ORF SEMINAR SERIES VOLUME 1 ISSUE 13 NOVEMBER Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China

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1 ORF SEMINAR SERIES VOLUME 1 ISSUE 13 NOVEMBER 2014 OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China Prof. Pranab Kumar Ray OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

2 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION

3 About the Author Prof. Pranab Kumar Ray is Director, Centre for Hydro-Meteorological Research, Kolkata. He taught at Presidency College from 1976 until his retirement in He has worked in the field of river network development and integrated water resource management on principles, management structures and implementary designs for several river basins in India as well as for trans-boundary rivers. He has experience with river regulation activities and related interventions by Europe and USA in developing countries. Prof. Ray has worked on land-use and water resource planning in the context of climate change for the last four decades. He is currently working on formulation of an organisational structure for transboundary integrated water resource management in South Asia Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.

4 Introduction Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Water Sharing between India and China* ll natural elements of the Earth's system are limited by their presence in space and time. This applies particularly to clean Awater, critical for growth and survival. Availability of water is slowly reducing and will be more erratic in the near future when demand for it will very likely surpass availability in time and space. Sovereign states in all probability will move towards intense utilisation of their territorially defined water resources, leaving little for downstream neighbours. This scenario is appearing to be ominously true in the transboundary river basins of South Asia. It is therefore worthwhile to scrutinise water sharing between India and China. The Indus and Tsangpo-Brahmaputra river systems, along with the upper Kosi and the Karnali, are central in this regard. India and China can put to planning and management a vast amount of water between them. An amicable arrangement of water utilisation and their basin-wise integrated management will bring economic success to both countries. A friendly settlement relating to water resources of trans-boundary river systems is urgently needed between India, China and their neighbours Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh. India and China are the two major stakeholders for water resources of South Asia and can help uplift the economies of these smaller countries. The two can show the way forward for friendly integrated water management and develop unique precedents of rational practices for mutual upliftment through sharing and peaceful use of water. *Lecture delivered at a conference organised by the Kolkata chapter of ORF on 15 February

5 ORF Seminar Series The Domain for Planning and Management India and China do not share any rivers exclusively between them; all trans-boundary rivers of India and China are also shared with other neighbours. The Indus and Sutlej systems are shared by India, China and Pakistan, while the most resource-rich trans-boundary river of all, the Brahmaputra, is shared between India, China, Bangladesh and Bhutan. The Kosi, Arun, Barun and Karnali rivers are shared by China, Nepal and India and are part of the Ganga system. For all such rivers, China happens to be the upper riparian state. India is a middle riparian state for the Brahmaputra system. Bhutan is the upper riparian state for a significant subsystem of basins within the Brahmaputra system, while Bangladesh is the lower riparian state for the Brahmaputra. China and India, being upper and middle riparian states in these two mega systems, face the issue of integrated management and water sharing under a unique situation. Upper riparian states are generally slow to respond to matters of integrated water management, although exceptions can be found as in the case of India and Pakistan. India happily and successfully shared waters of the Ravi, Chandra Bhaga and Jhelum with Pakistan, although India has upper riparian status for these rivers. China, too, has shown a positive attitude for water management in many domains; for example, it is equally agreeable to sharing water in the Ganga-Mekong system. But uniformity is a rare virtue in geopolitics, particularly in the context of India-China relations. The deep chasms created by the confrontation in the 1960s are receding now and a new phase of bilateral warming is gaining momentum. While a long legacy of complex mind blocks and irreversible misconceptions overshadows concerns of mutual interest in the labyrinth of the geopolitics of South- Southeast Asia, the ground is today ripe to explore possibilities of 2

