CANDU Non-Proliferation and Safeguards: A Good Story Seldom Told
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1 CANDU Non-Proliferation and Safeguards: A Good Story Seldom Told Jeremy Whitlock Manager, Non-Proliferation and Safeguards whitlockj@aecl.ca 2007 December 13 History of nuclear non-proliferation IAEA Safeguards CANDU Proliferation Resistance AECL Safeguards Technology Program International collaboration 1
2 HISTORY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 1945: Agreed Declaration on Atomic Energy signed by USA, UK, Canada prevent nuclear proliferation promote peaceful use of nuclear energy Prior to mid-1950s: Information denial policy (USA) Dec.8, 1953: Atoms for Peace (not Atoms ONLY for Peace ) s: 1960 Export controls & safeguards (initially between USA and others) HISTORY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (cont d) 1957: IAEA promotion of nuclear energy international safeguards Canada on Board of Governors since inception 1965: Canada ends uranium exports for weapons use (USA, UK); will only export for peaceful use, with safeguards (Pearson) 1968: Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America) full-scope safeguards 1970: Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): 1970: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): 5 NW states vow to not spread weapons, and get rid of theirs (eventually). NNW states vow to not acquire weapons, and pursue only peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 2
3 HISTORY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (cont d) 1974: Zangger List (NPT): trigger list of sensitive export materials 1974: India detonates nuclear device using Pu from CIRUS Canada adopts more stringent export safeguards, established in formal bilateral Nuclear Co-operation agreements (1974 Policy Stmt.) 1976: Canada nuclear cooperation only with signatories to NPT 1974 and 1976 Policy Statements form basis of Cdn. non-proliferation policy (most stringent?) 1978: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Export controls Subset of Canadian policy HISTORY OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (cont d) 1990: Canada re-instates limited safety assistance for Pakistan and India, under recommendation of IAEA 1995: Indefinite extension of NPT (25-year review) 1997: IAEA adopts additional protocol safeguards Information on (and access to) all parts of fuel cycle (incl. locations where nuclear material for non-nuclear use is stored), all buildings on nuclear sites, manufacturing of sensitive equipment Expanded environmental sampling (locations, wide-area sampling) Enhanced inspection access rights and communication abilities 2002: IAEA adopts integrated safeguards Optimum application of comprehensive safeguards, based on Statelevel approach Requires annual IAEA conclusion about state-wide peaceful use of nuclear material (Canada received this in Sept. 2005) 3
4 NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION a political decision Five "nuclear weapons states" from the NPT Other known nuclear powers States formerly possessing nuclear weapons States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear programs States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear weapons research programs States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted them (source: Wikipedia) IAEA SAFEGUARDS Timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material (and resulting deterrence) Based on material accountancy, including declared nuclear material as well as undeclared production, and independent verification. Power reactors have not been attractive targets for proliferation CANDU technology sets the standard for effective and comprehensive safeguards Canada a founding member of IAEA, a leader in the development of a global safeguards regime 4
5 IAEA SAFEGUARDS Timeliness : Detection Time : Maximum time that may elapse between diversion and its detection by Agency safeguards Assumes that necessary facilities exist to convert material; Processes already tested Non nuclear components of the device already assembled and tested Material Unirradiated direct-use (MOX) Irradiated direct-use (spent fuel) Indirect-use (fresh fuel) Detection Time (Inspection Frequency) 1 month 3 months 12 months IAEA SAFEGUARDS Significant Quantity : Amount for which possibility of nuclear explosive cannot be excluded. Takes into account losses due to conversion and other processes. Material Significant Quantity, SQ Relevance to CANDU Direct-Use Nuclear Material Indirect-Use Nuclear Material Pu (<80% Pu-238) 8 kg >100 bundles spent fuel U kg NA U[U-235>/= 20%] 25 kg NA U [U-235<20%] 75 kg (U-235) or 10 t (NU) >500 bundles Thorium 20 t NA 5
6 IAEA SAFEGUARDS Nuclear Material Accountancy Items: fuel bundles Material Balance Area: fresh fuel storage, reactor core, spent fuel bays Flow KMPs* Receipts Shipments Nuclear production Inventory KMPs Fresh fuel Reactor core (?) Spent fuel Reception Bay Spent fuel Storage Bay *Key Measurement Points IAEA SAFEGUARDS Nuclear Material Accountancy (cont d) Facility maintains near real time NM accounting records for shipments, receipts, and fuel movements within the MBA. Bar coding supports fresh fuel accounting. Facility files reports to SSAC* when bundles enter or leave the MBA, which are submitted to the IAEA For inspections, facility prepares a detailed List of Inventory Items containing the location of each bundle. Once a year the facility performs a physical inventory check and prepares a Physical Inventory Listing for submission to the IAEA. *State System for Accounting and Control 6
7 IAEA SAFEGUARDS Verification : Reactor Inspections 1. Annual Comprehensive Physical Inventory Verification Fresh and spent fuel 2. Quarterly Interim Inventory Verification Spent fuel (3 month timeliness for Pu) 3. Design Information Verification, Follow up to discrepancies and anomalies, Maintenance of IAEA equipment, etc. 4. Transfers Receipts of fresh fuel Shipments of spent fuel HOW DO WE MEASURE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE? Several expert groups (e.g. GIF, INPRO) have considered the targets and pathways for Proliferation, and have come up with measures that address these: Technical Difficulty Time Cost Fissile Material Quality Detection Probability (or Safeguardability) Detection Resources (Cost of Safeguards) Intrinsic Extrinsic 7
