International Expert Panel Views on the Ontario Power Generation Response to the Request of the Canadian Minister of Environment and Climate Change

Transcription

1 International Expert Panel Views on the Ontario Power Generation Response to the Request of the Canadian Minister of Environment and Climate Change for Assessment of Alternate Locations for the Deep Geologic Repository December 2016

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3 PREAMBLE Ontario Power Generation (OPG) applied for a license to construct a Low and Intermediate Level Waste (L&ILW) Deep Geologic Repository (DGR) at approximately 680 metres (m) below the Bruce Nuclear Site (BNS) in April A pre-requisite to OPG being granted a license to construct the DGR is approval of the project Environmental Assessment (EA). Public hearings on OPG s license application and EA were conducted before a federally appointed Joint Review Panel (JRP) between 2013 and The JRP concluded that construction of the L&ILW DGR at the BNS is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, taking into account the implementation of the mitigation measures committed to by OPG together with the mitigation measures recommended by the JRP. The JRP presented its conclusions and recommendations to the Federal Minister of Environment and Climate Change (Minister) consistent with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act On February 18, 2016, the Minister requested that OPG provide additional information as input to the decisionmaking process. The Minister s request sought additional information in the following areas: a) A study that details the environmental effects of technically and economically feasible alternate locations for the Project, with specific reference to actual locations that would meet OPG s criteria for technical and economic feasibility. In conducting this study, OPG is to detail the thresholds for what is considered to be technically and economically feasible. In addition, OPG is to indicate what the incremental costs and risks would be for additional off-site transportation of the nuclear waste. b) An updated assessment of the cumulative environmental effects of the Project considering the potential construction and operation of a used fuel DGR within the traditional territory of the Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON), and c) An updated list of mitigation commitments for each identified adverse effect under CEAA The International Expert Panel (IEP) review is limited to the Minister s request described in (a) above. The purpose of the IEP Review is to inform OPG on the adequacy and completeness of its approach, and the analyses carried out to determine the environmental effects of locations identified as technically and economically feasible alternates to the BNS, and overall conclusions. As requested by OPG, the IEP has evaluated and provides comments to address: 1. The overall adequacy and completeness of OPG s response to the Minister s request 2. Consistency of OPG s approach with international experience, 3. Traceability of evidence-based references used in support of qualitative analyses, and 4. Appropriateness of OPG s conclusions given the above. The IEP Review has focused on OPG s methodology used to determine environmental effects and its suitability to support decision making. In reviewing OPG s draft response, the IEP made recommendations regarding revisions to the documentation and these have been considered in the final reports. In its response to the Minister OPG avoids the repetition of the information already presented at the earlier phases of the project. Therefore the following documents have been made available to the IEP to support its review process: The Preliminary Report (Licensing Submission Package) The Environmental Impact Statement The Joint Review Panel Environmental Assessment Report 3

4 The Report of the Independent Expert Panel on Qualitative Risk comparisons among Four Alternative Means for managing the Storage and Disposal of Low and Intermediate Radioactive Waste in Ontario The OPG Consolidated Project Description. During the review process, the IEP was afforded ample opportunity to interface with OPG and NWMO management and staff and to come to fully understand the project and the proposed response to the Minister. The IEP participated in the overall process by: Reviewing draft versions of the documents cited above and providing comments which led to changes in the submission Holding two meetings with the OPG and NWMO team members in Canada Conducting a site visit to the Western Waste Management Facility (WWMF) at the BNS to observe the L&ILW to be disposed and to visit the location of the proposed DGR Examining the methodology used by OPG to respond to the Minister s inquiry Evaluating the adequacy and completeness of the responses Determining if the actual questions posed had in fact been addressed and would support decision making International Expert Panel Members: Larry W. Camper, United States Lawrence H. Johnson, Canada Timo Äikäs, Finland The members of the IEP are introduced in more detail in Appendix 1. 4

5 1 THE OVERALL ADEQUACY AND COMPLETENESS OF THE RESPONSE Requirements Based on Minister s Request The overall adequacy and completeness of the response of OPG has been assessed by the IEP and can be judged against the fulfillment of the request of the Minister. For this purpose, the IEP has, based on the request for additional information and exchanged letters between the Minister and OPG, carefully identified the requirements included in the request and evaluated the OPG s response for their fulfillment. In February 2016 the Minister requested that OPG provide additional information, prior to making a decision on the Environmental Assessment (EA). In particular the Minister requested: A study that details the environmental effects of technically and economically feasible alternate locations for the Project, with specific reference to actual locations that would meet OPG s criteria for technical and economic feasibility. In conducting this study, OPG is to detail the thresholds for what is considered to be technically and economically feasible. In addition, OPG is to indicate what the incremental costs and risks would be for additional off-site transportation of the nuclear waste. At a later stage in 2016, as a result of exchanging letters, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) has clarified to OPG that: OPG has indicated that it intends to provide an assessment of the environmental effects of two technically and economically feasible geologic regions in Ontario, specifically in a sedimentary rock formation in southern Ontario and in a granite rock formation located in central to northern Ontario, without providing specific reference to actual locations. The CEAA has also requested OPG:... the Agency requests that the analysis of the environmental effects of the alternate locations to be provided by OPG provide a narrative assessment that does not assume that alternate sites in the geologic formation would have the same geographical and hydrological characteristics of the preferred site. The Interpretation of the IEP IEP has interpreted below the Minister s request and CEAA s clarification and has reviewed OPG s submission. OPG has given the response to the Minister s request in the following documents Study of Alternate Locations Main Submission (Main Report) Environmental Effects of Alternate Locations Cost and Risk Estimate for Packaging and Transport to the Alternate Locations Description of Alternate Locations The OPG response should fulfill altogether six requirements. These requirements are discussed below, along with the IEP s views on what would be needed to address these requirements and the adequacy and completeness of OPG s submission. 1. A study that shall detail the environmental effects of alternate locations for the Project. The description of the DGR to be located at alternate location, either in the area of the crystalline rock or sedimentary rock, must consider the independent nature of the facility. The DGR would be constructed and operated without any support of the existing nuclear infrastructure in an area to which the waste must be transported. 5

6 Therefore, the IEP considers it important that the description for the scope used as a basis for assessing the environmental effects shall cover adequately the activities and functions not included in the reference project. This has been achieved in the report Environmental Effects of Alternate Locations, in which an up-to-date EA methodology has been used to assess impacts on the alternate sedimentary and crystalline locations. The environmental effects analysis relies on a report Description of Alternate Locations that provides sufficient detail and background on the site characteristics. 2. These alternate locations shall be technically and economically feasible. The assumptions regarding the geology of the alternate locations must be based on realistic assessments of rock properties for the respective locations. The report Description of Alternate Locations provides sufficient descriptions of the characteristics of the alternate locations, relying as it does on reports that provide detailed sedimentary and crystalline site descriptions. The documented rock properties must be sufficient to make the siting of a repository and thus the safe disposal of nuclear wastes possible. The IEP considers that the OPG argument for the technical feasibility of implementation at an alternate sedimentary location is reasonable, but is conscious that the safety concept of the reference project may not be directly adaptable to crystalline rock without some modifications. The IEP considers that the submission has addressed how the safety concept would differ if the DGR would be sited in crystalline rock and what measures would be taken to ensure a reasonable level of safety. The OPG reports have indeed noted that some conditioning of certain wastes may be needed and that an enhanced engineered barrier system would be required for this case. In the view of the IEP, some waste conditioning technologies for L&ILW are available and there is precedent for using more robust engineered barrier systems as would be required in a crystalline DGR. If an alternate site in crystalline rock were to be pursued, the concepts for waste treatment and engineered barrier system (EBS) design would need to be examined through safety assessment calculations to demonstrate that an adequate margin of safety would be achieved. The IEP is aware that diverse approaches have been used internationally for the disposal of L&ILW and has included in its report an account of international safety principles and examples of L&ILW repositories implemented elsewhere. The IEP has in its evaluation of the feasibility assumed that existing technology would be used as a reference and no merit has been counted for any possible new technology not yet tested or used within the nuclear technology area. Economic feasibility is an issue, which involves not only the differences in the cost estimates between the DGR reference project and the DGR in the alternate locations but also the considerable uncertainty on the future cost estimate since the DGR at an alternate site would mean the postponement of the start of the disposal by several decades. This uncertainty together with the obviously higher overall cost must be considered when selecting mechanisms for future financing. IEP has been informed by OPG that the funds for the DGR have already been collected and contributed to the fully paid segregated fund. This fund is a resource in the long term and can be part of the mechanisms to cover the cost of the DGR in the alternate location. The IEP considers that the cost estimates for transportation are well established and are likely to have low uncertainties given the OPG experience with transporting wastes from the Darlington and Pickering sites to the BNS. The much larger cost uncertainties regarding characterisation and acquisition of alternate sites in either sedimentary or crystalline regions are acknowledged in the Main Report and appear to have been based on reasonable assumptions. 3. Specific reference to actual locations that meet OPG s criteria for technical and economic feasibility shall be made. Reference is made to two alternate locations representing two different geological environments as mentioned above. The IEP finds it to be important that the description of the main properties of the host rocks at a site at these locations presented in the Description of Alternate Locations report emphasizes the long-term stability of both crystalline and sedimentary locations, but distinguishes between the hydraulic characteristics of these two 6

