MEMORANDUM. Background

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1 MEMORANDUM TO: DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS, SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE FROM: STEPHEN GARDNER AND MELISSA PORTER, DEMOCRATIC PROFESSIONAL STAFF DATE: SEPTEMBER 19, 2008 SUBJECT: FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION On Wednesday, September 24, 2008, at 2:30 p.m., in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation will hold a hearing on the Safety and Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation. The hearing will examine the safety and security challenges relating to the transportation of nuclear waste, including the potential transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) to the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. The hearing will review the current regulatory structure for the shipping and transport of nuclear waste, as well as any concerns regarding the impact of increased nuclear waste transportation. The Committee will hear testimony from federal officials, academic researchers, and an environmental advocate. Chairman Inouye will preside. Background Nuclear power has received renewed attention as the United States seeks alternate energy sources to curb greenhouse gas emissions and reduce energy costs. Currently, the U.S. nuclear power industry is comprised of 104 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states and generates about 20 percent of the nation s electricity, including more than half of the electricity for six states. No nuclear power plants have been ordered in the United States since 1978 due in large part to high capital and regulatory compliance costs and concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal. Nuclear plants generate electricity by converting uranium to electricity through a fission reaction that produces enough extreme heat to turn water into steam, which in turn powers turbines which create electric power. When nuclear fuel no longer gives off enough heat to produce electricity, it is considered spent. SNF takes the form of dime size ceramic-like pellets that are fixed in metal tubes. The tubes are stored in thick, stainless steel canisters called casks that are designed to facilitate the safe and secure transport of radioactive materials. Despite the 30-year halt in nuclear power plant production, the United States still generates nuclear waste, which can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces an annual average of about 20 metric tons of SNF and HLW, for a nationwide total of about 2,000 metric tons per year. In addition to the nuclear waste being generated by existing power plants, significant amounts of SNF and HLW are sitting in temporary and interim storage sites across the county. Commercial SNF is stored at 72 different sites, and nuclear waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) is stored at five centralized DOE sites across the country.

2 The federal government is responsible for the collection and permanent disposal of commercial SNF. In 1982, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act which requires SNF and HLW to be permanently stored in a deep underground geological repository. After studying the scientific and environmental impacts of nine initial sites, the DOE narrowed the list of potential sites to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, and Congress approved this selection in The DOE submitted a licensing application for Yucca Mountain to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 8, If the NRC approves the application and Congress fully funds the DOE s requests, shipments to Yucca Mountain could begin by Transportation of SNF and HLW The transport of SNF and HLW to temporary storage facilities and Yucca Mountain, if approved, is a complex process that crosses multiple state, local, and federal jurisdictions. Nuclear waste is transported by rail, truck, and barge, and such transportation involves a host of regulations including those pertaining to the handling, packaging, and transport of hazardous materials in order to ensure public safety. Although the DOE is ultimately responsible for the shipment of nuclear waste, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the NRC are the federal regulatory agencies responsible for the safe transport of hazardous materials. In July 1979, the DOT and the NRC signed a memorandum of understanding which clearly delineates responsibilities for regulating the transport of radioactive waste. In general, the DOT is responsible for the shipment of hazardous materials under many statues, including the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of The DOT regulates the actual transport of hazardous waste through cooperation of three agencies. The Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is tasked with the transportation of hazardous materials in all modes of transportation and sets standards for the packaging, transporting, and handling of radioactive materials. In addition to inspection and enforcement, PHMSA regulates the material classification, labeling, shipping papers, vehicle placarding, and loading and unloading of radioactive waste materials. Similar to its regulatory oversight responsibilities of commercial motor vehicles and their drivers, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) maintains the standards for the drivers and highway transportation routes for motor carrier conveyances used in transporting nuclear waste. Highway route selection is based on a preferred system that minimizes time in transit on a controlled course. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) currently maintains requirements for railroad operations, rail equipment, track infrastructure, and the handling of radioactive waste while in transportation by rail. Each agency develops standards for SNF and HLW that are in line with international standards for the shipment of radioactive waste. While the DOT maintains the standards for the transportation of SNF and HLW, the NRC sets design, performance, and inspection standards for the containers that transport large quantities of radioactive waste within the United States. To prevent the release of radioactive waste, the casks that transport SNF and HLW are designed to be durable and remain intact in the event of an accident. In order for the NRC to approve a cask design, the cask must contain its nuclear contents in four simulated accident conditions, including free fall, puncture, fire, and underwater submersion. The NRC also establishes security regulations to minimize the possibility of theft, diversion, or attack on shipments of radioactive waste. 2

