as it was felt the matter was being dealt with at the technical level. Still, given each successive ASSB ruling, in its role of providing advice to the PMO, an SRB might have been able to offer an independent viewpoint. NATO STANAGS 14. The ASSB decision noted......the HE grenade did not conform to STANAG..... This STANAG, of which Canada is and remains custodian, was ratified in The PMO has pointed out that it is applicable to.. designs developed after the date of ratification.. In this case, the issue is more that of the.. rather than conformance or not to a STANAG. From the technical discussion noted earlier, Rigorous testing could provide more information; but in the final analysis, the status of any one of these grenades used in an operational scenario and not fired, will remain unknown. CRS - DND 5/7

9 PART III - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15. A COTS product was identified and procured, yet three years after contract award, and one and a half years after payment in full, the product has not been introduced into service. Although additional information was provided by the contractor, and discussions were held to identify mitigation strategies, the ASSB meeting of 11 February 1999 finally concluded that. Testing has been proposed... This does not conform to the tenets of COTS. acquisitions that typically are low risk, low cost and suitable for quick introduction into service. Further testing may see this grenade introduced into service, but likely under severe operational restrictions It is recommended that a meeting be held between PMO LAV, DAPM and DLR, to discuss the technical details.. associated with this grenade, the merits and cost effectiveness or lack thereof of testing, and the urgency of the requirement..... CRS - DND 6/7

10 PART IV - LESSONS LEARNED 17. In reviewing this acquisition the following issues have emerged as points to bear in mind when considering a COTS strategy or the acquisition of any materiel not already in the inventory, especially if safety is a critical issue: UPDATE a. Historical usage information should be obtained as part of market research. It is noted that such information was requested in this acquisition but as part of the contract to acquire the munition. b. A detailed understanding of COTs procurement and its applicability, is essential. c. A proper test and evaluation protocol that reflects conditions in the operational scenario must be established. Clothe the Soldier represents a positive example in this regard. d. The PWGSC Contract Authority should be kept apprised of problematic issues and their status. e. The roles and responsibilities of technical specialists must be clearly defined and well understood. f. Procedures for mitigating risks must be written and proven before risks are deemed to be low. Risks should be identified in terms of probability of occurrence and impact in order for development of a suitable mitigation strategy. g. Requirements should flow from doctrine. h. Contract compliance must be demonstrated and warranty clauses should be exercised if in place. i. The Senior Review Board should be apprised of safety critical issues. j. ASSB decisions must be provided to senior levels. k. NATO STANAGS should be respected in acquisitions of new materiel, especially if Canada is also the Custodian. 18. Since dissemination of this report in draft, the stated recommendation for a technical review has been acted upon. Eleven significant areas of concern have been identified and options for mitigation are to be costed.. CRS - DND 7/7

11 Annex A CRS - DND A-1/1 WITHHELD