7 rock types. The purpose of the DGR is the safe isolation of the waste from the human environment. Therefore, the IEP places emphasis on the technical feasibility criteria related to geological stability and depth and volume of rock as well as hydraulic characteristics, all of which play the key roles both for the long-term safety and operational safety. The alternate locations will require different safety concepts due to the different properties of the host rock. The IEP notes that the safety case for a site in a crystalline rock location, because of the fractured nature of the rock, would ultimately require technical criteria for the EBS and conditioning of some waste types so that safety criteria would be met. The need to develop and define these is acknowledged in the Description of Alternate Locations report. The IEP notes that the OPG economic criterion quite reasonably relates to assessing the costs for characterising and acquiring an alternate site to identify the need for additional funds. 4. The thresholds for what is considered to be technically and economically feasible shall be detailed. IEP finds that safety, cost efficiency and preference for optimal timing are important elements in repository projects in general. Thresholds may be project or site-specific issues and may affect the availability of the site or the total cost estimate. The IEP thinks in the interests of good safety culture that any locations that do not meet thresholds which may impair safety should not be considered. OPG has identified technical thresholds of minimum depths of 200 m and minimum bedrock thickness of 300 m. The IEP considers that a suitable economic threshold would be any project cost increase for which there is no benefit from an environmental or public health and safety perspective. 5. The incremental costs and risks for additional off-site transportation of nuclear waste shall be indicated The transportation of nuclear materials has a rather long and well-established tradition. Competences and technical means for safe transportation exist, as evidenced by the many years of experience of OPG in transporting wastes. The IEP thinks that this area is well covered using the existing information especially as set forth in the packaging and transportation description in the Study of Alternate Locations Main Report. 6. A narrative assessment that does not assume that alternate sites in the geologic formation would have the same geographical and hydrological characteristics of the preferred site shall be provided. This requirement is related to CEAA s remark that in assessing the environmental effects of alternate locations for the JRP, OPG assumed that the alternate locations would have similar geographical and hydrological characteristics as the preferred site, including being proximal to a small wetland and a great lake. The IEP notes that OPG has identified clearly in the Description of Alternate Locations Report and Main Report that the sedimentary location extends through a broad region of southwestern Ontario. A DGR site in this location could thus be some distance from a great lake. In the case of the crystalline rock location, OPG notes that wetlands are common in the Canadian Shield, but that the repository surface facilities could likely be located some distance from a wetland. And given the extent of the Canadian Shield, the repository in the alternate location could be some distance from a great lake if desired. Fulfillment of the Requirements The IEP has reviewed the documents and finds their adequacy and completeness for the intended purpose to be satisfactory. The appropriateness of the conclusions presented by OPG is discussed in greater detail in Comment 4 of this report. 7

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9 2 EXAMPLES OF REPOSITORIES FOR L&ILW IN OTHER COUNTRIES Introduction In the case of low-level waste (LLW) and intermediate-level waste (ILW) or, when discussed together for joint disposal, L&ILW, the typical disposal concept is near-surface disposal (tens of m depth) or deep geological disposal (several hundred m depth) in an engineered repository or a combination of the two. The selection of the specific solution for disposal depends on national standards, the half-lives and inventories of the waste to be disposed of and the results of risk assessments including evaluation of engineered barriers. Broadly speaking, short-lived LLW, along with small amounts of long-lived ILW, may be suited to near surface disposal. In contrast, larger quantities of long-lived ILW, as in the case of the OPG waste, normally require disposal at up to hundreds of m depth in rock that has strong isolation properties. For example, a DGR 600m deep in a bedded salt formation for long-lived transuranic waste (WIPP) is in operation in New Mexico. Deep geological repositories for long-lived ILW are planned in several countries; e.g. France, Switzerland, the UK, Sweden, Finland, Belgium and the Czech Republic, most of which already have operating near-surface repositories for some types of L&ILW. Some examples of both types of waste repositories that are already in operation in several countries are discussed in this report. The examples of LLW, ILW and L&ILW repositories are presented in Appendix 2. These do not represent all the facilities that are in operation or under development. They nonetheless demonstrate that the practice of disposal of L&ILW has been implemented and has been pursued under formal licensing processes in many countries. The examples illustrate several important points that are relevant to the proposed OPG repository for L&ILW. The first is that repositories for L&ILW vary considerably in their depths, ranging from 30 m to hundreds of m, depending on the rock properties, disposal site characteristics and regulatory safety requirements specified by the various countries. Furthermore, repositories in crystalline fractured rock environments are typically regarded as requiring engineered barrier systems to limit groundwater movement and enhance containment of radionuclides in the repository. From the perspective of repository design, it can be seen that several L&ILW repositories are designed as connected facilities (e.g. Sweden, Finland, South Korea), i.e. they are directly located at and connected to Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) sites where wastes are produced and are presently in interim storage. This has distinct advantages with respect to operational safety, security and cost, although this clearly can only be accomplished where the rock and engineered barrier system meet long-term safety requirements. It can also be seen that L&ILW repositories have been judged in the licensing process to be safe in locations next to bodies of water (the Baltic sea, in the case of Sweden and Finland and the Pacific Ocean in the case of South Korea) or for shallow land disposal as is the case in the United States. Some LLW facilities are surface-based (Aube in France and some U.S. facilities); however, such repositories are for short half-life L&ILW which is not comparable to the ILW component of the proposed OPG L&ILW DGR. In choosing the site for a L&ILW disposal facility, a number of technical, economic, social and government policy considerations must be addressed in a transparent manner. In reviewing and considering the various disposal systems used internationally, the various waste types, radionuclides and geologic characteristics and safety requirements must be carefully examined in order to make a decision for disposal in a given country. Review of the proposed OPG DGR for the disposal of L&ILW demonstrates that the disposal system will be robust and meet or exceed the practices utilized in other countries. EU Directive EU Council Directive 2011/70/EURATOM /1/ in effect since 2013 directs all Member States of the European Union to establish national programs to ensure the transposition of political decisions into clear provisions for the timely implementation of all steps of spent fuel and radioactive waste management from generation to disposal. The Directive further states that it should be an ethical obligation of each Member State to avoid any un- 9

10 due burden on future generations in respect to spent fuel and radioactive waste. The Directive was passed by the European Parliament and is supported by all EU Member states. The national program needs to be notified to the Commission. The deadline for the first notification was August 23, 2015, followed by notifications of major changes, as necessary. The Directive states that the storage of radioactive waste, including long-term storage, is an interim solution, but not an alternative to disposal. Member states were obligated to deliver national programs to the Commission by August The EU has established a review of the programs. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not directly operate or regulate any facilities for the disposal of low-level and intermediate-level (L&ILW) radioactive waste. However, the IAEA s Statute authorizes the Agency to establish safety standards to protect health and minimize danger to life and property. The standards must be used by the IAEA in its own operation and a Member State can apply them by means of its regulatory provisions for nuclear and radiation safety /2/. The IAEA safety standards and guidance reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The process of developing, reviewing and establishing the IAEA standards and guidance involves the IAEA Secretariat and all Member States, many of which are represented on the four IAEA safety standards committees and the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards. Regarding the disposal of L&ILW, the Agency has produced several safety standards and guidance documents having a bearing on the disposal of such waste. The first of these documents is General Safety Guide, No. GSG- 1, Classification of Radioactive Waste /3/, that sets forth a waste classification system ranging from exempt waste to high-level waste. LLW is defined as waste that is above clearance level, but with limited amounts of long-lived radionuclides. Such waste requires robust isolation and containment for periods of up to a few hundred years and is suitable for disposal in engineered near surface facilities. This class covers a very broad range of waste. LLW may include short-lived radionuclides at higher levels of activity concentration, and also longlived radionuclides but only at relatively low levels of activity concentration. The next highest class of waste in the IAEA system is ILW which is waste that because if its content, particularly of long-lived radionuclides, requires a greater degree of containment and isolation than that provided by near surface disposal. However, ILW needs no provision or only limited provision for heat dissipation during its storage and disposal. ILW may contain long-lived radionuclides, in particular, alpha emitting radionuclides that will not decay to a level of activity concentration acceptable for near surface disposal during the time for which institutional controls can be relied upon. Therefore, waste in this class requires disposal at greater depths, on the order of tens of m to a few hundred m. Another important IAEA document relative to the disposal of L&ILW is Specific Safety Requirements, No. SSR-5, Disposal of Radioactive Waste /4/. The document points out that a number of design options for disposal facilities have been developed and various types of disposal facilities have been constructed in many Member States and are currently in operation. These design options have different degrees of containment and isolation capability appropriate to the radioactive waste that they will receive. The specific aims of disposal are: a) To contain the waste, b) To isolate the waste from the accessible biosphere and to reduce substantially the likelihood of, and all possible consequences of inadvertent human intrusion into the waste, c) To inhibit, reduce and delay the migration of radionuclides at any time from the waste to accessible biosphere and d) To ensure that the amounts of radionuclides reaching the accessible biosphere due to any migration from the disposal facility are such that possible radiological consequences are acceptably low at all times. The document points out that the balance between the importance of each of these aims and to the extent to which they are accomplished will vary depending on the characteristics of the waste and the type of disposal facility utilized. Disposal facilities are not 10

