Radiological Response Decisions

Transcription

1 Radiological Response Decisions Using science to guide animal and agricultural emergency management Kevin M. Dennison, DVM

2 Overview of session Introductions & goals Basic radiation safety resources PAGs, DILs, science and perceptions People, service animals and pets Animal agriculture

3 Goals At the end of the session you should be able to: Identify resources on basic radiation safety Identify purpose and location for Federal guides on protecting the public from radiation hazards Identify key scientific questions in responding to animal issues in radiological or nuclear incidents

4 Advisory Team on Environment, Food, and Health Element of Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Council Established in CFR CDC, EPA, FDA, and USDA are permanent members Provide protective action recommendations

5 Basic Radiation Safety Resources Oak Ridge Associated Universities CDC Radiation Emergency Training and Education Basic Radiation Science, California CUPA, 4 hrs FEMA Emergency Management Institute Independent Study IS 3, IS 301: Radiological Emergency Response

6 Radiation = energy Ionizing radiation = very high energy More potential for tissue damage

7 Radiation vs. contamination Radiation Exposure to radiation energy Exposure ceases when removed from the source Sunlight X-rays Tanning beds Air travel Gamma irradiated food Contamination Accumulation of radioactive material External Internal Continues to expose until material is removed

8 Examples radioactive elements Potassium 40 Radioactive form of potassium found all around us and inside us! Iodine 131, Cesium 137, Cobalt 60 Cancer radiation therapy Uranium 235 Nuclear power plants Americium 241 Smoke detectors Job aid on key isotopes:

9 Types of ionizing radiation Alpha particles 2 neutrons 2 protons Beta particles 1 electron Gamma rays Very high energy light wave (photon) Neutrons

10 Penetration Abilities Especially damaging to internal tissues if inhaled or swallowed Damaging to internal tissues if inhaled or swallowed and can cause external skin burns Damaging to tissues externally and internally

11 Half-life of radionuclides (T ½ ) Range from billions of years to milliseconds Time for 50% for decay

12 Measuring radioactivity What is measured? Traditional/US units International units Conversion Radioactivity of a material (dps = disintegrations per second) Dose equivalent (Net effect) Exposure (gamma/x-ray) (What is emitted) Amount of exposure absorbed 1.0 Curie = Decay of 1 gm of radium rem (radiation exposure- man) 1 Becquerel = 1 dps Sievert (SV) 100 rem = 1 Sievert Less commonly used for basic response personnel 3.7 X Becquerels = 1 Curie Roentgen (R) coulomb/kg (C/kg) 3880 R = 1 C/kg Roentgen Absorbed Dose (RAD) Gray (GY) 100 RAD = 1 GY

13 Average Annual Radiation Exposures: 6.2 msv = 620 mrem Consumer products, occupational 2% Medical 48% Natural background 50% Source: NCRP Report No. 160, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States (2009)

14 Average Annual Medical Exposures (U.S.) Data Source: NCRP Report No. 160, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States (2009)

15 Typical Doses (1 mrem = 10 µsv) mrem IU Airport Screening µsv NY to London by air 5 50 µsv Chest X-Ray µsv Natural background(annual) msv CT Scan -Abdomen 1, msv Occupational annual limit 5, msv Clinical signs of illness 100,000 1 Sv 50% survival (whole body) 400,000 4 Sv Radiotherapy (tumor) 8,000, Sv

16 Periodic table of elements

17 EPA PAGs PAG = Protective Action Guide Recommendation on avoiding future dose, not safe limits! Evacuation, relocation Use of potassium iodide supplements in radioiodine incidents Worker protection

18 FDA DILs Derived Intervention Levels Essentially a PAG for food Identifies unsafe levels in food Lower DILs for infants/children DILs in Bequerels per kilogram Cesium 137/134 = 1200 Bq/kg (370 for infants) Iodine 131 = 170 Bq/Kg (55 for infants) s/chemicalcontaminants/ucm htm#level98

19 Behold the Mighty Becquerel Defined as one disintegration per second K 40 = Bq/kg of muscle tissue Only.01% of Potassium is K40 (half life of 1.25 billion years) If everyone on earth were a K 40 atom One person would emit radiation Every 127 days

