Effects of Civil Service Management Practices in Malawi Carolyne Barker and Brigitte Seim

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1 Effects of Civil Service Management Practices in Malawi Carolyne Barker and Brigitte Seim The Survey of Public Servants The survey was executed in person among bureaucratic officials in Malawi between June 2017 and August Across 62 institutions, 1,257 public servants completed the survey. While the sample was not randomly selected from the entire pool of participants, and is therefore not representative in a strict statistical sense, the research team had extensive discussions about how to achieve balance within the sample of participants on gender, level, function, and institution. We specifically aimed to over-sample two groups of bureaucrats: those with access to corruption channels (such as those working in procurement) and those working in the districts (to ensure both centralized and decentralized government institutions and functions were included). This survey was jointly funded through the British Academy and the United Kingdom s Department for International Development (DFID). It forms part of a larger British Academy- DFID-funded project on civil services in developing countries. 1 The project, Civil service reform and anti-corruption in developing countries: Tools and evidence from eight countries in four developing regions, is led by Professor Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling at University of Nottingham and Dr. Christian Schuster at University College London. Structure of the Report This report presents an analysis of civil service management practices in the context of Malawi. These management practices include recruitment, pay, promotion, performance evaluation, career management, and leadership decisions. The government of Malawi has promulgated a number of management reforms in recent years, but the implementation of these reforms has been varied (across ministries, geographies, and time). Responses to this survey allow us to analyze how the reforms in the bureaucracy and other bureaucratic policies shape attitudes and behaviors among civil servants. First, we provide data on participants perceptions of current civil service management practices in Malawi. Second, we summarize the core attitudes and behaviors of Malawi s public servants. Third, we analyze the relationship between the two: how management practices may be shaping attitudes and behavior among public servants. Finally, we discuss ways in which our analysis will hopefully inform evidence-based decisions about civil service management practices in the future

2 I. Data on Civil Service Management Practices PUBLIC SERVANTS ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES Assessment Assessing candidates for their first job in the public sector is overwhelmingly done through interviews and written examinations. 99% of survey respondents reported that they had to pass an interview before securing their first job in the public sector. 2 In addition, 34% of respondents reported needing to pass a written examination prior to their first public sector position. 3 Determining how candidates are assessed prior to advancing to a better position is less straightforward. Advancement to a better position is largely undertaken through three channels: (1) promotion centrally by the Public Service Commission (42.88%); (2) transfers from another state institution (42.00%); and (3) transfers from within a bureaucrat s current institution (34.37%). 45 Promotions by superiors, public competition, and internal competition are much less common. Public Sector Reforms: Performance Evaluation A major component of Malawi s civil service reforms are formal performance evaluations. Our results indicate that the implementation of these evaluations has been quite varied. While the majority of respondents have had at least one formal evaluation over the past two years, nearly 12% of civil servants have never received such formal evaluation. 67 Figure 1 displays the distribution among respondents. Figure 1: Distribution and Frequency of Formal Evaluations 8 How many times has your performance been formally evaluated? (over the past two years) Density Number of Formal Performance Evaluations 2 Q18_str 3 Q18_str 4 Q31 5 Proportions do not sum to 100% as respondents were asked to check all channels that applied to their last advancement. 6 Interviews with those in the Office of the Vice President (formerly managing the reform effort in Malawi) confirm that the already ambiguous requirement to conduct formal evaluations has been executed intermittently and inconsistently. 7 Q104 8 Q104 2