11 expected to provide complete containment and isolation of waste over all time; this is neither practicable nor necessitated by the hazard associated with waste that declines with time. The requirements document cites the fact that within any Member States or regions, a number of disposal facilities of different designs may be required in order to accommodate radioactive waste of various types. Regarding the categories of LLW and ILW the document points that for LLW, disposal in a near surface facility consisting of engineered trenches or vaults constructed on the ground surface or up to a few tens of m below ground level may be designated for disposal of this category of radioactive waste. Regarding ILW, the document states that depending on its characteristics, ILW can be disposed of in different types of disposal facilities. Disposal could be by emplacement in a facility constructed in caverns, vaults or silos at least a few tens of meters below ground level and up to a few hundred m below ground level. It could include purpose-built facilities and facilities developed in or from existing mines. It could also include facilities developed by drift mining into mountainsides or hillsides, in which case the overlying cover could be more than 100 m deep. The document also addresses the disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in a geologic disposal facility. Specifically, disposal in a facility constructed in tunnels, vaults or silos in a particular geological formation (e.g. in terms of its long term stability and its hydrogeological properties) at least a few hundred m below ground level is discussed. Such a facility could be designed to receive HLW including spent fuel if it is to be treated as waste. However, with appropriate design, a geological disposal facility could receive all types of radioactive waste. The IAEA safety guidance document No. SSG-14, Geological Disposal Facilities for Radioactive Waste /5/, addresses in some detail the safety case and the various steps in developing a geological disposal facility. While the L&ILW waste to be disposed of in the planned Canadian DGR at the BNS is not spent fuel or any other form of HLW, it is important to note that this document, No. SSG-14, is cited within the OPG application and related supporting information as part of the design considerations for the disposal of L&ILW. The IAEA document No. SSG-14 points out that disposal in geological formations has been advocated as a long term management solution for HLW and ILW. 11

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13 3 OPG S RESPONSE AND TRACEABILITY OF EVIDENCE-BASED REFERENCES USED IN SUPPORT OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSES As part of its review of the OPG submission to the Minister, the IEP examined the traceability of the evidence used by OPG to support its qualitative analysis. In addition to reviewing the Main Report and the three supporting reports, the IEP also examined the references therein to establish that they provided the information claimed and supported the arguments made. In doing so, the IEP confirmed that the format of referencing is consistent and complete, thus the details would provide a reader with the ability to find the references using internet search tools or through a request to OPG. The report Environmental Effects of Alternate Locations refers to reports that provide the basis for the methodology used by OPG in their submission, as well as several technical reports that provide technical background related to site descriptions. The references for the former include recent guidance from the CEAA (2012, 2015) regarding how environmental effects should be assessed and how alternate means should be treated. These are clearly appropriate for the study and support the methodology presented. The other references provide technical material that relates to description of the characteristics of alternate locations, which appear to be adequate for the work performed. The IEP examined a number of these reports to establish that they provide the information referred to and judge that the references are appropriate for the work performed. The report Description of Alternate Locations contains references that provide the necessary background information related to establishing siting criteria and providing adequate descriptions of the characteristics of alternate locations for a DGR project in both crystalline and sedimentary rocks. The references are in the view of the IEP appropriate for the task at hand. The reports describing the characteristics of sedimentary and crystalline rock locations and geology contain the information needed for the qualitative analysis of the locations in question. Regarding the Study of Alternate Locations Main Submission, the information therein is taken largely from the supporting reports for the submission identified in Section 1 of the Main Submission. The IEP considers that the data used and conclusions drawn in the supporting reports are fairly represented in the Main Report. The IEP is familiar with many of the reference documents cited within the OPG response and the IEP did look at a number of the documents to confirm their relevance and accuracy. Overall, the IEP finds the reference documents have been utilized in an appropriate manner to support conclusions reached by OPG. 13

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15 4 APPROPRIATENESS OF ONTARIO POWER GENERATION S CONCLUSIONS In Comment 1 the IEP finds the adequacy and completeness of the presented documents for the intended purpose satisfactory. The documents address the requirements of the Minister s request and in the opinion of the IEP provide the additional information needed for decision making. The study on environmental effects presents a conclusion that a safe DGR at an alternate location could be constructed without any significant environmental effects. This is a conclusion relevant to geological repositories in general and can be supported by the experience from other countries. The environmental effects of a DGR project have been found to be small in many countries when studying technically feasible sites for the purpose of radioactive waste disposal. More important, however, is the conclusion of OPG that the environmental effects of DGR at an alternate location (at an independent disposal site) are likely to be greater as compared to the planned DGR project at the BNS. This conclusion is also supported by international experience. For example, environmental impact assessments conducted for L&ILW repositories and repositories for deep geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland and Sweden see /6/, indicate similar results. When establishing criteria and thresholds for the technical feasibility, OPG has selected safety as a starting point and considers that this must be achieved using existing technical solutions. The IEP considers this appropriate. Safe disposal is only possible at a site with suitable rock properties and application of appropriate design measures. OPG has brought forward as a criterion that the incremental cost shall be recoverable to maintain the economic feasibility. The IEP thinks that cost efficiency is relevant to consider in situations where all options are feasible as assessed against safety an environmental impact. From the sustainable use of resources point-of-view, the utilization of existing facilities would be more efficient than investment at a new site that would not provide any improvements in safety or reduction in environmental effects. As a result, the IEP considers that a suitable economic threshold would be any project cost increase for which there is no benefit from an environmental or public health and safety perspective. OPG has presented the incremental cost for the project at the alternative location, transportation being a significant contributor. The conclusion on the increased cost is well presented considering that there are significant uncertainties for the technical concept related to crystalline rock and the associated requirements for engineered barriers. OPG has brought forward the importance of the funding as part of the mechanism to cover the cost of the DGR. The length of the DGR project is several decades and the timing of the cost increases together with the lifetime of the NPP is crucial to OPG to be able to finance the costs of the DGR at an alternate location from internal resources, or through debt financing, or a combination of the two. In Comment 2, the IEP summarized the pertinent guidance from the IAEA regarding the management and disposal of L&ILW and provided a discussion of the regulatory system in the United States for the disposal of this type of waste. Similarly, information was provided about the EU direction for the management and disposal of radioactive waste. In all cases, there is an expressed preference for disposal over long-term storage of this waste. For example, the recent adoption of the EU Directive on radioactive waste was highlighted as this states that interim storage is not a solution and that the timely implementation of disposal is needed. Given that 28 nations that are similarly as advanced and as ethically responsible as Canada agreed to this directive, this point appears relevant in considering the future of the OPG DGR. The IEP has summarized the situation regarding the disposal of LLW, ILW and L&ILW in a number of countries in order to draw a meaningful comparison to the proposed DGR at the Bruce site or for that matter at an alternate site. Specifically, information was provided regarding six countries as follows: Finland; France; Germany; South Korea; Sweden and the United States. It is noteworthy that information on more than six disposal sites is provided given that more than one L&ILW disposal facility exists in some of the countries. In the view of 15

