Application of CSM on risk assessment at SBB

Transcription

1 ERA-Workshop, 25 June 2013 Application of CSM on risk assessment at SBB Dr Jonathan Shaha Swiss Federal Railways SBB Central Safety Department 25 June 2013

2 Outline: Implementation of CSM RA at SBB Ú In 2012 the SBB developed and introduced an internal regulation to comply with the ERA Regulation No. 352/2009 on CSM on risk assessment. The project to develop the SBB-Regulation on CSM was managed by the Central Safety Department of SBB. Ú In 2012 there was no legal obligation in Switzerland to apply the CSM RA. Meanwhile the Swiss Regulation has been adapted to comply with the European Safety and Interoperability Directives with effect from July SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

3 Outline: Purpose and Expected Benefit Ú The main purposes of the SBB-Regulation on CSM were to: Improve systematic procedures in addressing changes in order to comply with standards and requirements and to improve quality assurance. Make the necessary preparation to be in accordance with the CSM-RA. Ú The main benefit of the new SBB-Regulation lies in areas where changes have not been addressed in a systematic way so far. Examples of such cases are the refitting of rolling stock and new material for maintenance. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

4 Objectives The objectives of this presentation are as follows: Ú to illustrate the procedure of implementing the requirements CSM on risk assessment at SBB Ú To report on the experience made so far, especially to report on the challenges in applying the CSM RA Ú To discuss some of the challenges regarding the application of CSM RA SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

5 Safety Organisation at SBB Swiss Federation (proprietor of the rail system) Performance Agreement and Strategy EU / ERA Safety directive 2004/49/EC Management Board («VR») Principles of «VR SBB» related to safety and security CEO Guideline for Safety at SBB -> specifications for safety at SBB CEO / Head of central safety department K-SQ Safety management system (SMS) SBB Ú leader for the subject of safety at SBB SMS of divisions -> operational safety SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

6 Mandate of SBB s Central Safety Department The central safety department contributes to the achievement of the strategic goals by ensuring Ú That SBB operates a safety management system embracing the divisions. Ú That the required safety level is efficiently maintained and continuously improved on the basis of cost-benefit analyses. Ú That, by means of supervising activities, the specifications from the SMS are fulfilled, the relevant safety processes and the safety performance are being checked. Ú That maintenance and further development of a sustainable safety culture supporting the required safety level are ensured. Ú That the publication of SBB-internal safety regulations embracing the different divisions is being co-ordinated within the company. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

7 CSM RA as Part of the Safety Management System Main processes Planning Monitoring Measurement Analysis Improvement Strategic planning Measurement Incidents Analysis of Accidents Annual planning Risk Management Subordinate processes Trend Analysis Safety Safety Comparisons Assessment by Management Audits CSM RA SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

8 Main Steps in the Development of the SBB-Regulation The development of the SBB-regulation on CSM took approx. 2 years. It consisted of the following main steps: Ú The Central Safety Department developed a first draft on the basis of the requirements from EC-Regulation No. 352/2009 and the know-how on risk management developed in different specialist areas of SBB. Ú The draft regulation was discussed and refined in workshops with specialists from the divisions. Ú A number of application cases was defined and assessed on the basis of the draft regulation. Feedback from this test phase was used to optimise the regulation. Ú It was ensured to have the acceptance from all stakeholders (management SBB and divisions) before introducing the regulation. Ú The regulation entered into force in SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

9 Contents of the SBB-Regulation on CSM Is a change present? Ú The SBB-Regulation describes in detail the procedure and its individual elements ayes 3. Check of safety relevance Safety relevant? yes 4. Check of significance significant? yes Risk assessment With hazard log Independent assessment SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

10 before: Improved Systematic Procedures from Applying CSM RA Changes not being assessed Assessment according to established procedure (not only safety!) Ú will continue to exist! Projects with necessary approval from FOT* EN (-29) (RAMS Standards) Access to railway network Risk assessment of occupational safety Etc. * FOT = Federal Office of Transport new: SBB-Regulation on CSM supplements existing verification procedures Check of safety-relevance and significance (if required) change Non-safety-relevant change Safety-relevant Non-significant +documentation change Significant SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

11 Training Ú A total number of specialists from SBB were given a one-day training course Ú Objectives of training course were: The decision about the safety-relevance of a change can be made The criteria for a significant change can be applied The contents of a risk assessment are known Duty for documentation is clear Requirements for independent assessment are known Ú The training course contained the following main items: Instruction in applying the contents of the internal regulation, explained by means of sample application cases from SBB Hands-on exercise in groups of 3-4 on selected application cases of significant changes SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