6 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: integrated water management mechanisms between these two Asian nations. India and China are coming closer with greater economic cooperation between them. But the walls of the past remain, currently reflected in the political segregation both nations still sometimes practice, such as India's refusal to allow China to join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). China is the leading pivot of power in Asia and likely to be the second biggest power in the world in the future, given its phenomenal economy and military power base. An in-depth evaluation is needed to formulate a strategy of coping with Chinese dominance while keeping national interests safe. The core bilateral issues of a border dispute and a trade deficit should be settled, followed by joint water resource planning and management for mutual benefit. In the coming decades water politics will dominate in South Asian countries, with India, China, Nepal and Bangladesh in the forefront. Issues are certainly bilateral now, but there are chances of multilateral dialogue in the future. Therefore, formulation of a policy for integrated basin water management among the larger neighbours of the region and active involvement should be a priority. Of the three trans-systems, the biggest is the Yarlung-Tsangpo basin, running through four countries China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh. China has the largest spatial share of the basin 51.1 percent of the 1.73 million square km, but generates only 29 percent of the total basin discharge because of Tibet's cold desert climate. The Yarlung-Tsangpo originates from a lake called Tamlung in the Angsi Glacier (Chemyungdung Glacier is not the actual source) and flows approximately 1,217 km in Tibet, where the total annual precipitation of rain and snow together varies between 25 and 65 cm. The amount of 3

7 ORF Seminar Series precipitation decreases towards southwestern Tibet, where the cold winter brings snowfall. This has resulted in some 11,000 glaciers and ice fields. The Tibetan plateau experiences a rise in mean daily temperature from mid-march to June due to the northerly movement of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and the Heat Equator towards 30 degrees north. With an increase in daily maximum temperature, glacial ice and ice caps start to melt, rejuvenating the discharge of the Tsangpo and its tributaries. If the annual hydrographs of the Yarlung Tsangpo and its tributaries like the Lhasa or the Wang Chu are considered, they all display a steady rise in discharge between mid-march and mid-july. The increase from March to mid-june is caused by the melting ice; thereafter, it is due to the summer monsoon rains from mid- June to early August. The average flow of the Yarlung Tsangpo in southern Tibet is only 1,980 cubic meter per second (cumec), while its tributaries record an even lower figure between 275 cumec (Lhasa) and 110 cumec (Wang Chu). On entering India as the Siang and further on called Brahmaputra the son of Brahma the river is flush with potential. The average discharge in Assam reaches 16,240 cumec and further decreases to 19,300 cumec in Bangladesh. Peak discharges stay above one million cumec. Such a phenomenal rise in capacity is due to a high average rainfall (more than 275 cm annually) in Bhutan, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and other Northeastern states of India, where the main channel is endowed with large amounts of discharge from several tributaries such as the Subansiri, Sankosh, Manas, Jiavarali and Teesta. The Indian section of the basin, covering 34.2 percent of basin area, contributes 39 percent of the total discharge. Equally significant is the contribution from Bhutan. This mountainous state covers 6.7 percent of the total basin area but generates 21 percent of the system output. Bhutan, therefore, will need to be a nodal partner in the context of 4

8 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: integrated water management of the Yarlung-Tsangpo-Brahmputra- Jamuna system. India and Bhutan jointly generate 60 percent of the total discharge and should command key roles in water management in eastern India, including the water situation of Bangladesh. The positive synergies between India and Bhutan at present should be an important aspect for consideration in an India-China-Bhutan perspective. Being the lower riparian state, Bangladesh may feel the most vulnerable in this scenario. India, as the middle riparian state, has several advantages over China as well as lower riparian Bangladesh. The Indian part of the basin of the Brahmaputra is the most resource-rich in terms of volume of discharge that can be used for irrigation, hydropower generation and water transport. Bhutan, a mountainous country with moderate demand for consumable use for its vast runoff, could allow outflow into the Indian section of the basin in Assam. As far as China is concerned, India should enter into a dialogue for securing 20 percent of the environmental flow (EF) down the channel of the Brahmaputra. It should be noted here that China, using 80 percent of the discharge generated within Tibet, cannot cause water scarcity of any nature in the Indian part of the basin. But to secure 20 percent of the discharge down the Brahmaputra at Pasighat (where the river enters the country), India should have year-round hydro-meteorological data of the Yarlung-Tsangpo basin. Presently, India has access to only discharge data of the Tsangpo during the monsoon period for flood forecasting purposes. Treaty arrangements should be pursued to obtain hourly hydrograph and rating curve of the Brahmaputra in order to ensure a 20 percent EF on a daily basis instead of a monthly/yearly average flow. The issue of integrated water management of India-Bangladesh trans-boundary rivers has developed more as a political than a hydro-engineering problem. Delay in moving 5

