Lessons learned from safeguards implementation for facilities under construction

Transcription

1 Lessons learned from safeguards implementation for facilities under construction STEPHANIE POIRIER SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT IMPLEMENTATION ANALYST Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management October Lyon, France

2 Our agenda: What are IAEA Safeguards? Safeguards (SG) verification Safeguards By Design (SBD) SBD at the Nuclear Power Plant Life Management Conference Lesson learned / examples How to start working together earlier 2

3 Safeguards: Origin Safeguarding Nuclear Material is required by treaty: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ( INFCIRC/140) NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT fulfill the non-proliferation commitment they have made, "with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." 3 3

4 The International Atomic Energy Agency s five technical departments: mission is to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 4

5 The International Atomic Energy Agency: objective is to provide credible assurance that States are honouring their Safeguards obligations 5

6 Safeguards: Definition A set of technical measures applied by the IAEA on nuclear material and activities, through which the Agency seeks to independently verify - that nuclear facilities are not misused -that nuclear material not diverted from peaceful uses - and the absence of undeclared activities (completeness) ( 6 6

7 Safeguards fieldverification measures include: Nuclear material accountancy, is when the inspector compares the information stated on the nuclear material accounting records, books and reports of a facility with what has been reported by the State to the IAEA. During a design information verification, inspectors compare the design information the State has submitted to the IAEA with infield observations Environmental samples may be taken for analysis to verify that the facility has been used as declared.. Inspectors verify the inventory of nuclear material using a range of measurement techniques: item counting, weighing, non-destructive assay with radiation detectors, containment and surveillance techniques, such as the application of seals and the use of cameras and detectors installed at the facility are used to maintain the continuity of knowledge established during the inventory. Common used safeguards equipment NVS1-2003_web.pdf 7 7

8 Safeguard By Design (SBD): Definition Integration of features to support IAEA safeguards verification while still at the design process. 8

9 SBD is a Facility Lifecycleactivity R&D Phase Pre-conceptual Design Preliminary Design Final Design Construction Commissioning Operation Maintenance Extension Refurbishing Decommissioning 9

10 Why a safeguards presentation today at thenuclear Power Plant Life Management Conference (PLIM)? PLIM is the place to reach stakeholders who need to know about safeguards by design - when considering operation and refurbishment, - when considering new NPP design and construction, looking back at the lesson learned from implementing safeguards measures over the past two decades 10

11 Implementing safeguards by design Establish early dialogue as soon as the engineering design is mature : Familiarize designers, vendors, operators, subcontractors with IAEA/ Safeguards (SG) - verification access needs - and equipment and infrastructure needs

12 Some lessons learned & some examples 12

13 Example of lessons learned : Make sure we agree on all aspect linked to SG equipment including during special maintenance with external stakeholders. Camera bracket broken during crane movement Camera view obstructed by scaffold material 13

14 Lessons learned Retrofitting equipment is costly: Cable penetration for reactor containment Brackets, platforms, or ladder installation sensor(s), system installation/maintenance/access are not easy to deploy once the facility is in operation It also involves: extra work for the operator (operational, safety & security) extra effortfor State Authority interfacing with the IAEA/SG extra cost for the IAEA to discuss/clarify/ subcontract 14

15 Examples of Safeguards by design Canada(2000s ) Early consideration in Advanced CANDU Reactor for Spent Fuel verification Difficulty to verify Spent Fuel in piled Spent Fuel baskets Verification point moved to an earlier part of the flow Provision made to install radiation monitoring, surveillance at different location of the facility Early discussion prevented the need to retrofit equipment after facility construction Reduced cost for SG instrumentation installation and burden on the operator 15

16 Examples of Safeguards by design Canada: another good example Verification of the loading of modular air cooled storage (MACSTOR) cylinders was once a human-inspection-intensive activity for the IAEA The effort was mitigated over past decade through the use of unattended monitoring for the smaller and more common MACSTOR-200, but for the larger MACSTOR-400, the design indicated at early stage the need to work together on a solution: Consisted of additional dedicated monitoring tubes installed next to each of the 16 inner cylinders. this design was easily implemented as it did not impact the structural integrity, the safety basis or the security constraints 16

