Seminar 25 November 2008 Danish Institute for International Studies

Transcription

1 Seminar 25 November 2008 Danish Institute for International Studies Permit systems in Africa: Creating or de-creating local hydraulic property rights? Barbara van Koppen International Water Management Institute

2 This presentation on Sub-Saharan Africa Contradiction between the policy goals to promote small-scale users access to water also by strengthening local water governance, and the newly promulgated permit systems (or license, water right, concession, etc) Conclusions Permit systems need to be thoroughly revised Support is needed for hydraulic property rights creation

3 Legal reform since 1990s Civil law traditions: Mozambique (Ley de Agua 1991), Uganda (Water Statute 1995), Tanzania (1997 and 2002 Amendments to Water Ordinance (Control and Regulation) Act No. 42 of 1974, and currently redrafting the law), Zimbabwe (Water Act No 31/1998), Burkina Faso (Loi d oriéntation relative a la gestion de l eau 2001) Mixed traditions: Ghana (Water Resources Commission Act 1996), South Africa (National Water Act 1998), Kenya (The Water Act 2002), and Swaziland (Water Act 2002).

4 New permit systems All water resources vested in the state as owner and custodian Obligation to apply for licenses by all existing and all new uses (except South Africa, only for new uses; existing lawful uses recognized) Exemptions for de minimis uses: domestic and small-scale productive uses for subsistence, through manual abstraction (except Tanzania: all users)

5 Roots in Roman water law Dual nature: obligation and entitlement Obligations: imposing obligations for the uses of public waters in a common interest Entitlements: dispossessing conquered tribes of their prior claims to water under customary water laws, and elite entitlement

6 Local water law

7 Permit systems Regulation or entitlement & dispossesion?

8 Revival of dispossession under colonization Latin America: The Papal Bull of 1493: gave the catholic kings all newly discovered lands, including waters. Water use became the object of special king s permits (Mercedes) granted by the Spanish government authorities [..]. Such permits could be revoked.[..] The violation of permit requirements could be punished with a fine..[..] Africa: water resources ownership often vested in overseas rulers and elite entitlement; shift to president at independence.

9 Early implementation experiences, mainly among large-scale users For water managers: a regulatory tool to Obtain information Revenue collection ( user pays and polluter pays ) Allocate water to new entrants, regulate, and where needed re-allocate water to redress inequities from the past

10 Tanzania: For information and revenue collection: Yes, but there are much more effective ways Surveys much quicker, halting water rights allocations Revenue collection among few large-scale users, but too costly among many small-scale users. South Africa: Effective billing of 63,000 registered uses (lawful or unlawful) through WARMS data base Water quality protection tedious Huge inequities in the distribution of water use

11 Distribution of water use in Olifants basin, South Africa 100% 90% 80% Percentage of Total Rural Use (%) 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Percentage of Rural Households (%) Line of Equity Combined Rural Water Use Source: Cullis and Van Koppen, 2007

12 Quantifying inequities in South Africa Olifants Basin 0.5 percent of water users use 95 percent of the water resources Gini coefficient: 0.96 Moving from 116 (Schedule One) to 277 lpcd by all small-scale uses requires the registered users to share 6 percent of water use Provincial/national Regulating the 10 largest users addresses percent of water volumes used per province

13 For water allocation to large-scale new entrants: again easy access? Mozambique: major new estates, e.g. biofuel Procana in Limpopo basin

14 Water allocation reform in South Africa Out of 1212 new licenses, 2 percent for Historically Disadvantaged Individuals Halting conversion of existing lawful uses into licenses, unless under: Compulsory Licensing Verification and validation of existing lawful use too costly and sensitive, so: Allocate state-set licenses Promulgate General Authorizations far higher than Schedule One uses

15 Potential implications for small-scale users Permit systems contradict the policy aim of improving access: Enforcing the dispossession of prior customary and local water rights regimes Imposing new hassle with disproportionate costs for small uses and women; collective permits problematic Exemptions for de minimis uses (and General Authorization) are second-class entitlements

16 Recommendations For the few large-scale users that can and need to be regulated: target permits or regulate otherwise For small users: priority General Authorizations For the first time in history: recognize rural customary/local water arrangements as lawful, Strengthen e.g. through DIIS research Local Governance Cooperation and Conflict Support hydraulic property rights creation to vest wet claims to water

17 THANK YOU

18 Lorenz Curve for direct and indirect benefits Percentage of Total Rural Use (%) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Percentage of Rural Households (%) Line of Equity Direct Water Use Indirect Use Source: Cullis et al for Olifants WMA