Safely designing High Speed Two

Transcription

1 Safely designing High Speed Two Challenges in building the organisation, and demonstrating the railway to be safe Dr Reuben McDonald, Head of System Safety, Security & Interoperability, HS2 16 th June

2 Overview System Definition Of HS2 Health and Safety CSM-RA & Examples Security

3 Common Safety Method CSM-RA Assessment Body FHA HAZID Fault Trees Event HERA SWIFT Trees Event Trees SWIFT Fault Trees HAZID Hazard Record Assessment Body FHA HAZID HAZID FHA Hazard Record FHA HERA SWIFT TRACER PSSA Hazard Identification Assessment Body HERA Hazard Record Fault Trees SAFSIM PSSA PSSA SWIFT HERA HERA Event SWIFT Trees SAFSIM Event Trees SAFSIM SWIFT SAFSIM TRACER Event TRACER System FHA Safety Technical File SAFSIM SAFSIM Trees SWIFT SWIFT Hazard Fault HAZID Record Trees TRACER TRACER SWIFT HAZID System Safety Technical FHA FHA HAZID Event HAZID TRACER SWIFT Trees File HAZID HAZID FHA HAZID SAFSIM PSSA SWIFT TRACER HAZID FHA System SWIFT FHA FHA SAFETY Event Technical SWIFT File FHA FHA FHA FHA HAZID Trees Hazard Fault Record Trees FHA PSSA FHA Event PSSA HAZID SWIFT Trees FHA Safety Hazard SWIFT Hazard SAFSIM SWIFT SAFSIM Event Trees Event Trees Event Trees Record PSSA HAZID PSSA PSSA SAFSIM Fault Trees SWIFT Event Trees TRACER Fault Trees Hazard HAZID HERA FHA Record Fault SWIFT SWIFT Trees HERA TRACER TRACER SWIFT HAZID TRACER HAZID SWIFT FHA SWIFT HAZID Fault Trees FHA PSSA Record HAZID PSSA Plan Hazard FHA HAZID SWIFT HERA PSSA SAFSIM HAZID SWIFT SAFSIM Record SWIFT SWIFT System Fault Safety Trees Technical HAZID FHA Fault Trees FHA File Fault Trees FHA FHA Fault Trees FHA SWIFT FHA HAZID Event Trees HAZID SWIFT PSSA SAFSIM Fault Trees SWIFT SWIFT SAFSIM HERA TRACER FHA Hazard Record SAFSIM SWIFT PSSA SWIFT HERA Fault Trees PSSA HERA TRACER SWIFT SWIFT PSSA SWIFT SWIFT FHA PSSA SWIFT HAZID HAZID Hazard Record HAZID HERA HAZID SWIFT HAZID HAZID TRACER HAZID Risk Control Measure FHA HERA TRACER SWIFT HERA TRACER FHA SAFSIM SAFSIM SAFSIM Hazard Record SAFSIM Event Hazard Trees Record FHA HERA SWIFT HERA TRACER SAFSIM Fault Trees FHA Event Hazard Trees FHA Record System SWIFT Safety FHA Technical SWIFT SWIFT SAFSIM SWIFT SWIFT PSSA Hazard File Record FHA HERA SWIFT System Fault Trees System Safety Safety Technical Technical File SAFSIM SAFSIM HERA TRACER File SWIFT PSSA FHA HAZID SWIFT TRACER HAZID SWIFT TRACER TRACER HAZID Fault Trees HERA System FHA Hazard Record SWIFT PSSA FHA HAZID SAFSIM SWIFT HAZID TRACER HERA SAFSIM PSSA Safety Technical FHA File SWIFT HERA SWIFT Hazard Record HERA PSSA TRACER SWIFT TRACER Hazard Event Record FHA Hazard HERA Record FHA FHA Hazard Record HERA FHA SAFSIM FHA HERA Trees SWIFT SAFSIM Hazard SWIFT Record FHA SAFSIM FHA TRACER SAFSIM SWIFT SWIFT FHA FHA SWIFT HERA SAFSIM PSSA Fault Trees FHA Event SWIFT SWIFT HERA FHA SWIFT FHA Hazard SWIFT Record HERA SAFSIM FHA TRACER Hazard Record FHA FHA Hazard Record SAFSIM Frequency Hazard Trees Hazard FHA Record HAZID System Safety Technical File SAFSIM HAZID FHA SAFSIM HAZID FHA FHA Analysis SAFSIM Record FHA FHA SAFSIM FHA FHA SWIFT FHA SWIFT System Safety Technical File CSM-RA Hazard Record Hazard Record SAFSIM PSSA FHA FHA HERA TRACER Event Trees Event Trees SWIFT SAFSIM Consequence Analysis System Safety Technical File HAZID Common Safety Method Common Safety Common Method Safety on Method Risk CSM-RA assessment HAZID. it s not as complicated as you think