20 Is food unsafe? Background CS 137 = 1 Bq/kg Food sampled at 10 Bq/kg (1,000% increase!!) Food sampled at 1000 Bq/kg For comparison: K 40 = 100Bq/kg in muscle tissue Background radioiodine = near zero Milk sampled at 10 Bq (>>10,000% increase!) Milk sampled at 100 Bq

21 Science vs Perception Science Quantitative view of radiation hazards Science-based PAGs/DILs Science-based protective actions More effective resource allocation Reduced economic impacts Reduction in fear Perception and fear Fear of all radiation or zero exposure goal Inappropriate tactics due to political pressure/fear Alarmist messages Manufactured data Loss in confidence in response Waste of useable products

22 Examples of questions that science can answer Evacuate or shelter in place? Recommendations: Use FRMAC or other (State) data products People, service animals and pets all are managed by same criteria if resources allow

23 Types of incidents Accidents transportation, medical, industry Nuclear power plant (NPP) incident Radiological exposure device - RED Radiological dispersion device RDD Improvised nuclear device IND Generally envisioned at 10 KT or smaller

24 IND vs NPP accident Nuclear detonation 10 KT Smaller total amount of plutonium or uranium Large % of fissionable material used up Plume many thousands of feet high, very wide distribution (traces globally) Neutron induced radionuclides from debris! Very high gamma exposure Nuclear power plant release Large amount of nuclear fuel at risk Highly variable size of release Plume of limited height and distance Offsite radiation effects are primarily from increased cancer risk.

25 FOR EXAMPLE ONLY Automated Report: Assessment ( , ) RDD Explosion at 17 Sep :00 UTC Predicted Evacuation and Sheltering Areas Based on EPA/DHS Guides Applicable within first hours/days while radioactive cloud is present A Evacuation of entire population warranted, unless additional unusually hazardous circumstances exist (exceeds 5 rem). Estimated Population: 4810 Area: 1.4 km2 Extent: 2.8 km A B B Evacuation or sheltering normally initiated (1 to 5 rem). Estimated Population: Area: 7.2 km2 Extent: 5.8 km Notes: Promptness of evacuation and/or sheltering reduces radiation dose and cancer risk. Sheltering-in-place can be more protective than evacuation while radioactive cloud is present. Radiation dose predicted for maximally exposed individuals and includes both dose from contaminated air, plus dose from ground contamination over four days. Protective actions are only based on dose that can be avoided. Prediction does not include dose received before 17 Sep :00 UTC. Assumptions: Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term but no measurements. Plume Phase - Radioactive cloud may still be present or imminent. Four days exposure to both airborne and ground contamination. Briefing Product for Public Officials Current: 20 Sep :51 UTC Technical Details: FRMAC Home Team Advice & Recommendations: A-Team Check for updates FOR EXAMPLE ONLY page 1 of 3 Production/EVENT_23756/ws_0/prodexec_6/BP

26 EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE ISCM Workshop Exercise ( , ) Nuclear Detonation at 16 May :00 UTC Predicted Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) for 16 May :00 UTC Dangerous fallout zone posing immediate threat to survivors and responders Presented in 6 time steps Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation levels exceeding 10 R/h. The best initial action is to seek adequate shelter. Delay responder entry (several hours) unless undertaking a carefully planned mission with sufficient benefit to justify the anticipated radiation dose. Total Population: Area: 42.6 km2 Extent: 15.3 km Notes: Communicating protective actions to the public is critical. Generally, advise public to seek and remain in adequate shelter to avoid exposure to fallout until instructed to evacuate. Evacuation through heavy fallout may increase dose and decrease survivability. The highest hazard from fallout occurs in the first hours but rapidly declines as the fallout decays. The radiation levels in the zone and the size of the zone rapidly decrease over time. Dangerous Fallout Zone is entirely embedded in Hot Zone (not shown here, see separate figures Predicted Hot Zone ). Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term; confirm with measurements. Radioactive cloud has passed contoured area, radiation from fallout remains a serious hazard. Model assumes that no shelter or other protective actions have been taken to decrease exposure. Briefing Product for Public Officials Current: 16 May :16 UTC Check for updates Development/EVENT_16549/ws_0/prodexec_40/ForReports EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE Technical Details: FRMAC Home Team Advice & Recommendations: A-Team page 1 of 8

