INDEX: Emergency Operations Centers Project Development and Capabilities Assessment

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2 INDEX: Emergency Operations Centers Project Development and Capabilities Assessment Chapter 1. Chapter 2. Chapter 3. Chapter 4. Chapter 5. Chapter 6. Introduction 1.1 Historical Context 1.2 Purpose of an E.O.C. 1.3 Research Sources 1.4 Database Planning for EOC Development 2.1 EOC functions 2.2 Survivability Requirements 2.3 EOC staff and organization 2.4 Space requirements 2.5 Suitability of Existing Space vs. New 2.6 Facility Location 2.7 EOC Design/layout 2.8 Communications Capability 2.9 Redundancy/Infrastructure Systems 2.10 EOC Supplies and Equipment Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Hazards Identification 3.3 Vulnerability Assessments Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need 4.1 The Process 4.2 Space Standards 4.3 Multi-Use Opportunities 4.4 Involving Your Staff Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities 5.1 Architectural Character 5.2 Facility Success/The Protective envelope 5.3 Exterior Wall Protection 5.4 The Roof: The Weakest Link 5.5 Glass: A Part of the Protective Envelope 5.6 Facility Illustrations 5.7 Specialized Facility Construction Details Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems 6.1 Power/Emergency Generators 6.2 Water/Redundant Water Systems 6.3 Sewer/Waste Water Systems 6.4 Communications/Secondary Systems 6.5 Air Handling Systems C:\staging\3F5CA \in\3F5CA doc

3 INDEX Page 2 Chapter 7. Chapter 8. Chapter 9. Chapter 10. Chapter 11. Chapter 12. Communications Capability 7.1 EOC Communications consists of 4 functional areas 7.2 Internal Communications 7.3 External Communications 7.4 Public Communications 7.5 Environmental requirements 7.6 Location 7.7 Environment Communications Rooms/Dispatch Centers 7.8 Power/Redundancy 7.9 Air Quality 7.10 Self Containment 7.11 Psychological Issues 7.12 Support Assistance EOC Security Concepts and Requirements 8.1 EOC Site Characteristics 8.2 Site Selection 8.3 Site Design 8.4 Controlled Access 8.5 Surveillance 8.6 Control Points and Physical Barriers 8.7 Parking 8.8 Site Utilities 8.9 Entry Control, Vehicular Access and Circulation 8.10 Building Envelope 8.11 Signage 8.12 Physical Security Lighting 8.13 Space Design 8.14 Building Security 8.15 Biological Acts of Terrorism 8.16 Summary Evaluation of Existing EOC Facilities 9.1 How to Use the Checklist Development Options: New, Remodel or Adaptive Reuse 10.1 Development Option: New Construction 10.2 Development Option: Remodeling of Existing Facilities 10.3 Development Option: Addition to Existing Facilities 10.4 Development Option: Addition and Renovation to Existing Facilities 10.5 Development Option: Acquisition of an Existing Building (Adaptive Re-Use) Delivery Options: How Facilities Can Be Constructed 11.1 The Traditional Method: Design-Bid-Build 11.2 The Construction Management Method 11.3 The Design-Build Method Human Factors 12.1 The Intelligent Use of Color C:\staging\3F5CA \in\3F5CA doc

4 INDEX Page 3 Chapter 13. Chapter 14. Chapter 15. Chapter 16. Chapter 17. Chapter 18. Funding Opportunities and Facility Costs 13.1 Federal Grants Home Land Security 13.2 State Grants 13.3 Development Impact Fees 13.4 Voter Referendums/Tax Base 13.5 Tax Exemption Programs 13.6 Community Redevelopment 13.7 Developer Set Asides 13.8 Capital Improvement Bonds 13.9 Capital Improvement Programs USDA/Grants and Loans Facility Costs Psychological Aspects of EOC Environments 14.1 The Intelligent Use of Color How to Obtain Professional Services 15.1 Selection Team 15.2 Formal R.F.P. s 15.3 Obtaining Qualified Firms 15.4 Interview Process 15.5 Summary Standards and Accreditation 16.1 Facility Standards/Recommended Space Allocation 16.2 Efficiency Factor 16.3 Specific Standards and Accreditation Requirements Existing Facilities/Floor Plans Bibliography/Appendix 18.1 Publications 18.2 News Publications 18.3 Codes and Design and Construction Standards 18.4 Data and Information Sources C:\staging\3F5CA \in\3F5CA doc