4 HS2: a strategic transformation Phase One Stations: Euston Old Oak Common Birmingham Interchange Birmingham Curzon Street Phase Two Stations: East Midlands Hub Sheffield Leeds Manchester Piccadilly Manchester Airport

5 Phase one key construction statistics 230km ROUTE LENGTH 46km TUNNELS 74km CUTTINGS 128 mt EXCAVATED MATERIAL (90% TO BE RE USED) STRUCTURES OVER BRIDGES STRUCTURES UNDER BRIDGES MAIN COMPOUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION SATELLITE COMPOUNDS

6 HS2 The Project

7 Scope of HS2 design BUSINESS REQUIREMENTS OPERATION CONCEPT THE HS2 TRAIN SERVICE AND INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE DESIGNED AND DEVELOPED TOGETHER ENGINEERING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TRAINS TRACK CONTROL STATIONS ETC. ROUTE SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT

8 What is safety risk?

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10 System safety Safety means freedom from unacceptable risk of harm 1 System safety refers to the safety of the operational railway, this includes Passengers Railway staff Members of the public System safety covers sudden events but not the ongoing health and safety of the staff Reference 1: EN , and CSM-RA (2009) regulation

11 The Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment is used to assess the safety of the operational railway

12 Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment Requires a proposer the undertake the risk assessment process, identify the hazards, the risks, the associated safety measures and the resulting safety requirements Passengers Workforce Public

13 The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations is used to assess the health & safety in construction

14 Construction (Design and Management) Regulations Requires a designer.. to eliminate, so far as is reasonably practicable, foreseeable risks to the health or safety of any person during: Construction Maintenance Use

15 Design for construction Design for operation CDM CSM-RA Safety of project personnel Safety of Others Occupational Health

16 CDM Hazard Register CSM-RA Hazard Record

17 HS2 System Safety

18 HS2 Safety Goals (from functional response) HS2 Ltd will design, build and operate the Railway to meet or better the performance standard of HS1, to reduce safety risks as low as reasonably practicable in line with best current international practice.

19 Common Safety Method on Risk Evaluation and Assessment (EU 402/2013)

20 Design Stages civil infrastructure Parliamentary Design Specification Design Employers Requirements Design Scheme Design Detailed Design

21 CSM Task System Description HS2 Lifecycle stage Concept design Parliamentary Design/ Spec Scheme/ Employers Detailed design Construction design design Activity by lifecycle stage CSM-RA Develop Preliminary system description Develop system description (functional, interfaces) System description should reflect preliminary design, be configuration controlled Should be detailed, controlled and complete (reflecting system architecture) Change control ensure any changes (e.g. in as built) are included and assessed Test and commissioning Change control ensure any changes resulting from tests are included and assessed Operational Change control ensure any changes are included and assessed Hazard Identification High level Preliminary hazard identification Hazard identification on all systems and subsystems Detailed hazard identification on all systems, subsystems and products, including site specific and migration stages Update hazard identification against changes Construction hazards identified and managed as part of CDM process Update hazard identification against changes Update hazard identification against changes Selection of Risk Accept. Principle Develop principles Identify likely RAP for hazards Identify RAP for hazards identified Update RAP for hazards identified against changes

