Dynamic Price Discrimination in Airlines
|
|
|
- Jodie Turner
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Nicholas G. Rupp Joseph Meskey Department of Economics and Finance The University of Texas - Pan American Department of Economics East Carolina University EARIE European Association for Research in Industrial Economics Milan, Italy August 2014
2 Outline 1 Motivation Contribution and Intuition 2 Construction of the Summary Statistics 3 Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation 4
3 Motivation: Price dispersion Motivation Contribution and Intuition Price dispersion (Borenstein and Rose, 1994). Price dispersion with panels (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009) Role of costly capacity and demand uncertainty (with Gan, 2007); price competition (with Lee, 2012); price discrimination (with Jindapon, 2010); systematic peak-load pricing; demand learning; asymmetric pricing. Intertemporal price dispersion (Gaggero and Piga, 2011). Dynamic price dispersion (Mantin and Koo, 2009). Nonlinear pricing (Hernandez and Wiggins, 2010). Intertemporal price discrimination and dynamic adjustment to stochastic demand (Williams, 2013).
4 Motivation: Price discrimination Motivation Contribution and Intuition Carriers exploit fences such as: Saturday-night-stayover. Advance purchase discounts. Minimum- and maximum-stay. Refundable tickets. Frequent flier miles. Blackouts. Volume discounts. Fare classes (e.g. coach, first class) Hour-of-day purchase. Airlines have the most sophisticated pricing systems in the world.
5 Contribution and Intuition Motivation Contribution and Intuition Explains how sellers offer tickets at different prices at different hours of the day. Unique data on posted prices collected every hour. Conditions for price discrimination to exist: Different valuation across consumer types. Prevent arbitrage. Business travelers (high types) have higher valuations than tourists (low types). Incentive compatibility constraint: Prevent high types from behaving as low types. Airlines set higher prices during office hours. As the proportion of business travelers increases the difference increases.
6 Construction of the Construction of the Summary Statistics Lowest available fare (consistent with Deneckere and Peck, 2012). Pick a single day: Thursday, July 12, Initially follows Stavins (2001), but with two key improvements: Panel. Keep track of price changes by the hour. One-way, non-stop, economy-class. Connecting passengers / sophisticated itineraries / legs. Uncertainty in the return portion of the ticket. Saturday-night-stayover / min- and max-stay. Fare classes (e.g. coach, first class). 230 flights. 60 days prior to departure. (1422 observations per flight) American Airlines, Alaska, JetBlue, Delta, Frontier, AirTran Airways, United, US Airways, and Virgin America,
7 Summary Statistics Construction of the Summary Statistics Table: Summary statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES mean sd min max Fare: Whole sample ,288 0 Adv < , Adv < Adv < Adv < Adv DayWeek: Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Notes: The sample size is 145,458.
8 Static Pricing Equation Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation LnFare ijt = βhour t + 59 k=0 γ k I [Advt=k] + v ij + ε ijt, i: flight; j: route; t: time. Day in advance fixed effects. v ij controls for: Time-invariant flight-, carrier-, and airport-pair-specific characteristics. Flight-specific characteristics: Aircraft size, departure time, hub effect at the flight level, and systematic peak-load pricing. Carrier-specific characteristics: Managerial capacity. Airport-pair-specific characteristics: Herfindal index, distance between airport pairs, and hub effect.