16 the IEP, the proposed DGR at the BNS is a highly robust solution for the disposal of the L&ILW in question and is consistent with or superior to the approaches utilized in other countries. The IEP in considering its observations on the OPG submission notes that while the submissions themselves are primarily technical, the decision-making clearly involves social, political and technical considerations. The differences between pursuing an alternate location versus the proposed site at Bruce relate to environmental, risk assessment, economic and social considerations. From the environmental perspective, the Environmental Effects report shows that the impacts are greater for many indicators typically evaluated in an environmental assessment and in terms of risk assessment and the Main Report makes it clear that there will be a small incremental increase in transportation risk for workers and the public if an alternate location is pursued. In terms of social impacts, the identification and selection of an alternate site could be very problematic, costly and time consuming with no certainty of a positive outcome. A project risk that is not elaborated in the submission is that were a decision to be made to pursue an alternate site, there is a possibility that a protracted site search may not lead to a socially acceptable site, despite the certainty that many technically acceptable sites exist. The Kincardine municipality where the DGR has been proposed has a well informed populace with considerable nuclear knowledge and many people in the region are employed at the BNS. This can be contrasted with an alternate location in which the affected communities would be likely to be much less knowledgeable of nuclear issues. OPG has long experience in community consultation and believes an alternate location with a willing host community could eventually be found. From the perspective of the IEP, this is far from certain. Given that there is strong local public support for the DGR at the BNS and a Canadian Environmental JRP judged the site to be safe and to have strong social support in the area, the pursuit of an alternate location appears risky. The risks to which the IEP refers are both ethical and economic. From an ethical perspective the responsibility for dealing with the long-lived radioactive waste will be passed on to future generations who will not have been involved in the use of the electricity associated with waste production. Further, the future generations would be potentially subjected to economic consequences since the proposed repository is effectively already paid for by existing electricity uses and the needed funds exist in a segregated fund. A search for a site within a new location may take decades, a period during which a large sum of money will need to be collected through increased electricity rates. Over this period of time, some existing NPP will cease operations as they reach the end of their useful lives and those remaining will have to carry the financial load of paying for a future repository. From the perspective of the hydro-geological properties of alternate locations and their ability to retain the radionuclides until they decay to safe levels, the IEP determined that, based on the Alternate Locations Report, a technically suitable site at a location in sedimentary rock of similar quality could be found. However, there appears to be no likelihood that such a site would be better than the present proposed site, as the present site would completely isolate the radionuclides from the biosphere as shown in the safety analysis and as evidenced by the impermeability of the formation. In the case of a location in crystalline rock of the Canadian Shield, the IEP notes that a good quality site could probably be found. However, treatment of some of the waste would be required to reduce the release into repository pore-water and additional engineered barriers would be required to enhance carbon-14 retention. Given such measures, the long-term safety requirements could be met, as evidenced by the safety assessment for repositories for L&ILW in the Fennoscandian Shield in Finland and Sweden. This is clear from the results in for the SFR L&ILW repository at Forsmark in Sweden that is located about 50 meters under the Baltic Sea (see Comment 2). Nonetheless, even with some waste treatment and additional engineered barriers, the margin of safety for a DGR in crystalline rock in the Canadian Shield is likely to be smaller than for a repository in the Cobourg formation. 16

17 Main Conclusions: 1. Moving the DGR from the proposed site at the BNS to a site at an alternate location will add substantial complexity to the project especially in terms of packaging and transporting the waste to the alternate site. 2. Use of a site at an alternate location will result in increased environmental consequences especially when considering the need to clear 40 ha of the up to 900 ha of land required for the site as well as clearing land for road access and perimeter security. 3. While from a technical point of view a suitable site in sedimentary rock with equivalent long-term isolation potential could be found away from a great lake as shown in the map of the sedimentary site alternate location, selecting such a site for the DGR will not result in an increase in public health and safety despite the considerable expenditure to acquire and develop the alternate site. Similarly, the technical requirements for a site could likely be met for crystalline rock at a location away from a great lake and wetlands, although likely with a reduced margin of safety relative to a sedimentary site. 4. Selection of an alternate DGR site would necessitate gaining the acceptance of a nearby host community and indigenous people and, combined with the time required for site characterization, it could take decades to reach the licensing stage. Furthermore a decision to pursue an alternate site for a DGR might not lead to success, given the challenges in obtaining social acceptance, in which case the existing L&ILW will remain in storage at the WWMF at the BNS for an undetermined period of time 5. The total incremental project cost for an alternate DGR site is likely to range from ~$1.2 B to ~ $3.5 B and would have to be funded presumably through rate increases to utility customers. This is in contrast to the proposed DGR at the BNS, for which sufficient funds have already been collected and exist in a segregated fund. 6. From the perspective of the IEP, a suitable economic threshold would be any project cost increase for which there is no benefit from an environmental or public health and safety perspective. 7. The host rock at the planned DGR site at the BNS is a superb environment to secure the L&ILW in a manner that will effectively isolate the radionuclides from the biosphere. The transport time of any radionuclides in porewater through the host rock to the accessible environment is so long that they will decay to insignificant levels before release occurs. The IEP concludes that OPG has adequately addressed the questions and concerns posed by the Minister and the CEAA as set forth in Comment 1, The Overall Adequacy and Completeness of the Response. In Comment 2, the IEP points out that the proposed DGR at the BNS is robust and consistent with or superior to other existing or planned L&ILW disposal facilities internationally. The conclusions reached by OPG are adequately documented and the information provided is at an appropriate as cited by the IEP in Comment 3. In the view of the IEP, the OPG submission illustrates that the solution with the least environmental and economic consequence is the proposed DGR at the BNS. The IEP conclusion is consistent with a similar conclusion reached in 2015 by the Joint Review Panel established by the Minister and the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. All of the views expressed in this IEP report were arrived at through an independent assessment based upon review of all of the applicable documents prepared by OPG, review of relevant historical documents, a site visit to the existing WWMF and proposed DGR site at the BNS, meetings conducted with NWMO and OPG in Canada as well as through professional collaboration bringing to bear the collective experience and expertise of the IEP. The draft documents prepared by OPG were commented upon in process by the IEP and the final submission was reviewed by the IEP in establishing its findings. 17

18 18

19 REFERENCES /1/ EU, (2013). /2/ IAEA, /3/ IAEA, (2009). Classification of Radioactive Waste, General Safety Guide, No. GSG-1, International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna, Austria. /4/ IAEA, (2011a) Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Specific Safety Requirements, NO. SSR-5, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. /5/ IAEA, (2011b) Geological Disposal Facilities for Radioactive Waste, Specific Safety Guide, No. SSG-14, International Atomic Energy Agency. Vienna, Austria. /6/ POSIVA, (1999). The Final Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel. Environmental Impact Assessment Report. Posiva Oy, Helsinki, Finland. 19

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21 APPENDIX 1: Members of the International Expert Panel Larry W. Camper, CEP, REP, CWMP, CIPM, AMC Executive Consultant Senior Nuclear Safety Consultant Mr. Camper is an experienced health physicist, radiation safety expert, environmental remediation expert and executive with more than 40 years of professional experience with various aspects of the nuclear industry within both the private and public sectors including: radiation safety; medical, research and academic uses; commercial uses; industrial uses; environmental assessment and management; low-level waste oversight; uranium recovery; decommissioning of reactors and complex material sites; spent fuel management and performance assessment. Mr. Camper has been very involved both nationally and internationally and increasingly has focused on the nexus between nuclear materials uses, energy production and related environmental concerns as well as stakeholder outreach and coordination. Mr. Camper is also an experienced technical manager and executive having directed several very complex and large programs within the nuclear and environmental industries. Mr. Camper retired from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on September 30, 2015 as the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs. For the preceding ten years, Mr. Camper served as the Director of the Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection in the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs. Prior to assuming that position, Mr. Camper served in several Senior Executive Service positions within the NRC including: two years as the Deputy Director, Spent Fuel Project Office; four years as the Chief, Decommissioning Branch and four years as the Chief, Materials Safety Branch. Mr. Camper also served for ten years as the U.S. Representative to the Waste Safety Standards Advisory Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria. Mr. Camper served for ten years as a member of the US Executive Steering Committee for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management an international treaty to which the US is a contracting party. Mr. Camper also served as a Country Group Chairman and officer in the General Committee for the 4th Review Meeting of the Joint Convention taking place at the IAEA. Mr. Camper also served as the Chairman of the NRC NEPA Executive Steering Committee, as a member of the NRC Fuel Reprocessing Executive Steering Committee, and as the NRC Agency Historic Preservation Officer. Mr. Camper serves as a member of the Board of Directors and as a member of the Program Advisory Committee and for the Waste Management Symposia. Mr. Camper serves as a member of the Certification Review Board for the Academy of Board Certified Professionals and he served as a member of the Nuclear Environmental Engineering and Sciences Advisory Board for Clemson University. Mr. Camper received a B.S. degree in Radiological Science and Administration (School of Medicine and Health Care Sciences) and an M.S. degree in Administration (School of Business) both from George Washington University. Mr. Camper also completed graduate course work in applied health physics at Oak Ridge Associate Universities and he completed a graduate level Certificate in Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act from Duke University, co-sponsored by the Council on Environmental Quality. Mr. Camper completed a certificate in Strategic Management of Regulatory and Enforcement Agencies at Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Executive Education. Mr. Camper also completed a certificate in Environmental Collaboration at the US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution. Mr. Camper is certified by the Academy of Board Certified Environmental Professionals (ABCEP) with a specialty in environmental assessment. He is registered with the National Registry for Environmental Professionals (NREP) and he is also Certified as a Waste Management Professional by NREP. Mr.Camper is also certified by the American Academy of Project Management as a Certified International Project Manager (CIPM) and he is certified by the Global Academy of Finance and Management as an Accredited Management Consultant. Mr. Camper is a 2005 recipient of the Presidential Rank Award as a Meritorious Executive within the Senior Executive Service and is the 2010 recipient of the Richard S. Hodes, M.D. Honor Lecture Award provided by the Southeast Compact for outstanding leadership in the low-level waste industry. Mr. Camper has been elected by 21