3 States and local governments enforce DOT safety regulations on highways. In this capacity, states can check for compliance with federal and state regulations regarding driver fitness, appropriate and safe equipment, and proper documentation. In addition, states can require carriers to have additional permits to operate with hazardous materials within their states and can designate or prohibit routes for hazardous material transportation. States and local governments also supply the first responders in the event of an accident, so are responsible for having emergency response and preparedness plans. Under this regulatory structure, there have been more than 3,000 shipments of radioactive waste without major incident in the past 40 years. The U.S. government has maintained a safe track record of nuclear shipments since 1964, with more than 10,000 used nuclear fuel containers being safely transported over 1.7 million miles by the nuclear energy industry. During this time, nine minor incidents have occurred, over half of which involved empty containers. Four occurred on highways and five occurred on rail, although none caused injuries, fatalities, or environmental damage or released any radioactive materials. The accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the most serious nuclear accident in U.S. history, was not caused by or related to the transportation of nuclear waste. Yucca Mountain The Yucca Mountain Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) evaluated a mostly legal-weight truck scenario and a mostly rail scenario for transporting nuclear waste from across the nation to Nevada. The DOE estimates that shipments could span a period of up to 50 years and involve anywhere from 190 to 317 casks per year on trains that carry 3-5 casks, and anywhere from 53 to 89 truck shipments annually on trucks that carry one cask per truck. According to the FEIS, shipping the same amount of SNF only in the mostly legal-weight truck scenario would involve about 53,000 shipments, and only in the mostly rail scenario would involve approximately 10,700 shipments to Nevada in total. The FEIS also evaluated three shipment options within the State of Nevada to determine if the optimal shipping method for minimizing impact to the public and the environment was by light-weight truck, heavy-haul truck, or rail. The DOE selected rail, both nationally and in Nevada, as the preferred mode of transportation for nuclear waste shipments because such shipments would place workers and the public in the least amount of jeopardy and would allow for greater security than trucks. The DOE also decided that it will utilize primarily dedicated train service for rail shipments in order to maintain operational control of the shipment and minimize costs to the DOE and rail carriers. Dedicated trains reduce the risk of a SNF or HLW cask being involved in a train accident and offer the most cost efficient way to ship nuclear waste over long distances since personnel, car switching, and inspections could be kept to a minimum. However, shipments to Yucca Mountain will not occur exclusively by rail, as designated highways and routes will also be used to transport some radioactive waste. Since there is currently no rail line to Yucca Mountain within Nevada, the DOE examined five rail corridors within the State on which the DOE could construct a rail line to Yucca Mountain to connect it to the existing national rail system. In its Record of Decision, the DOE determined the 300 mile Caliente Corridor offered the best opportunity for construction of a new rail line. The Surface Transportation Board has jurisdictional responsibilities over the 3

