RAJESH UPRETY OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE. B.TECH (MECHANICAL), PGDBM (Specialization in Marketing) PIPE AND COATING

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1 RAJESH UPRETY Presenting Author Photo Present Affiliation Academic Qualification Area of Specialization OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE B.TECH (MECHANICAL), PGDBM (Specialization in Marketing) PIPE AND COATING Achievements / Awards INSTRUMENTAL IN INTRODUCING DUAL FBE COATING IN INDIA Authors PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT FOR PIGGABLE & NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES

2 PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OBJECTIVES OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE: TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINES. AT ALL TIMES TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY, PROTECT ENVIRONMENT AND ENSURE CONTINUOUS AVAILABILITY OF PIPELINE FOR TRANSPORTATION WITHOUT INTERRUPTIONS, THEREBY MINIMIZING THE BUSINESS RISKS AND THROUGHPUT LOSS.

3 PIPE TRIANGLE PIPE PLEASURE PAIN 3

4 TOTAL PIPELINE NETWORK IN INDIA PIGGABLE PIPELINE : 40,000 KM NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINE : 5000 KM (EXCLUDING GAS/ OIL FLOW LINES) SUB-SEA SPM LINES (SINGLE LINES) 4

5 Number of Onsite Incidents Onsite Incidents Trend last three years (till date) (till date) 0 Ref & GPP PL MO E& P Total

6 Number of Fatalities Fatalities in Onsite Incidents - Trend (till date) Ref & GPP * Ref & GPPs : 28 Fatalities in a single Incident in ** Marketing Operations (MO): 05 Fatalities in a single incident in *** E&P: three children drowned at well site in PL MO E& P (till

7 PIPELINE INTEGRITY EXAMPLE : FLASH FIRE DURING GRINDING OPERN AT NIGHT IN A TANK FARM (MISSING BOUNDARY PILLARS/TP/TLP, SOP, ESD, CP MONITORING, COATING SUEVEY) EXAMPLE : TWO CASES OF SEAM FAILURE IN A CRUDE PL WITHIN 18 YEARS OF SERVICE (SURGE ANALYSIS, HYDRAULICS, LDS, VALVES, WT) EXAMPLE : FIRE & EXPLOSION IN A NATURAL GAS PIPELINE LEADING TO MULTIPLE FATALTIES (PIGGING, COATING)

8 CATAGORIES OF PIGGABLE/ NON- PIGGABLE LINES FROM PIGGING POINT OF VIEW THERE ARE FOUR CATAGORIES OF PIPELINES : 1. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH REGULAR CLEANING PIGGING IS CARRIED OUT. 2. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH CLEANING PIGGING IS NOT CARRIED OUT. 3. NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES SUCH AS WELL FLOW LINES/ JETTY LINES. 4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP.

9 BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE PIPELINES(PIGGING DONE REGULARLY) 1. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH REGULAR CLEANING PIGGING IS CARRIED OUT. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS IS NOT CARRIED OUT REGULARLY. PROPER STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IS NOT CARRIED OUT TO ESTABLISH TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION.

10 BASIC CONCERN FOR PIGGABLE PIPELINES(PIGGING NOT DONE REGULARLY) 2. PIGGABLE LINES IN WHICH CLEANING PIGGING IS NOT CARRIED OUT. BASIC DETAILS ABOUT THE HEALTH OF THE PIPELINE ARE NOT AVAILABLE. PRIODICITY FOR MAINTENANCE IS NOT FOLLOWED OR IGNORED. SINCE COMMISSIONING PROPER CLEANING PIGGING HAS NOT BEEN DONE. HIGH APPREHENSION OF CONDENSATE AND WAX DEPOSITION CANNOT BE OVER RULED.

