Mehdi Arzandeh. University of Manitoba. Department of Economics. 519 Fletcher Argue Building

Transcription

1 Mehdi Arzandeh University of Manitoba Department of Economics 519 Fletcher Argue Building Winnipeg MB R3T 5V5 Phone: Website: EDUCATION PhD in Economics, University of Manitoba, Expected May 2017 M.Sc. in Agricultural Economics, University of Tehran, 2010 B.Sc. in Agricultural Economics, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, 2007 RESEARCH INTERESTS Electronic Trading Research and Development Intellectual Property Rights Mergers and Acquisitions International Trade CURRENT RESEARCH Asymmetric Firms R&D Investments in Plant Breeding under IPRs with D.G. Brewin. Tariffs, R&D, and Two Merger Policies, with H. Gunay. The Information Content of the Limit Order Book, with J. Frank. Market Microstructure Dynamics in Agricultural Futures Markets, with J. Frank. PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Research Assistant, University of Manitoba, 2010-present Author, McGraw-Hill Education Canada, 2016 PowerPoint Presentation for Microeconomics by C. McConnell, S. Brue, S. Flynn, and T. Barbiero, 14th Canadian Edition. PowerPoint Presentation for Macroeconomics by C. McConnell, S. Brue, S. Flynn, and T. Barbiero, 1

2 14th Canadian Edition. Instructor, University of Manitoba, 2012-present. Introduction to Microeconomics (ECON 1010) Introduction to Macroeconomics (ECON 1020) Microeconomic Theory 2 (ECON 2460) Macroeconomic Theory 1 (ECON 2020) Quantitative Methods in Economics (ECON 2040) International Trade (ECON 3670) Teaching Assistant, University of Manitoba, present. Survey of Mathematical Topics for Economists (ECON 6040) Introduction to Agribusiness Management (ABIZ 1000) RESEARCH AND CONFERENCES Market Microstructure Dynamics in Agricultural Futures Markets, Selected Paper for Presentation at the NCCC-134: Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management, St. Louis, Missouri, April 24-25, 2017, with J. Frank. The Information Content of the Limit Order Book, Presented Paper at the NCCC-134: Conference on Applied Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting, and Market Risk Management, St. Louis, Missouri, April 18-19, 2016, with J. Frank. Firms Asymmetric R&D Investments in Plant Breeding under Changing IPRs, Paper Submitted to the Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization in Sep. 2016, Revision Requested in Feb. 2017, with D.G. Brewin. Tariffs, R&D, and Two Merger Policies, Paper Submitted to the Canadian Journal of Economics, Sep. 2016, with H. Gunay. On the Dynamics of Firm R&D Investments in Plant Breeding under IPRs, Presented Paper at the 48th Annual Conference of the CEA, Vancouver, May 29 - June 1, 2014, with D.G. Brewin. Optimal R&D Investments in Plant Breeding with IPRs and Flexibility between Hybrid and Herbicide Tolerance Trait Development, Selected Poster at the 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting in Washington D.C., August 4 6, 2013, with D.G. Brewin. Estimating Soil Phosphorous Budgets for Rural Municipalities in Manitoba, Manitoba Livestock Manure Management Initiative, 2013, with P. Loro, D. G. Brewin, W. Akinremi, Collin Gyles, and D. Ige. 2

3 Long Term Dynamics of Firm R&D Investment in Plant Breeding under Plant Breeders Rights, Presented Paper at the 16th ICABR Annual Conference, Ravello, Italy, June 24-27, 2012, with D.G. Brewin. Forecasting Tractor Demand in Target Markets of Iran, Africa and West Asia: Application of Compound Forecast, Iranian Journal of Agricultural Economics and Development, 2010, 40(4): 17-26, with S.S. Hosseini and H. Mafee. Comparing the Productivity of Manufacturing and Agriculture Sectors, Selected Poster at the 7th Iranian Agricultural Economics Conference, March 2010, with H. Salami. Measuring the Total Factor Productivity and Causal Testing Its Effective Parameters in Iran s Agricultural Sub-Sectors, Presented Paper at the 7th Iranian Agricultural Economics Conference, March 2010, with H. Mafee and I. Saleh. AWARDS Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Funding, 2015-present. The University of Manitoba Faculty of Graduate Studies GETS Scholarship, , Won the 3rd Award at the George Morris Centre s Student Poster Competition, Growing Canada's Agricultural Economy: The Role of Trade Conference, January 23-25, 2013 Chateau Laurier, Ottawa, Ontario. Won the Best Student Award in the 2nd Educational Ceremony of University College of Agriculture and Natural Resources, University of Tehran, Ranked 1st in the Nationwide University Entrance Exam for M.Sc. degree in Agricultural Economics, Iran AFFILIATIONS Member of the Canadian Economic Association (CEA). Member of the Canadian Agricultural Economic Society (CAES). VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE President of the University of Manitoba Iranian Students Association (UMISA), University of Manitoba ( ) President of Students' Guild Council of Faculty of Agriculture, University of Mashhad ( ) Member of Students Scientific Committee of Faculty of Agriculture, University of Mashhad ( ) 3