9 ORF Seminar Series towards a viable management agreement will worsen the situation. India and Bangladesh can move in a number of sectors for solutions through planning. The most important of such sectors is agriculture, where both India and Bangladesh need adequate water for irrigation between October and May, when absence of rain generates demands for water. The problem of supplying water can be addressed through innovative water storage solutions such as channel barrages, weirs and effective recharge plans all over the Brahmaputra plains of the two countries. This will also enrich the groundwater or 'blue water' which can supplement surface storage for irrigation. India and Bangladesh should also embark on planning for all the 54 trans-boundary rivers of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak system. Both countries should free themselves of mental blocks and avoid engaging on a single water issue such as water sharing of the Teesta or the Barak (Tipaimukh) dam. The framework for trust building between the two countries could begin with an arrangement for transparent data sharing, mutual evaluation of data, ensuring 20 percent EF for all trans-boundary rivers and completing basin-wise hydro-climatic survey for future engagements. India and Bangladesh, with an average of 200 cm annual rainfall, can adequately provide for the needs of their farmers with proper basin-wise water resource planning and management. Planning for power and water transport could be integrated into the task of water management. 6

10 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: The second domain for river sharing is the Indus system. India, China and Pakistan are the main stakeholders, with some presence of Afghanistan. Among these four states, India and Pakistan were successful in executing the Indus Water Treaty, 1960, which has withstood the test of time and has caused only some minor problems. Both India and China are fairly silent about their plans for this river. India, under the Indus Treaty, can use the waters of the three western tributaries of the Indus, while the other two tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab, as well as the Indus waters, can only be used for nonconsumable purposes. The upper course of the Indus covers only 10 percent of the total basin area, while Pakistan's share is about 60 percent 7

11 ORF Seminar Series and India commands about 22 percent. The point to be noted is that all five rain- and snow-fed tributaries of the Indus receive their water from the southern slopes of the Himalayas, which are more bountiful than the dry plateau areas of Tibet and equally dry areas of Pakistan. Afghanistan, with only eight percent of basin area, is not an important resource provider to the Indus basin system. India is usually silent about utilising the full potential of the Indus waters for non-consumable purposes. Sections of the Indus, the Shyok and other small but resource-rich tributaries, which pass through deep gorges and are fed by snowmelt, have large hydropower potential. Waters of the upper Indus and Sutlej are very much on the radar of waterdeficient western Tibet. As with the Brahmaputra basin, India is in a situation where it can move towards greater non-consumable use of the Indus system. Need for Sharing The Yarlung-Tsangpo sections as well as the upper Indus and Kosi-Arun basins are spread over Xizang Zizhiqu Province (Tibet) of China. In future, the existing India-Pakistan, India-Nepal and India-Bangladesh bilateral water sharing principles should be broadened to achieve an integrated water treaty: India and China would be significant partners while the other neighbours within these basins would be amalgamated into regionally accepted treaties. China will, in the immediate future, utilise both the Yarlung Tsangpo and upper Indus and upper Sultej systems for hydropower generation as well as for canal irrigation. So far the chain of dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo has attracted Indian attention, but the upper Indus and upper Sutlej 8