27 EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE ISCM Workshop Exercise ( , ) Nuclear Detonation at 16 May :00 UTC Predicted Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) for 16 May :00 UTC Dangerous fallout zone posing immediate threat to survivors and responders Presented in 6 time steps Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation levels exceeding 10 R/h. The best initial action is to seek adequate shelter. Delay responder entry (several hours) unless undertaking a carefully planned mission with sufficient benefit to justify the anticipated radiation dose. Total Population: Area: 12.5 km2 Extent: 8.4 km Notes: Communicating protective actions to the public is critical. Generally, advise public to seek and remain in adequate shelter to avoid exposure to fallout until instructed to evacuate. Evacuation through heavy fallout may increase dose and decrease survivability. The highest hazard from fallout occurs in the first hours but rapidly declines as the fallout decays. The radiation levels in the zone and the size of the zone rapidly decrease over time. Dangerous Fallout Zone is entirely embedded in Hot Zone (not shown here, see separate figures Predicted Hot Zone ). Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term; confirm with measurements. Radioactive cloud has passed contoured area, radiation from fallout remains a serious hazard. Model assumes that no shelter or other protective actions have been taken to decrease exposure. Briefing Product for Public Officials Current: 16 May :16 UTC Check for updates Development/EVENT_16549/ws_0/prodexec_40/ForReports EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE Technical Details: FRMAC Home Team Advice & Recommendations: A-Team page 2 of 8

28 EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE ISCM Workshop Exercise ( , ) Nuclear Detonation at 16 May :00 UTC Predicted Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) for 17 May :00 UTC Dangerous fallout zone posing immediate threat to survivors and responders Presented in 6 time steps Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation levels exceeding 10 R/h. The best initial action is to seek adequate shelter. Delay responder entry (several hours) unless undertaking a carefully planned mission with sufficient benefit to justify the anticipated radiation dose. Total Population: Area: 2.8 km2 Extent: 3.4 km Notes: Communicating protective actions to the public is critical. Generally, advise public to seek and remain in adequate shelter to avoid exposure to fallout until instructed to evacuate. Evacuation through heavy fallout may increase dose and decrease survivability. The highest hazard from fallout occurs in the first hours but rapidly declines as the fallout decays. The radiation levels in the zone and the size of the zone rapidly decrease over time. Dangerous Fallout Zone is entirely embedded in Hot Zone (not shown here, see separate figures Predicted Hot Zone ). Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term; confirm with measurements. Radioactive cloud has passed contoured area, radiation from fallout remains a serious hazard. Model assumes that no shelter or other protective actions have been taken to decrease exposure. Briefing Product for Public Officials Current: 16 May :16 UTC Check for updates Development/EVENT_16549/ws_0/prodexec_40/ForReports EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE Technical Details: FRMAC Home Team Advice & Recommendations: A-Team page 3 of 8

29 EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE ISCM Workshop Exercise ( , ) Nuclear Detonation at 16 May :00 UTC Predicted Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) for 18 May :00 UTC Dangerous fallout zone posing immediate threat to survivors and responders Presented in 6 time steps Dangerous Fallout Zone (DF) - Dangerous radiation levels exceeding 10 R/h. The best initial action is to seek adequate shelter. Delay responder entry (several hours) unless undertaking a carefully planned mission with sufficient benefit to justify the anticipated radiation dose. Total Population: 0 Area: 0.4 km2 Extent: 1.1 km Notes: Communicating protective actions to the public is critical. Generally, advise public to seek and remain in adequate shelter to avoid exposure to fallout until instructed to evacuate. Evacuation through heavy fallout may increase dose and decrease survivability. The highest hazard from fallout occurs in the first hours but rapidly declines as the fallout decays. The radiation levels in the zone and the size of the zone rapidly decrease over time. Dangerous Fallout Zone is entirely embedded in Hot Zone (not shown here, see separate figures Predicted Hot Zone ). Assumptions: Assumes 10 kt detonation at 0 ft elevation. Areas shown are model predictions based on an estimated source term; confirm with measurements. Radioactive cloud has passed contoured area, radiation from fallout remains a serious hazard. Model assumes that no shelter or other protective actions have been taken to decrease exposure. Briefing Product for Public Officials Current: 16 May :16 UTC Check for updates Development/EVENT_16549/ws_0/prodexec_40/ForReports EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE Technical Details: FRMAC Home Team Advice & Recommendations: A-Team page 6 of 8