5 Chapter 1 Introduction: 1.1 Historical Context: This guidance publication is intended to inform the first-time designer and those involved in Emergency Preparedness of the requirements of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). These facilities are unique and, in essence, provide the physical environment for critical response in the event of a natural or man-made emergency. Historically, EOC facilities were accommodated in a wide variety of structures, most of which were buildings adaptively reused to accommodate emergency response functions. During the cold war period the threat of a nuclear strike accelerated the planning process and understanding of how emergency response structures should be designed to withstand these unique and dynamic forces. Specific guidelines were developed for facilities, relative to their protection factor, or ability to withstand exceptional events such as a nuclear strike. Structures became, in a sense, bunkers consisting of thickened and reinforced exterior surfaces (walls, roofs, etc.) and, in many cases, additional protection added by the utilization of earthern berms. Since the 1970 s the design and construction of EOC s has been the subject of an intense and analytical study by Architects, Engineers and Emergency Management personnel. Coupled with a better understanding of the varied forces associated with natural events (such as hurricanes and tornadoes) the design focus of facilities shifted from nuclear protected facilities to those that could survive natural events and continue to function prior to, during and after an event. Hurricane Andrew clearly demonstrated the necessity to increase our understanding of survivable buildings and became the basis for greater scientific analysis, while incorporating numerous lessons learned as existing structures were analyzed as to why they did, or did not, survive this storm event. Most recently, we have observed another major shift in facility planning, based upon the impact of world-wide terrorism and, in particular, the change in the American Psyche brought about by the 9/11 attacks in New York City, Washington and Pennsylvania. We now view building design in terms of a multidiscipline approach toward survivability, considering how to protect against natural and man-made events, with the latter being considered in the context of sabotage and not solely an Act of War. This has had a profound impact upon the design of facilities, the security associated with these facilities, and has enhanced our understanding of systems redundancy as a critical factor in the ability of an EOC to continue to provide for emergency response. 1.2 Purpose of an EOC: The basic purpose of an EOC is to provide a facility, located in an appropriate centralized location, in which government can continue to function and provide interagency coordination and executive decision making for managing disaster C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

6 Chapter 1 Introduction Page 2 response and recovery. An EOC, above all must be survivable during and after an incident, be it a man-made or natural event. There are specific criteria relative to the location, sighting and design of such facilities, as reflected in this publication. This document, in that respect, is intended to be a best practices guide, rather than a technical standard and is not intended to supercede existing building codes, rules and/or standards. It s purpose is to provide an overview of facility requirements and design criteria, rather than a step-by-step manual. 1.3 Research Sources: Contained in the Appendix of this publication is a listing of technical sources, research reports and documents relative to the many issues concerned with EOC s. The following is a brief summary of those which are of particular relevance to facility designers: Emergency Operations Centers Handbook (with Appendix I), FEMA, CPG 1-20, May 1984 EOC Assessment Checklist, Attachment IX, FEMA, 2002 Survivable Crisis Management Plan Development Guide, FEMA, April 1993 Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January 2002 State of Florida, Model Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection Guidelines, DCA/DEM, October 1997 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-98 Florida Building Code 2001, section Public Shelter Design Criteria Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of Energy Facilities, DOE-STD , January 2002 Installation Force Protection Guide, USAF, WDBG Protecting Buildings and Occupants from Airborne Hazards, USACE, TI , October 2001 Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents, USACE, ETL , February 1999 Hurricanes of 1992: Lesson Learned and Implication for the Future, American Society of Engineers, 1994 You are encouraged to review these publications, the general guidance information presented in this publication, as well as the other publications noted in the Appendix. C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

7 Chapter 1 Introduction Page EOC Data Base: As a prelude to this publication a detailed questionnaire was submitted to all 67 Florida Counties as well as an additional 45 cities. The questionnaire delt with a diversity of subjects, ranging from their status of existing EOC s and their systems to the issue of accreditation. Excerpted from the responses was the following information: Age of Facilities: As reflected on this chart almost half of all EOC s all over 20 years old, and as such, have had to adapt to the rapidly changing technology that has taken place over the past two decades. Additionally, the increased demands of emergency response has had a direct impact upon the viability of existing facilities. 20+ yrs 48.5% Other 8.6% Age of facility 0-9 yrs 28.6% yrs 14.3% Original Building Function: Equally important is the fact that over half of these facilities (55.9%) were originally constructed for a function other than an Emergency Operations Center. Many diverse types of buildings have been converted to an EOC function, with a variety of success, but clearly the adaptive reuse of existing structures for an EOC poses the question of appropriateness. No 55.9% Yes 44.1% Originally constructed as an E.O.C Size of the Facility: In the estimation of the respondents the overwhelming majority (67.6%) of the facilities are overcrowded for their functional needs. This is due, in all probability, to the age of facilities and the increase in functions that facilities of this nature now provide. No 67.6% Yes 32.4% Size of facility appropriate for its function C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

8 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Facility Redundant Services: The importance of facilities being provided with redundant services (power, water, etc.) is noted throughout this document, and is generally understood by most entities, all existing facilities (100%) have back-up emergency generators, yet only 41.2% have secondary water systems and less than 30% have back-up sanitary sewer systems. No 0.0% Yes 100.0% Emergency power back-up. Other 3.0% Yes 41.2% Yes 29.4% No 58.8% Potable water (Secondary System). No 67.6% Sanitary sewer (Secondary System) Facility Redundant Services: The importance of facilities being provided with redundant services (power, water, etc.) is noted throughout this document, and is generally understood by most entities, all existing facilities (100%) have back-up emergency generators, yet only 41.2% have secondary water systems and less than 30% have back-up sanitary sewer systems. No 29.4% Yes 70.6% Back-up communication tower(s). C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