9 Table: Static Pricing Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) Variables Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr 2: * (0.949) 3.319* (0.971) 3.333* (0.955) 3.589* (1.008) 3: * (2.938) 9.819* (2.937) (2.925) 10.06* (2.874) 4: * (3.275) 9.360* (3.274) (3.263) (3.278) 5: (3.296) (3.301) (3.282) (3.223) 6: * (2.939) 8.054* (2.921) (2.929) (2.847) 7: * (2.855) 8.478* (2.849) (2.847) (2.938) 8: * (2.662) 8.307* (2.653) (2.653) (2.788) 9: * (2.665) 7.173* (2.653) (2.653) (2.803) 10: (2.118) 5.485* (2.124) (2.106) (2.142) 11: (1.344) (1.349) (1.335) (1.364) 12: (1.474) (1.478) (1.463) (1.350) 13: (1.396) (1.392) (1.389) (1.156) 14: (1.566) (1.572) (1.553) (1.260) 15: (1.808) (1.803) (1.799) (1.454) 16: (1.688) (1.692) (1.677) (1.511) 17: (1.590) (1.584) (1.579) (1.362) 18: (1.461) (1.466) (1.453) (1.419) 19: (1.448) (1.447) (1.438) (1.381) 20: (1.198) (1.202) (1.191) (1.448) 21: (0.787) (0.805) (0.791) (1.359) 22: (0.957) (0.970) (0.961) (1.670) 23: * (0.520) * (0.535) (0.519) * (1.124) 24: * (0.279) * (0.276) (0.279) * (0.264) Mondayt * (3.655) * (3.667) (3.652) Tuesdayt * (3.525) * (3.539) * (3.530) Wednesdayt * (6.441) * (6.471) * (6.451) Thursdayt * (8.410) * (8.426) * (8.381) Advt * (9.152) * (9.158) * (9.176) Advt * (0.255) 1.248* (0.255) 1.248* (0.255) Advt * ( ) * ( ) * ( ) Route FE No Yes Yes Yes Flight FE No No Yes Yes Adv FE No No No Yes Within R
10 Table: Static Pricing Equation: Role of Adv t. (1) (2) (3) (4) Sample: 0 Adv < Adv < Adv < Adv < 59.3 Variables Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr 2: (2.930) (1.503) (0.665) (0.620) 3: * (9.450) (3.147) (0.790) (1.326) 4: (10.19) (3.589) (0.924) (1.328) 5: (9.059) (4.070) (0.810) (1.393) 6: (8.007) (4.255) (0.767) (1.102) 7: (7.171) (3.880) (0.693) (1.176) 8: (6.258) (3.372) (0.861) (1.162) 9: (5.985) (3.408) (1.214) (1.259) 10: (6.034) (3.120) (0.817) (0.858) 11: * (3.922) (3.465) (0.666) (0.979) 12: * (3.632) (4.121) (0.887) (1.100) 13: (4.423) (4.801) (0.931) (1.190) 14: * (2.681) (5.171) (1.149) (1.767) 15: (3.739) (5.457) (1.179) (1.053) 16: (3.862) (4.284) (0.936) (0.889) 17: (3.608) (4.292) (0.784) (1.015) 18: (2.879) (3.705) (0.816) (1.006) 19: (1.984) (3.799) (0.729) (0.825) 20: (2.650) (3.467) (0.749) (1.016) 21: (4.631) (1.921) * (0.448) (0.574) 22: (4.372) (1.778) (0.528) (0.905) 23: (4.789) (1.975) (0.565) (0.334) 24: * (0.959) (0.539) (0.546) (0.0794) Observations 31,037 36,377 39,405 38,550 Within R
11 1:00 3:00 5:00 7:00 9:00 11:00 13:00 15:00 17:00 19:00 21:00 23:00 Coefficient Estimates Static Rolling Regression Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation Figure: Rolling Regression: Pricing Estimates
12 Dynamic Pricing Equation Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation LnFare jt = αlnfare j,t 1 + βhour t + 59 k=0 γ k I [Adv=k] + v ij + ε ijt. Buyers and sellers are allowed to behave dynamically. LnFare j,t 1 is treated as endogenous. Forward looking. Can form beliefs about future prices. Estimation is consistent with rational expectations.
13 Dynamic Panels Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation LnFare j,t 1 as endogenous: Allowed to be correlated with ε ijt and earlier shocks. Cannot be correlated with ε ij,t+1 and future shocks. To estimate (α, β, γ), we use the methods described in Holtz-Eakin (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991): Take first differences to eliminate the fixed effect term v ij. Use ε ijt to construct the moments E( ε ijt M). Assume ε ijt is not serially correlated. Lagged values of LnFare ijt are valid instruments. Two specification tests: Second order serial correlation test. Sargan test for the validity of the instruments.