11 BASIC CONCERN FOR NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES 3. NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES SUCH AS FLOW LINES/ JETTY LINES. THERE IS NO FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON THESE PIPELINES. THERE IS NO CATHODIC PROTECTION FOR SOME UNDERGROUND PIPELINES. MONITIORING SYSTEM NOT IN PLACE IN LINE WITH OISD-GDN-233. IN SOME PIPELINES IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT EVEN CORROSION PROBES/ COUPONS ARE NOT USED.

12 CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES 4. SPM / SUB-SEA LINES HAVING NO LOOP. FIT FOR PURPOSE SUBJECT TO VARIOUS CONDITIONS IS NOT A SOLUTION. AWARENESS ABOUT VARIOUS TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE FOR ASSESSING INTERNAL CORROSION SUCH AS DIRECT ASSESSMENT. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF PIGGING THE LINE BY USING MODERN TECHNOLOGY. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING THE LINE TO A PIGGABLE LINE.

13 CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING INTERNAL CORROSION OF NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES THREATS IN LACK OF PIGGING IT MAY RESULT IN HEAVY DEPOSITION OF WAX IN CASE OF CRUDE PIPELINES. IT MAY RESULT IN DEPOSITION OF CONDENSATE IN CASE OF NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, WHICH MAY SPEED UP INTERNAL CORROSION RATE.

14 OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 a) INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINES : i. INTERNAL INSPECTION ii. PRESSURE TESTING SUCH AS HYDROTESTING iii. COMBINATION OF i) & ii) b) INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR NON-PIGGABLE PIPELINES : i. EXTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT (ECDA) ii. INTERNAL CORROSION DIRECT ASSESSMENT (ICDA) iii.stress CORROSION CRACKING DIRECT ASSESSMENT (SCCDA)

15 OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 c) INTERNAL CORROSION : a) EFFECTIVENESS OF CORROSION MITIGATION MEASURES SHOULD BE CHECKED ONCE IN SIX MONTHS BY ANALYSING CORROSION COUPON. b) ER PROBES/ ECN PROBES/ LPR (LINEAR POLARISATION TECHNIQUE) PROBES SHOULD BE INSTALLED. c) IF RATE OF INTERNAL CORROSION IS > 1 mpy, CORROSION INHIBITOR SHALL BE USED. d) WHENEVER REPLACEMENT OF PIPELINE IS CARRIED OUT, INTERNAL VISUAL INSPECTION SHALL BE CARRIED OUT.

16 OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 d) STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (SCC) : a) PRESENCE OF H 2 S CAN LEAD TO SERIOUS SULPHIDE STRESS CRACKING OF STEELS, WHICH CAUSES STEPWISE CRACKING IN STEEL. ITS MITIGATION CAN BE DONE IN TWO WAYS BY INJECTING CHEMICAL INHIBITORS & BY TREATING STEEL WITH CERTAIN ALLOYING ELEMENTS & CONTROLLING ITS HARDNESS. B) SCC IS A SELECTIVE EXTERNAL CORROSION ATTACK RESULTING FROM A COMBINATION OF DISBONDED COATING, TENSILE STRESS, AND CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.

17 a) HISTORICAL DATA b) PIPELINE MAPS & GEO DETAILS (DEPTH, LAND PROFILE ETC.,) c) BASIC TECHNICAL DATA SUCH AS PIPE DIA, WT,GRADE, FLOW RATE, DESIGN PRESSURE, COATING TYPE, CP PARAMETERS ETC., d) PRESENCE OF LIQUID WATER e) PRESENCE OF H 2 S, CO 2 OR O 2. f) CORROSION MONITORING DATA INCLUDING TYPE OF MONITORING (E.G., COUPONS, ELECTRIC RESISTANCE ETC.,) g) PIPELINE SURVEY DATA : SOIL RESISTIVITY DATA, COATING SURVEY DATA OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 e) PIPELINE DATA REQUIRED FOR DIRECT ASSESSMENT :