9 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Natural Light: The development of new window/glazing systems over the past decade permits EOC facilities to incorporate natural light systems, yet over half (58.8%) of all existing facilities do not have any provisions for introducing natural light into their interiors spaces. This is generally attributable to the age of most facilities but is equally a product of a more conservative philosophical approach toward facility design. No 58.8% Other 3.0% Yes 38.2% Natural light (Windows) Appropriate Heating and Cooling: The vast majority of existing facilities are apparently successful (85.3%) in terms of the efficiency of their heating and air-conditioning systems. However, almost 15% of facilities surveyed expressed dissatisfaction with their building mechanical systems, which has direct impact upon staff performance, especially during the response to an event. No 14.7% Yes 85.3% Appropriate Heating and Air Conditioning ADA Accessibility: Universal Accessibility is mandated by both Federal and State codes and law and the vast majority of facilities are, in the perception of the respondents, in compliance with ADA requirements. It is important, however, to evaluate facilities on an ongoing basis as ADA requirements are an ever-evolving process and governmental facilities must be designed to accommodate special needs. No 47.1% Yes 52.9% Adequate security (Site and Building). C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

10 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Security/Site and Building: The necessity for EOC facilities to be secure environments is universally understood yet almost half of the respondents (47.1%) indicated that their facilities do not meet this very important criteria. This fact is perhaps the most surprising in the survey and one that requires immediate attention and/or corrective action, particularly relative to national and international events of the past two years. No 47.1% Yes 52.9% Adequate security (Site and Building) Protected Emergency Response Vehicle Facility: All Emergency Operations Centers have a wide variety of response equipment, including emergency response command vehicles. Typically these are investments of some expenses yet the vast majority (85.3%) are not accommodated in a protected (covered) environment. No 85.3% Yes 14.7% Protected (enclosed) emergency response vehicle parking General Vehicle Parking: It is important to provide sufficient parking for staff, visitors and emergency response personnel. Yet over half of the respondents (55.9%) indicated that insufficient parking was provided. This disparity becomes even greater when an activation occurs and additional personnel are required to be at the facility. No 55.9% Sufficient parking. Yes 44.1% C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

11 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Issues Related to Air Quality: The Premise of a sick building syndrome is one of obvious concern, particularly in Florida as a result of our hot and humid environment. The respondents indicated that this issue of some concern (29.4%), a one which should be addressed as quickly as possible. No 67.6% Other 3.0% Yes 29.4% Issues related to air quality Flood Hazard Area: Several facilities are located in areas of a known flood hazard (20.6%) which has an obvious impact upon their ability to appropriately function during such an event. This correlates primarily to those facilities which were not originally designed as an EOC, rather the adaptive reuse of an existing building. No 79.4% Yes 20.6% Facility located in a known flood hazard area Facility Subject to Flooding: A significant number of facilities (11.8%) are actually being subjected to flooding, in essence resulting in their failure to function as an EOC during that critical period. It is also of concern if surrounding areas are subject to flooding as it impacts upon the ability of staff and related response personnel to gain access to the facility. No 88.2% Yes 11.8% Facility has been subjected to flooding. C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

12 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Located in Conflict Area: Almost half of all respondents (47.1%) indicated that their facility was located in an area of potential conflict such as a power plant, major roadways, rail line, chemical/industrial facility, etc. No 52.9% Yes 47.1% Located in an area of potential conflict (i.e. power plant, major roadway, etc.) New Facility Need: For many of the reasons stated, a significant majority of respondents (67.6%) indicated that, in their estimation, a new EOC facility was warranted. As EOC facilities are relatively expensive facilities to construct this represents a substantive back-log of financial infrastructure needs. No 32.4% Yes 67.6% Anticipate the need for a new facility Impact of 9/11: The events of 9/11 has had an impact upon the functional requirements of EOC s (35.3%), yet a majority (64.7%) do not believe that it has adversely affected either their facility or its ability to function appropriately. No 64.7% Yes 35.3% Recent events (9/11) impacted facility. C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

13 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Staffing Impact: Related to the issue of facility size is the potential growth of staffing within the next five years. A majority of respondents (61.8%) indicated that their EOC staff is anticipated to increase, with an impact on the adequacy of space currently being provided. No 67.6% Other 5.8% Yes 61.8% Anticipate an increase in staffing within the next 5 years Facility Activations: Almost all EOC facilities have been activated for an event, ranging from a hurricane (94.1%) to an man-made event such as a fire or chemical spill. As noted in the accompanying charts, EOC facilities continue to serve their respective communities during very critical periods. No 0.0% Other 2.9% No 2.9% Other 3.0% No 11.8% Other 5.8% Yes 97.1% Yes 94.1% Yes 82.4% Facility has been activated for a specific event. Hurricane. Other natural disaster. No 58.8% Other 5.9% Yes* 35.3% Other * "Yes" answers identified the following: Y2K, exercise, flood, superbowl, search and rescue, special events.) No 64.7% Other 5.9% Yes 29.4% Act of terrorism (potential or real). No 26.5% Other 5.9% Yes 67.6% Man-made event (fire, chemical spill, etc.) C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