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31 Evacuation decision challenges Communication challenges: People may not be receiving warnings, may not know the appropriate Civil Defense actions Incident type and analysis time: NPP incident more pre-planned actions/outreach IND many fatal doses occur before analysis and communication established Spontaneous evacuations

32 Estimating pet populations Addresses multiple types of animal populations: Pets, livestock, zoos, wildlife Tools, examples, resources Applicability to all incident types For copy: Service animals: 1-2 per 1000 people 32

33 Managing pet/sa contamination Start with incident standard for people External/internal: REP standard: 300 cps above background (~2X background) IND much higher: VR16 standard = 10,000 cps (33x higher) Internal: Detected by: External readings after decontamination Whole body counts Continued readings above 0.02 milli-sieverts per hour Alpha/beta internal not detected with hand instruments

34 Gross pet decon Current best practice Carefully brush off large particles A wet towel of paper towels may help Thorough decon Monitor- hand probe preferred, portal screening Soap and water bathing complete or focal Drying (critical if alpha is present) Re-monitor

35 Pet Service Animal Response Pet Assessment Pet Sheltering Evacuation/relocation Decontamination Animal SAR/Animal control Shelter-in-place support Veterinary missions Clinical care Public health Working animals SAR and law enforcement Service animals Fully qualified operational resources will be a crucial concern JIT training will be essential

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39 Critical response issues - pets Must brief decision makers! ICP, EOC and political levels Shelters not accepting anyone who is contaminated HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN? Treating small amounts of contamination like mortal threats IND viewed through REP lens Pet decontamination Who will provide pet decon? (guidance, training, PPE) Will pet decon divert resources from people?

40 Treatment Do any pets, service animals, or zoo animals show signs of radiation associated illnesses or other illness and what resources are available for treatment? How likely is the incident to expose pets, service animals, and zoo animals above 100 Rem (1 Sv) in a nuclear power plant accident? In a improvised nuclear device incident? What other problems cause signs similar to radiation induced illness?

41 Animal Search and Rescue 1. Depends on type of incident 2. Initial support of human SAR operations 3. Animal SAR in zones with no restrictions on stay times 4. Animal SAR in remaining zones as safety allows Will need JIT training for ASAR assets Need policy for equids, camelids, pet livestock Some IND zones may never be searched for animals

42 Zoo Animals Average gamma LD 50 dose? Around 400 rem?? Dose reduced by: Substantial enclosures Clean food and water Removal of visible fallout Can zoo staff safely care for animals? Stay times? Training? Prioritized evacuation if resources available? Would euthanasia ever be needed?

43 Agricultural Response Priorities 1. Establishing initial movement control zones Revising as science and policy direct Regionalization goal 2. Determining what animals need to be destroyed Delayed priority Initial emphasis on concentrated operations

44 Initial control/embargo zones NPP incident (Ingestion pathway planning) 50 mile initial zone Timely decision-making is crucial Modify as data and circumstances dictate Food animals, crops What about non-food livestock? Pet livestock? Control zones of IND, RDD and other incidents could vary greatly

45 Food control checklist Where is the plume for all radionuclides? Iodine 131? Cesium/strontium depositions? Where are the agricultural assets Crops, livestock, processors, etc. What boundaries can be conveyed clearly? Whole counties or clear geographic boundaries

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49 Enforcement of embargos Need clear decision Decision process is highlighted in graded IPX Need clarity as to who contributes, who decides Need to avoid procrastination & indecision Communicate decision clearly Written decision, media releases, industry notice Signage and embargo checkpoints International notification Set up checkpoints, 100% isn t possible

50 Mortality management Needs ground verification, not just modeling Could be some outliers of contamination Need a two-part plan: If areas are contaminated with I 131 above DILs If areas are contaminated with cesium, strontium and other longer life isotopes above the DILs Always include a buffer zone Can some stock be rehabilitated? (see recovery)

51 Indemnity: huge challenge American Nuclear Insurers NPP liability, backed by additional Congressional guarantee Pay claims, not up-front indemnity If US Secretary of Agriculture defines radiological contamination as a disease Could pay indemnity under APHIS VS CCC funds Indemnity obligated before depopulation FEMA under mission assignment Need legal review of authority

52 Indemnity/Depop questions What happens if indemnity isn t obligated before depopulation Can we make a timely policy decision? Are their exceptions to depopulation Valuable genetics Valuable performance Non-food livestock Pet livestock Short half-life radionuclides

