UBC POLI 101 Canadian Politics The Federal System (not Constitutional Mega-Politics) http://www.politics.ubc.ca/fcutler/teaching/poli101 1 Federalism Separate orders of government defined by the Constitution But not Confederalism: where the higher-level assembly is made up of representatives of governments not representatives of the people Division of Powers - Constitutionalized Neither can change this unilaterally Disputes go to a third party the Supreme Court General support in the political culture for the existence of multiple levels of government 2 Canadians Like Co-operation But They re Confused Thinking about how governments make decisions, which of the following do you think would be best for Canada: One, the federal government should have the final say on some things, the provincial governments on others, and they should both stay out of each other's way; or two, both levels of government should work most things out together. Final Say Work Together DK N BC 13% 86% 1% 325 Alberta 17% 82% 1% 327 Man/Sask 11% 88% 1% 450 Ontario 17% 81% 2% 403 Quebec 30% 65% 4% 1001 Atlantic 6% 93% 1% 434 It is often difficult to figure out which level of government is responsible for what BC AB Total Strongly Agree 28.2% 26.9% 27.6% Somewhat Agree 49.8% 45.8% 47.9% Somewhat Disagree 11.6% 16.5% 13.9% Strongly Disagree 2.9% 4.3% 3.5% Don't Know 7.5% 6.6% 7.1% N 241 212 453 3
Why Federalism? Prevention of tyranny Division of sovereignty tempers Parliamentary Supremacy Multiplication of factions Madison Efficiency Information about citizens preferences more reliable Service delivery more cost-effective Representation closer to the people (more democratic) Citizens shop for bundles of services Geographical variation in preferences In Canada: the accomodation of ethno-cultural difference Recruitment of leaders through the levels of gov t Policy Experimentation / Borrowing Ideas & Success 4 Why NOT Federalism? Inequality different revenue bases mean different levels of service equalization is inefficient Confusion undermines responsible government voters may not be able to hold governments accountable legislatures may not be able to hold Cabinets accountable Destructive competition (Race to the Bottom) A bidding war to attract industry undermines revenue Entrenchment / exacerbation of geographical conflict. Diversion from more important concerns. Cost Duplication / Overlap Lack of economies of scale 5 Intrastate (within) and Interstate (between) Federalism Intrastate Federalism: The representation of the units of the federation within the national government (e.g. US Senate 2 Senators from each State) Constitution ensures Provincial Representation in Senate and House of Commons Convention of regional balance in Cabinet Can be interpreted in centralist or decentralist ways Interstate Federalism: Interactions between Federal and Provincial gov ts Joint programs Bureaucratic linkages and consultations Integration of Tax system First Ministers Conferences Interstate federalism functions more smoothly, or there is simply less need for it, if intrastate mechanisms are legitimate and effective. 6
Development of Canadian Federalism 1 Confederation + Reasons for Federalism in 1867: Deadlock of United Canada s Double Majority stalemate Quebec desire for constitutional guarantee of control over language, education, culture, civil law, religion Martimes wanted self-government, feeling of distinct political culture, different economic interests Logistics Communication/Transportation slow & costly But the shadow of US Civil War So strong central government with residual power, disallowance, primary power to tax The objective was independent governments, able to function on their own in watertight compartments we have avoided all conflict of jurisdiction and authority Sir John A. Macdonald 7 Division of Powers Federal Trade and Commerce Criminal Law Raising of Revenue Postal Service Census / Statistics Defence Shipping, Fisheries Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians Residual Power Provincial Crown Land (Natural Resources) Hospitals, Charities Municipal Institutions Education Property and Civil Rights within the Province Generally all matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province Concurrent Agriculture Immigration Residual Power, s. 91: to make laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces 8 Quasi-Federalism? Remember, federalism is a situation where neither government can infringe on the other s powers But in Canada, at the beginning Paramountcy federal gov t laws stand in case of conflict Reservation and Disallowance Residual Power of the federal government Declaratory Power (public works for national benefit) Unequal power of taxation Federal Spending Power Federal appointment of judges Macdonald thought of the provinces as colonies 9
Development of Canadian Federalism 2 to 1949 Post-1867 Empowerment of Provinces Provinces Rights, Strong Premiers Compact Theory Judicial decisions undermined residual power Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in Britain Limited federal powers to those enumerated in s.91 POGG limited to matters not covered in s. 91&92 (Local Prohibition case - 1896) and to an emergency power (Fort Frances case - 1922) Generous interpretation of provincial property and civil rights and all matters of a merely local or private nature in the prov ; with a limited interpretation of federal trade and commerce power (unlike USA) Swing back to centralization, but against JCPC resistance WWI federal War Measures Act, temporary centraliztion Depression: JCPC says not an emergency, so POGG can t justify federal New Deal social programs: welfare, unemployment insurance, pensions, etc. WWII intervenes and provides the emergency the federal government needs, as well as an economic solution Quebec opts-out of Canada Pension Plan and Tax Sharing 10 Development of Canadian Federalism 3 Post-War Centralization: 1940 amendment adding unemployment insurance to fed. 1949 Elimination of Appeals to the JCPC in Britain Growth of the Spending Power Shared Cost Programs Problems with Shared Cost Programs: undermines provincial independence Encourages spending Reduces accountability Growth of both levels of government, so less conflict Tax sharing, tax rental But Equalization allowed provinces to provide similar services Co-operative federalism: so many problems and opportunities were new not provided for in the constitution so negotiation became the rule Intergovernmental Relations are a key feature of Canada (1000 committees, 500 federal-provincial programs Illustration: Post-Secondary Funding Provincial: Operating grants, salaries, scholarships Federal: Block funding for education, research funds, scholarships As governments stopped growing, conflict increased 11 Current Canadian Federalism Executive Federalism: Intergovernmentalism First Ministers Conferences (FMCs) Ministers Meetings Premiers Meetings Federal cuts Diminishing federal role and use of spending power Provinces can be more aggressive against the fed gov Federal gov t less able to enforce national standards SUFA The Social Union Framework Agreement (1999) Feds agree to get provincial consent for new programs Reduce barriers to mobility and equality no residence requirements Collaborative policy development and data collection Enhance accountability by identifying sources of funding Funding predictability 12
More to come Case Study: Health Care 13 Consequences of Federalism Cairns: Solidifies provincial societies and encourages provincial politicians to play to provincial identities so Federal Institutions create Federal Societies! Larger Government? Competition for citizen satisfaction leads both to compete or cooperate to deliver more programs than are wanted Smaller Government? Race to the bottom competition for investment 14