12 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: waters are equally lucrative for irrigation in northwestern Tibet and in Chinghai, Sinkiang and Suchow provinces. Similarly, the upper Kosi, Karnali and Barun may be connected to the Lhasa River for augmenting the flow of upper Tsangpo. Such gains for China would cause extreme losses to Indian interests unless a policy is developed among all stakeholders on integrated water resource management that is strengthened by treaties. Broader Indian interests are linked to its larger neighbours and to its own 1 'eight sisters' and the Ganga basin states of Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh. Water needs of SBWANAMM and the Gangetic states can only be ensured if multilateral water management plans are clearly adopted within the framework of a South-Southeast Asian Water Treaty between China, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan and Bangladesh (CIPNABB). Integrated water management will become crucial due to effects of climate change. The Yarlung Tsangpo, Indus, Sutlej and Kosi are all snow-fed rivers. In another three to five decades, the amount of snowfall will decrease, as will the supply of snowmelt waters from the upper courses of these rivers. But the demand for water will increase. This rise in intensity of water demands in Tibet and China will also increase their consumption of the discharge, affecting the flow of the lower sections of these major rivers in India. Integrated basin water management can reduce the negative impacts of climate change. 1. Sikkim, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur, Assam, West Bengal and Bhutan (an independent state but a core nation for India's Look East Policy.) [SBWANAMM] 9

13 ORF Seminar Series WATER RESOURCE DOMAINS FOR GBB SYSTEM INDIA MYANMAR Some Misconceptions Transparent and logical evaluation will clear many misconceptions. Myth 1: The Brahmaputra will go dry if China builds dams on it. Being the upper riparian state for the Indian Brahmaputra system, if China does indeed builds dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the river in Assam may dry up. 10 This is a misconception. The upper Tsangpo basin is dry land with annual rainfall of only cm. The amount of discharge generated in upper Tsangpo is thus only 22 percent of the total discharge of the Brahmaputra basin. India is rich in rainfall annual precipitation is 250 cm on average and

14 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: there are cm rainfall zones spread over large areas of the basin. Therefore, the Indian part of the basin generates 67 percent of the total discharge, and 11 percent is generated in Bangladesh. Dams built in China consequently cannot deprive India or Bangladesh of the huge water resources of the Brahmaputra. This aspect should be comprehensively deliberated upon in India and Bangladesh. Myth 2: There is not enough water in the Brahmaputra system. The utilisable water of the Brahmaputra system is estimated to be a mere four percent of the total discharge. This is because of the very high speed of the discharge and its sheer volume. But this amount of utilisable flow can be significantly increased by developing higher capacity reservoirs and transferring excess water to drought-prone areas. Transfer of water during flood peaks will not decrease water availability for Bangladesh. There are many apprehensions in Bangladesh about proposed river linking projects. With transparent diagnostic survey and planning papers, such apprehensions can be laid to rest. Myth 3: Runoff discharge from hydroelectric projects decreases lower channel flow. This is another area where deep distrust has been created. Runoff discharge from hydropower stations with booster discharge dams will not destroy lower riparian ecosystems in any way. Misconceptions like these should be rebutted with proper analysis of discharge data. Such projects abound in 11

15 ORF Seminar Series Sikkim today and will also emerge in large numbers in Arunachal, Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam and West Bengal. The suspicion over the Tipaimukh and Upper Teesta projects should be properly allayed through vox populi. The Policy The policy should take care of the interests of millions of people of South and Southeast Asia and their requirements of fresh water for their daily needs. It should also take into account water needs for food production, animal husbandry, forestry, industrial requirement, navigation and healthy ecosystems. This will require Integrated Basin Water Management (IBWM) with policies and tools for developing and raising sustainable water utilisation. Not only should there be treaties for sharing discharge of rivers, these agreements should also accommodate all aspects of water use by communities. The most important issue is to meet demand for water in seasonal and spatial scarcity modes within the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra and Ganga-Indus basin systems. Hydrometeorological conditions of these three mega-systems vary widely, both in potential resources and the demands made on them. The policy should encompass all aspects related to integration of inputs, outputs and delivery schedule, keeping in mind sustainability and ecosystem requirements. A Logical Framework for IBWM The basic logic of this policy is to deliberate the need for water sharing and then to arrive at an equitable share for each basin and sub-basin in India, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan (ICPABB). 12