14 Chapter 1 Introduction Page Survivability of a Facility: This question is, the most critical, as it addresses the issue of facility feasibility. As reflected in the chart a surprising percentage of EOC s are designed to withstand only a category 2 storm (23.5%) while a higher percentage of (35.3%) respondents indicated that their facilities were capable of surviving a category 5 storm. 35.3% 11.8% 23.5% 2.9% 26.5% Category 2 ( mph) Category 3 ( mph) Category 4 ( mph) Category 5 (156+ mph) Unknow n Estimated survivability of facility Facility Size vs. Population/Service Area: There exists a direct relationship between service area and population of the geographical area relative to the size of the EOC. This provides some insight into a rule of thumb evaluation for both existing and proposed facilities. Clearly, facility space requirements must be established to meet specific needs and be a product of a detailed analysis that defines each space, and its size, that is to be incorporated into the facility. This formula, however, can serve as a preliminary tool for evaluating spatial need. Facility Size = sq. ft./per 1000 population. C:\staging\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C\in\3F5C8BA7-66F6-105B8C.doc

15 Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development: 2.1 EOC Functions: The generally accepted premise is that a modern Emergency Operations Center has five primary functions, identified as follows: Direction and Control, consisting of broad guidance, not tactical operations. Situation assessment, i.e. the ability to overview an incident and understand its broader implications. Coordination; to involve the response personnel in a coordinated effort Priority Establishment; to prioritize the response to an incident or event Resource Management The EOC is the location of the Voice of Government during (and in some cases after) an emergency or disaster. It exists to protect the general population, to protect property and to provide the capabilities for the community to return to normal. Direction, Control and Warning are the essential functions of EOC operation. The Emergency Management Institute provides an in-depth ICS/EOC Interface workshop (Unit 4) specifically on the subject of EOC functions. The reader of this document, and the potential designer of an EOC facility, is encouraged to become familiar with these criteria and, if possible, to attend workshops at the National Emergency Training Center. 2.2 Survivability Requirements: The issue of facility survivability is of paramount importance. In that context it is important to understand the premise that an EOC is only as strong (i.e. capable of survivability) as its weakest link. Thus the importance of perceiving the entire facility envelope in terms of protecting the critical functional aspects of the personnel that it accommodates. Experience indicates that the loss or failure of any part of the exterior protective system can result in overall facility failure. Contained in this publication are criteria and details relative to this issue, discussing typical wall construction, roof types, doors and windows, fresh air intakes, exhausts, etc., all of which become critically important components in building survivability. 2.3 EOC Staff and Organization: There are two primary staffing considerations for the design of an EOC; those personnel that are functionally at the facility on a day-to-day basis and those that are accommodated there in direct response to an event Emergency Management Staff: The spatial needs and functional characteristics of the Emergency Management staff is, in many respects, a product of the size of the County C:\staging\3F5C8BF8-642F \in\3F5C8BF8-642F doc

16 Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development Page 2 or the City involved. Larger jurisdictions have both the need and the financial resources, to provide staffing levels that are proportional to population. Determining the specific spatial need of these personnel is a product of a detailed Spatial Needs Assessment (as discussed in this publication, Chapter 4) in which function equates to specific square footage requirements. A detailed listing of spaces that are typically provided is contained in Chapter ( ). The spatial needs of each jurisdiction are, however, unique and, most importantly, need to be established in conjunction with emergency management staff that will utilize the facility Incident Command Staff: Prior to, during and after an incident designated personnel are accommodated at the EOC. They provide coordination with their respective organizations and assist in formulating response. Representatives, based upon accepted Federal and State protocols include Law Enforcement, Fire Response, Public Works, the Red Cross, etc. These individuals/organizations are typically located in the area of the EOC identified as the Incident Command Center. Experience suggests that this space be designed to provide maximum flexibility as compared to more fixed auditorium type seating. It is important to note, however, that multi-use capability of such a space may become the governing factor, when cost, community acceptance and political considerations come into play. 2.4 Space Requirements: As noted, facility space allocation is a product of analysis of function and personnel to be accommodated. Recent study has, however, suggested that the allocation of approximately gross square feet per 1000 population of the jurisdiction will generally provide sufficient area. Extremely small (population) Counties and Cities will generally exceed this value as there are certain basic facilities that must be provided. CPG-120, as an example originally allocates square feet per EOC staff member, but since the publication of that document (1984) numerous code and ADA requirements have been adopted, suggesting that a figure of gross square feet per staff may be appropriate. It is equally important to note that the physical protection of redundant building systems, such as housing for an emergency generator system within the EOC, has also had an impact upon facility size and, importantly, upon overall building costs. 2.5 Suitability of Existing Space vs. New: Most existing EOC s were developed several years ago and have not been capable of updating systems, technology, and survivability, as mandated by current C:\staging\3F5C8BF8-642F \in\3F5C8BF8-642F doc