18 OVERVIEW OF OISD-STD-233 f) DIRECT ASSESSMENT (DA) METHOD g) INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR PIPELINE HAVING EXTERNAL COATING BUT WITHOUT CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM (IMPRESSED CURRENT BASED OR SACRIFICIAL CURRENT BASED). h) INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR PIPELINE HAVING EXTERNAL COATING BUT WITH CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM (IMPRESSED CURRENT BASED OR SACRIFICIAL CURRENT BASED). i) HYDROTESTING

19 FEW CASE STUDIES (1) CASE-I : THE LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 1999 AND IPS WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE YEAR THE IPS REPORT WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE AS IT WAS INFORMED THAT THE SAME IS UNDER REVIEW BY TPI. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS SHOWED IRON CONTENT AS HIGH AS 49%. THERE WAS NO ACTION TAKEN BY THE OPERATOR.

20 FEW CASE STUDIES (2) CASE-II : SUB-SEA LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 2006, HOWEVER, PIGGING OPERATION NOT YET CARRIED OUT AS THERE WAS NO SCRAPPER LAUNCHING BARREL OR SCRAPPER RECEIVER BARREL. (3) CASE-III : IN ONE OF THE JETTY LINE, THERE WAS NO CATHODIC PROTECTION IN THE UNDERGROUND PIPELINE EVEN THOUGH EXTERNAL COATING WAS IN PLACE.

21 FEW CASE STUDIES (4) CASE-IV : OFF-SHORE CRUDE LINE WAS COMMISSIONED IN 2005, HOWEVER, PIGGING OPERATION NOT YET CARRIED OUT.

22 OTHER MAJOR INCIDENTS MAJOR INCIDENTS OCCURRED IN RECENT PAST

23 LOCATION MAP NARMADA SITE

24 SCHEMATIC VIEW OF THE NARMADA RIVER SITE

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29 TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVER S.No. Pipeline Operator Pipe Size Remarks (1) Reliance (RGTIL) Natural Gas 48 OD x WT (25.4 mm), API 5L X70 Gr. Line is intact (2) GAIL India Natural Gas 30 OD x 19.1/11.9 mm WT, API 5L X 70 Gr. Snapped & burst (3) Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) Ch KM (NG) Natural Gas 26 OD x WT, API 5L X 60 Gr. Snapped & burst. Pipe has got stuck in the nearby electrical tower (4) Reliance Industries Limited (RIL)(NG) Ch KM 24 OD x WT API 5L X 60 Gr. Snapped & burst.

30 TOTAL NO. OF PIPELINES PASSING THROUGH NARMADA RIVER S.No. Pipeline Operator Pipe Size Remarks (5) Gujarat State Petronet Ltd., (GSPL NG) Ch KM 24 OD x (17.5 mm) WT, API 5L X 60 Gr. About 100 m pipeline is exposed. (6) ONGC (Ch KM) CRUDE OIL OD x (9.53 mm) WT, API 5L X 46 Gr. (7) IOCL (Amod Hazira Pipeline) OD x WT, API 5L X 60 Gr. Leakage in line Line is intact (8) ONGC (OPAL) Naptha OD x 0.25 WT, API 5L X 46 Gr. Under construction

31 ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT S.No CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT (1) IT WAS A NATURAL CALAMITY. UNPRECEDENTED SUDDEN FLOODS DUE TO HEAVY RAINS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM. (2) THE RIVER BANK (SOUTH SIDE) WAS NOT REINFORCED, WHICH RESULTED IN HEAVY SOIL EROSION. (3) REMOVAL OF PLANTS AND VEGETATION DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION TOWER OF TORRENT POWER CLOSE TO THE RIVER BANK, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN LOOSENING OF THE PARENT SOIL. (4) IRRIGATION DEPT. DID NOT PROVIDE ANY PRIOR WARNING BEFORE RELEASE OF ABRUPT WATER DISCHARGE IN SUCH A LARGE QUANTITY. (5) SOIL EROSION IS A GRADUAL PROCESS, WHICH TAKES NUMBER OF YEARS. PIPELINE OPERATORS SHOULD CLOSELY MONITOR SUCH BEHAVIOR OF THE RIVER COURSE AND THE ADJOINING BANKS ON A REGULAR BASIS.