16 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: This will require the following steps: I. Evaluation of hydro-meteorological and sectoral demands of all basin management units comprising of the constituent countries. India should evaluate the data matrix of major basins across its states using the principle of need-based equity. Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal should do likewise. This will ensure the use of need-based equity as a principle for running water as well as 'blue water' below for integrated surface-subsurface water management plans. II. III. Execution of inter-state and intra-state basin water sharing be governed by two apex commissions. These commissions will be autonomous bodies with their terms and references formulated jointly by concerned nations for the inter-state basins and by the Indian Parliament for intra-state basins. The moderating platform for the intra-state basin commission should comprise representatives from the Ministries of Water, Agriculture, Industry and Water Transportation, while the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Environment of all pertinent sovereign neighbours should be represented in the international apex commission. The regulatory authority of the intra-state apex commission should be the Supreme Court of India, while for inter-state basins, the Supreme Court of each member country by rotation should control all affairs. The national apex commission should have under its control all State River Boards. Transparency in data sharing and development of required data matrix on the lines of the Monsoon Experimental Programme, MONEX. 13

17 ORF Seminar Series This is the ultimate necessity. India and China, along with their basin neighbours, should organise such a Core Data Agency (CDA). IV. Peaceful and amicable settlement of disputes. Both bilateral and multilateral disputes should be settled amicably through down-to-system evaluation and be mitigated by the apex body initially and later by the designated Supreme Court in the case of inter-state basin disputes and by the Indian Supreme Court for intra-state ones. V. Sustainable water uses and their implementation as the main theme of water treaties. Integrated Basin Water Management System Monitoring Execution Development of Basin Plans Review New Agenda Development of Water Management Policy INTERNATIONAL APEX NATIONAL Debate Assessment of Basin wise Resources Review Country State COMMISSIONS Creation of Basin Authorities Actions Forward: Review the conditions for arriving at a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for IBWM among five neighbours (China, 14

18 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh) under the international apex commission. Replicate such MOU for Indian states.. Develop fabrics for IBWM treaties with both national and international partners. Evaluate basin-wise water resources for all utility sectors. On the basis of utilisable resources, arrive at equitable distribution formulae, keeping in mind multiple needs and prospects. Execution will be the exclusive right of sovereign states within their geographical areas. However, formulate norms for inspections, arbitration and peaceful resolution of disputes for intra-state rivers, execution of management plans should be jointly carried out by water-sharing states. Monitoring, arbitration, etc. will be through a national commission and the Supreme Court of India. 15

19 ORF Seminar Series Discussant's Comments Ecologically informed statements, not sensationalism, will benefit China-India water cooperation Prof. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay Adviser, Water Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA Professor (Retired) IIM Calcutta, India Introduction Prof. Ray has addressed the complex issues related to Himalayan rivers both in the regional context of South Asia and in the broader context of Southeast Asia and China with impressive knowledge. He has shown great ability to identify details, particularly quantitative ones. Such maturity and openness of ideas have made the discussions very rich. It is a reflection of how we are addressing the matter nationally. However, there is slow progress in addressing the issues related to management of trans-boundary river systems. If we look at India's Draft National Water Policy of 2012, a document of about 30 pages, we see that very little space has been dedicated to Himalayan rivers and addresses only generalities. Himalayan rivers account for 70 percent of the total river water flow of the country but receive very little attention in policy discourse in the public domain. Thus, there is a problem in conducting research on this 70 percent and publishing scientific work, because there is restricted access to detailed hydrological data. We must understand river water in its quantitative aspect, in its ecological details and its economic use. There is therefore a need for data and discourse in the public domain. 16