22 CSM Task Risk acceptance: Code of Practice/ Ref System Risk acceptance: Explicit Risk Estimation HS2 Lifecycle stage Concept design Parliamentary Design/ Spec design Develop standards baseline Identify where hazards are managed by Codes of Practice Develop criteria for explicit risk Scheme/ Employers design Detailed design Ensure code of practice/ reference system is relevant for the control of the considered hazards Demonstrate that explicit risk criteria have been met Construction Test and commissioning Operational Update code of practice/ reference application against changes Update argument in response to changes Safety Requirements Collate safety requirements Identify safety requirements from hazard controls and feed into requirements process Update safety requirements in response to changes in hazards Demo of Compliance Collate validation evidence Independent Assessment Develop strategy for independent assessment Appoint AsBo AsBo review of Design Deliverables AsBo review of Scheme/ employers Deliverables AsBo report Hazard Management Establish hazard management processes Implement hazard management (using hazard record) Continue hazard management process, update as required

23 Application of CSM-RA in HS2 System Definition for hybrid bill design EXTERNAL CIVIL ENGINEERING STATIONS TRAIN DEPOT MAINTENANCE DEPOT TRACK ROLLING STOCK ENERGY CONTROLS & COMMS TELEMATIC APPLICATIONS OPERATIONAL PASSENGER