53 Depopulation Would holding animals on clean feed and water reduce cost of disposal? Standard waste vs hazardous waste? Reduced exposure to responders? ICS structure Likely multiagency, multi-jurisdiction planning and response effort Resource availability (contractors, fully qualified personnel) may be challenging JIT training probably a key

54 Contaminated carcass management EPA driven decision Burning is out Rendering is out Burial Long-term issues locally rad waste site Plasma arc vitrification of burial site Composting

55 Communication Details about embargo/control areas Producers and industry Contribute to public messaging Inform and update international partners Detect and mitigate mis-information

56 Other agricultural response Some mitigation begins on day 1/week 1 Covering feed, bringing animal indoors Modifying ventilation Taking animals off pastures Power-washing fruit trees, vines, etc.

57 Summary Animal and agricultural response Primary initial missions : Support mass care related to pets Support mass care related to mass feeding Initiate food/agriculture embargos Enforce embargos Inform international partners Communicate with stakeholders and the public

58 Radiological Recovery Using science to guide animal and agricultural emergency management Gordon S. Cleveland Kevin M. Dennison, DVM

59 Session outline Scope of recovery Pets and non-agricultural animals Livestock and integrated animal agriculture Evolution of agricultural exclusion zone Rehabilitation vs. destruction of livestock Mitigation of agricultural assets Messaging, marketing, and public acceptance

60 Scope of recovery Agricultural recovery could entail: Months Years Decades Generations What we don t have, but would need Ukrainian Institute of Agricultural Radiology Russian Institute of Agricultural Radiology and Agroecology

61 Non-agricultural animals Nuclear power plant, RDD, other accident Can recover non-ag animal facilities in most incidents Little radiation-induced morbidity/mortality Nuclear detonation Mortality/morbidity in pets mirrors human impact Significant long-term relocation zone Perhaps higher numbers of unclaimed/stranded/stray animals Wildlife management issues in all scenarios

62 Scope of Recovery Agriculture All incidents Potential for permanent agricultural exclusion zone Buffer or other defined zone? Monitoring and compliance agreements to move products Some products might be safe while others not Remediation could improve usability Regulatory control, but will market acceptance drive production?

63 Pet/Service Animal Recovery Issues Stray/stranded/feral pets Long-term housing pet policy Pet facility recovery Kennels Shelters Other Epidemiological studies of radiation exposed pets and service animals?

64 Zoos/animal facilities Zoo in relocation zones When can they re-open? Is permanent/temporary relocation an issue? Research facilities Cleaning and recovery of operations? Evacuation, relocation, repurposing, euthanasia? Pet facilities (animal control, shelter, kennels) Cleaning/recovery of operations if possible

65 Exclusion/relocation zones Wildlife preserves? True living laboratory Sentinel populations Monitoring of game species Example: Wild boar testing in Germany Wildlife

66 Agricultural recovery Cold war era Threat was global thermonuclear war USDA had significant radiological response and recovery expertise Modern era More focal terrorism Economic partners/competitors rather than enemies USDA expertise Advisory Team and few other assets No laboratory capability for radiological assessment

67 Response Evolution of exclusion zone Initial plume model largest area of concern for agriculture Plume refined by ground data integration Identification of any outlying contamination zones Some areas later released from embargo Late response depopulation zone Destruction of livestock, crops and other products that are unsafe (or unmarketable?)

68 Refining the zones Testing of soil, plant, animal and other samples Characterizing any outlying zones Moving from model with data support to an all-data product The Babushkas of Chernobyl

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75 Bq/kg soil Minimizing the Contamination of Agricultural Environment Toward Food Safety - with Primary Focus on the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster. Kiyotaka Miyashita National Institute for Agro-Environmental Sciences

76 Decision points response/recovery FDA DILs + buffer zone + manageable borders Based on very conservative parameters Shown safe in international incidents But may be criticized as hundreds or thousands of times background levels! Other standards? Industry/consumer driven? Politically driven? Slippery slope that can compound economic harm without added protection of the public

77 Long-term management Inner total agricultural exclusion zone Buffer/other zone Assessment of any impacts on domestic and international markets Limited uses? Routine testing? Compliance agreements? Marketplace acceptance?