17 Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development Page 3 standards. Most existing buildings do not lend themselves for adaptive reuse as the cost to accomplish the degree of facility protection desired can, in some instances, exceed the cost of a new facility. Additionally, and as previously noted, the basic premise of an EOC and the potential of man-made incidents directed toward such a facility, has also affected the ability of existing facilities to accommodate emerging technology and functional requirements. 2.6 Facility Location: This guidance publication attempts to define criteria relative to the physical location of an EOC. Identified are specific criteria for site finish floor elevation with, as an example, the need to locate the first floor above the level of a category 5 storm. It is equally relevant to consider the means of vehicle access (roadways) being at such an elevation as to provide staff with the capability to gain access to the facility when a natural event occurs. This publication attempts to provide numerical criteria for site selection but clearly the most critical need is to locate a facility at a location that will permit it to continue to function and remain survivable. 2.7 EOC Design/layout: The design or layout of an EOC is a functional consideration dealing with numerous criteria, such as security, access, code requirements for exiting, ADA requirements and, most importantly, function. Contained in this report are floor plans for existing EOC s which appear to meet basic facility criteria. Both City and County EOC s are represented as are smaller/larger jurisdictions. It is important, in that respect, to understand the need to separate public and press access from critical areas, such as the Incident Command Center and associated spaces. Access to this area should be limited to ICS personnel so that critical functions can be provided without distraction or interruption. 2.8 Communications Capability: The ability for an EOC to accommodate and retain communications capability is of significant importance. These are highly specialized areas, generally selfcontained and with access limited to communications staff and related administrative personnel. Additionally, Communications areas are, by their nature, technologically sophisticated and continually evolving to be able to incorporate emergency technology. These spaces, similarly to the Incident Command Center, are highly specialized and should be designed by individuals with previous experience with communications facilities. C:\staging\3F5C8BF8-642F \in\3F5C8BF8-642F doc

18 Chapter 2 Planning for EOC Development Page Redundancy/Infrastructure Systems: One of the significant lessons learned, as a result of hurricane Andrew, was the need to provide facilities with redundant facility systems, including power, sewer, water, communications, etc. In many instances it is equally critical to consider additional redundant systems such as dual emergency generators, as an example. Standard Electrical power to an EOC will, in all probability, be lost during an event. An emergency generator must be capable of providing power for 100 percent of the facility electrical needs. A failure in this back-up system can result in the inability of the facility to function, thus the need to consider the provision of dual emergency generators as an additional safeguard EOC Supplies and Equipment: EOC s are designed to be self-contained facilities, capable of remaining functional (and survivable) over what can be sustained period of days or weeks. In that respect the facility must be provided with stockpiled supplies such as food, water, medications, fuel for emergency generators, etc., that will permit the staff to respond without outside assistance. In some instances there may not be the ability for exterior sources to respond, depending upon the character of the incident. The need to accommodate supplies must be thought of in terms of this premise, i.e. to ensure continued and uninterrupted functional capability. EOC s are also highly technical facilities, incorporating sophisticated technology and equipment. Each such system needs to be identified early in the planning process, defined in terms of its own requirements (power, cooling, water, access, etc.) as well as any unique requirements that it may require. Service areas for specialized equipment, as an example, have a direct impact upon facility size. The location of an U.P.S. system (uninterrupted Power Source), as an example is of importance as is the service area surrounding this type of system. The designer, as well as the emergency manager should document, to the extent possible, all required and/or anticipated pieces of equipment and do so in the initial stages of programming and design, to insure that appropriate space is provided and that the project budget is comprehensive. These are just some of the issues, noted in a summary form, that are discussed in greater detail in this publication. The best experience and insight is to be gained by the on-site tours of new EOC s and by discussing lessons learned with the staff after they have established the operational capabilities of the facility in question. C:\staging\3F5C8BF8-642F \in\3F5C8BF8-642F doc

