Autoswitch: Smooth Transition from Standard Simulated Plant Operation to Severe Accident Conditions
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1 2018 Power Plant Simulation Conference (PowerPlantSim 18) Autoswitch: Smooth Transition from Standard Simulated Plant Operation to Severe Accident Conditions 15 January 2018 Vincent Gagnon Yin Choy Lim
2 Topics Introduction L3 MAPPS Severe Accident Simulation (SAS) Technical Solution Overview MAAP 2-D & 3-D Visualizations L3 MAPPS SAS Experience Autoswitch Concept Mechanism Test Cases Examples of 2-D/3-D Visualizations Examples of SAS Implementations MAAP5 is an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) software program that performs severe accident analysis for nuclear power plants including assessments of core damage and radiological transport. A valid MAAP5 license to MAAP5 from EPRI for customer s use of MAAP5 is required prior to a customer being able to use deploy MAAP5 with Licensee s simulator products. EPRI ( conducts research and development relating to the generation, delivery and use of electricity for the benefit of the public. As an independent, nonprofit organization, EPRI brings together its scientists and engineers as well as experts from academia and industry to help address challenges in electricity, including reliability, efficiency, health, safety and the environment. EPRI does not endorse any third party products or services. Interested vendors may contact EPRI for a license to MAAP5. PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 2
3 Introduction The Fukushima-Daiichi accident prompted many utilities to examine the role of severe accidents in their training programs, including on their real-time operator training simulators such that plant personnel are well trained on how to cope with severe accidents In general, most of the existing full scope simulators Cannot provide severe accidents training Have simplified spent fuel pool models Have inadequate electrical models to support training on degraded battery conditions during Station Blackout conditions (SBO) L3 MAPPS first SAS deployment on a real-time operator training simulator was in 2000 PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 3
4 L3 MAPPS SAS Technical Solution Overview Based on Electric Power Research Institute s (EPRI) Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) Severe Accident Simulation (SAS) fully integrated into L3 MAPPS Orchid simulation environment Multiple implementations possible Full Scope Simulator Engineering Simulator Classroom Simulator Standalone SAS Simulator Several MAAP versions can be implemented such as MAAP5-PWR, MAAP5-BWR, MAAP4- CANDU, MAAP5-CANDU, etc. PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 4
5 L3 MAPPS SAS Technical Solution Overview Standard Simulated Plant Models MAAP Capabilities Degraded Reactor Core Conditions Fuel Melting Cladding Oxidation Hydrogen Generation Vessel Failure Containment Failure Fission Product Release Expand Existing Simulator Capabilities Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs) Severe Accidents (SAs) Severe Accident Simulated Plant Models MAAP5 Models L3 MAPPS Models PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 5
6 L3 MAPPS SAS Technical Solution Overview Equipped with 2-D and 3-D animated and interactive visualizations of Reactor Vessel NSSS Containment Building Spent Fuel Pool Provides plant personnel (i.e. operators, emergency response organization, engineers, management, etc.) with additional insight into the behavior of the plant during severe accidents Autoswitch feature to transition seamlessly from L3 MAPPS standard models to SAS models when the hottest fuel temperature exceeds a pre-defined temperature* *Does not apply to Standalone SAS Simulator PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 6
7 L3 MAPPS SAS Technical Solution Overview PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 7
8 L3 MAPPS SAS Experience Krško (Slovenia) FSS FSS in service: 2000 Integration of MAAP4: 2000 Integration of MAAP5: 2017 Olkiluoto 3 (Finland) FSS FSS in service: 2011 EPR-specific version (MAAP4-ANP3) created jointly by AREVA and EPRI Integration of MAAP4-ANP3: 2Q18 (ongoing) Ling Ao Phase II (China) SAS Training Simulator FSS in service: 2011 Integration of MAAP5: 2013 Integration of MAAP5 with Autoswitch: 2Q18 (ongoing) Susquehanna 1 (USA) FSS FSS in service: 1990; currently being upgraded by L3 MAPPS Integration of MAAP5: 1Q18 (ongoing with simulator upgrade) PWR SAS Training Simulator SAS simulator in service: 2016 Integration of MAAP5: 2016 South Texas Project (USA) FSS FSS in service: 1996; upgraded to latest Orchid in 2016 Integration of MAAP5: 2016 (delivered with Orchid upgrade) Wolsong 1 (Korea) FSS FSS in service: 2018 Integration of MAAP4-CANDU: 2Q18 (ongoing with FSS) PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 8
9 Autoswitch Mechanism Before Switch Point, L3 MAPPS standard models are active Reset Point Trigger Point Switch Point MAAP5 spent fuel pool model is used for all conditions MAAP5 models (reactor core, NSSS and containment) are initialized when the hottest fuel temperature reaches 750 o C (Trigger Point) Transition Zone is between 750 o C and 775 o C to allow the MAAP5 models to stabilize and match the L3 MAPPS models Seamless switchover occurs when the hottest fuel temperature reaches 775 o C (Switch Point) L3 MAPPS Models MAAP5 freezes when Tf < 725 Switch Reset 725 C 750 C 775 C Initialize MAAP5 MAAP5 Activates Transition Zone L3 MAPPS Models freeze When Tf > 775 Switch Hottest Fuel Temp MAAP5 PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 9
10 Autoswitch Setpoints Selection (PWR) Why did L3 MAPPS choose 775 o C as the Switch Point? Control rods are made of boron, silver (Ag), indium (In) and cadmium (Cd) Ag-In-Cd Control rods have the lowest melting point (1,050 o K or 777 o C) of all material present in the reactor vessel At this temperature, the plant values of L3 MAPPS standard models and MAAP5 models match relatively well to ensure a bumpless transition Why did L3 MAPPS choose 750 o C as the Trigger Point? Allow MAAP5 models to initialize and stabilize At this temperature, the plant values of L3 MAPPS standard models and MAAP5 models match relatively well source: MAAP5.04 documentation PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 10
11 Test Case #1: Large Break LOCA without Safety Injection Where is the switchover point? PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 11
12 Test Case #1: Large Break LOCA without Safety Injection PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 12
13 Test Case #2: Station Blackout (SBO) Where is the switchover point? PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 13
14 Test Case #2: Station Blackout (SBO) PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 14
15 BWR SAS Reactor Core Vessel 3-D Visualization PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 15
16 BWR SAS Primary Containment 3-D Visualization PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 16
17 PWR SAS Containment 3-D Visualization Demo PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 17
18 BWR SAS Spent Fuel Pool 3-D Visualization PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 18
19 2-D Visualization - Offsite Dose PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 19
20 Examples of Severe Accident Simulator Implementations Japan China PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 20
21 Conclusions MAAP-based real-time SAS integrated with full scope simulators has been delivered by L3 MAPPS since 2000 SAS demand is on the rise since the Fukushima- Daiichi nuclear accident L3 MAPPS offers PWR, BWR and CANDU SAS solutions The Autoswitch feature allows smooth transition from standard models to SAS models when the hottest fuel temperature exceeds a pre-defined temperature SAS supplemented with 2-D and 3-D visualizations for the reactor vessel, NSSS, containment and spent fuel pool help better understand severe accidents Offsite dose can also be included PPS L3 MAPPS. All rights reserved. 21
22 Thank You 2018 Power Plant Simulation Conference (PowerPlantSim 18) L3 MAPPS 8565 Côte-de-Liesse Montréal, Québec, Canada H4T 1G5 Tel: +1 (514) Fax: +1 (514) Web: LinkedIn: L3 MAPPS
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