3 At the aggregate level, civil servants in Malawi seem to agree on certain measures of the quality of performance evaluations. Specifically, 70% of respondents report that their performance has been assessed against a set of objectives that were agreed upon before the beginning of the assessment period. 9 Moreover, 66% of respondents Somewhat agree or Strongly agree that hard work has led to better performance evaluation ratings. 10 When asked whether performance evaluation ratings have had an influence on their career advancement, 65% of bureaucrats responded with Somewhat agree or Strongly agree. 11 Similarly, nearly 60% of respondents agree that a negative performance rating could lead to their dismissal from the public sector 12. This result is especially salient in Malawi a country where public sector dismissals are rare. Performance evaluations may act as a motivating factor for public servants if they believe negative evaluations might lead to dismissal. Among the responses to five questions regarding performance evaluations, one result was especially striking. A majority of bureaucrats agreed with statements proposing that evaluations are fair, that they are affected by performance, and that these evaluations have consequences for advancement and dismissal. However, only 47% of bureaucrats responded Somewhat agree or Strongly agree when presented with the statement My performance evaluations have had an influence on my salary. 13 As this report discusses below, there are an enormous number of salary categories in Malawi. Within each pay grade, there is also substantial variation in how much a bureaucrat is paid. The number of salary categories, and the variation within each category point to the complexity of salary decisions within the Malawian bureaucracy. Given this complexity, it is unlikely that new reforms, in the form of performance evaluations, have had time to affect established salary patterns, and therefore, it is understandable that civil servants still do not see evaluations as linked to compensation. Beyond formal performance evaluation, 62% of bureaucrats Strongly agree that their work is closely supervised. Further, 71% of bureaucrats Strongly agree that they would face serious consequences for violating legal rules at work. 14 Political Influence Bureaucrats in Malawi overwhelmingly report that politics influence civil service management practices. Overall, 46% of civil servants report that the ruling party guides a decision in my institution sometimes, often, or all the time/very often. 15 The results are similar across other dimensions: 51% of respondents report that The ruling party influences who is a beneficiary of a particular program either sometimes, often, or all the time/very often. 16 Similarly, 47% of respondents reported that The ruling party requests use of our 9 Q105_1 10 Q105_2 11 Q105_4 12 Q105_5 13 Q105_3 14 Q109_1 and Q109_2 15 Q140_1 16 Q140_5 3

4 institution s resources either sometimes, often, or all the time/very often. 17 Finally, nearly 46% of respondents agreed that the statement I feel worried that someone from the ruling party will not approve of my work either sometimes, often, or all the time/very often. 18 What does this influence look like in practice? Our survey asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: When political directives conflict with professional norms, following professional norms is more important to me than complying with political directives. While 89% of civil servants responded, Somewhat agree or Strongly agree, only 5% of respondents either Strongly disagreed or Somewhat disagreed. 19 (Slightly more than 6% responded Neither agree nor disagree.) While the vast majority of civil servants agreed with this statement, a non-trivial portion of respondents place more importance on political directives than professional norms. Given that this data was self-reported, it s possible that the results of this question were affected by social desirability bias. If this is the case, the proportion of civil servants placing greater weight on political directives versus professional norms is likely to be higher than 5%. Human Resource Management The majority of civil servants in Malawi are hired after completing interviews and written examinations, and there are many mechanisms in place to limit the influence of politics in the civil service. However, we may wonder about the extent to which political connections influenced the hiring process. Indeed, while candidates are assessed using interviews and examinations, 30% of bureaucrats report that personal or political connections influence the hiring decision About half the time or more frequently. 20 Despite an apparently competitive exam process, political connections still seem to influence hiring decisions. Nearly 34% of respondents reported that even when candidates are hired through competitive interview processes, personal or political connections influence the hiring decision, About half the time, Often, or Always or almost always. 21 Moreover, when candidates are hired by appointment without competition, 34% of respondents reported that when candidates are hired through competitive interview processes, personal or political connections influence the hiring decision, About half the time, Often, or Always or almost always Q140_7 18 Q140_8 19 Q174_1 20 Q110_1 21 Q110_2 22 Q110_3 4