19 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment 3.1 Introduction: Emergency operations centers (EOCs) are essential for the effective direction, control, and coordination of emergency response operations. In order to provide Survivable Crisis Management (SCM) capabilities, an EOC should meet the following characteristics: 1) Flexibility (ability to satisfy mission requirements for all-hazards); 2) Sustainability (ability to support operations for an extended duration); 3) Security (ability to guard against potential risks and protect operations from the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information); 4) Survivability (ability to sustain the effects of a disaster and continue operation); and 5) Interoperability (ability to communicate with other EOCs and responders). The purpose of this chapter is to: 1) identify potential hazards (natural, man-made, civil) that may potentially impact an EOC in Florida (Hazards Identification); 2) characterize the impacts on the EOC facility and supporting infrastructure (Vulnerability Assessment); and 3) assess the probabilities of these hazards impacting the State of Florida (Risk Assessment). 3.2 Hazards Identification: The Florida Division of Emergency Management has organized potential hazards that may impact the state of Florida into three categories: Natural (flood, hurricanes and coastal storms, severe storms and tornadoes, wildfires, erosion, sinkholes); Technological (hazardous materials accidents, nuclear power plant accidents, loss of functionality of key infrastructure, computer malfunction); and Civil (terrorism acts including blast, incidents involving release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear agents). The following section identifies natural hazards in Florida, profiles these hazards, and assesses the vulnerability of EOCs to these hazards Natural Hazards: Due to its unique geographical setting, the State of Florida is vulnerable to a wide array of natural hazards that threaten life and property. The following hazards were included in this study: Flood Hurricanes & Coastal Storms Severe Storms and Tornadoes Wildfire Some of these hazards are interrelated (i.e., hurricanes can cause flooding and tornadoes), and some consist of hazardous elements that are not listed separately (i.e., severe thunderstorms can cause lightning; hurricanes can cause coastal erosion). This section provides a brief overview of the hazards, and their historical occurrences. Appendix A provides additional C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

20 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 2 descriptive information on each hazard outlined above, and other hazards, including erosion, dam/levee failure, and sinkholes Flood: Flooding is the most frequent and costly natural hazard in the United States and has caused over 10,000 deaths since Nearly 90 percent of presidential disaster declarations result from natural events in which flooding was a major component. Floods are generally the result of excessive precipitation, and can be classified under two categories: flash floods, the product of heavy localized precipitation in a short time period over a given location; and general floods, precipitation over a given river basin for a long period of time. The severity of a flooding event is determined by the following; a combination of stream and river basin topography and physiography, precipitation and weather patterns, recent soil moisture conditions and the degree of vegetative clearing. 330 Santa Rosa Holmes 220 Jackson 202 Walton Washington Nassau Escambia Okaloosa Calhoun Gadsden Leon Hamilton Madison 312 Bay Jefferson 103 Baker Liberty Wakulla 83 Columbia Duval Taylor Suwannee Union Clay Franklin Gulf 145 Lafayette ,590 Saint Johns Gilchrist 116 Putnam Alachua Flagler Dixie Levy 137 Marion Volusia Citrus Total number of facilities 158 Lake 130 indicated in red Sumter Hernando Orange 450 Pasco 208 Osceola Pinellas Polk Hillsborough 90 Brevard % Facilities in Flood 608 Indian River Prone Areas per County Manatee Hardee Okeechobee to Highlands 183 Saint Lucie to 70 Sarasota 300 Desoto Martin Glades 20 to Charlotte 5 to Hendry Palm Beach Less than 5 Lee 554 No Q3 Data Available 88 or Zero Facilities Collier Broward Miami-Dade Monroe miles Figure 1. Percentage of Facilities in Flood Prone Areas: By County Florida is affected by a large number of tropical weather systems. Although storm surge has the greatest potential for loss of life, recent research indicates that inland flooding was responsible for the greatest number of fatalities over the last 30 years. Studies C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

21 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 3 show that 59 percent of the tropical cyclone deaths in the United States resulted from severe inland flooding. Appendix A provides detailed information on the flood history in Florida, including a description of major storms that have occurred since 1994, and the damages incurred Hurricanes and Coastal Storms: Hurricanes, tropical storms, nor easters, and typhoons, also classified as cyclones, are any closed circulation developing around a low-pressure center in which the winds rotate counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere (or clockwise in the Southern Hemisphere) and whose diameter averages 10 to 30 miles across. Hurricanes and tropical storms can form in the Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico from the months of June to November. The peak of the Atlantic hurricane season is in early to mid-september and the average number of storms that reach hurricane intensity per year in this basin is about six (6). Holmes Santa Rosa Jackson Walton Washington Nassau Escambia Okaloosa Gadsden Leon Madison Hamilton Calhoun Bay Jefferson Liberty Columbia Baker Duval Wakulla Taylor Suwannee Union Clay Gulf Lafayette Franklin Saint Johns Gilchrist Alachua Putnam Dixie Flagler Levy Marion Volusia Population Distribution [Census 2000] 1,000,000 to 2,300, ,000 to 1,000, ,000 to 500, ,000 to 200,000 50,000 to 100,000 Less than 50,000 Citrus Lake Sumter Hernando Orange Pasco Osceola Hillsborough Brevard Polk Indian River Manatee Hardee Okeechobee Highlands Saint Lucie Sarasota Desoto Martin Glades Charlotte Palm Beach Hendry Lee Collier Broward Miami-Dade Monroe miles Figure 2. Potential Areas Covered by Surge: Category 3 Hurricane Florida has experienced the greatest number of hurricane landfalls of any state in the nation. The state s flat topography also makes it susceptible to the full force of hurricane winds and powerful C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