22 the Board of Directors of the Waste Management as a Fellow of the Waste Management Symposia in recognition of his long-standing service to the organization. Mr. Camper is the 2016 recipient of the M. Sacid (Sarge) Ozker Award presented by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Nuclear Engineering Division for distinguished and eminent achievement in the commercialization of nuclear power/energy with particular emphasis in the field of radioactive waste management. Mr. Camper is a present or past member of a number of professional organizations including: Academy of Board Certified Environmental Professionals; American Academy of Project Management; American Association for the Advancement of Science; American Association of Physicists in Medicine; American Industrial Hygiene Association; American Nuclear Society; Environmental Law Institute; Global Academy of Finance & Management; Health Physics Society; International Association of Facilitators; Institute of Management Consultants; National Association of Environmental Professionals; National Museum of Nuclear Science and History; National registry for Environmental Professionals; New York Academy of Sciences; Society of Nuclear Medicine and the Waste Management Symposia. During his career with the NRC, he provided many presentations on regulatory and technical matters to numerous national and international professional conferences and meetings and he represented the agency during many public meetings to address complex regulatory issues. Mr. Camper has served as a Committee Member and Panelist on two low-level radioactive workshops sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences. Mr. Camper is the President and Executive Consultant with Advoco Professional Services, LLC. Advoco provides a broad spectrum of professional consulting services focused on environmental assessment and remediation, health physics issues, nuclear regulatory policy and compliance, nuclear waste management, environmental conflict resolution, communications strategy, facilitation and stakeholder outreach, nuclear technical issues, NEPA support, Federal and State agencies coordination and executive management. Mr. Camper is also associated with Talisman International, LLC as a senior nuclear safety consultant dealing with a broad spectrum of nuclear and environmental issues. Mr. Camper is a veteran having served eight years in the US Air Force. Lawrence H. Johnson Senior Nuclear Waste Management Consultant Lawrence Johnson is an independent consultant in nuclear waste management with over 35 years of experience in chemistry and risk assessment of nuclear waste management. He has been involved in nuclear waste management programs in Canada and throughout Europe in the areas of chemistry of nuclear fuel, development and testing of engineered barriers for nuclear waste repositories and radiological safety assessment of repositories for spent fuel, intermediate-level waste and low-level waste. He also has experience in managing technical programs involving nuclear fuel and development of engineered barriers and in overall R&D planning. Lawrence Johnson graduated with a BSc. in chemistry (with great distinction) from the University of Lethbridge in He then joined Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) as a research scientist studying the dissolution of spent fuel and waste glass. In 1986 he became manager of Fuel Waste Technology Branch at Whiteshell Laboratories of AECL, overseeing development of disposal canisters and engineered clay barriers and studies of waste form dissolution in the Canadian Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Program. He was also program manager of studies of durability of spent fuel in interim wet and dry storage. In 1998 he became Senior Advisor to the Waste Technology Division. He is senior author of two Canadian performance assessment studies of engineered barriers prepared for the federal Nuclear Fuel Waste Environmental Assessment Panel that reviewed AECL s Environmental Impact Statement in In 1999 Lawrence joined Nagra (the Swiss National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste) as senior scientist in safety assessment and engineered barrier performance. He became Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Coordinator at Nagra in 2005, responsible for planning of Nagra s RD&D and its international cooperative research program and preparation of the RD&D Program report. He has worked in diverse areas of engineered barriers performance, including spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste glass behaviour, 22

23 disposal canister design, corrosion studies, bentonite properties, criticality assessment and development of models for safety assessment. He is one of the principal authors of the Nagra 2002 Opalinus Clay safety assessment study which successfully demonstrated feasibility and safety of disposal of spent fuel, high-level waste and intermediate-level waste in the Opalinus Clay formation of Northern Switzerland. He is author of about 130 reports and journal papers covering many areas related to long-term performance of engineered barrier systems, including spent fuel behaviour, canister development and corrosion, bentonite performance and radiological safety assessment. Lawrence Johnson is a Member of the Chemical Institute of Canada and is a former member of the Materials Research Society (MRS) and chaired the MRS Symposium on the Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management in in Boston in Lawrence Johnson has worked extensively with many national disposal programs and was Nagra s representative to the Implementation of Geological Disposal Technology Platform which was initiated by the European waste management agencies with the support of the EU. In 1997, he was a member of the NEA International Review Group for the SKI (Sweden) SITE-94 performance assessment study, and during was a member of the USDOE Expert Panel on Waste Form Dissolution and Radionuclide Mobilization. In 2005, he served on the NEA International Review Group for the Andra (France) 2005 Dossier Argile and for several years was a member of the advisory group to the CEA (France) on spent fuel performance. In the period he was a member of the team that performed the safety assessment studies for the SKB (Sweden) / Posiva (Finland) KBS- 3H Project. He spent six years as a member of the NWMO (Canada) Independent Technical Review Group and is presently a member of Posiva s Safety Case Advisory Group for the 2020 repository operating licence. Lawrence retired from Nagra in 2015 and continues to work with many European, Canadian and U.S. organisations as an independent consultant. Timo Äikäs Senior Nuclear Waste Management Consultant Timo Äikäs is an independent consultant with professional experience of nuclear waste management. Since being employed by Posiva Oy from its establishment in 1996, Timo Äikäs retired in 2014 having held the positions of Executive Vice President and Corporate Advisor. Timo Äikäs has worked in various aspects of geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel for three decades, including site selection, development of the disposal system and the design and development of the underground rock characterisation facility (ONKALO) and disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. Posiva Oy is a Finnish organisation responsible for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear reactors of the owners Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) and Fortum Power and Heat Oy. Before establishment of Posiva Timo Äikäs was working for TVO as the chief geologist. Between the years the tasks of Timo Äikäs were related to siting of the L&ILW repository of TVO at Olkiluoto and for deep geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel. He was the manager for several site selection research projects starting from the screening of potential candidate sites up to the detailed characterisation of a few sites for safety evaluation, environmental assessment and site selection. Olkiluoto site was selected based on this process for geologic disposal of spent fuel in The VLJ-repository was built between and commissioned in The Finnish Government granted the construction license to Posiva to build the deep repository for spent nuclear fuel at Olkiluoto in Until the February 2013 Timo Äikäs was the Executive Vice President of Posiva. In addition to management work of the company Mr. Äikäs was also in charge for the engineering as the Technical Director, the task he had since the year The engineering comprised the development of the disposal concept KBS-3 and the design of the nuclear facilities for disposal. In this capacity he was also responsible for cost estimation and funding calculations. An engineering geologist by background (Master of Science, University of Turku, 1977) he has more than 35 years' experience in nuclear waste management. Before his entrance to this area he worked in several civil engi- 23

24 neering projects in Finland and abroad. Timo Äikäs has been active internationally. He has participated in the activities of OECD/NEA and IAEA and has given presentations at many international conferences during his career. The close cooperation with Swedish SKB (Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB) throughout the years has been an important part of his working career. Mr. Äikäs was the member of SKB s internal review panel SIERG (Site Evaluation and Design Review Group) between Timo Äikäs makes an appearance on the documentary movie Into Eternity by Michael Madsen (Magic Hour Films, 2010). After his retirement Mr. Äikäs has been a special adviser to organizations both in Finland and abroad. 24

25 APPENDIX 2 : Examples of LLW, ILW and L&ILW Repositories Finland There are two nuclear power plants (NPP) operating in Finland: the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants. The Loviisa plant comprises two reactor units operated by Fortum Power and Heat Oy. The Olkiluoto plant comprises two reactor units operated by Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). In addition, a third unit is under construction at the Olkiluoto site. In 2010, the Finnish Parliament endorsed the Government s Decision-in-Principle (DiP) to build a NPP unit by Fennovoima Oy at a new site, Pyhäjoki (Figure 2-1). Fennovoima Oy submitted the application for construction license on July The license is expected in The Hanhikivi 1 reactor should become operational in Since the waste to be disposed of consists mostly of the operating waste accumulating during the lifetime of the reactors the repository operations are closely connected to the operation of the power plants and serve the needs of the particular NPP /1/. Pyhäjoki Eurajoki Loviisa FIGURE 2-1. The location of nuclear power in Finland. Fortum Power and Heat Oy has two NPP in Loviisa at Hästholmen island. Teollisuuden Voima Oyj has two operating units and one unit under commissioning in Eurajoki at Olkiluoto island. Fennovoima Oy is starting the construction of one NPP unit in Pyhäjoki at Hanhikivi peninsula. The safety concept of the Finnish repositories for L&ILW is based on a multi-barrier principle in which the bedrock properties and engineered barriers act in concert to provide the containment and isolation of the waste from biosphere. In the repository the waste packages are surrounded by concrete structures, and furthermore, by buffer and backfill materials to limit the movement of the groundwater to and from waste packages. The performance of the barriers together with the low groundwater content of the bedrock and the slow movement of the groundwater enable the safe disposal also for the long-term. Olkiluoto VLJ-Repository The site characterization for the Olkiluoto repository for operating waste was started in The rock body consisting of tonalite was identified and the repository design, favouring the vertical orientation, made using the good properties of this competent rock. The construction license was granted in 1986 and the repository was commissioned in The repository consists of two rock silos, a hall connecting the two and auxiliary facili- 25