78 Monitor food portals human and animal Slaughter/meat processing Egg or dairy processing Animal feeds Rendering/pet food Monitoring = Animal monitoring (portals?) Laboratory sampling of food and feed FDA FERN labs 78

79 Food Supply Security Mission Radiological Monitoring for Contaminated Animals $170,000 from NIFA, to Texas A&M to develop portable, scale-able, large animal portal provide emergency evacuation triage and ante-mortem surveillance at slaughter facilities 79

80 Rehabilitation of livestock Radioiodine and dairy stock Radioiodine = 8 day half-life day to <1% of iodine remaining Milk may fall well below DILs much earlier than that Industry factors Milk dumping challenges Management/economics of non-producing cows Market acceptance of product

81 Non-milk products and radioiodine Iodine does not bio-concentrate in muscle Primarily concern for pastured dairy animals No scientific justification for mass depopulation But politics, perception and economics Long-term focus on cesium, strontium and other long half-life isotopes

82 Can we clean up livestock Radioiodine self limiting 60 days Acceptable to public, industry, and politicians? Radiocesium mitigation Significant levels in muscle tissue Clean feed and water below DILs in weeks Bentonite clay in diet Use of Prussian Blue based products??? FDA may not allow Concurrent strontium/other contamination?

83 Other radionuclides Strontium 90 : Deposition in bone Longer biological half-life Hard to detect (pure beta decay) Mitigation of animals above DILs not likely Calcium supplementation might help in animals below the DILs

84 Other radionuclides Actinides: U, Am, Th, Pu Heavy elements Generally very long half-lives Source: nuclear fuel, mining/industrial, natural Often very toxic chemically Mitigate less likely after substantial livestock exposure

85 Mitigation Creating a living laboratory Happened in both Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters Large body of scientific publications Expect similar for any major radiological incident

86 Currently at 192 publications

87 Chernobyl containment arch $1.7 Billion cost Shared by 40 nations

88 Long-term mitigation & management USA can exclude significant areas and still feed the nation Cost vs. benefit different in Japan and USA Might change mitigation options

89 Japan compared to USA (Approximate) Japan: 145,936 sq mi California: 163,696 sq mi USA: 3,535,932 sq mi

90 General agricultural mitigation Photograph from USDA ARS Cesium mitigation High potassium fertilizers on pastures/crops Deep plowing to sequester some cesium below root level High potassium/cesium uptake sacrificial crops Plants that will be harvested and destroyed Horseweed, red rooted pigweed Removal of top 5 cm of soil

91 Other options Power-washing trees Re-routing water flows from contaminated areas that drain onto agricultural lands Example: some rice areas were re-contaminated by runoff from high radiocesium areas Crop selection Test crops on Par Pond, Whicker 1995

92 Mitigating misinformation Need to understand the disadvantage of communicating science-based messages Alarmism is popular The government lies Talking heads could say anything Only advantage is actual data and the ability to explain data to the public/media

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95 Another version Labeled Australian Radiation Services

96 Radiation levels in US food seem to rising gradually ever since 3/11/2011. "New EPA milk samples in Hawaii show radiation in milk at up to 800% above limits for C-134, 633% above limits for C- 137 and 600% above EPA maximum for I-131 for a total of 2033%, or times, above the federal drinking water limits. These levels have been rising ever since the Fukushima accident.

97 The squid in the hoax story was said to be 160 feet long and its immense size was blamed on radiation being leaked into the Pacific in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Alarms sound over radioactive gigantism, screamed a headline above a story that featured a PhotoShopped image and quoted experts who do not exist.

98 Science vs Perception Science Scalable radiation risk Science-based PAGs/DILs Science-based protective actions More effective resource allocation Reduced economic impacts Reduction in fear Perception and fear Fear of all radiation or zero exposure goal Inappropriate tactics due to political pressure/fear Alarmist messages Manufactured data Loss in confidence in response Waste of useable products and economic disaster

99 Summary Science can help drive our planning and response in radiological incidents Worldwide, there is a tremendous body of scientific literature to support recovery Expertise within USDA has decreased in the past decades The perception challenges may dwarf the scientific challenges

100 Speaker contact Kevin Dennison, DVM National Emergency Management Staff Veterinary Medical Officer USDA APHIS Animal Care Fort Collins, CO cellular Gordon Cleveland Radiation Program Specialist USDA APHIS Veterinary Services Riverdale, MD (301) cellular