4 THESIS PAPERS ABSTRACTS PAPER 1. R&D Investments by Asymmetric Plant Breeding Firms under Changing Intellectual Property Rights In a Cournot duopoly model, we examine three major intellectual property rights in the plant breeding industry, namely patents, patents with a farmer s exemption, and patents with a researcher s exemption. In the symmetric variation of the model, we find that breeders invest less in R&D with a researcher s exemption if variety differentiation is low or knowledge spillover is high. We also show that farmers prefer a farmer s exemption in the short run to other IPRs but should favor a researcher s exemption or patent in the long run. Moreover, the social planner for most ranges of variety differentiation and knowledge spillover prefers the research exemption over the patent and prefers the patent to the farmer s exemption. In our asymmetric variation of the model, we consider two sources of asymmetry for breeders separately. First, we assume that one breeder is more efficient in conducting R&D. Second, we assume there is no cost difference between the breeders, however, one breeder benefits from a head start in terms of stock of knowledge. Both asymmetric cases give rise to the situations where the researcher s exemption can resolve the common pool problem and increase R&D investment or create free riding problems and lower R&D investment. We show that the more efficient/more endowed breeder invests more in R&D under the researcher s exemption than patents if variety differentiation is high and cost/knowledge endowment dispersion is low. On the other hand, the less efficient/less endowed breeder, generally, invests less in R&D under a researcher s exemption if variety differentiation or cost/knowledge endowment differences are low. Importantly, the results show that for most of the possible range of parameters where the researcher s exemption encourages R&D more than a patent, asymmetric firms voluntarily cooperate in research and a social planner intervention may not be required to increase R&D. These findings suggest new gains for society from adopting the 1991version of the UPOV convention. Keywords: Plant Breeding, Farmer s Exemption, Researcher s Exemption, IPRs, Game Theory, Asymmetric Firms, Knowledge Spillover, Product Differentiation, Cournot Oligopoly. PAPER 2. Tariffs, R&D, and Two Merger Policies In an international Cournot oligopoly model, we compare two different merger policies when firms are merging endogenously and engage in research and development (R&D). In the benchmark model, countries set optimal tariff levels but do not have merger policy. If ex-ante identical firms merge internationally, they have an ex-post cost advantage over the outsiders due to tariff savings. This gives the merger an incentive to increase its R&D investment, which increases the cost dispersion further; therefore, the merger paradox, where each firm wants to be an outsider, disappears when R&D is efficient. As a result, we find different equilibrium market structures depending on the efficiency of R&D. In the second part, we compare two different merger policies, one that puts emphasis on welfare 4

5 (roughly the Canadian merger policy) and another one that puts emphasis on consumer surplus (roughly the European Union s merger policy). We show that under the welfare-increasing merger policy, monopoly is the equilibrium market structure when R&D is very efficient. This explains why a merger, which created a monopoly, was approved in Canada. As R&D becomes less efficient, the equilibrium market structures become less concentrated under the two different merger policies. Each merger policy can be global welfare maximizing depending on the efficiency of R&D; however, the consumer-surplus-increasing merger policy is optimal for a wider range of parameters. Keywords: Competition Policy, Merger Policy, R&D, Endogenous Mergers, Tariff, Trade Policy, Cournot oligopoly, Merger Paradox. PAPER 3. The Information Content of the Limit Order Book Price discovery is a fundamental function of electronic markets and is defined as the incorporation of information to prices through the actions of traders. Recent finance literature has found evidence that, as a part of their trading strategies, informed traders may submit limit orders instead of market orders. If so, the steps of limit order book (LOB) beyond the best bid and best ask spread (BAS) contain valuable information and contribute to price discovery of the underlying asset. This is the first attempt to examine the informativeness of the LOB beyond the BAS for agricultural commodities. We reconstruct the LOB using market depth data and apply three information share approaches to test whether the steps of LOB beyond BAS contribute to price discovery in agricultural commodity markets. This is done for five major agricultural commodities namely lean hogs, live cattle, corn, wheat, and soybeans as well as the CME E-mini S&P 500. We find that a substantial market depth exists at the steps beyond the best bid and ask prices in the futures markets. The results of the three information share measures show that the steps of the LOB beyond the BAS contribute by over 27% to price discovery of futures contracts. Across agricultural commodities, the steps of the LOB beyond the BAS have more information for grains than meats. Moreover, we find that the steps closer to the top of the book contain more information that the steps farther from the top for all the products. These findings indicate that informed traders in futures electronic markets actively use limit orders with price steps beyond the BAS and especially the steps near the top of the book. The results also show that for E-mini S&P 500, the steps closer to the top of the book contain more information at the beginning and the end of the week whereas steps farther have more information in the middle of the week. For agricultural commodities a clear pattern is not observed. Keywords: Futures Markets, Information Share, Commodity Markets, Electronic Trading, Limit Order Book 5