8 INTRINSIC PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF CANDU REACTORS Technical Difficulty, Proliferation Time & Cost: CANDU NU fuel cycle does not require and enrichment facility. Large mass of CANDU spent fuel (standard burnup) is required to extract one Significant Quantity of reactor-grade Pu: >2 tonnes, comprised of >100 CANDU fuel bundles (~twice the mass of LWR spent fuel for equivalent Pu production) Pu concentration (kg PU /kg SPENT FUEL ) in spent fuel is low (~half that of LWR), despite higher production rate (kg PU / MWd e ) this important distinction is due to much higher fuel throughput Excess reactivity low (cannot tolerate added absorbers) On-power refuelling requires complex, automated, monitored process (daily refuel needed, at coolant temp. & pressure, in ~1000 rem/hr fields) Refuelling frequency near maximum capability of fuelling machine INTRINSIC PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF CANDU REACTORS (cont d) Fissile Material Quality: Pu isotopic quality reactor grade (similar to LWR), despite relatively low average burnup this is due to high flux per unit power in CANDU, and use of natural uranium. Pu Isotopic Composition of Spent Fuel 238 Pu 239 Pu 240 Pu 241 Pu 242 Pu %fissile CANDU NU 1 0.1% 66% 27% 5% 1% 71% CANDU SEU 1 0.4% 44% 39% 8% 9% 52% PWR 2 1.3% 63% 25% 6% 5% 69% 1 Dyck, Gary R., unpublished transport calculations using WIMS-AECL, 1999 November 2 National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy Press, Washington, DC,
9 EXTRINSIC PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF CANDU REACTORS (SAFEGUARDS) Detection Probability (Safeguardability): All power reactors must meet same IAEA safeguards criteria and goals. Detection resources (Cost of Safeguards): Higher than LWR but small compared with detection resources for a bulk facility, e.g. enrichment (i.e. detection resources relative low for full fuel cycle). Cost is minor compared to O&M cost of facility. SAFEGUARDS APPROACH IN CANDU Focus: Accountability for Spent Fuel Approach: Detailed accounting of fissile material inventory IAEA Inspections: Independent verification of facility accounts by counting and verifying authenticity of randomly selected fresh and spent fuel Verification that station changes do not compromise safeguards effectiveness Safeguards technology: Counting spent fuel bundles as they are removed from the reactor Monitoring spent fuel movement and storage Monitoring for removal of spent fuel along non-standard paths (e.g. airlock, rehearsal port, fresh fuel loading port) 9
10 CERENKOV VIEWING DEVICE (CVD) TRANSFERS TO DRY STORAGE Approx bundles per year transferred in a campaign lasting ~2 months Bundles transferred from trays/modules into baskets with welded covers holding 60 bundles each 1-2 baskets loaded, dried, welded and transferred per day Neutron/gamma detectors and used to monitor transfer, and dual seals placed on dry storage 10
11 DEFENSE IN DEPTH: Complementary and Redundant Safeguards System Both gamma and neutrons monitored Detection contiguous and overlapping (e.g. core discharge + bundle counter) Both cameras and sealing (spent fuel bay) Camera views overlapping Two redundant seals (spent fuel bay, dry storage) AECL SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Background Not a Program Cross-cutting capability for support of CANDU safeguards through technology development, coordinated by Manager, Non-Proliferation & Safeguards Historically, as a supplier to IAEA, CNSC (legacy support for ARC sealing, CVDs) Presently, still in supplier mode but taking a proactive stance (e.g. Safeguards by Design) Increase visibility/activity in this area 11
12 ARC Sealing CVD AECL SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Legacy Support Items New and Innovative Items AECL SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Digital Imaging CVD (CVD-DIS) 12
13 CVD-DIS images from G-2 Bays Underwater Lights on Underwater Lights off 7-year cooled CANDU 6 fuel bundles AECL SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM Silicon Diode Radiation Detector Inexpensive Disposable R dil il bl Readily available Works for very high fields Small - Can fit anywhere Very simple design 13
14 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION: Anti-neutrino detectors 20 metre overburden 25 meters standoff from core San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit II 3.46 GWt LLNL INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION: Daily Power Monitoring Using Only Antineutrinos An ntineutrino counts per day Date Predicted count rate using reported reactor power Observed count rate, 24 hour average Reported reactor power 0 2/23/05 2/27/05 3/3/05 3/7/05 3/11/05 3/15/05 3/19/ Reactor Power (%) LLNL 14
15 INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION: CANDU Safeguards Transparency (Sandia) Reactor power history Individual id bundle tracking at all times Tracking of on-load fuel handling (FM position, bundles entering/leaving core, etc.) with verification (remote monitoring) TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK Can detect host diversion, theft and safety issues Relies solely on plant data Uses extrinsic sensors and monitors to verify changes in diversion risk REMOTE MONITORING Only applicable for host diversion Relies solely on extrinsic sensors and monitors INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION: International working groups on PR GIF Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection (PRPP) Working Group Co-chair (R. Nishimura) PRPP assessment methodology published INPRO Collaborative Projects Proliferation Resistance assessment manual for new Nuclear Energy Systems (to be published) CANDU DUPIC PR analysis (Korea, Canada, U.S., Russia, JRC-Ispra) 15
16 SUMMARY CANDU safeguards are proven Approach successfully used to safeguard 31 CANDU reactors for past 25 years. Second generation safeguards systems support remote monitoring and provides enhanced robustness CANDU has intrinsic features that provide proliferation resistance CANDU has a unique and historically relevant role to play in new proliferation-resistant fuel cycle development 16
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