32 ROOT CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT S.No CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT (6) IT WAS A NATURAL CALAMITY. UNPRECEDENTED SUDDEN FLOODS DUE TO HEAVY RAINS AND LARGE QUANTITY OF DISCHARGE OF WATER FROM SARDAR SAROVAR DAM. (7) BECAUSE OF THE EROSION OF THE SOIL FROM THE RIVER BANK, PIPE LINE, WHICH WAS BURIED IN THE GROUND BECAME EXPOSED AND PIPE LINE IN THE ERODED PORTION BECAME UNSUPPORTED. DUE TO THE FORCE OF WATER ON THIS EXPOSED PORTION OF PIPE LINE, IT STARTED OSCILLATING AND FINALLY ONE OF THE PIPELINES GOT SNAPPED DUE TO HEAVY OSCILLATION EFFECT IN HANGING PIPE LINE SECTION. THE VELOCITY OF WATER AND TURBULENCE IN THE RIVER WAS EXTREMELY HIGH AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT.

33 NATURAL GAS PIPELINE Leak/Burst site Date/Time of incident No. of fatalities th June 2014 at about 0545 hours Operating pressure 42 to 45 Kg/cm 2 Design pressure 72 Kg/cm 2 Pipeline size and grade 18 OD API 5L X60 Grade ORIGINATING STATION 18" (API 5L X-60) RIVER BRIDGE SV-1 SV-2 SV-5 SV-4/ I P HIGHWAY X-ING SV-3 (CANAL) (PIGGING STATION) RIVER X-ING SV-6 SV-7 SV-8 POWER PLANT 12

34 ANALYSIS / OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT CROSS COUNTRY PIPELINE SUPPLYING NATURAL GAS TO POWER PLANT THE PIPELINE WAS BEING OPERATED AT A LOWER FLOW RATE AND LOWER PRESSURE W.R.T. THE DESIGN PARAMETERS. PIPELINE WAS TRANSPORTING WET GAS WHILE IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED FOR TRANSPORTING DRY NATURAL GAS. THE GAS CONTAINED CO2 AND SOME TRACES OF SULPHUR. LEAKAGE TOOK PLACE AT THE LOWEST POINT WHERE THE PIPELINE WAS CROSSING A CANAL AT 6 O CLOCK POSITION. 34

35 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS OF THE FIRE INCIDENT IT WAS RAINING ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT, SO IT IS INFERRED THAT VAPOUR CLOUD FORMED DUE TO HEAVY WEATHER. A TEA STALL OWNER. WHO TURNED ON THE STOVE IN THE MORNING, POSSIBLY PROVIDED THE SOURCE OF IGNITION. THERE HAS BEEN A HISTORY OF PREVIOUS LEAKS NEAR THE PLACE OF ACCIDENT. 35

36 ROOT CAUSE OF THE FIRE INCIDENT LEAK DUE TO INTERNAL CORROSION PRESENCE OF CO2 LED TO FORMATION OF H2CO3. DURING EARLIER REPAIRS EXTERNAL COATING GOT DAMAGED RESULTING IN EXTERNAL CORROSION. IMPROPER PIGGING FOAM PIG USED INSTEAD OF SCRAPPER PIGS. PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS NOT CARRIED OUT. IPS CARRIED OUT IN MAXIMUM METAL LOSS REPORTED IN IPS IS EQUIVALENT OF 50% OF WALL THICKNESS. USE OF WET NATURAL GAS INSTEAD OF DRY NATURAL GAS. NOT USING CORROSION INHIBITOR. 36