26 ties constructed at a depth of m inside the bedrock in the Ulkopää peninsula of Olkiluoto Island (Fig. 2-2). The facilities can be accessed both via the vehicle access tunnel and a shaft. LLW is deposited in the rock silo inside a concrete box, while a silo of steel-reinforced concrete has been constructed for ILW in the other rock silo. The silo for low-level waste has a capacity of about 5,000 m3, while the capacity of the ILW silo is about 3,500 m3 (these volumes apply to waste placed in 200-litre drums). A preliminary design for the extension of the VLJ repository has been prepared, aimed at the new repository facilities that will be required around the 2030s. The extension will correspond to the increase in the operating life of OL1 and OL2 to the 60 years, and allows for the implementation of the disposal plan for operating and decommissioning waste from the OL3 plant unit now under commissioning. The needs of the possible additional power plant unit in the future will also be taken into account when planning the expansion of the repository /2/. Olkiluoto site has been also selected to host the DGR for spent nuclear fuel. Government granted the construction license for the DGR in The DGR will be constructed at 420 m depth approximately 2-3 km east of the VLJ-repository. Loviisa VLJ-Repository The characterization of the Hästholmen island for the geologic disposal was started in The island and its surroundings consist of Rapakivi granite, which is rather homogenous and competent rock type. The design, taking into account the structural features of the granite was developed, favouring the horizontal orientation, and the repository was located in the competent rock below water conducting sub-horizontal fracture zone. The repository consists of an access tunnel (length 1170 m) and horizontal deposition galleries excavated at a depth of about 110 m and of personnel and ventilation shafts (Fig. 2-2). The construction work on the repository began in 1993, and its first phase was completed at the end of The first construction stage involved the excavation of most facilities and access routes. Two deposition tunnels were excavated for maintenance waste and a repository hall was excavated for solidified waste. The repository received its operating license in 1998 and was put to disposal use in The second deposition tunnel and solidified waste hall were completed during the second construction phase that ended in The third phase for the excavation of additional gallery for the maintenance waste and the connecting tunnel began in October The extension improved the interim storage and sorting of maintenance waste drums. The gallery was commissioned for the interim storage of waste drums during A plan for the disposal of the decommissioning waste has been drafted. The plan includes the excavation of additional galleries at the current depth. The plan includes the disposal of heavy components (pressure vessel, steam generators) without any sectioning. The size of the access tunnel makes this approach possible /2/. Hanhikivi Repository The bedrock at the Hanhikivi site consists of crystalline fractured rock type called metaconglomerate. The conceptual design based on the experience in Finland and elsewhere has been developed for the L&ILW repository for the needs of the Hanhikivi NPP (Fig. 2-3). The preliminary safety of the concept has been dealt with in conjunction with the Government s DiP which was ratified by the Parliament in The site characterization will be carried out, as well as the detailed design at a later stage and the repository facility will be licensed separately based on the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. There is a plan to extend the repository later for the disposal of decommissioning wastes /1/. 26

27 REPOSITORY REPOSITORY FIGURE 2-2. The location and layout of the L&ILW repository at Hästholmen island in Loviisa (left). The location and layout of the L&ILW repository at Olkiluoto in Eurajoki (right) /2/. REPOSITORY SITE FIGURE 2-3. The tentative layout of the repository presented for the disposal of L&ILW of Fennovoima s Hanhikivi 1 NPP in Pyhäjoki. The underground vault marked by grey is the planned extension for the disposal of decommissioning wastes. (Picture: Courtesy of Fennovoima Oy) 27

28 France France has 58 NPPs in operation. Andra is the national waste management agency in France and operates several repository facilities. Two of the disposal sites are in the Aube Department; the CSFMA (short-lived L&ILW) and the CSTFA (very LLW) disposal facilities, which are designed to take waste from the nuclear power industry. Both are near-surface facilities with a design as illustrated in Fig Neither contain long-lived radionuclides, except below strictly defined thresholds. In the case of long-lived intermediate level wastes, a geological repository at greater depths (about 500 m) in clay rock is planned and this is yet to be developed /3/. FIGURE 2-4. Design concept for the disposal facilities for short-level L&ILW and very LLW at Aube /3/. Germany The Konrad Facility for L&ILW (a former iron ore mine) has been under development as a repository since 1975, and is licensed to dispose of about 300,000 m 3 of LILW with negligible heat generation (Fig. 2-5) /4/. The Asse salt mine repository for L&ILW was licensed by federal and state agencies in the 1960s and 1970s. It received wastes from 1967 to 1978, but its condition is poor and it now judged that the licensing process was inadequate. The alternative of filling it with concrete to provide a stable matrix for the 126,000 drums already emplaced was rejected and BfS (Federal Ministry for Radiological Protection) decided in 2010 that the wastes should be retrieved. 28

29 FIGURE 2-5 The geology of the Konrad facility. The iron ore body is shown by dark brown (malm). The repository rooms (below) will be built as an extension to the old mine /4/. South Korea There are 23 NPP in operation in South Korea. Four of them are CANDU reactors. The site selection process for a L&ILW repository in South Korea began in In 2005, there was 90% approval in a public vote for hosting a disposal facility sited near the Wolsong NPP. Construction of the repository started in early 2006 and was completed in June The repository is located in Gyeongju in North Gyeongsang (Fig. 2-6) province at a depth of 80 m in sediments underlain by crystalline rock. The first phase of the repository consists of six underground silos, each 40 m high and with a diameter of some 24 m. This first phase can hold up to 100,000 barrels of radioactive waste. The low-level waste includes clothes, filters, and equipment used routinely at the South Korean NPP. It is placed in drums that are then compacted. Intermediate-level waste contains, for example, resins and chemical sludge (Fig. 2-7, Fig. 2-8). The South Korean nuclear regulator, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, gave approval for full operation to begin in December 2014 for the facility's first phase. The first waste, 16 drums of waste within a concrete disposal container, were put within one of the facility's silos on 13 July 2015 /5/. 29

30 FIGURE 2-6. The location of NPP in South Korea). The repository for L&ILW (Gyeongju) is located close to the Wolsong NPP site /6/. FIGURE 2-7. The illustration of the Gyeongju repository for L&ILW. The planned extension is marked with grey /6/. 30

31 FIGURE 2-8. Arrangement of the L&ILW repository at Gyeongju in S. Korea; (Nucl. Eng. International /5/) Sweden There have been 12 NPP at four sites. The NPP at three sites are operating (Fig 2-9) today. The NPP in Barsebäck has been shut down and awaits dismantling. The SFR Repository for L&ILW was commissioned in This is a centralized repository where radioactive waste from operations and decommissioning of NPP in Sweden and other applications is transported to and disposed of. The repository, although centralized, has been connected to the operations of the Forsmark NPP. An application for extension (enlargement) of the facility was made in 2014 /7/. The safety concept of SFR is based on multiple barriers in which the engineered barriers together with the crystalline rock contain and isolate the nuclear waste from environment. Currently the SFR is under licensing for the extension for future needs. The radioactive waste disposed of in SFR includes operational waste from Swedish NPP and from the interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel, as well as radioactive waste from other industries, research institutions and medical care. In order to be able to also deposit decommissioning waste from the Swedish NPP, an extension of the repository, is planned. Additional disposal capacity is also needed for operational waste from NPP in operation, since their operating life-time have been extended compared with what was originally planned. The repository is or is being built 50 m under the sea bottom. The deepest part of the underground vault currently is 120 m (bottom of the silo). The extension is planned to the 120 m level (Fig. 2-10). The existing SFR comprises five waste vaults with a disposal capacity of approximately 63,000 m 3. The extension SFR 3 will have a disposal capacity of 108,000 m 3 in five new waste vaults plus one new vault for reactor pressure vessels from the nine boiling water reactors /8/. 31

32 FIGURE 2-9. The location of the nuclear power plants in Sweden. Vattenfall Ab operates two NPP units in Ringhals on the Western coast, OKG has three operating units in Oskarshamn Southern East coast. Forsmarks Kraftverksgrupp has three units in Östhammar on East coast. SFR is located in Östhammar community next to the Forsmark NPP. Barsebäck NPP in the South has been shut down and awaits dismantling (Picture: courtesy of SKB). 32