5 II. Core Attitudes and Behaviors of Malawi s Public Servants WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO BE A GOOD PUBLIC SERVANT IN THE EYES OF MALAWIAN SURVEY RESPONDENTS? Given the current civil servant management practices in Malawi, this report now turns to the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of Malawi s public servants. Our focus is the attitudes and behavior of Malawian public servants their work ethic, motivation, job satisfaction, commitment to public service, performance, integrity and ethical conduct. Work Motivation Work motivation is the willingness of public servants to work hard and to work well. It is a central driver of public sector performance (Wright, 2001). This reports measures work motivation as a composite of three survey questions about work effort and motivation, and is measured on a scale of 0 to The index is composed of bureaucrats responses to three questions. The first asks how willing the respondent is to work early or stay late to finish his or her job. The second asks the respondent s willingness to do extra work for his or her job that is not really expected of them. The last question asks how willing each bureaucrat his to put forth his or her best effort to get their job done, regardless of any difficulties. The mean motivation among bureaucrats is slightly greater than On the 4-point scale, this indicates that, on average, Malawian bureaucrats report medium-high levels of work motivation. Below, this report analyzes determinants of work motivation. Work motivation varies across agencies. Bureaucrats in a semi-autonomous or autonomous agency report a mean score of In central government ministries and departments, however, reported work motivation is significantly lower, at an average 2.83 points. Below this, for bureaucrats working in a state-owned enterprise or town, municipal, or district council scores average 2.67 and 2.24, respectively. Across institutions, technical and professional bureaucrats report slightly high levels of work motivation, averaging 2.91 points. The difference in work motivation for technical versus non-technical bureaucrats is significant at a 95% confidence level. While political appointees have an average work motivation score of 2.97, this difference is not statistically significant. 25 Efforts to increase work motivation should be targeted at bureaucrats outside of autonomous agencies, paying particular attention to the needs of non-technical bureaucrats. Job Satisfaction The mean level of reported job satisfaction in our sample is 5.0 (on an 8-point scale from 1 to 8, with 8 being completely satisfied ). Bureaucrats in different roles report different levels of job satisfaction. Political appointees report the lowest level of satisfaction (mean=3.9) whereas technical and professional bureaucrats report the highest levels of satisfaction (mean=5.4). Bureaucrats that listed their main role as administrative support and assistance, and management or supervision of employees reported the lowest levels of satisfaction. This difference is significant at a 95% confidence level. This difference remains even when controlling for experiencing late payments, a prevalent problem in Malawi. In 23 Work motivation is a composite of scores on: Q112_1, Q112_2, and Q112_3. 24 Varname: work_motivation 25 This lack of statistical significance is likely due to the low number of political appointees in our sample. 5

6 other words, bureaucrats whose primary responsibilities are technical and professional report higher levels of satisfaction than political appointees, even when they experience late salary payments. Self-Efficacy Among Civil Servants Self-efficacy among Malawian bureaucrats is quite low. Respondents were asked how frequently the following statement applied to them: I have the necessary skills and knowledge to complete even the most difficult assignments at work to the highest possible standard. 26 Strikingly, nearly 35% of bureaucrats in Malawi responded that this statement Never or almost never, Rarely, or Sometimes applied to them % of bureaucrats responded that this statement Often applied to them, and less than half (40.65%) of bureaucrats responded that the statement Always or almost always applied to them. Moreover, the responses to this question are not correlated with education. 27 Among bureaucrats who have Bachelor s Degrees or higher, for example, 49.89% feel they Never or almost never, Rarely or Sometimes have the necessary skills and knowledge. Similarly, for bureaucrats with a High School Diploma or less, 45.10% respond that they have the necessary skills Never or almost never, Rarely or Sometimes. Figure 1: Distribution and Frequency of Formal Evaluations Density Never/almost never Rarely Sometimes Often Always/almost always I have the necessary skills and knowledge to complete even the most difficult task High School Education or Less Bachelor's Degree or Higher 26 Q259_6_2 27 Measured as highest level of education completed (Q4) 6