20 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: The other difficulty is that India, in spite of participating in the preparation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, abstained from voting on it. So, in the case of Himalayan rivers, we face the difficulty that there is no institutional framework for addressing international waters. In the case of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin, a large part of the basin belongs to China, but a large share of the Himalayan water flows through India and then goes to Bangladesh. The average annual precipitation in the trans-himalayan region is about mm and in fact decreases to mm at locations further north. Also, we have not discussed the Ganga in detail; the only river discussed in this forum has been the Brahmaputra. From the point of view of river basin issues, we must take the Yarlung Tsangpo/Siang as one of the tributaries of the Brahmaputra, for which Pasighat can be taken as a convenient starting point. A number of rivers meet near Pasighat and create the Brahmaputra. They include the Burhi Dihing, the first from the east, then Lohit, Dibang and Dihang, which is the name of the YarlungTsangpo as it crosses into India. A public perception that the Brahmaputra will dry up as a result of some hydropower projects at the Tsangpo Bend in China, though unfounded, could make us enquire into not only what is happening in Siang or upstream at the Tsangpo Bend, but also see what is happening in the BurhiDihing, Debang, Lohit, etc. The series of tributaries the Subansiri, Manas, Sankosh, Teesta and all other 30 to 40 tributaries of the Brahmaputra draining the southern aspect of the Himalayas contribute about 80 percent of the flow of the Brahmaputra as it leaves India. Except the Dihang, all of the other rivers drain the southern aspect of the Himalayas. There is a small upstream part of the Lohit in Myanmar, but it is not very important in terms of the 17

21 ORF Seminar Series totality of the river. The contribution of the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet to the annual flow of the Brahmaputra at Bahadurabad is about 20 percent. This contribution rises at the time of lean flow and drops significantly during the monsoon peak flow. When we look at interventions in the rivers, it is not only a question of the totality of the water content. There is the question of having a reliable hydrograph of the river, because while the total flow may remain the same, periodicity may change due to interventions upstream. We need to have a friendly approach to structural interventions even in the case of hydropower plants. In India, we need to understand what China is planning to do with the Zagmu Dam, which has been cleared by the People's Council of China, and the three others in the pipeline. Further downstream on Siang (in India), at least three dams are under construction. The contribution of the Dihang to the flow of the Brahmaputra at Pasighat will be determined by the release from the last of the dams on the Dihang. So, the dams in India on the tributaries to Brahmaputra will be more directly responsible for the hydrograph of the Brahmaputra at Pasighat. The impact of the dams within India has been quite drastic. For example, the daily hydrograph of the Lohit looks like the annual hydrograph of monsoon rivers, as the base flow is very low. But at about 5 pm, the flow peaks because power generation starts. Then it looks comparable to the annual hydrograph of the river during May or June, when the flow increases. The flow comes down at about 10 pm, when the hydropower generation is stopped. This is a 360-time compression of the annual hydrograph of the downstream flows. As a result, there is a tremendous environmental impact on the tributaries of Brahmaputra. This also impacts the Assam flood plains along the banks of the Brahmaputra, 18

22 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: because of the series of hydropower stations from the Burhi Dihing to the Lohit all the way up to the Teesta. Our hydropower dams are providing electricity, but due to the rather limited nature of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, notable environmental damage is expected to take place in the river ecosystems. For example, in the current EIA process, there is a spatial limit of 10 km. A hydropower plant can make the riverbed dry over a much longer stretch because of tunneling. In case of cascade plants, this impact will be observed over a longer stretch but the impact is formally studied within a 10 km limit. There is a need for strategic environmental assessment which takes the entire river basin as the spatial basis for assessment. EIA in its present format is thus incomplete and unscientific. Going back to the engineering interventions at the Tsangpo Bend, they are very lucrative for China in terms of hydropower generation but are not very economical as water transfer projects. This area is the world's single largest hydro-potential source of about 45,000 MW. Hydropower is now more important for India and China, where new economic demands require more CO -free energy sources. China is likely trying to 2 benefit from the large total drop available at the Tsangpo Bend in order to meet these demands. On the question of water transfer, media reports have appeared on the dangers to the Brahmaputra drying up in case of a physical transfer of water from the structures being built at the Tsangpo Bend to the northern plains of China. There is great need of water in the North China Plain, but China is not an economically foolhardy country. It has a sound process for project feasibility assessment and its investments are based on pragmatism. If water is to be taken from the YarlungTsangpo 19