33 FIGURE Schematic illustration of SFR outside the Forsmark NPP. The grey part is the existing repository (SFR 1) and the blue part is the planned extension (SFR 3) (Picture: Courtesy of SKB). United States The United States utilizes a complicated mosaic for the regulatory oversight of the disposal of LLW and the equivalent of ILW. The main agencies that regulate and oversee LLW disposal in the United States are the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) /11/. The States also serve an important role including regulatory oversight of the four commercial operating LLW disposal facilities in the United States. The mission of DOE-EM is to safely address the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government sponsored nuclear energy research. In addition, DOE-EM continues to generate LLW through remediation activities such as facility decommissioning, tank waste retrieval and immobilization and soil and groundwater treatment. Such waste is referred to as government-owned LLW. DOE- EM manages one of the largest, most diverse, and technically complex environmental remediation programs in the world. DOE-EM remediation and related operations generates a spectrum of LLW, Greater Than Class C Waste (GTCC)-like waste and transuranic (TRU) waste. The resultant waste is disposed of in a myriad of ways including disposal on-site consistent with DOE Order 435.1, disposal at the Nevada National Security Site, disposal in commercial disposal facilities, disposal at certain other DOE sites and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). DOE-EM is self- regulating and conducts its various operations under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) /10/. The EPA has authority to set limits on radiation exposure with the development of standards that have a bearing on the disposal of LLW and other radioactive materials uses including high-level radioactive waste and the agency provides a role in the oversight of the WIPP facility in New 33

34 Mexico. The EPA also has regulations resulting from the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Resource Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA) which provide regulations for site remediation and disposal of materials in hazardous waste facilities. The NRC regulates the civilian use of radioactive materials including 100 operating NPP within the United States under the AEA and also has the responsibility to ensure safe and protective disposal of commercial radioactive wastes. Commercial LLW and ILW equivalent is generated through the operations, maintenance and decommissioning of NPP, research and test reactors, and through industrial, medical and research applications. The NRC may relinquish a portion of its regulatory and licensing authority to Agreement States through a process authorized under the AEA and in fact, all four of the existing commercial LLW disposal facilities operating in the United States are regulated by Agreement States. The Low-Level Radioactive Policy Act of 1980 and its amendment in 1985 assigned to each state the responsibility of disposing of its own LLW /11/. Disposal may also be facilitated through state compacts that are agreements ratified by the Congress among groups of states. While the United States has defined LLW, there is no standard classification system for LLW across its federal agencies. For example, DOE-EM identifies requirements that allow LLW to be disposed of via near-surface disposal through agreements with stakeholders. In addition, it should also be noted that the DOE uses the term Greater Than Class C (GTCC)-like waste rather than GTCC waste as is the case with commercial waste as set forth in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61.55, Waste Classification /10/. The NRC utilizes a classification system based on the content and concentration of specific radionuclides i.e., Class A,B,C and (GTCC)/14/. Class A waste is usually in the form of Dry Active Waste or DAW. This waste class can include the following: paper, clothing, tools, laboratory glass, soil, wood, metal, dewatered concentrates and ionexchange resins. Class B and C wastes may include some of the same physical characteristics of Class A waste. However, the most common waste forms of these classifications include: activated metal components, ionexchange media and mechanical filters. GTCC waste consists of irradiated metal components from reactors such as core shrouds, support plates and core barrels as well as filters and resins from reactor operation and decommissioning. Sealed sources used at hospitals, medical schools, research facilities and universities can also be classified as GTCC waste. A third category, other waste, consisting of contaminated equipment, rubble scrap metal, filters, soil and solidified sludge may be classified as GTCC waste based on their differing radionuclides and concentration levels. It should be noted that international regulatory schemes utilize a somewhat different system as was cited earlier under the discussion of the IAEA process relative to LLW and ILW. However, the waste contents are very similar or identical to the materials disposed of in the United States or elsewhere internationally. In terms of drawing a comparison between that system and the NRC classification system for these types of radioactive waste, note that the NRC classification system does not use the term ILW but Class C, GTCC and transuranic waste (TRU) are essentially synonymous with ILW as defined by the IAEA. The NRC regulations for the disposal of LLW are set forth in 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste /9/. The regulation utilizes an integrated safety system approach for the disposal of commercial LLW addressing site selection, site design and technical analyses, licensing, waste forms and classification, site operation, facility closure, post closure stabilization and institutional controls. The definitions in that regulation define a land disposal facility as the land, buildings, and equipment which is intended to be used for the disposal of radioactive waste into the subsurface of the land. The regulations also states that a near-surface disposal facility is a land disposal facility in which radioactive waste is disposed of on, in or within the upper 30 m of the earth s surface /9/. As a result, licensed commercial LLW disposal facilities in the United States are sited and utilize the upper 30m of the earth s surface. The waste classification system set forth in the cited regulation points out that waste that is not generally acceptable for nearsurface disposal is waste for which form and disposal methods much be different, and in general more stringent, than those specified for Class C waste. In the absence of specific requirements in Part 61, such waste must be 34

35 disposed of in a geologic repository as defined in Part 60 or Part 63 of 10 CFR unless proposals for disposal of such waste in a disposal site licensed pursuant to Part 61 are approved by the Commission/9/. This is the waste referred to as GTCC. Currently in the United States, there is no disposal capability for GTCC LLW but that matter is currently getting a great deal of attention by the DOE-EM and the NRC and it is anticipated that the regulatory scheme for the oversight of the disposal of GTCC LLW will be developed in the near future. Transuranic (TRU) waste that has its origin in defense-related activities is disposed of at the WIPP facility and commercial TRU waste up to the concentration of 100 nci/gm are disposed of under the regulation in Part 61. Commercial TRU waste in excess of 100 nci/gm is also currently under review by the NRC staff based upon Commission direction to proceed with a rulemaking to address disposal of this radioactive material. There are four commercial LLW disposal sites in the United States. They are located in Andrews County, Texas operated by Waste Control Specialists, Barnwell, South Carolina operated by EnergySolutions, in Clive, Utah also operated by EnergySolutions and in Richland, Washington operated by U.S. Ecology. Each of these sites are located in Agreement States and three of the four accept Class A, B and C LLW with the site in Utah accepting only Class A LLW. The Agreement States determine the type of LLW allowed for disposal in the facilities based upon state compacts and other issues. Defense-related TRU waste is disposed of at the WIPP facility in New Mexico. Selection of a LLW disposal site is contingent upon many factors. Desirable physical characteristics include minimal surface water sources; a geology that can be characterized, modeled, analyzed and monitored; groundwater at sufficient depth so that it does not intrude into the waste; low frequency of tectonic processes and low rates of erosion, landslides and weathering. In the United States, shallow land burial of LLW has been one of the traditional methods for disposal for many years. This disposal technique places waste below the land surface, but above the water table. In the United States there are four currently operating commercial LLW disposal sites and certain low-activity waste is disposed of in hazardous waste facilities. In addition, defense origin TRU waste is disposed of at the WIPP. Thus, these five facilities disposed of LLW and the equivalent of ILW. The L&ILW to be disposed of at the DGR at BNS is both similar to and different from the waste disposed of in the United States. For example, the WIPP repository contains much higher amounts of TRU than the proposed DGR at BNS but the carbon-14 amounts in the United States repositories are much lower than at the BNS to be disposed in the DGR. However, the waste is LLW and ILW including TRU waste. Since all of the commercial disposal sites in the United States utilize shallow-land disposal (30m) with engineered barriers, two of these sites will are discussed below as an illustration. The DOE WIPP facility is also discussed given that it is a deep geologic repository. Andrews County, Texas The Andrews County, Texas site is located in western Andrews County next to the State of New Mexico state line. It is licensed by the State of Texas and operated by Waste Control Specialists. The site accepts Class A,B and C LLW from Texas, Vermont, the Federal government and any other states via importation, if first approved by the Texas Compact Commission. The operator of the site was issued a license in 2009 and construction was completed and the site became operational in The facility is a 1,338 acre treatment, storage and disposal facility consisting of a commercial waste disposal cell, a federal waste disposal cell, a hazardous waste cell and a waste stabilization and storage area. The LLW disposal facility is authorized for the disposal of 2,310,000 cubic feet of LLW and 3,890,000 curies of radioactivity. The geology of the site consists primarily of the Dockum Formation comprised of very low permeability clays that are approximately 183m to 244m thick, with a hydraulic conductivity of approximately 1E-8 to 1E-9 cm/sec/20/ making the naturalized red clay less permeable to water than concrete. The water table for the site is 244 to 305m below the surface and the water is considered non potable and too salty for irrigation use. The disposal of the LLW will be in modular concrete containers and grouted with burial between 3m to 9m below the 35

36 surface in the geosynthetic trap-lined concrete reinforced cells in the red bed clay formation. As a practical operating parameter, the waste is at least 8 m below the surface/12/. Space between the containers will be grouted to help prevent shifting. Commencing at 30 to 40 m below the surface, the cells will be filled with more than 91 m of liner material and red bed clay and the surface will be restored to its natural state/12/. The waste is covered with a multi-layered cover system that is 8m to 14 m thick with a granular drainage layer, a bio-intrusion barrier above that cover followed by native topsoil. FIGURE Operational since 2012, the Texas Waste Compact Facility is owned by the State of Texas, operated by Waste Control Specialist. The cell is 30 m deep with reinforced and lined walls /14/. FIGURE Waste emplacement in concrete canisters within the lined disposal cell at the Waste Control Specialists LLW disposal facility /14/. 36

