Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy: Past and Future

Transcription

1 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy: Past and Future James E. Platte PhD Candidate Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 27 July 2011

2 Technical Background University of Michigan Apr 2001: BS in nuclear engineering Dec 2002: MS in nuclear engineering Westinghouse Electric Company Summer 2001: Core technology division intern Los Alamos National Laboratory Summer 2002: MS research project

3 Policy Background Elliott School of International Affairs May 2005: MA in Science, Technology, and Public Policy Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Sep 2006: Entered PhD program U.S. Government Jun 2005-Feb 2006: Nonproliferation Graduate Program intern at Department of Energy Jul 2008-Dec 2010: Roberts Scholar at U.S. Department of Defense

4 Why Study Nuclear Policy Dissatisfaction with management of Department of Energy funding of MS research Lack of technically trained policy makers Interest in history and politics Fall 2002: Class on science policy Spring 2004: Study abroad in Seoul Governments are inexorably tied to nuclear technology Necessary to understand technical and political considerations to make proper policy

5 Fletcher School Experience Dec 2007: Finished 3 semesters of coursework Nov 2008: Passed comprehensive exams Fields of study: international security studies, international environment and resource policy, and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Dec 2009: Oral defense of dissertation proposal Nov 2010: Written dissertation proposal approved

6 PhD Research Summary Title: National Decision Making and Nuclear Fuel Cycles: An Analysis of Influences Central Question: Why have countries developed different national nuclear fuel cycles? Theoretical Tools: Prospect theory and strategic culture Case Studies: India, Japan, and South Korea Time Frame: 1960s and 1970s

7 Analytical Framework Prospect theory predicts that decisions makers are risk averse in a gains frame and risk acceptant in a losses frame Must first determine reference point, which will indicate either gains or losses frame Reference point determined by national goals, economic conditions, security concerns, regional relations, etc. (use strategic culture) Pursue absolute gains in losses frame and relative gains in gains frame Frame will determine how decision makers will react to changes in status quo

8 Points of Analysis Start by establishing initial policies and goals of late 1950s and early 1960s, then analyze reaction to four status quo changing events 1964: First Chinese nuclear test 1968: Signing of the Non Proliferation Treaty by United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom 1973: Arab oil embargo 1974: First Indian nuclear test and formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group Analytical cut off date is 1978 (prior to Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents)

9 Summer Field Research Received funding from the Hitachi Center for Technology and International Affairs at the Fletcher School to conduct research in Japan from June 1 to July 31 Gather data on development of Japanese nuclear fuel cycle policy through interviews with officials and scholars Site visit to Rokkasho nuclear fuel cycle facility Received funding from Fletcher School PhD program to conduct similar research in India from August 1 to September 4

10 Key Findings From initial nuclear development plan in 1956, Japan has been committed to developing a closed nuclear fuel cycle By late 1960s, Japan was set on developing uranium enrichment, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and fast breeder reactors There has been little waiver on this policy Primary driver for developing closed nuclear fuel cycle is energy security Desire to develop semi-national energy source Problems with oil (World War II and 1970s)

11 Key Findings Security Motivation? Economics of developing fuel cycle facilities is debatable Economic costs may be offset by political gains Some conservative, nationalistic politicians have hinted at wanting to maintain the capability to develop nuclear weapons Not a mainstream opinion Reaction to Carter administration in late 1970s suggests that nuclear program is strategic Yet, economic security is basis of Japanese strategy Strong, public commitment to peaceful use

12 Key Findings Characteristics of Japan's nuclear policy making Dominated by bureaucrats in METI, Science & Technology Agency, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Form consensus with utilities & local governments Seemingly little input from public on a national level (either through public debate or Diet members) Legal & political inertia make changing policy difficult Lack of strong prime ministers or clear leader Alternatives or contingencies not given much consideration after initial policy decisions

13 Key Findings Nuclear fuel cycle policy affected little by external events or influences Closed nuclear fuel cycle seen as ideal power source to drive economy Domestic debate focused on safety of nuclear sector, not proliferation or security Conforming to safeguards, nonproliferation norms are done to ensure access to all nuclear technology Oil shocks of 1970s only increased pace of reactor construction Weapon tests, Non Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Suppliers Group, etc were diplomatic challenges

14 Preliminary Conclusions After World War II, Japan was in losses frame, making decision makers risk acceptant and seek recovery of lost power Closed nuclear fuel cycle was way to guarantee energy security to drive economy Worth political and economic risks Oil shocks of 1970s reminder of the instability of oil sector and need for closed nuclear fuel cycle To not develop closed fuel cycle would risk losing the entire nuclear sector Policy inertia and decision making style also led to unwavering commitment to closed cycle

15 Future of Nuclear Policy Accident at Fukushima Daiichi is status quo changing event Japan effectively has no energy policy now and must conduct comprehensive review Opportunity to explore all options (closed or open nuclear fuel cycle, renewable energy, etc) All or nothing extremes are not sensible Switching to open cycle would not necessarily equate to risking losing whole nuclear industry Opportunity for public to become more involved Change how nuclear is debated in public

16 Contact Information Jim Platte Address: 28 Peabody Terrace, #902, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Telephone:

17 Thank You Questions?