Irrigation Reforms at Mali s Office du Niger:

Transcription

1 Irrigation Reforms at Mali s Office du Niger: Process: Achieving Commitment Geert Diemer Products: Forging New Rules, Results Djibril Aw Taking Stock, Tackling New Issues El Hadj Oumar Tall

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3 1978: ON = settlement agency Monopoly on Feasibility studies, construction, O&M Recruiting, installing settlers, land records Input supply, extension, mechanized cultivation Rice processing, marketing, seed production Accountabilities Ext ns n Minister Director General Acc ntin g Farmer C ns trc tn etc

4 Timeline (not to scale) Independence Request to WB Donors start tests that weaken agency, empower farmers, yield new rules GOM consolidates reforms New institutions solidly in place, govern stakeholders / Farm incomes: unknown Yields 1-2 T/ha Farm incomes: $1000 Yields: 5-6T/ha

5 The Commitment Process How did political will come about?

6 Donors explore ON GOM requests hardware funding, not reform. WB: sees potential, stresses inefficiencies, explores econ potential of rehab, offers TA to draft Master Plan for rehab; Bilateral: sees opportunity for structural response to famines, explores technical solutions to raise yields; Two complementary angles.

7 1982: Two Negotiation Sites Multi-donor meeting Paris: hardware funding only if GOM commits to reforms; Same days in Bamako: bilateral and GOM trade rehab funding against small reform steps already feasible for GOM: stabilize land occupation; allow farmer organizations as partners; extension agents without policing role; Complementary conditionalities.

8 : Forging a New Coalition Coalition in 1982: agency + GOM; farmers absent: dispersed, unorganized and ineffective; Rice market reforms weaken agency loses threshing, hulling, marketing; Scheme reforms gain farmer support: credit program by FOs raises farmer incomes (1982); affordable threshers (1984), dehullers (1986) raise incomes; joint maint ance funds empower farmers, ON partners (1987); revision land tenure empowers farmers (1988); manual field leveling raises yields, raises sense of ownership (1982, 1991);

9 1992: a Pro Reform Stakeholder Coalition Farmers: organized, motivated, assertive, harvest affordable rice at 4.6T/ha (6Tnow); ON staff: lost status, leverage, visibly oversized after erosion of functions; Donors: seek to consolidate test reforms; GOM: awash in political capital after downfall of military, seeks economic liberalization, risks losing all donor support if it does not commit.

10 Main Point on Process Small institutional steps + small technical steps + market incentives built new stakeholder coalition Implementation in < 3 years: reform cell resisted only by ON staff Market tilt to producers helped scheme power tilt towards them; Agency, farmers only players in public irrigation sector; Players at outset: passive farmers, assertive staff.

11 The Products How to meet the demands of GOM (funding for rehab, expansion); donors (sustainability of hardware investments); farmers (control over water fees)?

12 Goal and Conditions for Achievement GOAL Recover O&M cost from users; CONDITIONS 1. Make agency accountable to farmers for use of water fee; 2. Provide land tenure security to farmers; 3. Pull agency out of commercial, industrial activities; 4. Downsize staff with minimum negative impact.

13 Features of ON Reforms Joint farmer-agency committees for management of the water fee; Farming permit for land tenure security; Performance Contract (PC) between Government Agency Farmers Negotiated staff severance package

14 Joint Farmer-Staff Committees to Manage Water Fees (#1) To allow farmer oversight, scheme split in 5 zones of 12,000 ha, each with 3-4 secondary units; Creation of Joint Committees Equal number of elected farmer reps (4-7) and appointed agency staff (4-7) Term: 5 years PC earmarks >50% of budget for maintenance; Zone committees fix budget, input by secondaries; Also award bids, oversee contractors, sign for payment;

15 Joint Farmer-Staff Committees to Manage Water Fees (#2) 1 delegate from each group of contiguous zones sits on Steering Committee for PC; 1 also sits on ON Board of Directors; Eviction for non-payment fee by ON manager Waive fee payment if water delivery inadequate.

16 The Instrument for Land Tenure Security: the Farming Permit (FP) FP guarantees usufruct of same plot to farmers who farm adequately; pay water fees in time. Farmer may transmit FP to heirs; Farmer cannot sell, mortgage or sublease FP

17 M&E of the PC = Stakeholder Arena PC sets goals, duties for GoM, agency and farmers; Renegotiated every 3 years; Sets fees, and % dedicated to maintenance; Sets goals for yields, cropping intensity, rehab, expansion; Engages donors in funding rehab, expansion; Evaluates stakeholder performance halfway and at end of term; Negotiates rules for new issues such as land development, need for land titles;

18 Managing Staff Retrenchment Challenge: lay off 70% in a depressed labor market; Risks: jeopardize entire reform process; Deal: severance = 3 years salary. Funding source: bilaterals. Outcome: most staff stayed on scheme as farmers or service providers.

19 : more production/ha/pp, tripled population: natural+migration 7000 ON Population ON Population 0 Wet season rice yield (Kg paddy/ha) Wet season production/person (Kg paddy) Series Series

20 : Intensified cropping, sixfold jump of marketable surpluses Cropping intensity Quantity of tradable paddy (Mt) Cropping intensity Quantity of tradable paddy (Mt)

21 Taking Stock, Tackling New Issues How do PC, joint committees, FL work? How do stakeholders tackle strategic planning?

22 Joint Committees: Here to Stay? #1 Strong Points: Empower farmers; Nearly 100% cost recovery although fees doubled; Evictions legitimized: joint decisions users and agency; Weak Points: Training budget committees controlled by agency; Operational costs committees underbudgeted; ON staff: full time, well resourced but farmers: part time, under resourced; Decisions skewed towards staff views;

23 Joint Committees: Here to Stay? #2 Stakeholder Views: Farmer Committee members: more resources for training; more means to interact with constituency; wait to be convinced WUAs are effective. Master Plan: towards full WUAs; Resolution Through negotiations for new PCs and Master Plan process

24 Performance Contract: Cases PC = Arena. Cases: tax on maintenance; Govt share in maintenance of primary system; 3 rd party verification of works.

25 Dynamics of PC negotiations Farmer aims limited ON budget, low water fees work + GOM, ON on donor funds for canal hardware; ON aims more budget, tasks and/or staff, works + GOM for high water fees, + GOM and delegates for maximum donor funding; Donor aims limited ON budget work + GOM and ON for high water fees

26 Outdated Land Tenure? Breaches of License Clauses: Sub-lending Sale Unattractive to Private Investment Option for Developed Land Allow ownership; Option for New Land Small farmers contribute labor for tertiary canal; Commercial farmers finance secondary and terity canals Resolution: through Master Plan process