37 Barnwell, South Carolina The Barnwell site is located in Barnwell, South Carolina. It is licensed by the State of South Carolina and operated by EnergySolutions. The site accepts Class A, B and C LLW from within the state and from Connecticut and New Jersey. Disposal of LLW began in 1969 with Chem-Nuclear System, LLC, now a wholly owned subsidiary of EnergySolutions being granted a license by South Carolina to store radioactive waste while reviews were being performed to license the facility for disposal of LLW. After the reviews were completed, the license was amended in 1971 to allow shallow land disposal of radioactive waste. Since the initial opening of the Barnwell facility, increased use of waste volume reduction techniques has resulted in higher level of radioactivity per storage container. In response, the disposal technology originally utilized has been enhanced to include the use of concrete vaults /13/. Through the years, 115 acres have been developed for disposal. Enhanced shallow land burial at the Barnwell facility involves the construction of trenches. Individual trench construction is based largely on the geology and hydrology of the area of interest. The Barnwell facility, underlain by sediments of the Atlantic Coastal Plain, is overlain by a 1.2m to 1.8m layer of sandy loam that is not suitable for waste burial. Lower soils typically consist of stratified clay, silt, sand and limestone. Some areas of the site have been precluded from trench construction. The soil in which the trenches are located is mainly clay, providing low infiltration rates for surface water and slow ground water movement. The elevation of the water table varies over the site, with the highest elevations occurring at the northern boundary. The water table varies mainly in relation to the surface slope, and lies 9 to 15 m below the surface. Allowable trench bottom elevations are dependent on the maximum historically measured water table elevation in the trench vicinity. A minimum allowable separation (at least 1.5 m between the trench bottoms and the water table is an important element of trench construction /13/. The current Class A waste trench is approximately 30m long, 91m wide and 9m deep. Typical Class B/C waste trenches are approximately 183m long, 15.2m wide and 6m deep. Current slit trenches are approximately 91m long, 3m wide and 6m deep. Slit trenches at the Barnwell facility contain the higher Class concentrations of LLW. These waste are usually comprised of activated metal components. The deep narrow trench aids in minimizing exposure to workers during package off-loading operations. Three types of vaults are used at the Barnwell facility. Rectangular vaults are normally used for wastes packaged in metal boxes and drums. The size of the rectangular vaults is about 3m by 3m on the sides by 3.4m tall. Cylindrical vaults are normally used for wastes packaged in metal cylindrical liners, high integrity containers and drums. The cylindrical vaults are about 2.4m in diameter and 2.7m tall. Vaults used in slit trenches are about 5.2m long by 1.5m wide by 1.4m tall. The nominal thickness of the vault walls is 0.2m /13/. As waste packages are placed in the trench vaults and the vaults are closed, as much sandy clay as possible is added as backfill material to fill voids between the vaults. This process continues from one end to the other as the trench is filled. A temporary compacted clay cap is then installed over the completed trench. This mitigates infiltration of surface water to the trench contents until the enhanced cap is installed. Various species of grass may be planted on the temporary trench cap to help control erosion. Finally, enhanced caps are placed over completed groups of trenches in phases. Prior to closure of the facility, the entire areas used for disposal will have been capped. These caps are designed to virtually eliminate water infiltration through the trenches. The enhanced caps consist of a compacted clay layer that is a minimum of 0.30m thick, a geosynthetic clay liner (GCL), a 60 mil high density polyethylene (HDPE) liner, a sand drain layer and a sandy topsoil layer. The sand drain layer combined with the contoured compacted clay structural fill promotes the lateral movement of water from the tops of the filled trenches. The sandy topsoil provides a plant growth medium. The HDPE and GCL liners provide a double barrier to prevent water percolation to the filled trenches. Should the HDPE liner fail, the GCL liner is designed to seal the rupture. The site is subject to extensive environmental monitoring and a significant number of operating restrictions are imposed via the license issued by the State of South Carolina /13/. 37

38 FIGURE Vertical slice of Barnwell LLW disposal cell depicting enhanced cover /13/ FIGURE Waste emplacement at the Barnwell, SC LLW disposal facility /13/ 38

39 There are some differences in the operating histories in the four commercial disposal facilities in the United States but as cited earlier, all of the operating sites utilize near-surface disposal coupled with engineered barriers following the integrated systems approach set forth in 10 CFR Part 61. Waste Isolation Pilot Project (DGR) The WIPP is located 42km east of Carlsbad, New Mexico, in eastern Eddy County, in an area known as the southeastern New Mexico nuclear corridor that includes the National Enrichment Facility near Eunice, New Mexico, the WCS LLW disposal facility just over the border near Andrews, Texas and the International Isotopes, Inc. facility to be built near Eunice, New Mexico. WIPP is located in the Delaware Basin of New Mexico which is a 600 meter deep salt basin formed during the Permian Period approximately 250 million years ago. The bedded salt formation was chosen for its presumed long-term stability and self-sealing properties /16/. In 1979, Congress authorized the design and construction of WIPP, planned to be a repository for (TRU) waste which is a class of waste that is radioactive elements heavier than uranium on the periodic chart, including plutonium, americium, curium and neptunium resulting from the United States defense effort after The end of the Cold War and the downsizing of the United States weapons complex expanded WIPP s mission to include excess plutonium. Instead of just contaminated rags, clothing and equipment, in 1998 the DOE decided to dispose of plutonium, originally part of the United States strategic stockpile, from the now-closed Rocky Flats site. Some 3.5 tons, or more than 70 per cent of the plutonium stored in WIPP, was originally meant to be used in nuclear weapons. WIPP now holds more than 171,000 waste containers containing approximately 5 metric tons of plutonium /17/. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act of 1992 authorized the disposal of 6.3 million cubic feet of defense TRU waste at the WIPP facility /18/. The WIPP facility operates under several regulatory regimes. DOE has authority over the general operation of the facility, including radiological operation prior to closure. The EPA certifies the longterm radiological performance of the repository over a 10,000 year compliance period after closure of he facility. The State of New Mexico, through EPA delegation of the (RCRA), has issued a Hazardous Waste Facility Permit for the disposal of the hazardous waste component of the TRU waste. Additionally, the Mine Safety and health Administration (MSHA) is required to perform four inspections annually at the WIPP. Four shafts connect the underground area with the surface (Fig. 2-15). The Waste Shaft head-frame and hoist are located with the Waste Handling Building and are used to transport TRU mixed waste, equipment and materials to the repository. The Waste Hoist can also be used to transport personnel and materials. The Air Intake Shaft and the Salt Handling Shaft provide ventilation to all areas of the underground except for the Waste Shaft station. This area is ventilated by the Waste Shaft itself. The Salt Handling Shaft is also used to hoist mined salt to the surface and serves as the principal personnel transport shaft. The Exhaust Shaft serves as a common exhaust air duct for all areas of the underground. Waste is placed in rooms 660 m underground that have been excavated within a 910 m thick salt formation where salt tectonics have been stable for more than 250 million years. Because of plasticity effects, salt and water will flow to any crack that develop, a major reason the area was chosen as a host medium for the WIPP project /16/. TRU waste disposed at the WIPP facility is categorized as contact- handled or remote-handled based on the amount of radiation dose measured at the surface of the waste container. Contact-handled waste has a radiation dose rate not greater than 200 millirem per hour, while remote-handled waste can have a dose rate up to 1,000 rem per hour. Approximately 96 percent of the waste to be disposed of at WIPP is contact-handled. The first nuclear waste arrived at WIPP on March 26, As of December 2010, the facility has received and stored 9,207 shipments (72,422 cubic meters) of waste. The final facility contains a total of 56 storage rooms with each room being 92 m in length. The plant is estimated to continue accepting waste for 25 to 35 years /16/. 39

40 The waste to be disposed of at the proposed DGR at the BNS is not defense-related waste and is substantially different waste in many ways. However, some TRU waste is included in the ILW inventory of the BNS DGR (as well as long-lived carbon-14 waste) and disposal is planned at approximately 680 meters deep in a mined cavity. Thus, the WIPP information is provided for comparison as it is a deep geologic repository and TRU waste will be disposed of in the facility. FIGURE Vertical slice depiction of the WIPP DGR at 660 m below the surface together with stratigraphic sequence. References/Appendix 2 /1/ STUK (2015). Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. 5th Finnish National Report as referred to in Article 32 of the Convention. Finnish Authority for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK). Helsinki, Finland. /2/ Posiva (2015). Nuclear waste management of the Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power plants - Summary of operations. Posiva Oy, Eurajoki, Finland. /3/ Andra, /4/ BfS, Bundesamt für Strahlenschuzt /5/ Nuclear Engineering International, / 40