14 Table: Dynamic Pricing Equation: Role of Adv t (1) (2) (3) Sample: 0 Adv < Adv < Adv < 59.3 Variables Coef StErr Coef StErr Coef StErr 2: * (0.758) 0.693* (0.253) 1.936* (0.379) 3: * (0.770) 0.979* (0.255) 5.095* (0.383) 4: * (0.780) 0.689* (0.256) 1.788* (0.386) 5: * (0.783) (0.258) 1.311* (0.389) 6: * (0.784) (0.261) 1.373* (0.391) 7: * (0.791) (0.264) 1.180* (0.395) 8: * (0.796) 0.795* (0.268) 1.208* (0.399) 9: (0.798) 0.734* (0.273) (0.403) 10: (0.796) (0.274) (0.404) 11: (0.798) * (0.275) (0.405) 12: (0.800) (0.275) (0.406) 13: (0.803) * (0.276) (0.407) 14: (0.802) * (0.277) * (0.407) 15: (0.801) * (0.277) (0.407) 16: (0.800) * (0.276) (0.406) 17: (0.795) * (0.274) * (0.404) 18: (0.789) * (0.272) * (0.401) 19: (0.785) * (0.272) * (0.400) 20: (0.780) * (0.270) (0.397) 21: * (0.781) (0.270) * (0.398) 22: (0.767) (0.264) (0.390) 23: (0.746) (0.257) * (0.379) 24: (0.752) (0.255) (0.380) LnFare ij,t * ( ) 0.392* (0.0128) 0.625* ( ) Specification tests: Serial correlation [0.983] [0.976] [0.928] Sargan [1] [1] [1]
15 Regression Estimates Static Pricing Equation Dynamic Pricing Equation Table: Dynamic Pricing Equation. Role of Adv t. Sample: 0 Adv < Adv < Adv < 59.3 Weekdays Weekends Weekdays Weekends Weekdays Weekends (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Variables: LnFare ij,t * 0.625* 0.743* 0.404* 0.404* 0.778* 0.625* 0.616* 0.794* ( ) ( ) (0.0372) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0452) ( ) ( ) (0.0231) Officet a * * * * * (0.340) (0.708) (0.220) (0.120) (0.639) (0.0785) (0.174) (0.360) (0.115) Eveningt * * 0.662* * * * * 0.474* (0.338) (0.708) (0.220) (0.118) (0.584) (0.0789) (0.172) (0.359) (0.116) Officet Advt b * (0.0421) (0.0147) (0.0108) Eveningt Advt 0.169* * (0.0409) (0.0134) (0.0106) Price discrimination: β Office β Evening 0.931* * [ ] [ ] [0.967] [0.331] [0.0290] [0.0114] At Advt = 7 c 2.502* 1.587* [1.48e-07] [6.65e-08] At Advt = * [0.753] [9.11e-06] At Advt = [0.838] [0.478] Specification tests: Serial correlation d [0.959] [0.934] [0.386] [0.985] [0.984] [0.945] [0.965] [0.922] [0.409] Sargan e [1] [1] [0.903] [1] [1] [0.998] [1] [1] [1]
16 Dynamic price discrimination for perishable good under uncertain demand is a challenging task. Fares variation over time cannot be labeled as price discriminatory. Estimate price differences within the same flight within the same day to departure. Airlines separate consumers in two types: Business and tourists. High valuation consumers pay higher prices during office hours. The difference is higher as the proportion of high types increases.
Dynamic Pricing, Advance Sales, and Aggregate Demand Learning
Dynamic Pricing, Advance Sales, and Aggregate Demand Learning in Airlines Department of Economics & Finance The University of Texas-Pan American Duke University November, 2011 Outline 1 Introduction Motivation
Dynamic Pricing, Advance Sales, and Aggregate Demand Learning in Airlines
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Dynamic Pricing, Advance Sales, and Aggregate Demand Learning in Airlines Diego Escobari The University of Texas - Pan American 17. December 2011 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38509/
Price Discrimination through Refund Contracts in Airlines
Price Discrimination through Refund Contracts in Airlines Diego Escobari, Paan Jindapon October 5, 2008 Abstract We show how a monopoly airline uses two ticket types, refundable and non-refundable, to
Price Discrimination through Refund Contracts in Airlines
University of Alabama From the SelectedWorks of Paan Jindapon 2012 Price Discrimination through Refund Contracts in Airlines Diego Escobari Paan Jindapon Available at: https://works.bepress.com/jindapon/2/
Price dispersion and competition in business routes: An empirical analysis
Price dispersion and competition in business routes: An empirical analysis Paolo Roma (paolo.roma@unipa.it) DICGIM - Università degli Studi di Palermo, Viale delle Scienze 90128, Palermo, Italy Fabio Zambuto
Price Discrimination in Advance-Purchase Discounts with Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence from Airlines
Price Discrimination in Advance-Purchase Discounts with Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Regression-Discontinuity Evidence from Airlines Diego Escobari Nicholas G. Rupp Joseph Meskey April 12, 2016 Abstract
On-line Booking and Revenue. Low-Cost Airline. Claudio Piga. Economic Analysis Seminar at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
On-line Booking and Revenue Management: Evidence from a Low-Cost Airline Claudio Piga Loughborough University and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis Seminar at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Introduction
On-line Booking and Revenue Management: Evidence from a Low-Cost Airline
On-line Booking and Revenue Management: Evidence from a Low-Cost Airline Claudio Piga Loughborough University and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis Seminar at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Introduction
Demand Uncertainty and Capacity Utilization in Airlines
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Demand Uncertainty and Capacity Utilization in Airlines Diego Escobari and Jim Lee The University of Texas - Pan American, Texas A&M University - Corpus Christi February
Transportation Research Forum
Transportation Research Forum Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry Author(s): Junwook Chi, Won W. Koo, and Siew H. Lim Source: Journal of the Transportation Research Forum, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Fall
Revisiting the Relationship between Competition and Price Discrimination in the Airline Industry
Revisiting the Relationship between Competition and Price Discrimination in the Airline Industry Ambarish Chandra a,b Mara Lederman a May 4, 2015 a : University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management