7 Corruption Following the Cashgate scandal in late 2013, Malawi has faced domestic and international scrutiny regarding the level of corruption in the public sector. Our survey asked respondents about the frequency of select on-the-job behaviors. Specifically, respondents were asked how frequently: Public servants help divert resources to a party or person with political links 28 In their institution, public servants use their position to help out friends or family 29 In their institution, public servants receive gifts or otherwise personally benefit from their positions 30 We aggregated responses to these questions to create a Corruption Index, with values ranging from 0 to Note that these questions cover only three aspects of what might be considered corrupt behavior; many forms of corruption were not discussed in this particular survey. Further, as this data is self-reported, the results may be an underrepresentation of the actual prevalence of corrupt behavior, owing to social desirability bias. Even with this in mind, bureaucrats report that the frequency of corrupt exchanges is low. On the 13-point scale, the mean score was 4.66 points. This suggests that there is some perceived corruption in the Malawian civil service, but the level of corruption is not perceived to be extreme. Civil servants in the upper half of the salary distribution report significantly lower levels of perceived corruption. Among highly paid bureaucrats, the mean score is 4.56 points, whereas among lower paid bureaucrats, the mean score is 4.67, though this difference is not statistically significant. This could indicate either that lower-level officials are more likely to report corruption or that they are more likely to witness or be involved in it. Regardless of interpretation, it is interesting to note that this finding aligns with other recent surveys of Malawian bureaucrats that find higher rates of reported corruption among lower-level officials. 32 Figure 2: Perceived Level of Public Sector Corruption Density CorruptIndex 28 Q219_6 29 Q219_7 30 Q219_8 31 CorruptIndex 32 See, for example, the survey conducted by Anders, Kanyongolo, and Seim in early 2017 among bureaucrats as part of an impact assessment of the law enforcement response to Cashgate. 7

8 III. Effects of Management Practices on Attitudes and Behavior WHAT DETERMINES WORK MOTIVATION & JOB SATISFACTION? RECRUITMENT CHANNELS MATTER Individuals are recruited into the civil service through a number of channels. This survey asked how civil servants found out about their first paid, full-time job in the public sector. Respondents who found out about the job opportunity through (a) a school or university that they attended, (b) their Public Service Commission assignment, or (c) personal communication with a government employee, family, or friends, reported significantly different levels of work motivation compared to other groups. Bureaucrats who find out about their first job through school reported significantly lower levels of workplace motivation. In contrast, bureaucrats who found out about their first job through their Public Service Commission assignment or personal communication reported significantly higher levels of workplace motivation. 33 Timeliness of Payments Matter Late salary payments to civil servants is a widespread issue across Malawi. Controlling for a number of demographic factors (education, gender, and level/role), timeliness of payments is a significant determinant of work motivation and job satisfaction. 34 Experiencing late payments significantly decreases reported levels of motivation and job satisfaction. 35 Higher ranking civil servants are, on average, more satisfied with the timeliness of their payments. Furthermore, the timeliness of payments seems to lead to improved work motivation. Among respondents, those who are more satisfied with the timeliness of payments are significantly more willing to put forth his or her best effort at work and significantly more willing to do extra work. SALARY AND PAY GRADES One question in the survey asked respondents to which Pay Grade they belong to. Respondents to this survey reported 71 unique pay grades. The sheer number of pay grades suggests noteworthy variation in salary structure across civil servants. Further variation exists within these pay grades. For example, there are 42 individuals who place themselves within pay grade F. Only among respondents within this pay grade, salaries range from between 100,000 kwacha to 5,000,000 kwacha. Similar salary variation exists within nearly all of the 71 pay grades. Further, only 20% of bureaucrats responded Always or almost always when asked how frequently the statement If a public servant earns more than colleagues with similar responsibilities, it is because he/she has more years of service in the public sector applied. 36 Fewer than 15% of bureaucrats responded Always or almost always when asked how frequently the statement If a public servant earns more than colleagues with similar responsibilities, it is because he/she has performed better applies. 37 Interestingly, it may not be personal or political connections that are driving the 33 Only recruitment through personal communications is a significant predictor of work satisfaction. 34 The correlation coefficient of work motivation and job satisfaction is These results are robust to controlling for receiving some additional information about the prevalence of late payments, which was used in a separate analysis not discussed here. 36 Q110_8 37 Q110_5 8