22 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 4 TABLE 1 storm surge. Between 1900 and 2002, Florida was impacted by 65 hurricanes, 24 of which were major hurricanes (Category 3 or higher). Generally, the lower intensity hurricanes have made landfall in the northwest portion of the state. Hurricane intensity is classified by the Saffir-Simpson Scale, which rates hurricane intensity on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the most intense. The Saffir-Simpson scale is shown in Table 1. Saffir-Simpson Scale Category Maximum Sustained Wind Speed (mph) Minimum Surface Pressure (millibars) Storm Surge (feet) Greater than Less than Source: National Hurricane Center Damage and loss of functionality can also occur as a result of storm surge. A storm surge is a wave that has outrun its generating source and become a long period swell. The surge is always highest in the right-front quadrant of the direction in which the hurricane is moving. As the storm approaches shore, the greatest storm surge will be to the north of the hurricane eye. Such a surge of high water topped by waves driven by hurricane force winds can be devastating to coastal regions, causing severe beach erosion and property damage along the immediate coast. Appendix A provides additional information on historical occurrences of hurricanes and coastal storms in the State of Florida Severe Storms and Tornadoes: A third category of natural hazards that affects the State of Florida is severe storms and tornadoes. According to the National Weather Service, there are over 100,000 thunderstorms every year, though only about 10 percent are classified as severe. Although thunderstorms generally affect a small area when they occur, they are very dangerous because of their ability to generate tornadoes, hailstorms, strong winds, flash flooding and damaging lightning. While thunderstorms can occur in all regions of the United States, they are most common in the central and southern states because atmospheric conditions in those regions are most ideal for generating these powerful storms. C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

23 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 5 A tornado is a violent windstorm characterized by a twisting, funnel-shaped cloud extending to the ground. It is most often generated by a thunderstorm (but sometimes result from hurricanes and other coastal storms) when cool, dry air intersects and overrides a layer of warm, moist air forcing the warm air to rise rapidly. The damage from a tornado is a result of the high wind velocity and wind-blown debris, also accompanied by lightning or large hail. According to the National Weather Service, tornado wind speeds normally range from 40 to more than 300 miles per hour. The most violent tornadoes have rotating winds of 250 miles per hour or more and are capable of causing extreme destruction and turning normally harmless objects into deadly missiles Florida Tornadoes: While no place in the United States is immune to tornadoes, there are areas where they occur much more frequently including the state of Florida. According to the NOAA s Storm Prediction Center (SPC), the highest concentration of U.S. tornadoes has been in Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas and Florida respectively. Although the Great Plains region of the Central United States does favor the development of the largest and most dangerous tornadoes (earning a designation of tornado alley ), Florida experiences the most number of tornadoes per square mile of all states (SPC, 2002). Figure 3 shows tornado activity in the State of Florida, by county. Santa Rosa Holmes Jackson Walton Washington Gadsden Leon Madison Hamilton Nassau Escambia Okaloosa Calhoun Bay Jefferson Liberty Columbia Baker Duval Wakulla Taylor Suwannee Union Clay Gulf Lafayette Franklin Saint Johns Gilchrist Alachua Putnam Dixie Flagler Levy Marion Volusia Citrus Lake Sumter Hernando Orange Historical Tornado Frequency [F0 & Greater] 100 to to to to 40 5 to 20 0 to 5 Pasco Osceola Hillsborough Brevard Polk Indian River Manatee Hardee Okeechobee Highlands Saint Lucie Sarasota Desoto Martin Glades Charlotte Hendry Palm Beach Lee Collier Broward Miami-Dade Monroe miles Figure 3. Tornado Activity in Florida: By County C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

24 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 6 Florida has averaged approximately 75 tornadoes per year since 1950, with an average of 3 deaths and 60 injured per year. According to the National Climatic Data Center, the state of Florida experienced 3,983 tornado events from 1950 through February of These events caused 183 deaths, 3,183 injured, and a total of approximately $1,148,782,000 in property damage (NCDC, 2003). Table 1 in Appendix A (Volume II) depicts the number of tornadoes in Florida by county, the number of deaths from tornadoes, and property damage. Santa Rosa Holmes Jackson Walton Washington Nassau Escambia Okaloosa Gadsden Leon Madison Hamilton Calhoun Bay Jefferson Liberty Columbia Baker Duval Wakulla Taylor Suwannee Union Clay Gulf Lafayette Franklin Saint Johns Gilchrist Alachua Putnam Dixie Flagler Levy Marion Volusia Citrus Lake Sumter Hernando Orange Annual Probability for Wind Speed of 115 mph or Higher [%] 2.0 to to to to to to 0.4 Pasco Osceola Hillsborough Brevard Polk Indian River Manatee Hardee Okeechobee Highlands Saint Lucie Sarasota Desoto Martin Glades Charlotte Hendry Palm Beach Lee Collier Broward Miami-Dade Monroe miles Figure 4. Annual Probability for Wind Speed of 115 mph or Higher: By County Wildfire: A wildfire is any fire occurring in wild lands (i.e. grassland, forest, brush land) except for fire under prescription. Prescription burning, or controlled burn, undertaken by land management agencies is the process of igniting fires under selected conditions, in accordance with strict parameters. Wildfires are part of the natural management of the earth s ecosystems, but may also be caused by natural or human factors. Over 80 percent of forest fires are started by negligent human behavior such as smoking in wooded areas or improperly extinguishing campfires. The second most common cause for wildfire is lightning. C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