Product Differentiation and Market Definition
Competition and Price Dispersion: Consumer Heterogeneity, Product Differentiation and Market Definition Myongjin Kim Leilei Shen July, 2017 Abstract We analyze the effect of competition on price dispersion
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry: An Analysis with Explicit Quality Differentiation
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry: An Analysis with Explicit Quality Differentiation Master Thesis M.Sc. Economics and Business Specialization Urban, Port and Transport Economics
Price discrimination occurs when firms charge different mark-ups to different
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2018, 10(2): 190 224 https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160252 Revisiting the Relationship between Competition and Price Discrimination By Ambarish Chandra and Mara
Empirics of Airline Pricing
Empirics of Airline Pricing [Think about a interesting title that will motivate people to read your paper] [you can use this file as a template for your paper. The letters in green are comments and the
Price discrimination by a monopolist
Review Imperfect Competition: Monopoly Reasons for monopolies Monopolies problem: Choses quantity such that marginal costs equal to marginal revenue The social deadweight loss of a monopoly Price discrimination
Marco Cornia, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Adam Hale Shapiro
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA WORKING PAPER SERIES Price Discrimination and Business-Cycle Risk Marco Cornia, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Adam Hale Shapiro Working Paper 2011-3 March 2011 Abstract: A
Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Industry
Discussion Paper No. 463 Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Industry Caspar Siegert * Robert Ulbricht ** * University of Munich ** Toulouse School of Economics March 2014 Financial support
Airport, airline and departure time choice and substitution patterns: An empirical analysis
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Airport, airline and departure time choice and substitution patterns: An empirical analysis Diego Escobari The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 12 June 2017 Online
Dynamic price competition in air transport market, An analysis on long-haul routes
Dynamic price competition in air transport market, An analysis on long-haul routes Chantal Roucolle, Catherine Müller, Miguel Urdanoz To cite this version: Chantal Roucolle, Catherine Müller, Miguel Urdanoz.
Airliner s Pricing Strategies and Perceived Price Fairness
Airliner s Pricing Strategies and Perceived Price Fairness Author: Rick Wetzelaer University of Twente P.O. Box 217, 7500AE Enschede the Netherlands r.wetzelaer@student.utwente.nl ABSTRACT Price discriminatory
ESSAYS ON PRICING UNDER UNCERTAINTY. A Dissertation DIEGO ALFONSO ESCOBARI URDAY
ESSAYS ON PRICING UNDER UNCERTAINTY A Dissertation by DIEGO ALFONSO ESCOBARI URDAY Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
SECOND-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION (P-R pp )
ECO 300 Fall 2005 November 5 MONOPOLY PART 2 SECOND-DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION (P-R pp. 386-7) This is an imperfect attempt to extract some consumer surplus using quantity discounts, usually in blocks
Merger Analysis with Endogenous Prices and Product. Characteristics Generalized Theorem and Application to the U.S.
1 Merger Analysis with Endogenous Prices and Product Characteristics Generalized Theorem and Application to the U.S. Airline Industry Ziyi Qiu July 28, 2018 University of Chicago 1 University of Illinois
Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power
Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power 1 Introduction Once firms face a downward sloping demand curve they have the ability to affect market price Up to now we have been assuming that a firm can only charge
Estimation of Demand and Supply in US Airline Industry
International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science Vol. 4 No. 6 August, 2016 Estimation of Demand and Supply in US Airline Industry Ran Wang Georgia Institute of Technology Email: wangran2010@gmail.com
Project Benchmark Check-In
Project Benchmark Check-In Task Date Assigned Due Date/ Check-In Date Date turned in Check off box Itinerary Sections 1-5 4/18/2016 4/19/2016 Itinerary Section 6 4/19/2016 4/20-21/2016 Cost Analysis 7a-7c
Yield Management. Serguei Netessine 1 The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania
Yield Management Serguei Netessine 1 The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania Robert Shumsky 2 W. E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration University of Rochester February 1999, revised
Internet Penetration and Capacity Utilization in the US Airline Industry
Internet Penetration and Capacity Utilization in the US Airline Industry James D. Dana, Jr. Northeastern University Eugene Orlov Compass Lexecon May 11, 2008 Abstract Airline capacity utilization, or load
MERGER ANALYSIS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRICES AND PRODUCT QUALITIES
Generalized Theorem and Application to the U.S. Airline Industry MERGER ANALYSIS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRICES AND PRODUCT QUALITIES Ziyi Qiu University of Chicago This paper studies firms endogenous choices
Managing Capacity and Demand
Managing Capacity and Demand Shin Ming Guo NKFUST Managing dynamic demand Service capacity is perishable Yield Management Case: Increase Revenue with Fixed Capacity The Park Hyatt Philadelphia, 118 King/Queen
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 148 ( 2014 ) ICSIM. The Price Roller Coaster: Can Air Carriers Ride It?