9 discrepancies in salary only 4% of bureaucrats believe that If a public servant earns more than colleagues with similar responsibilities, it is because he/she has better personal or political connections. 38 In fact, considering these three findings in combination, it seems likely that bureaucrats perceive the salary variation as somewhat arbitrary. Compared to lower paid public servants, higher paid public servants are more likely to agree that higher salaries are the result of better performance and more years of service in the public sector. Finally, note that this variation does not take into account the many benefits that some bureaucrats receive (e.g., education stipend, cell phone stipend, transportation stipend), which only further increases the salary variation. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS The Government of Malawi has attempted to implement performance evaluations for public servants for a number of years. However, the implementation of evaluations has been uneven. The mean number of evaluations among respondents was slightly greater than two evaluations over the last two years, but reported values ranged from 0 to 5 evaluations. We exploit this variation in implementation to analyze the effect of more performance evaluations. Among respondents, receiving more performance evaluations decreases overall job satisfaction. Each additional evaluation decreases reported job satisfaction by a third of a point, on a 7-point scale. Additional evaluations also decreased how objective bureaucrats perceived the evaluations to be, 39 and their belief in the likelihood that performance ratings have an influence on salary. 40 Additional performance evaluations did not have an effect on how likely bureaucrats were to agree that Hard work has led to better performance evaluations. 41 The degree to which bureaucrats perceived performance evaluations effect career paths and dismals was also not significantly impacted by participating in a greater number of evaluations. 42 Earlier, we described that the average civil servant agrees with the aforementioned statements on performance evaluations. Taken together, our findings suggest that initially, performance evaluations are viewed as effective tools to measure performance. However, as the number of evaluations increases, and managers collect more data, there are two possible pathways. First, as managers collect more data, they may gain a better understanding of their staff s performance, and this performance may be lower than expected, which results in staff receiving negative evaluations, and subsequently updating their views on the evaluations efficacy. However, given Malawi s budgetary circumstances, it might be more probable that a second effect is more prevalent. As civil servants receive positive performance evaluations, their managers may recognize that they are doing a superior job for their pay grade or salary level. However, because of fiscal realities outside of their immediate control, managers are not able to increase the salary or timeliness of payments for high-performers. 43 There is a third possibility, which is that a certain type of supervisor, work environment, or employee is more likely to have more frequent performance evaluations and is also more likely to face or perceive challenges with 38 Q110_6 39 Q105_1 40 Q105_3 41 Q105_2 42 Q105_4 and Q105_5 43 It is possible that the institutions that successfully implemented a greater number of evaluations are meaningfully different from the institutions that did not employ performance evaluations 9

10 evaluation objectivity, salary fairness, and dismissal equity. Specifically, it may be the case that poor-performing employees have their performance evaluated more frequently. IV. Recommendations & Conclusion Overall, the civil service in Malawi displays a remarkable amount of variation. In the political sphere, Malawi s development has been decentralized. As a result, key aspects of civil service management including recruitment, performance evaluation, and salary are highly variable across institutions, functions, and pay grades. This variation may contribute to overall low satisfaction and self-efficacy among mid-level bureaucrats in the country. After examining individual survey response data, we conclude with a number of recommendations for civil service reform. 1. Given the influence of performance evaluations, policy-makers should put mechanisms in place to increase the neutrality of these evaluations, as well as disseminate information about these mechanisms so as to improve the perception of performance evaluations among the civil service. 2. Further analysis is necessary to understand the drivers of such large discrepancies in pay grade and salary. Additional analysis might examine how within-grade salary variation affects levels of motivation and satisfaction. For example, are bureaucrats in pay grades with extensive intra-grade salary variation less motivated and/or less satisfied with work? 3. Recruitment channels, salary, and timeliness of salary payments are key drivers of workplace motivation and job satisfaction. Attention to these areas of development will be critical in continuing to retain high-performing bureaucrats. a. Specifically, bureaucrats who find out about their first job through school report significantly lower levels of workplace motivation. Bureaucrats who found out about their first job through their Public Service Commission assignment or personal communication reported significantly higher levels of workplace motivation. Agencies should consider which aspects of school recruitment are different from Public Service Commission assignments. b. Salaries must match a bureaucrat s pay and grade. As emphasized above, further work is needed to ensure every bureaucrat receives the correct salary for his or her grade and rank. V. Bibliography Wright, Bradley (2001) Public Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Literature and a Revised Conceptual Model. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 11(4), p