23 ORF Seminar Series at the Great Bend, it must be done so from three major river basins Yangste, Mekong and Salwin. The economic feasibility of physical transfer of water from Yarlung Tsangpo to the northern plains is very low. On the other hand, generating hydropower is a lucrative possibility. This possibility is being pursued not only by China but also by India in the downstream parts of the Yarlung Tsangpo, i.e., the Siang and Dihang. So when we talk about sharing the Brahmaputra, quantitative transfer, if it were to take place, would not affect the Brahmaputra in any significant way. Hydropower plants at the Tsangpo Bend would change the downstream hydrograph, but since India also has five major hydropower stations downstream on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the final effect on the hydrograph of the Brahmaputra at Pasighat would come from the last hydropower station above Pasighat, which is in India. India must also accept that building hundreds of hydropower projects on the tributaries of the Brahmaputra will have a very significant impact on this great river. I heard Prime Minister Narendra Modi say in his first campaign speech in New Delhi on 19 January 2014 at Ramlila Maidan that China is stopping the flow of the Brahmaputra. In reality, China has very little ability to do so. Hydrological realities must be the basis for making such statements. The other aspect is related to Bangladesh. A Bangladesh-India initiative named Ecosystems for Life, organised by the International Union for Conservation of Nature, is trying to assess the depth of water in the Hooghly, Padma and Meghna rivers the Hilsa fish require to swim in freely from the Bay of Bengal. Several decades ago, the Hilsa used to travel a long way up the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin, which is not the case today. Instead, the Hilsa is now moving to the Irrawadi in Myanmar in large quantities. So, river water is not only important for 20

24 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: irrigation or power generation, it is also a source of cheap protein. In a country where poverty and food security are major concerns, we must think of not only allocating water for growing paddy and wheat but also about making food, including fish, available by river waters. Multi-Dimensional Challenges This brings us to the multi-dimensional challenges of water management in the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin. We have a long way to go, and it is necessary to collaborate with both downstream Bangladesh and upstream China so that the water future of all three countries is secure. Also, whatever requirements of water downstream players have must be accepted by their upstream neighbours like India, as far as Tibet is concerned, or Bangladesh, in relation to India and China. In the field of international relations, river waters have become a difficult, complex and challenging topic, and in the coming years, we will see more breakthroughs from communities, academics, diplomats and engineers in making sure that our Himalayan rivers provide us water security, security from floods during the monsoon and security in the production of food. We have to focus on open, amicable and informed sharing of rivers. There has been great progress in proposing and initiating an open type of management, such as that for the river Mekong, where China was initially a non-participant but is today an observer and could become a member of the Mekong River Commission in due course. So, we can hope that in the near future there may be an agreement to cooperate in the management of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna, which would look after the interests of the people across the basin. We should adopt a comprehensive approach; in the coming decade or so, we 21

25 ORF Seminar Series must arrive at a river basin-based solution and not one of dividing rivers at various points. South Asia needs to have its own variety of water diplomacy, because we have ignored, underestimated and paid no academic attention to the issue of sharing river waters of South Asia. This task has to be undertaken by people across professions. Water diplomacy is a new interdisciplinary approach to complex and sensitive issues in river basins where all stakeholder interests and dimensions are addressed. Let me end here by again congratulating Prof. Ray for his comprehensive presentation on a complex subject. Q&A Session Q: A joint study by the Asian Development Bank Institute and the Asian Development Bank found that by 2017, the demand for water in India, China and Southeast Asian countries will rise to triple or quadruple the current figures. It also showed that the present groundwater condition in both China and India is bad. In that scenario, there might emerge serious conflicts between countries sharing common river waters. I am hopeful this will not happen, given, for example, the Greater Mekong Region, which is riding on the success of Greater Mekong Regional Cooperation, where the Southeast Asian countries of China, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are being connected through energy, roads, railways, waterways, etc. Taking a comprehensive view of the entire infrastructure involved is better than taking a focused view on water alone. China is not a part of the Mekong River Commission, but it participates through the Mekong Region Infrastructural Commission. China 22