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 148 ( 2014 ) 186 193 ICSIM The Price Roller Coaster: Can Air Carriers Ride It? Teresa Tiago, Ana Azevedo,
A Model of Airline Pricing: Capacity Constraints and Deadlines
A Model of Airline Pricing: Capacity Constraints and Deadlines Shubhro Sarkar Abstract We study monopolistic pricing, with a capacity constraint, of a good that loses its value after three periods. In
Monopoly Monopoly 2: Price Discrimination and Natural Monopoly Allan Collard-Wexler Econ 465 Market Power and Public Policy September 13, / 28
Monopoly Monopoly 2: Price Discrimination and Natural Monopoly Allan Collard-Wexler Econ 465 Market Power and Public Policy September 13, 2016 1 / 28 Monopoly Overview Definition: A firm is a monopoly
Part IV. Pricing strategies and market segmentation
Part IV. Pricing strategies and market segmentation Chapter 8. Group pricing and personalized pricing Slides Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz Cambridge
GROUP DUTY ROSTER WITH MULTIPLE SHIFTS IN A DAY
1 1 GROUP DUTY ROSTER WITH MULTIPLE SHIFTS IN A DAY SUGGESTIONS & SOLUTIONS FOR TCMS V2 2 Conditions that requiring this feature: 1. More than 1 working shift. 2. Each working shift is clearly defined.
Pricing Strategy under Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Sellers on StubHub
Pricing Strategy under Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Sellers on StubHub Jian-Da Zhu National Taiwan University April 2018 Abstract This paper uses both listing and transaction data on
Internet Penetration and Capacity Utilization in the US Airline Industry
Internet Penetration and Capacity Utilization in the US Airline Industry James D. Dana, Jr. ortheastern University Eugene Orlov Compass Lexecon June 6, 008 A b s t r a c t Airline capacity utilization,
Topic 10: Price Discrimination
Topic 10: Price Discrimination EC 33 Semester I 008/009 Yohanes E. Riyanto EC 33 (Industrial Organization I) 1 Introduction Price discrimination the use of non-uniform pricing to max. profit: Charging
The Effect of Applying Price Discrimination Strategy on the Marketing Performance of Five Stars Hotels Located in Amman Jordan
The Effect of Applying Price Discrimination Strategy on the Marketing Performance of Five Stars Hotels Located in Amman Jordan Elham Fakhri Tomalieh University of Petra, Jordan, P.O Box 961343 Amman 11196
G rand S lam T. The Truth about Finding the Lowest Airfare
G rand S lam T www.uniglobetravel.in The Truth about Finding the Lowest Airfare Travel is a very dynamic industry with millions of fare changes per day. With constant changes and updates it s not surprising
The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets
The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets Marco Alderighi Università della Valle d Aosta Università Bocconi Alberto A. Gaggero University of Pavia March 14, 2016 Claudio A. Piga Keele University
SERVICE PRICING & REVENUE MANAGEMENT
SERVICE MARKETING SERVICE PRICING & REVENUE MANAGEMENT TRACY - MARY - NANCY LEARNING OBJECTIVES: LO1 - Recognize that effective pricing is central to the financial success of service firms. LO2 - Outline
DYNAMIC AIRLINE PRICING AND SEAT AVAILABILITY. Kevin R. Williams. August 2017 Updated February 2018 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
DYNAMIC AIRLINE PRICING AND SEAT AVAILABILITY By Kevin R. Williams August 2017 Updated February 2018 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 3003U COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY
DYNAMIC AIRLINE PRICING AND SEAT AVAILABILITY. Kevin R. Williams. August 2017 Updated February 2018 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO.