37 RECOMMENDATIONS PROPER CLEANING PIGGING TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY FOLLOWED BY PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS. INSTRUMENTED PIG SURVEY TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY AND THE ANOMALY RECTIFICATION TO BE CARRIED OUT AS PER THE RECOMMENDATIONS. PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE MADE FOR REPAIR OF PIPELINE. ANY CHANGE FROM THE INITIAL CHANGE SHOULD BE ROUTED THROUGH A MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCEDURE AFTER PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. CORROSION INHIBITOR TO BE USED IN THE LINE AS PER REQUIREMENT. IN ADDITION TO OFC COMMUNICATION THERE SHOULD ALSO BE ANOTHER STAND BY MODE OF COMMUNICATION. 37

38 MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTS CHANGING DESIGN SERVICE WITHOUT PROPER TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OR WITHOUT PROPER MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE PROCESS. NOT LEARNING FROM PAST FAILURES & NOT CARRYING OUT PROPER ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS. NOT CARRYING OUT PROPER CLEANING PIGGING & INTELLIGENT PIGGING SURVEY; NOT IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS OF IPS SURVEY IN TIME. HIGH DEPENDENCY ON THIRD PARTY AGENCIES WITHOUT PROPER CONTROL. INADEQUATE LINE-PATROLLING.

39 MAJOR LAPSES NOTED OF-LATE IN THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY ON THE BASIS OF SOME MAJOR ACCIDENTS LACK OF S.O.P. FOR MAJOR ACTIVITIES LIKE REPAIR OF PIPELINE, COLD CUTTING, MUD PLUGGING, PIGGING, HOT-TAPPING ETC., NOT USING CORROSION-COUPONS/ CORROSION INHIBITORS. NON-AVAILABILITY OF A PROPER LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM. MANUAL OPERATION OF SECTIONALIZING VALVES. DIRECT CURRENT VOLTAGE GRADIENT (DCVG) SURVEY / CURRENT ATTENUATION TEST (CAT) SURVEY/ CP SURVEY NOT CARRIED OUT REGULARLY FOR ASSESSING CONDITION OF COATING.

40 ELEMENT OPERATIONS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM RIGOROUS INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROVIDES FRAMEWORK FOR : (1) MANAGEMENT LEADERSHIP, COMMITMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (6) OPERATIONS & MAINTENANCE (7) MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE (2) RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (3) FACILITIES DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION SPECS, CODES, STANDARDS (4) INFORMATION / DOCUMENTATION (5) PERSONNEL & TRAINING (8) THIRD PARTY SERVICES (9) INCIDENT INVESTIGATION & ANALYSIS (10) COMMUNITY AWARENESS & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (11) OPERATIONS INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT AND IMPROVEMENT

41 THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

42 THREATS TO OPERATING PIPELINE INTEGRITY

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44 PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM EFFECTIVE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF AN ASSET COMPRISES OF : 1. DESIGN INTEGRITY (ASSURANCE THAT FACILITIES ARE DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNING STANDARDS AND MEET SPECIFIED OPERATING REQUIREMENTS), 2. TECHNICAL INTEGRITY (APPROPRIATE WORK PROCESSES FOR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS AND DATA MANAGEMENT TO KEEP THE OPERATIONS AVAILABLE) AND 3. OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY (APPROPRIATE KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, SOPS, COMPETENCE AND DECISION MAKING TO OPERATE THE PLANT AS INTENDED THROUGHOUT ITS LIFECYCLE.)