24 CIVIL ENGINEERING PROVIDE AC OTHER RAILWAYS OTHER RAILWAYS WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT OTHER RAILWAYS WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT THIRD PARTIES THIRD PARTIES E EXTERNAL ROAD THIRD PARTIES ROAD THIRD PARTIES ROAD THIRD PARTIES OTHER RAILWAYS WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT OTHER RAILWAYS STATIONS TRAIN DEPOT PROVIDE A SECURE BOUNDARY PROVIDE SECURE STABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR TRAINS PROVIDE SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR PASSENGERS, STAFF AND NEIGHBOURS PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE SECURE STABLING ENVIRONMENT (FOR PASSENGER TRAINS AND OTM) PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR SERVICES PROVIDE STATION FACILITIES PROVIDE RETAIL AND SUPPORT FACILITIES PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE DRAINAGE PROTECT STATION FROM RAIL VEHICLE IMPACTS PROTECT STATIONS FROM EXTERNAL IMPACTS PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES FACILITIES PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR PASSENGERS, STAFF AND NEIGHBOURS PROVIDE EGRESS FOR PASSENGERS PROVIDE SAFE EGRESS AND ACCESS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES ON TO TRAINS PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE E PROVIDE EMERGE PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE WELFARE & OFFICE FACILITIES PROVIDE DRAINAGE PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT NOISE & VIBRATION MITIGATION PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE ENVIRONMENT FOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS PROVIDE TRAINING FACILITIES AINTENANCE DEPOT PROVIDE TEST FACILITIES PROVIDE CONTAMINATED DISCHARGE FACILITIES TRACK ROLLING STOCK PROTECT PEOPLE ON RAILWAY FROM MOVING TRAINS PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE ENVIRONMENT FOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE STABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR ENG TRAINS & OTM PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO PROVIDE S&C LAYOUT FOR TRAINING THE TRAIN STAYS ON TRACK PROVIDE DRAINAGE ALLOWS SUFFICIENT ADHERENCE FOR TRAINS TO ENABLES TRAIN MOVEMENT ALONG ROUTE AND PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO ACCELERATE AND BRAKE AS REQUIRED TO ADJACENT INFRASTRUCTURE THE TRAIN PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO THE TRAIN PROTECT PEOPLE ON RAILWAY FROM MOVING TRAINS MITIGATE NOISE AND VIBRATION PROVIDE NOISE & VIBRATION MITIGATION PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO THE TRAIN STAYS ON TRACK STAYS WITHIN LOADING GAUGE ENERGY PROVIDE ENERGY FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES CONTROLS & COMMS TELEMATIC APPLICATIONS PROVIDE A SECURE CONTROL AND COMMS ENVIRONMENT SECURITY SYSTEMS MONITOR SECURITY ACROSS NETWORK PROVIDE CONTROL & COMMS FACILITIES PROVIDE OPERATION FACILITIES RECEIVE INFO FROM CIVIL ENG INFRASTRUCTURE RCM SECURITY SYSTEMS PROVIDE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE MONITOR & CONTROL THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE RAILWAY PROVIDE RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY PROVIDE E PROVIDE RESPONSIBIL OPERATIONAL PASSENGER PROVIDE A SECURE BOUNDARY PROVIDE EARTHWORK & GEOTECH PROVIDE SUPPORT TO AND CONSTRAIN THE TRACK FORM PROVIDE BUILDINGS, STRUCTURE AND FACILITIES PROVIDE DRAINAGE MANAGEMENT OF VEGETATION PROTECT RAILWAY FROM RAIL VEHICLE IMPACTS PROTECT RAILWAY FROM EXTERNAL IMPACTS CIVIL ENGINEERING PROVIDE NOISE & VIBRATION MITIGATION PREVENT INCURSION INTO THE LOADING GAUGE PROVIDE DIAGNOSTIC INFO TO TELEMATIC PROVIDE SAFE EGRESS & ACCESS PASSENGER OPERATIONAL PROVIDE EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE MONITOR SECURITY ACROSS NETWORK PROVIDE OPERATION FACILITIES MONITOR & CONTROL THE RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE RAILWAY PROVIDE RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES TO IMPLEMENT EMERGENCY PROVIDE E PROVIDE RESPONSIBIL TELEMATIC APPLICATIONS SECURITY SYSTEMS RCM SECURITY SYSTEMS CONTROLS & COMMS ENERGY ROLLING STOCK TRACK AINTENANCE DEPOT TRAIN DEPOT STATIONS CIVIL ENGINEERING PROVIDE A SECURE CONTROL AND COMMS PROVIDE CONTROL & COMMS FACILITIES RECEIVE INFO FROM CIVIL ENG INFRASTRUCTURE ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE ENERGY FUNCTIONS AND FACILITIES PROTECT PEOPLE ON RAILWAY FROM MOVING STAYS ON TRACK PROVIDE NOISE & VIBRATION MITIGATION STAYS ON TRACK TRAINS PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO ALLOWS SUFFICIENT ADHERENCE FOR TRAINS TO ENABLES TRAIN MOVEMENT ALONG ROUTE AND PROVIDES PHYSICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE TO PROVIDE DRAINAGE MITIGATE NOISE AND VIBRATION THE TRAIN ACCELERATE AND BRAKE AS REQUIRED TO ADJACENT INFRASTRUCTURE THE TRAIN PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE ENVIRONMENT FOR PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE CONTAMINATED DISCHARGE FACILITIES PROVIDE DRAINAGE PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT NOISE & VIBRATION MITIGATION PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT PROVIDE A SAFE WORKING ENVIRONMENT EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE MAINTENANCE PROVIDE WELFARE & OFFICE FACILITIES FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE ENVIRONMENT FOR PROVIDE SECURE STORAGE STABLING EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS ENVIRONMENT FOR ENG TRAINS & OTM Functional Architecture PROVIDE TRAINING FACILITIES PROVIDE TEST FACILITIES PROVIDE SECURE STABLING ENVIRONMENT (FOR PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & PASSENGER TRAINS AND OTM) FACILITIES FACILITIES FACILITIES FACILITIES FACILITIES PROVIDE TRAIN MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS & FACILITIES PROVIDE A SECURE BOUNDARY ACCEPT AND DESPATCH TRAINS AS REQUIRED PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR SERVICES PROVIDE DRAINAGE PROTECT STATION FROM RAIL VEHICLE IMPACTS PROTECT STATIONS FROM EXTERNAL IMPACTS PROVIDE EGRESS FOR PASSENGERS PROVIDE SECURE STABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR PROVIDE SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR PASSENGERS, PROVIDE STATION FACILITIES TRAINS STAFF AND NEIGHBOURS PROVIDE SAFE ENVIRONMENT FOR PASSENGERS, PROVIDE SAFE EGRESS AND ACCESS FOR PROVIDE RETAIL AND SUPPORT FACILITIES STAFF AND NEIGHBOURS EMERGENCY SERVICES ON TO TRAINS PROVIDE E PROVIDE EMERGE OTHER RAILWAYS OTHER RAILWAYS WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT OTHER RAILWAYS WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT THIRD PARTIES THIRD PARTIES E EXTERNAL ROAD ROAD OTHER RAILWAYS OTHER RAILWAYS THIRD PARTIES THIRD PARTIES ROAD WEATHER, ENVIRONMENT THIRD PARTIES