DYNAMIC AIRLINE PRICING AND SEAT AVAILABILITY By Kevin R. Williams August 2017 Updated February 2018 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2103U COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY
Estimation of Airline Itinerary Choice Models Using Disaggregate Ticket Data
Estimation of Airline Itinerary Choice Models Using Disaggregate Ticket Data Laurie Garrow with Matthew Higgins, GA Tech Virginie Lurkin* Michael Schyns, University of Liege Northwestern University Evanston,
Pricing Strategy under Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Sellers on StubHub
Pricing Strategy under Reference-Dependent Preferences: Evidence from Sellers on StubHub Jian-Da Zhu National Taiwan University January 2018 Abstract This paper uses both listing and transaction data on
Basic Monopoly Pricing and Product Strategies
Chapter 3 Basic Monopoly Pricing and Product Strategies Industrial 1 Introduction A monopolist has the power to set prices Consider how the monopolist exercises this power Focus in this section on a single-product
Pricing strategies: who leads and who follows in the air and rail passenger markets in Italy
Pricing strategies: who leads and who follows in the air and rail passenger markets in Italy Angela S. Bergantino * Claudia Capozza Mauro Capurso Abstract In this paper, we aim at empirically uncovering
A Re-examination of Incumbents Response to the Threat of Entry: Evidence from the Airline Industry
A Re-examination of Incumbents Response to the Threat of Entry: Evidence from the Airline Industry Philip G. Gayle* and Chi-Yin Wu** This Version: November 2013 First Version: August 2010 Forthcoming in
Air Ticket Sales as Bids from Airline Alliances
Air Ticket Sales as Bids from Airline Alliances Marc Ivaldi, Milena Petrova, Miguel Urdanoz December 8, 2014 Abstract Motivated by the higher price sensitivity and service homogenisation in the airline
REVENUE MANAGEMENT. An Introduction to Linear Optimization x The Analytics Edge
REVENUE MANAGEMENT An Introduction to Linear Optimization 15.071x The Analytics Edge Airline Regulation (19381978) The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) set fares, routes, and schedules for all interstate
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNET-ENABLED MARKET TRANSPARENCY: IMPACT ON DEMAND, PRICE ELASTICITY, AND FIRM STRATEGY
1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNET-ENABLED MARKET TRANSPARENCY: IMPACT ON DEMAND, PRICE ELASTICITY, AND FIRM STRATEGY Nelson F. Granados Alok Gupta Robert J. Kauffman Doctoral Program Professor Professor
Master thesis. Tom de Regt
The effect of ultra-low cost carrier market presence on the market fare of a network legacy carrier and the difference with low-cost carrier market presence Master thesis Tom de Regt 453462 MSc. Economics
CWT ViewPoint: CWT ViewPoint The Impact of Oil Prices and Fuel Surcharges on Corporate Travel. Perspective on industry-shaping developments
CWT ViewPoint: Perspective on industry-shaping developments September 2015 Americas CWT ViewPoint The Impact of Oil Prices and Fuel Surcharges on Corporate Travel Similar to the correlation between fuel
ESSAYS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPETITION AND FIRMS PRICE RESPONSES. A Dissertation SUNGBOK LEE
ESSAYS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPETITION AND FIRMS PRICE RESPONSES A Dissertation by SUNGBOK LEE Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements
Abstract Number: Price Volatility in the Airline Markets: Wait or buy? Benny Mantin. David Gillen. Department of Management Science
Abstract Number: 011-0220 Price Volatility in the Airline Markets: Wait or buy? Benny Mantin Department of Management Science University of Waterloo bmantin@uwaterloo.ca David Gillen Sauder School of Business
The Robustness Of Non-Decreasing Dynamic Pricing Laura van der Bijl Research Paper Business analytics Aug-Oct 2017 Prof.
The Robustness Of Non-Decreasing Dynamic Pricing Laura van der Bijl Research Paper Business Analytics Aug-Oct 2017 The Robustness Of Non-Decreasing Dynamic Pricing Laura van der Bijl Laura.vanderbijl5@gmail.com
Terry College of Business - ECON 4950
Terry College of Business - ECON 4950 Lecture 7: Price Discrimination, Bundling, Yield Management and Two-Sided Markets Primary reference: McAfee, Competitive Solutions, Ch. 11 Perfect Price Discrimination
When Consumer Type Matters: Price Effects of the. United-Continental Merger in the Airline Industry
When Consumer Type Matters: Price Effects of the United-Continental Merger in the Airline Industry Haobin (Bruce) Fan November 2017 Abstract Studies of airline mergers have largely focused on measuring