45 PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM DESIGN INTEGRITY : DESIGN OF A CROSS-COUNTRY PIPELINE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PLANT PIPING SINCE IT IS NOT CONFINED TO A LIMITED AND PROTECTED AREA AND MAY PASS THROUGH DIFFERENT TYPES OF TERRAIN OVER WHICH THE OPERATOR HAS NO CONTROL. THEREFORE, ITS DESIGN HAS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION BOTH NATURAL PHENOMENON AS WELL AS HUMAN ACTIVITIES ALONG THE ROUTE AND PROVIDE A SYSTEM ENSURING ITS LONG LIFE, OPERATABILITY AND EASE OF MAINTENANCE. WHILE CONCEPTUALIZING A NEW PIPELINE PROJECT MORE TIME SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO FREEZING DETAILED DESIGN AND ENGINEERING. STRESS ANALYSIS, SURGE RELIEF ANALYSIS, HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS, NETWORK ANALYSIS ETC., SHOULD BE DONE IN THE INITIAL STAGES AND NECESSARY DESIGN CHANGES TO BE CARRIED OUT REGARDING SELECTION OF PIPE, PIPE FITTINGS, VALVES, LAYOUT, P&ID ETC.,

46 DESIGN INTEGRITY SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN IS ACHIEVED BY : APPLICATION OF THE APPROPRIATE CODES AND SYSTEM HARDWARE COMPONENTS (ASME STANDARD & OISD STANDARDS). SELECTION OF PIPE MATERIAL AND ITS WALL THICKNESS, MATERIAL OF CONSTRUCTION FOR VALVES AND OTHER PIPE FITTINGS. CONSIDERING THE LOADS & STRESSES IMPOSED ON THE PIPELINE BY PHYSICAL PRESSURES AND FORCES, SUCH AS INTERNAL PRESSURE, STATIC LOADINGS AND WEIGHT EFFECTS. CONSIDER DYNAMIC LOADING, WHERE APPLICABLE, WIND, WAVES, EARTHQUAKE ETC., IDENTIFYING HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS & LOCATION CLASS. SPECIAL PROTECTIONS AT CROSSING LIKE RIVER/CANAL, RAIL, ROAD ETC.,

47 DESIGN INTEGRITY SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVED BY: (A) PIPE THICKNESS : THE NOMINAL WALL THICKNESS T FOR THE STEEL PIPE, SHALL BE CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME B CONSIDERS LONGITUDINAL JOINT FACTOR FOR TYPE OF PIPELINE MANUFACTURING, FACTORS FOR RAIL, ROADS, RIVER CROSSINGS, PIPES ON BRIDGES, LOCATION CLASS ETC. CORROSION ALLOWANCE ADDED TO THE CALCULATED THICKNESS. (B) ALL PIPING JOINTS ARE WELDED (C)THE HAZOP AND RISK ANALYSIS (D) LOCATING SECTIONALIZING VALVES AT IDENTIFIED LOCATIONS FOR ISOLATIONS EASILY APPROACHABLE. SECTIONALIZING VALVES SHALL BE REMOTE OPERATED.

48 DESIGN INTEGRITY SAFETY FACTORS IN DESIGN ACHIEVED BY: (E) SURGE ANALYSIS TO PREVENT OVER-PRESSURIZATION ON CLOSURE. (F) FEATURE OF DE-PRESSURIZATION, SHUTDOWN & ISOLATION LOGIC AT PUMP STATIONS. (G) METERING STATIONS AND SCADA SYSTEMS PROVIDE CONTINUOUS MONITORING PIPELINE OPERATIONS. OVERSIGHT OF (H) LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM WITH PROVISION FOR IDENTIFICATION / LOCATION OF LEAK AND ISOLATION OF AFFECTED SECTION. (I) EXTERNAL COATING & CATHODIC PROTECTION FOR EXTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL. (J) INHIBITOR INJECTION FOR INTERNAL CORROSION CONTROL CASE.

