States reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for safeguards evaluation

Transcription

1 States reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for safeguards evaluation Filippo Sevini 1, Renaud Chatelus 1, Malin Ardhammar 2, Jacqueline Idinger 2, Peter Heine 3 1 European Commission Joint Research Centre, ITU Ispra, Italy 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 3 US DOE Argonne National Laboratory, USA 1

2 Summary 1. The Additional Protocol 2. Export reporting and the Additional Protocol 3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation 4. AP Annex II and the evolution of its source INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (NSG Trigger list) 5. Discussion 2

3 1. The Additional Protocol The Model Additional Protocol of 1997 has enabled the IAEA to gain access to a wider range of locations in a State and State-declared information. The State evaluation process is supported by information derived from: obligatory State declarations and other reports, Agency s own verification activities (e.g. Short-Notice, Unannounced Inspections, Complementary Access) other safeguards-relevant information sources Early detection of undeclared/clandestine activities is supported by satellite imagery, environmental sampling, forensics and information analysis Important indicators: trade patterns, procurement attempts R&D activities 3

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5 2. Export / Import Reporting Requirements Article 2.a.(ix) shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: For each export: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date of export; Upon specific request, confirmation as importing State of information provided by another State concerning the export of such equipment and material In addition: Article 2.a.(iv) shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol

6 Additional Protocol Export / Imports Reporting Requirements Annex II List of equipment and non-nuclear material (based on IAEA INFCIRC/254/Part1 Trigger List) 1. I. Reactors and major equipment 2. II. Non-nuclear material for reactors 1. deuterium, heavy water, and nuclear-grade graphite 3. III. Reprocessing plants and especially designed or 4. prepared (EDP) equipment 5. IV. Fuel Fabrication plants 6. V. Enrichment plants and EDP equipment 1. centrifuge, diffusion, aerodynamic, CHEMEX, laser, plasma, electromagnetic 7. VI. Heavy water production plants and EDP equipment 8. VII. Uranium conversion plants and EDP equipment

7 Additional Protocol Annex I - Nuclear fuel cycle related activities The manufacture i. of centrifuge rotor tubes or the assembly of gas centrifuges ii. iii. of diffusion barriers or assembly of laser-based systems iv. or assembly of electromagnetic isotope separators v. or assembly of columns or extraction equipment vi. of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes. vii. or assembly of uranium plasma generation systems. viii. of zirconium tubes ix. or upgrading of heavy water or deuterium x. of nuclear grade graphite xi. of flasks for irradiated fuel xii. of reactor control rods xiii. of criticality safe tanks and vessels xiv. of irradiated fuel element chopping machines xv. The construction of hot cells

8 Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States Evaluation and implementation cycle 8

9 Plan verification activities State declarations Analyse & evaluate (State evaluation) Safeguards conclusions Conduct verification activities SG-relevant information from open and other sources (incl. nuclear trade-related data) Results of verification activities Simplified model of evaluation cycle

10 Consistency analysis process Based on: State declarations, information from verification activities and safeguards-relevant information from all other available sources E.g. technical cooperation, open source information Applied both to declared nuclear fuel cycle activities and to other possible safeguards-relevant activities

11 3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation Evaluating the Declaring State Do Annex II exports correspond to declared Annex I activities? Evaluating the Recipient State Are the Annex II imports consistent with indigenous NFC* needs? Is the scale of Annex I activities consistent with indigenous need for the NFC* + declared Annex II exports? If Annex I activities are not for the indigenous NFC*, are they reflected as Annex II exports? Are there corresponding Annex I activities for the Annex II imports? (if relevant) Are needs for the declared NFC* reflected as Annex II imports, or as indigenous capabilities? Evaluating both States: Are known nuclear cooperation or trade agreements reflected as Annex II exports/imports, and vice versa? * NFC = nuclear fuel cycle 11

12 Fictitious example: Annex I declaration for State A Manufacture of rotor tubes Assembly of gas centrifuges Annex II declaration for State A 2.a.(ix) (a) Export of rotor tubes to State B Scale of operation Approximately last year Approximately 3000 last year Quantity etc items State A has a declared centrifuge enrichment plant under expansion. Is the data consistent? Would further data be needed? 12