Area Conferences 2014
CESifo, a Munich-based, globe-spanning economic research and policy advice institution CESifo Conference Centre, Munich Area Conferences 014 CESifo Area Conference on Applied Microeconomics 8 F e b r u
THE PRICE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING POTENTIAL
THE PRICE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING POTENTIAL COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM AN AIRLINE MERGER John Kwoka Evgenia Shumilkina Northeastern University INTRODUCTION Mergers are very common phenomenon in market economies
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry
Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation As Published
UPS and Airport Business Center to 69th Street Transportation Center
108 Effective August 29, 2011 SEPTA UPS and to Serving Eastwick and Yeadon; on Weekends Customer Service 215-580-7800 TDD/TTY 215-580-7853 www.septa.org Route 108 British Airways Lufthansa US Airways International
Intertemporal Effects of Consumption and Their Implications for Demand Elasticity Estimates
Intertemporal Effects of Consumption and Their Implications for Demand Elasticity Estimates Wesley R. Hartmann* Graduate School of Business Stanford University 58 Memorial Way Stanford, CA 94305-505 Hartmann_Wesley@gsb.stanford.edu
ECONOMICS 1A: THE END IS NIGH! - PREPARING FOR THE FINAL EXAM
Professor Gregory Clark Winter 2000 ECONOMICS 1A: THE END IS NIGH! - PREPARING FOR THE FINAL EXAM Date Coverage: Wed, Mar 22, 4-6 pm. Syllabus sections 1-12 (and a little of 13) and all the material on
The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets
The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets Marco Alderighi Università della Valle d Aosta Università Bocconi Alberto A. Gaggero University of Pavia June 9, 2016 Claudio A. Piga Keele University
Price Dispersion and Differentiation in Online Travel: An Empirical Investigation
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Operations, Information and Decisions Papers Wharton Faculty Research 4-2002 Price Dispersion and Differentiation in Online Travel: An Empirical Investigation
Study of The Aspects Used By Commercial Airlines In Facilitating Domestic Tourism In Kenya
Study of The Aspects Used By Commercial Airlines In Facilitating Domestic Tourism In Kenya Diane Chelangat 1 Kennedy Ntabo Otiso 2 *Correspondence email: dianechelangat@gmail.com 1. School of Aerospace
Solution to Selected Questions: CHAPTER 11 PRICING WITH MARKET POWER
Chulalongkorn University: BBA International Program, Faculty of Commerce and Accountancy 900111 (Section 1) Chairat Aemkulwat Economics I: Microeconomics Spring 015 Solution to Selected Questions: CHAPTER
Discussion Paper Advances in Airline Pricing, Revenue Management, and Distribution
Discussion Paper Advances in Airline Pricing, Revenue Management, and Distribution Implications for the Airline Industry Prepared for ATPCO by PODS Research LLC Peter P. Belobaba William G. Brunger Michael
The Hidden Side of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Market
The Hidden Side of Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from the Airline Market Marco Alderighi Università della Valle d Aosta Università Bocconi Alberto A. Gaggero University of Pavia November 24, 2017 Claudio A.
Measuring market power when firms price discriminate
Loughborough University Institutional Repository Measuring market power when firms price discriminate This item was submitted to Loughborough University's Institutional Repository by the/an author. Citation:
USING EXPECTATIONS DATA TO INFER MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES AND CHOICES. Tat Y. Chan,* Barton H. Hamilton,* and Christopher Makler** November 1, 2006
USING EXPECTATIONS DATA TO INFER MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES AND CHOICES Tat Y. Chan,* Barton H. Hamilton,* and Christopher Makler** November 1, 6 VERY PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE!
Airline Seat Allocation and Overbooking
Airline Seat Allocation and Overbooking ISEN 609 Team Project Jung-Ho Park, EunSuk Ko, Yeong-In Kim 12/6/2011 1. Project Statement 1.1 Goal The goal of this project is to find an optimal seats allocation
OPERATİONS & LOGİSTİCS MANAGEMENT İN AİR TRANSPORTATİON
OPERATİONS & LOGİSTİCS MANAGEMENT İN AİR TRANSPORTATİON PROFESSOR DAVİD GİLLEN (UNİVERSİTY OF BRİTİSH COLUMBİA ) & PROFESSOR BENNY MANTİN (UNİVERSİTY OF WATERLOO) Istanbul Technical University Air Transportation
EARN $100 INTRODUCING DYNAMIC PACKAGING AT YOUR FINGERTIPS!