49 TECHNICAL INTEGRITY INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING PIPELINE PIGGING - PIGS ARE INSERTED INTO THE PIPELINE WHILE IT IS OPERATIONAL AND ARE CARRIED ALONG BY THE FLUID BEING PUMPED. CLEANING PIGS

50 TECHNICAL INTEGRITY INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING THEIR BASIC PURPOSE OF PIGGING IS THREEFOLD: (1) CLEANING PIG - PROVIDE A WAY TO CLEAN DEBRIS AND SCALE FROM THE INSIDE OF THE PIPE, (2) INTELLIGENT PIG - INSPECT OR MONITOR THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE, (3) OR ACT AS A PLUG OR SEAL TO SEPARATE PRODUCTS IN MULTI- PRODUCT COMMERCIAL PIPELINES OR TO ISOLATE A SEGMENT FOR REPAIR WITHOUT DEPRESSURIZING THE REMAINDER OF THE PIPELINE. (4) PIG RESIDUE ANALYSIS TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY TO MONITOR THE TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION RATE.

51 TECHNICAL INTEGRITY INTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING : INTELLIGENT PIG PIGS THAT MONITOR THE CONDITION OF THE PIPE ARE IN-LINE INSPECTION TOOLS. MONITORING PIGS, ALSO CALLED INSTRUMENT PIGS OR SMART PIGS. GEOMETRY PIGS : CHECKS DEFORMATION, MISALIGNMENTS, BENDS, ELEVATION CHANGES AND DIRECTIONAL CHANGES TO THE PIPE. MAGNETIC FLUX LEAKAGE AND ULTRASONIC TECHNOLOGIES : FOR CRACKS DETECTION AND THICKNESS MEASUREMENT, CORROSION DETECTION, LEAK DETECTION.

52 TECHNICAL INTEGRITY EXTERNAL HEALTH MONITORING - PIPELINE COATING & CATHODIC PROTECTION: PROTECTIVE COATING : TO PREVENT DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE PIPE & THE ENVIRONMENT & TO PREVENT ITS PARTICIPATION IN ELECTROCHEMICAL REACTIONS PROPERTIES REQUIRED (A) ELECTRICAL INSULATING PROPERTIES, RESISTANCE TO MOISTURE (B) MECHANICAL- ADHESION, ABRASION RESISTANCE, FLEXIBILITY, IMPACT RESISTANCE (C) STABILITY AGAINST TEMP CHANGE 3 LAYER POLYETHYLENE / POLYPROPYLENE OR FUSION BONDED EPOXY COATING IS PROVIDED

53 TECHNICAL INTEGRITY FOLLOWING COATING SURVEYS ARE DONE ON UNDERGROUND PIPELINES ONE MONTH AFTER THE COMMISSIONING OF IMPRESSED CURRENT SYSTEM: a. CLOSE INTERVAL COMPUTERIZED [ ON & OFF ] POTENTIAL LOGGING EVERY 1M OF PIPELINE ROW. b. PEARSON SURVEY ALONG PIPELINE ROW. c. CAT (CURRENT ATTENUATION TEST) EVERY 50M OF PIPELINE ROW. d. DCVG ( DIRECT CURRENT VOLTAGE GRADIENT) SURVEY AT DEFECT LOCATIONS INDICATED BY PEARSON, CIPL, CAT SURVEYS e. COATING CONDUCTANCE SURVEY AT AND MIDWAY BETWEEN CP STATIONS. f. CASING & CARRIER SHORT SURVEYS.

54 OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY ALL THE PIPELINE OPERATORS MUST HAVE A CORPORATE POLICY TO IMPROVE PIPELINE AND FACILITY INTEGRITY TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EMPLOYEES.INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT GOALS SHALL INCLUDE : PROMOTE THE LONG TERM INTEGRITY OF THE PIPELINE SYSTEM CONDUCT BUSINESS IN A SAFE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE MANNER COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS DEMONSTRATE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT THROUGH THE MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THROUGH ANNUAL RISK ASSESSMENTS ONLY ADEQUATELY TRAINED, SKILLED AND COMPETENT MANPOWER SHALL BE DEPLOYED FOR PIPELINE OPERATIONS. COMPLY WITH ALL THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)