12 Responsibilities Ú The responsibility to assess changes lies with the proposer (Art. 3 of Regulation on CSM RA). The CSM-Regulation associates this function e.g. with the RU, IM. Ú It is necessary to find a practical solution for addressing this function. At SBB we used the defined roles of safety responsibilities for allocating the role of the proposer. Ú The functions associated with safety responsibilities depend on the specialist area where the SBB-Regulation on CSM is applied. Safety responsibilities can lie with, e.g. The person responsible for a given process The person responsible for a type of equipment The person responsible for a type of vehicle The person responsible for safety in the staff division SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

13 Guiding the Users of the SBB-Regulation on CSM Ú Starting point: a change is present. Example: Supply and implementation of a new type of double deck rolling stock (with a range of new systems) for regional transport Ú The user of the regulation has to decide Is this change safety relevant? Is it significant? Ú A risk assessment has to be supplied in the event of a significant change SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

14 Supportive Material for Users Separate template reports were developed for the users for the following issues: Ú Check of the safety relevance Ú Check if change is significant Ú Risk assessment report and accompanying hazard log Ú Safety assessment report SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

15 Check of Safety Relevance Ú A change is checked for safety relevance by identifying its influence on railway safety. The influence on safety can be determined on the basis of safety scenarios. Ú An comprehensive set of scenarios exists at SBB relating to the whole range of accident types, such as derailments, collisions, fires, etc. Extract of Accident types: Safety scenarios: Derailments Passenger train Freight train Collisions of trains Dangerous goods accidents Two trains Train with shunting movement Train with object on track Release of toxic gases Release with explosion Fire of dangerous goods fires Rolling stock Passenger train in tunnel Freight train in tunnel Station building SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

16 Check of Safety Relevance Ú The assessment of the safety relevance is not limited to the change but includes also the interfaces to other systems or components influenced by the change. Component X Component Y system Change under assessment System A System B SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

17 Check if change is significant Ú The check of significance is done on the basis of the criteria in ERA s Regulation on CSM: Failure consequence Innovation Complexity (in)ability to monitor Reversibility (additionality of non-significant changes) Ú When one of the criteria is fulfilled the change is considered significant. Ú The users are supported in the check of significance with guidance on the application of these criteria. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

18 Challenges in Applying CSM on Risk Assessment Ú Variety of subjects with safety issues: SBB is an integrated railway company comprising one IM, three RU and an estate division. The SBB-Regulation addresses all of them and therefore has to be applicable to an immense variety of specialist subjects. Ú Identifying change: Identifying the changes to be assessed on the basis of the SBB- Regulation on CSM is not always straightforward. Especially for short-term changes (e.g. train scheduling) there is no time for proper application of the regulation. Ú Need for resources: the systematic handling of changes involving checks, risk assessments, documentation needs a lot of effort and manpower, which is not readily available. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

19 and some more Challenges Ú Roles and responsibilities: the roles in applying the SBB-Regulation on CSM have been defined. However, in practice, it is not always straightforward to allocate the roles and responsibilities. Which persons are in charge of doing the work? Ú Training of users: The know-how to apply the SBB-Regulation on CSM has to be transferred to a sufficient number of collaborators. Building up and maintaining this know-how is a long-term task. Ú Quality of applying the regulation: it is necessary to have a common understanding of the criteria used to judge about the safety-relevance and significance in order to have an SBB-wide systematic standard for significant changes. In order to support the process of implementing the SBB-Regulation on CSM a support group with representatives from all SBB-divisions has been set up. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

20 Conclusions Ú Application of the CSM RA Regulation aids the systematic assessment of changes with regard to their safety impact. Ú The task of identifying and assessing changes is complex. It needs trained people, building-up of experience, supplementary material to support users, clear processes and roles. Ú The application of the CSM RA Regulation is challenging for several reasons, especially roles and responsibilities have to be adequately defined and assigned Build-up of know how in assessing changes Providing the necessary resources (manpower) Training and supporting users Ú The support group at SBB implemented with the focus on the CSM application will continue to be important to provide guidance in the application of the regulation and to optimise the support material provided for users. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

21 Discussion Question 1: systematic application of CSM RA Ú How to ensure that systematic application of CSM RA within the railway company? Which elements should be focused on? Organisation of processes? By which means should users be supervised? Support and training of users? SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

22 Discussion Question 2: decision criteria for significant change Ú Are all of the following criteria for a significant change equally important: Failure consequence Innovation Complexity (in)ability to monitor Reversibility Or can they be prioritised in some way? Ú What practical experience exists with applying the criterion on failure consequence? Definition: credible worst-case scenario in the event of failure of the system under assessment, taking into account the existence of safety barriers outside the system. SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June

23 Discussion Question 3: Do we have to address all changes? Ú Should we aim at addressing «all» changes? Ú Or are there changes which we can neglect when applying the CSM Regulation? Ú How to deal with short-term changes? SBB Central Safety Department - Risk Management K-SQ-RMS 25 June