25 Hazard record output from hybrid bill design CIVIL PROTECT RAILWAY ENGINEERING FROM EXTERNAL IMPACTS CIVIL PROTECT RAILWAY ENGINEERING FROM EXTERNAL IMPACTS Road vehicle incursion Road vehicle incursion Adequate barriers/ protection of overbridges and parallel roads Ensure road design is adequate Include requirement for crossings under the railway to be shown designed and built to be fit for purpose and shown to be compliant with standards Include requirement for provision of adequate barriers between adjacent roads and rail to mitigate risk of incursion

26 CSM-RA for specification design Specification design includes developing the technical standards How do we develop a new suite of standards for a new railway?

27 CSM-RA for specification design HS2 is an Interoperable Railway, must comply with the European Technical Specification for Interoperability: Energy Infrastructure Locomotive and Passenger train Safety in Railway Tunnels Persons of Reduced Mobility Control, Command and Signalling Telematics Applications for Passenger/ Freight Operations and Traffic Management These in turn call up a series of standards and processes.

28 CSM-RA for specification design However, many new standards are being developed, approximately 300 were created for civil design. Theses were developed through a Integrated Design Review process (IDR 1 /2/3, IDC). Specific safety related standards were developed

29 Bridge over rail design writing standards In the phase 1 route, there are 154 bridges over the railway. Bridge design standards need to deliver a safe railway, example design issues hazards include: Bridge parapet design Locations of bridge structures/ piers

30 Errant vehicle protection standard Develop errant vehicle protection standard Based on HS1 standard and DfT risk assessment for bridge design Scope differences to HS2 identified Workshops held to identify deltas to HS2 system definition Standard enhanced to an HS2 version delivering an equivalent level of safety

31 Bridge design standard Since the Eschede disaster in 1998, the location of structures near the railway is key Bridge design based on Eurocodes, civil engineering standards etc. but How far should the bridge pier be from the running line? Used UIC 7772-R to build derailment model Quantitative ALARP calculation of increase in derailment consequence vs. additional bridge cost Result informs bridge design standard.

32 An example of risk acceptance Inspection access during operational hours Given hybrid bill walkway location, train characteristics, service frequency etc. Is HS2 able to accept the hazards realised by allowing access to the lineside areas during passenger service operation? Note: This has not been chosen for operation

33 Hazards around lineside access Worker in vicinity of track leading to worker struck by train Object thrown up by passing train Worker subjected to high noise levels Infrastructure worker/ Train Aerodynamic forces on workers Inadequate walking route provision leading to Slips, Trips and Falls (STF) Manual handling of equipment Unauthorised access leading to assault on the operational railway Use of road vehicles leading to road traffic accidents Being on site Getting to site Hazards relevant to lineside access

34 Aerodynamics example A specific identified hazard was the effect of HS2 trains on infrastructure workers. HS2 has chosen to close this hazard by application of a code of practice: The Locomotive and Passenger Train TSI sets a value for the protection of infrastructure workers and passengers from aerodynamic effects. Sets criteria: Worker Type Distance (m) Air Speed (v+2σ) m/s Maintenance workers Platform passengers 3.0 from the nearest track centreline 3.0 from the nearest track train speed kph (but consider actual speed)

35 Aerodynamics

36 Safe Integration

37 Hazard Record Information Flow Diagram Sub-system specific requirements Further Assessment HAZARD RECORD Further Assessment HS2 Contracts System Safety Sub- System Specific Teams HS2 Directorate Technical Review HS2 System Safety Team Review Review and Acceptance Hazard Closure Amendments to the Design

38 Security

39 CSM-RA for specification design In a safety context, Security can be seen as a additional cause to a number of operational hazards. Safety mitigation will work for security threats Cyber security is an important consideration A number of working groups are looking at this and rail systems Physical security is more widely understood

40 Thank you