55 OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY PRESSURE SET POINTS SHOULD BE APPROPRIATELY DEFINED AND BUILT IN THE OPERATION PHILOSOPHY. ESD LOGIC (CAUSE AND EFFECT DIAGRAM) SHOULD BE PROPERLY DEFINED. CLEANING PIGGING HAS TO BE CARRIED OUT AS PER OISD GUIDELINES AND PIG- RESIDUE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY. THE RESULTS OF THE PIG-RESIDUE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE ANALYSED WITH THE HELP OF STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES TO WORK OUT THE TREND OF INTERNAL CORROSION RATE. NO SAFETY SYSTEMS SHOULD BE BY-PASSED.

56 ROU INSPECTION OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY INSPECTIONS CAN INVOLVE INDIVIDUALS WALKING THE ROU AND ALSO AERIAL SURVEILLANCE. A) NO DWELLING OR PERMANENT STRUCTURE IN ANY FORM SHALL BE PERMITTED WITHIN THE RIGHT OF USER B) CONTROLLING VEGETATION GROWTH IN THE FORM OF TREES, C) PREVENTING ENCROACHMENT FROM ABOVE AND BELOW GROUND STRUCTURES, D) MAINTAINING VISIBILITY OF PIPELINE MARKERS PATROLLING ( GROUND / AERIAL ) OF ROW / ROU TO BE CARRIED OUT REGULARLY (URBAN AREAS AND NON-URBAN AREAS) OBSERVE SURFACE CONDITIONS, LEAKAGE, CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY, ENCROACHMENTS, WASHOUTS AND ANY OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE SAFETY AND OPERATION OF THE PIPELINE.

57 OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE MONITORING & REVIEW OF OPERATING PARAMETERS TO WORK WITHIN THE OPERATING BARRIERS. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) INCLUDING EMERGENCY ISOLATIONS. SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM MONITORING & PROOF TESTS OF ESD SYSTEMS. INTERPRETATION OF CATHODIC MONITORING RESULTS. INTERPRETATION OF PIGGING RESULTS & ACTIONS THERE OF. COATING HEALTH SURVEY & CORRECTIVE MEASURE.

58 CLASS LOCATION A CLASS LOCATION CAN CHANGE AS POPULATION GROWS AND MORE PEOPLE LIVE OR WORK NEAR THE PIPELINE. WHEN A CLASS LOCATION CHANGES, PIPELINE OPERATORS : MUST EITHER REDUCE THE PIPE'S OPERATING PRESSURE TO REDUCE STRESS LEVELS IN THE PIPE; REPLACE THE EXISTING PIPE WITH PIPE THAT HAS THICKER WALLS OR HIGHER YIELD STRENGTH TO YIELD A LOWER OPERATING STRESS AT THE SAME OPERATING PRESSURE; WHERE THE CLASS IS CHANGING ONLY ONE CLASS RATING, SUCH AS FROM A CLASS 1 TO CLASS 2 LOCATION, CONDUCT A PRESSURE TEST AT A HIGHER PRESSURE

59 PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OTHER IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ARE : THE INLINE INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES FOR ENSURING HEALTH INTEGRITY OF PIPELINES, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES, THE CONTROL FOR MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE INCLUDING THE PROCESS SAFETY ASPECTS

60 CONCLUSION PIPES LAID UNDERGROUND CANNOT SPEAK, IT IS OUR DUTY TO CARE FOR THE PIPE & GIVE EITHER PAIN OR PLEASURE. NEED OF THE HOUR TO IS TO HAVE A SENSITIVITY TOWARDS PIPE. PIPELINE INTEGRITY MUST CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION & OPERATION PHASES. PIPELINE INTEGRITY REQUIRES ADOPTING A FAILURES ARE PREVENTABLE MINDSET. ADOPTION OF CORROSION MANAGEMENT BEST PRACTICES CAN IMPROVE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF PIPELINE OPERATIONS.

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