13 Example, cont. State A has reported the export of 1000 rotor tubes to State B. Is State B known to engage in centrifuge rotor assembly*? Are there exports from State B of rotor tubes or centrifuge rotor assemblies? Does State B have a declared gas centrifuge enrichment plant? If so, is there consistency between imports, assembly activities and installment needs in the declared plant? Are there other import activities of possible relevance to the issue (other 2.a.(ix) exports to State B, trade statistics, etc.)? >>Possible follow-ups/clarifications to be sought? *If an AP is in force, is the assembly a declared AP Annex I activity? If so, what scale? 13

14 Main sources of trade-related data for State AP 2.a.(ix) exports from other States. [As relevant, State confirmation of imports, subsequent clarifications and, if required, complementary access.] Statistical trade data (sums of transactions per commodity and counterpart States) Transactional trade data (detailed records of export/ import transactions) TC (and other) procurement for State Procurement attempts for nuclear-relevant goods originating in State (cf. Session " Analysis of Nuclear Relevant Information on International Procurement and Industrial Activities for Safeguards Purposes")

15 Added value of 2.a.(ix) export information A variety of uses strengthening safeguards State Evaluation, e.g.: External source of information relevant to nuclear fuel cycle activities in the recipient State (whether the State has CSA/AP/66/VOA) Contributes to consistency analysis of activities in reporting State (Annex I as well as nuclear fuel cycle activities) A gauge of nuclear-related industrial capabilities (All of the above in conjunction with other information sources) 15

16 4. AP Annex II and the NSG Trigger List Background AP Annex II Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected): Annex II is a list reflecting INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1 (NSG TL, October 1995) Mechanism for updating AP Annexes provided in AP Article 16 INFCIRC/254/Part 1 now in its 12th revision Substantial changes of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, particularly following the NSG fundamental list review undertaken

17 NSG Fundamental Review Natural Uranium Mining and Milling 50 Trigger list changes and 40 nuclear dual-use changes Uranium Conversion Uranium Enrichment Highly Enriched Uranium Pit Fabrication High Explosive and Non-nuclear Components Graphite or Heavy Water Industrial equipment Weaponization Reactor Fuel Fabrication Reactor Reprocessing Plutonium Pit Fabrication

18 Main differences Part TL: Complete nuclear reactors New introductory note explaining the main categories of reactors Deletion of zero power reactors exemption Implicit inclusion of thorium reactors (by removal of a Pu production limit) More specific reference to heavy water reactors Explicit decontrol of fusion reactors 18

19 Main differences Part /2 1.8 Reactor internals (partially covered under 1.2 before), 1.9 Heat exchangers, 1.10 Neutron detectors, 1.11 External thermal shields 3.5 Neutron measurement systems for process control 5. Equipment for isotope separation of other elements (a) 2. Active magnetic bearings 6.8. Heavy water upgrade systems 6.9. Ammonia synthesis converters or synthesis units 7.2. Plants for the conversion of plutonium + numerous changes to control parameters, explanatory notes etc.

20 Other important differences 1.6 Nuclear fuel cladding: zirconium metal tubes or zirconium, threshold down to 10 kg (was 500 kg) 2.2. Nuclear grade graphite: threshold down to 1 kg (was 30 tons in 12 months) Technology and software not included in AP Annex II 20

21 5. Discussion Procedure for updating AP Annexes AP Annexes may be amended by the Board of Governors upon the advice by an open-ended working group (AP Article 16) Last raised by Committee 25 in 2006 (Recommendation 4 of 2006/Note 45) Discussed Sept but no agreement reached wide range of objections Opportune moment in the future?

22 Possibility to voluntarily report exports beyond AP Annex II The current reporting form requires an AP Annex II number The future AP input system will provide for expandable look-up lists However, it is already possible to select the Annex II Section heading and enter the detailed information in the subsequent fields

23 6. Summary Reports on AP 2.a.(ix) exports have multiple uses in safeguards evaluation (of both exporting and recipient States) Analysis of trade-related data contributes to analysis of completeness of State declarations and strengthens safeguards conclusions The model used for AP Annex II INFCIRC/254/Part 1 has been revised 10 times, while AP Annex II remains static Member States could consider ways to help improve the use of AP declarations by improving their own AP reporting voluntary measures updating AP Annex(es)? 23