4 selection of the route, and any usage issues that may arise as a result, should the DOE choose to initiate construction of such a line. Risks The possibility of injury, damage, or loss naturally exists when transporting hazardous materials such as radiological waste. Researchers have examined the probability that an accident will occur and the risks in accident and no-accident situations for transporting large quantities of SNF and HLW to Yucca Mountain. According to the DOE FEIS for Yucca Mountain, the chances of any accident to occur during shipment of SNF or HLW are about one in 10,000 for rail shipments and one in 1,000 for highway shipments. Considering the low-probability for an accident, it is estimated that one in 1,000 of the accidents will be serious enough to release radiological materials. The chance of a large release is estimated to be less than one in 1,000,000. The major risk in accident-free scenarios stems from radiological exposure to people because, even when fully contained in sealed cask, SNF still emits low levels of radiation. However, exposure to radiation depends on the speed of the transportation vehicle, the length of the exposure, and the distance to the highway or train track. A DOT study estimates latent cancer fatalities (LCF) to be in one in 50,000 shipments in dedicated trains, which is marginal when compared to the day-to-day radiation risks from the sun and other sources. Due to the proximity to the SNF containers, workers are exposed to higher levels of radiation than passersby. The same DOT study found the risk for workers on dedicated trains to be one in 14,000 shipments, which is still extremely low compared to the normal background of radiation exposure. The National Academy of Sciences confirmed both the accident and accident-free findings in their 2006 report, Going the Distance? The Safe Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste in the United States. The report stated, Transport by highway (for small quantity shipments) and by rail (for large-quantity shipments) is, from a technical viewpoint, a low-radiological-risk activity with manageable safety, health, and environmental consequences when conducted with strict adherence to existing regulations. Critics of the Yucca Mountain repository, however, argue that the federal government is not prepared to regulate the shipping campaign that will ensue if Yucca Mountain opens. Specifically, they argue that the health, environmental, and monetary consequences of an accident, no matter how small the risk, are too great given the increase in shipments if Yucca Mountain were to open. They also contend the NRC designed shipping containers have only been tested on computer simulators and not in real-world situations. Further, opponents maintain that the security and social challenges of shipping nuclear wasted are largely being ignored. The same National Academy report cited above also found that the social risks, such as lower property values, decreases in tourism, and anxiety increases have not received considerable attention and could complicate the transportation process. Security PHMSA regulates the secure shipment of hazardous materials, including radioactive materials. All hazardous materials employees must currently undergo security awareness training. In December 2006, the PHMSA in consultation with the Transportation Security Administration published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking titled Enhancing Railroad 4

5 Transportation Safety and Security for Hazardous Materials Shipments to require rail carriers to compile annual data on specified shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail transportation routes where those materials are transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on those assessments. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) contained language requiring the PHMSA to finalize this rulemaking, and an Interim Final Rule was issued on April 16, The Interim Final rule requires rail carriers to compile annual data on certain shipments of explosive, toxic by inhalation, and radioactive materials, use the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail routes where those materials are transported, assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on those assessments. It also clarifies rail carriers responsibility to address in their security plans issues related to en route storage and delays in transit. The PHMSA also adopted a new requirement for rail carriers to inspect placarded hazardous materials rail cars for signs of tampering or suspicious items, including improvised explosive devices. The 9/11 Act also required the DOT to document existing and proposed routes for the transportation of hazardous materials, including radioactive materials, by motor carrier and identify criteria for selecting routes based on safety and security concerns. In addition to government regulations, the railroad industry has their own performance guidelines for transporting HLW. Cask structure is also designed to protect against intentional destruction, but there is concern that shipments of radiological waste are a target for terror attacks, especially following the attacks on September 11, The NRC currently has regulations to guard casks against sabotage, including armed escorts on all shipments, tracking shipments by satellite 24 hours per day, and coordinating logistics with state and local law enforcement. In addition, if Yucca Mountain is approved, the DOE will provide technical and financial assistance to States to train and prepare for emergency response situations. Despite the regulatory structure for the secure transport of nuclear waste, and various studies and analyses of the security of SNF and HLW exist, an in-depth analysis of the transportation security risks of transporting SNF and HLW specifically to Yucca Mountain has not yet been done. Witness List The Honorable Harry Reid, U.S. Senator, Nevada The Honorable John Ensign, U.S. Senator, Nevada Panel I The Honorable Ward Sproat, Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, U.S. Department of Energy Mr. Michael Weber, Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Ed Pritchard, Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation 5

6 Mr. Ted Willke, Associate Administrator for Hazardous Material Safety, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transporation Panel II Mr. Ken Cook, President, Environmental Working Group Dr. Kevin Crowley, Senior Board Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences Dr. James D. Ballard, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, California State University, Northridge Mr. Ed Hamberger, President and CEO, Association of American Railroads 6