INTRODUCING EARN $00 Just by booking with TravelGenie! Clip the coupons on the back & send to the Inside Sales Department to redeem. DYNAMIC PACKAGING AT YOUR FINGERTIPS! New from Holiday House and Fun
Quantity-Based Price Discrimination Using Frequency Reward Programs. October 10, Abstract
Preliminary: Please do not cite without permission Quantity-Based Price Discrimination Using Frequency Reward Programs Wesley R. Hartmann Assistant Professor Stanford Graduate School of Business 518 Memorial
Essays on Firm Pricing Behaviors in the U.S. Airline Industry
Clemson University TigerPrints All Dissertations Dissertations 8-2018 Essays on Firm Pricing Behaviors in the U.S. Airline Industry Haobin Fan Clemson University, haobinf@g.clemson.edu Follow this and
Empirical Applications in Transport Economics. Philippe Gagnepain. Office: Tel:
Empirical Applications in Transport Economics Philippe Gagnepain Office: 15.2.57 Tel: 91 624 5732 philippe@eco.uc3m.es Section 2: Alliances, mergers, and collusion Increasing competition in many transportation
The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets
MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive The hidden side of dynamic pricing in airline markets Marco Alderighi and Alberto A Gaggero and Claudio A Piga Universitá della Valle d Aosta, Italy, University of Pavia,
Chapter 1 Introduction to Pricing Techniques
Chapter 1 Introduction to Pricing Techniques 1.1 Services, Booking Systems, and Consumer Value 2 1.1.1 Service definitions 1.1.2 Dynamic reservation systems 1.1.3 Consumer value 1.2 Overview of Pricing
Transport and Main Roads measuring congestion
Transport and Main Roads measuring congestion Frans Dekker David Johnston International Roads Federation/Roads Australia Conference Sydney, 2015 1 Overview 1. The why 2. What we do 3. Prioritisation tools
Monopoly. The single seller or firm referred to as a monopolist or monopolistic firm. Characteristics of a monopolistic industry
Monopoly Monopoly: a market structure in which there is only one seller of a good or service that has no close substitutes and entry to the market is completely blocked. The single seller or firm referred
Travel Forecasting Tutorial
Travel Forecasting Tutorial Travel Demand Modeling/Forecasting Process by which relationships among causal factors and travel decisions are analyzed and mathematically modeled. Decisions include: Travel
Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets
Price Discrimination in International Airline Markets Gaurab Aryal 1 Charlie Murry 2 Jonathan Williams 3 1 University of Virginia 2 Boston College 3 UNC - Chapel Hill October 15, 2018 Airline Pricing Two
PLAYING TO WIN. Vision Council Executive Summit Palm Beach, Florida January 23, 2015
PLAYING TO WIN Vision Council Executive Summit Palm Beach, Florida January 23, 2015 Twitter: @rogerlmartin STRATEGY IS ABOUT CHOICES To win, a company must choose to do some things and not others 2 STRATEGY
Egencia Special Report: How Leading Companies Leverage Egencia Technology to Drive Cost Savings
The Fundamentals of Travel Cost Savings Is your company: Consolidating 100% of its travel spend? Providing travelers with maximum access to inventory? Empowering travelers with powerful search & filtering
36106 Managerial Decision Modeling Revenue Management
36106 Managerial Decision Modeling Revenue Management Kipp Martin University of Chicago Booth School of Business October 5, 2017 Reading and Excel Files 2 Reading (Powell and Baker): Section 9.5 Appendix
Effect of Merger on Market Price and Product Quality: American and US Airways
Effect of Merger on Market Price and Product Quality: American and US Airways Somnath Das March 27, 2018 Abstract In this paper, I analyze the effect of the merger between American Airlines (AA) & US Airways
UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A)
UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Monopoly and oligopoly (PR 11.1-11.4 and 12.2-12.5) Advanced pricing with market power and equilibrium oligopolistic
Carrier Onboarding and FAQs
Carrier Onboarding and FAQs Carrier Onboarding Welcome to Direct Data Solutions. We could not exist without you. Direct Data Solutions maintains the principle of access based on participation. In other
Chapter 10: Monopoly
Chapter 10: Monopoly Answers to Study Exercise Question 1 a) horizontal; downward sloping b) marginal revenue; marginal cost; equals; is greater than c) greater than d) less than Question 2 a) Total revenue
Price Discrimination. It is important to stress that charging different prices for similar goods is not pure price discrimination.
What is price discrimination? Price discrimination or yield management occurs when a firm charges a different price to different groups of consumers for an identical good or service, for reasons not associated
SHOW ME THE MONEY: COMPARING THE BUSINESS VALUE OF TRADITIONAL AND ELECTRONIC B2B PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS. Alina M. Chircu Robert J.
SHOW ME THE MONEY: COMPARING THE BUSINESS VALUE OF TRADITIONAL AND ELECTRONIC B2B PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS Alina M. Chircu Robert J. Kauffman Carlson School of Management University of Minnesota Minneapolis,
Customer segmentation: Knowing your customer in an evolving African market
Customer segmentation: Knowing your customer in an evolving African market By Stephan Heinz, Consultant, EMEA - Seabury Group and Toby Stokes, Senior Vice President EMEA - Seabury Group Africa Wings magazine
GoldStreak Rules and Regulations for Carriage
GoldStreak Rules and Regulations for Carriage Effective January 3, 2011 This document contains the following information for shipments routed on Alaska Airlines (AS): RULES AND REGULATIONS General Application
Estimating Airlines Dynamic Price Competition
Estimating Airlines Dynamic Price Competition Nan Chen October 25, 2017 Abstract Dynamic pricing has become a common practice in many industries, but its effect under competition is uncertain due to the
Rail Service Criteria Update
Customer Service and Operations Committee Board Information Item IV-B March 8, 2012 Rail Service Criteria Update Page 61 of 87 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Board Action/Information Summary
Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Products Considering Quantity Discount Policy
Journal of Information & Computational Science 10:14 (013) 4495 4504 September 0, 013 Available at http://www.joics.com Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Products Considering Quantity Discount Policy