26 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: is set to host an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meet later this year. This could be good opportunity for discussing water issues. India had a successful water agreement with Pakistan in the 1960s brokered by the World Bank, so why not a treaty with China? A river-based treaty like Greater Mekong Region or the Greater Tumen Initiative is needed. What is the likelihood of a water treaty involving the Brahmaputra and Ganga? A: There has been work done on South Asian rivers as a whole. Regarding the Brahmaputra, riparian countries Bhutan, India, Bangladesh and China should address the river as a whole. The Ganga and Brahmaputra systems are quite different from each other. However, studies have been done and China was possibly not taken into consideration; dams and water sharing was an issue in India-Bangladesh relations. We have been getting flow data from Army sources for around five to seven years. Now, with technological advancement, particularly satellite imagery, is the data generated good enough to understand the matter? They are using outdated data concerning the Teesta River as well. India and China are both reluctant to cooperate. Still, India is now changing its mindset; regional thinking has come into play. Both speakers have made the point that we do not need to worry about the diversion of water from the Yarlung Tsangpo but that there are environmental concerns because of the hydropower plants. Q: How do these environmental concerns affect India? 23

27 ORF Seminar Series A: The environment is affected by humans, and has always been changing. The fall of the Harappan and Mesopotamian civilisations has been linked to bad environmental strategies. We are concerned about these things and it is pertinent to remember that run-of-the-river logic is not a panacea in itself. It also applies to Tipaimukh. If the power generation is for peak power, the generator needs to work, say from 5.30 pm to about 10 pm. With satellite imagery we can glean some kind of data about bank erosion and changes in the river course. But satellite imagery is not yet very reliable for river water discharge information. Q: Are big dams serving the needs of the country, especially when local opposition has prevailed in recent times (e.g., the damming of the river Narmada; the dams being built in the Northeast)? A: Post-independence, both Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chairman Mao had great faith in large dams as tools for economic advancement and food security. In India, we have built a number of dams. Many dams were built on the Himalayan rivers, starting with the Bhakra Dam. In the case of China, Chairman Mao wanted to stop the flooding of the Yellow River. And both countries relied on Russian dam building technology. So, the dam Sangmenxia on the Yellow River was built by the Russians. However, it did not achieve the task of sediment management, because of the failure to recognise the role of sediment in the management of dams in Europe. In our water policies, we have a lot to say about the water flow but nothing much to say about millions of tonnes of sediment. The sediment is as much a part of the flow in Himalayan rivers as the water. The 24

28 Rivers of Conflict or Rivers of Peace: Yellow River is the densest carrier of sediment, and the Ganga- Brahmaputra the largest carriers of annual sediment load. China and India, to start with, did not have any internal knowledge of modern river management systems. Both borrowed European technology, particularly from the Russians. But the Chinese built an indigenously designed dam at Xiao Lang Di, downstream of Sanmenxia, which has done much better at excluding sediments. Indians have not yet paid attention to sediment exclusion. Hydropower could become a high carbon dioxide producing technology if years down the line, dams are to be cleared of sediment by truck transporting. As opposed to European heritage of hydrology, the South Asian challenge is to develop a water science for high sediment flows. Q: Does the United Nations have any treaties that could be appropriated for this region? What should our framework treaty be? A: Our water policies and laws are based on the original British system. We have not progressed from there. Europeans have evolved, but we have not. We have to develop our knowledge on the basis of which the new approach to river management can evolve. The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Use of International Watercourses, put to vote in 1997, has a tremendous amount of material that can make a positive conceptual contribution, which any local level arrangement can use. Even if countries do not want to sign the UN convention, a lot of expertise has gone into drafting the UN convention, which can be put to our own advantage. When a Brahmaputra-based 25

29 ORF Seminar Series organisation is to be formed, for instance, ideas could be borrowed from the convention without actually going to the UN. Just because we have not signed the convention, we should not ignore it. Chair's Remarks Prof. Rakhahari Chatterji, Adviser, ORF, and a former Professor, Department of Political Science, Calcutta University, thanked the speakers for focusing on a very interesting, important and urgent issue. He felt the matter of water diplomacy will increasingly occupy an important place in the discourse on joint river systems. 26

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