17 Examples of Safeguards by design Finland Encapsulation plant and geological repository (EPGR) Finland is expected to be the first country worldwide to dispose of its spent nuclear fuel in an underground repository. Initial information used for the Finnish EPGR SBD was the IAEA Design Information Questionnaire In 2012 the draft Design Information for the Encapsulation Plant and Geological Repository were reviewed in regards to SBD The IAEA/ SG (and Euratom/SG) requested clarification and additional information Dialogue ongoing 17

18 Examples of Safeguards by design Ukraine: Chernobyl conditioning facility &Interim Spent Fuel Storage Context: Centre for dry cask storage where the spent nuclear fuel from Chernobyl s reactors no. 1, 2 and 3 would be stored for at least 100 years. Storage building for spent nuclear fuel from ISF2 (Chernobyl). Copyright Journal de l énergie(m. Leers 2010) The facility consists of two process area: one where the fuel must be delivered, dried, then packaged in waterproof metal packing cases, and a storage area where the fuel will be placed in concrete cavities. 18

19 Examples of Safeguards by design Ukraine Chernobyl conditioning facility The original conditioning building (1) modified when the facility was handed (2) over to the new contractor. Facility foreseen process was modified but not the need to apply SG measures. The need to keep SF route under continuity of knowledge (cameras, gamma, neutron detectors ) implied a clear communication with the new contractor. Benefit were rapidly understood by the new contractor with the State Responsible Authority assistance Open source Space allocation for unattended equipment would reduce the IAEA safeguards inspector presence while allowing permanent coverage Infrastructure for data transmission provide the assurance to the IAEA that the deployed systems are operating 24h/7days. (1) (2) Since

20 Examples of Safeguards by design Ukraine: Chernobyl Interim Spent Fuel Storage Safeguarded Stored Spent Fuel have to remain under sealing measures but safety and security measures imposed by the regulation were affecting the application of containment (sealing) measures applying seals was challenging due to the original design of storage for containers: safety and security at first! Solution were elaborated thanks to the dialog between the designers and the IAEA/SG. Nevertheless the absence of power & communication infrastructure could only be overcome by adopting an agile solution from the SG equipment side 20

21 Examples of Safeguards by design Ukraine: Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility at Chernobyl Context: The Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) will be a dry storage facility in which the used fuel from nine of the country's 15 reactors seven VVER-1000s and two VVER-440s located at Rivne, South Ukraine and Khmelnitsky are stored. CSFSF site will comprise a receiving facility and 94 Spent Fuel containers storage slots. Centralized Storage Facility for WWER-Type Reactors of the Ukrainian NPPs. (Source IAEA meeting08/2016 R.Stovbun) 21

22 Examples of Safeguards by design Ukraine: Centralized Spent Fuel Storage Facility at Chernobyl (Cont d) Long distance spent fuel shipment Transport containers are primarily designed for safety and security Receiving facility and process designed for safe handling of the transported fuel Space allocation for equipment supporting the SF elements verification at Nuclear power plant(s), Sealing made possible after lengthy dialog with transport containers designers, Infrastructure for data transmission at the unloading station supported after consensus was gained a possible reduction of the inspector presence and burden on the operator 22

23 Early consideration for IAEA safeguards should as much as possible be addressed during the planning / design phase Early contact with IAEA Department of Safeguards clarify potential upcoming issues before the facility work starts 23

24 Publications 24 24

25 Safeguards By design Guidance publications Part of the IAEA Nuclear Energy series - Provides guidance for the practical applications of nuclear energy for peaceful uses - Suitable for designers and vendors 25 25

26 Open source Too often in the design Process there are only two S, after today s presentation please consider the third one: Safeguards 26