25 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Technological Hazards: There are three different classes of wildland fires: surface fire, ground fire and crown fire. A surface fire is the most common type and burns along the floor of a forest, moving slowly and killing or damaging trees. A ground fire (muck fire) is usually started by lightning or human carelessness and burns on or below the forest floor. Crown fires spread rapidly by wind and move quickly by jumping along the tops of trees. Wildland fires are usually signaled by dense smoke that fills the area for miles around. Of Florida s approximately 36.3 million acres, 50% is forestland (including woodland brush and grassland), about 19% is urban, industrial or wetland, and another 31% is for agricultural use. Approximately 25.2 million acres are protected forest and wildlands in Florida. Florida s population continues to grow at a rate of approximately 3 million persons per year. From 1981 through 1996, an average of 6,080 wildfires occurred per year, burning 219,725 acres. Because of changing weather conditions, the yearly figures range from a low of 3,985 wildfires (with 86,944 acres burned) in 1991 to a record high of 14,042 wildfires (with 587,400 acres burned) in Since 1998, more than 21,000 wildfires have devastated over 1.3 million acres and destroyed more than 1,000 structures. In 1998, the previous El-Nino conditions subsided, causing drought conditions and 4,890 wildfires which burned 506,350 acres. The drought continued in 1999, with 5,636 wildfires destroying 355,197 acres. In 2000, another drought stricken year, 212,415 acres were burned from 6,718 wildfires. In 2001, the drought continued with 403,740 acres burned from 4,804 wildfires. These fires resulted in numerous fire complexes being developed each of those four years. This taxed the state s firefighting resources, those of other agencies in the state, and required assistance from other states. The largest contingent of air firefighting resources ever collected responded to the wildfires of 1998 in Florida. The Mallory Swamp fire, one of the single largest and most costly wildfires in Florida history, burned 57,200 acres near Perry, Florida in May 2001, costing an estimated $6.7 million. The term technological hazards refers to the origins of incidents that can arise from human activities such as the manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. The Florida DEM identifies the following examples of technological hazards: computer viruses, critical C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

26 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 8 infrastructure (damage or loss of functionality), hazardous materials, and nuclear power plants (damage or loss of functionality). Incidents involving hazardous materials are the most common technological hazard in the State of Florida. The State Emergency Response Council (SERC) oversees the state s Hazardous Materials program, and compiles data on the location of hazardous materials, number and location of reported incidents, the location of facilities and store or process hazardous materials, and other data. Table 2 captures the key indicators of the exposure of the state to hazardous materials accidents. For the purposes of this study, important findings include: 1) Sulfuric acid, chlorine and ammonia are the hazardous materials that are found in the greatest quantities in the State of Florida. 2) Over 60 percent of all risk management plans that are conducted in Florida address potential accidents involving anhydrous ammonia, sulfuric dioxide, and chlorine at water and wastewater treatment operations. 3) Approximately 14 percent of risk management facilities in Florida use anhydrous ammonia as a refrigerant (including food processing plants, food distributors). 4) Chorine, sulfur dioxide, and anhydrous ammonia are the hazardous substances most commonly stored or used at chemical repackaging and distribution facilities. Table 2 Hazardous Materials Exposure: Profile of LEPC Districts in Florida District Total # of Reported Incidents Top Reported Extremely Hazardous Material Total # of Toxic Release Inventory Facilities Total Section Facilities Nitric Acid Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Ammonia Sulfuric Acid Sulfuric Acid Chlorine Source: Compiled from 2002 Annual Report, State Emergency Response Council (SERC) for Hazardous Materials. C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

27 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 9 District 1 West Florida Regional Planning Council (Pensacola) 2 Apalachee Regional Planning Council (Blountstown) 3 North Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Gainesville) 4 Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council (Jacksonville) 5 Withlacoochee Regional Planning Council (Ocala) 6 East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Maitland) 7 Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Bartow) 8 Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council (St. Petersburg) 9 Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council (North Fort Myers) 10 Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council (Stuart) 11 South Florida Regional Planning Council (Hollywood) Civil Hazards: Civil emergencies include civil/political unrest, bomb threats, information warfare, and acts of terrorism. In assessing the potential threats to an EOC, acts of terrorism are of primary concern. Terrorism refers to intentional, criminal, malicious acts, which may involve the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including biological, chemical, and radiological weapons; arson, incendiary, explosive, and armed attacks; industrial sabotage and intentional hazardous materials releases; and cyberterrorism. In assessing the potential threats that are posed by human-caused hazards to the functionality of EOCs and staff, local emergency managers can take the following steps: 1) form an EOC Working Group that brings together expertise in hazards analysis, EOC (facilities and operations), and mitigation; 2) coordinate with the Florida Division of Emergency Management and Florida Homeland Security to incorporate threat assessments of WMD into the EOC assessments; 3) develop profiles of human-caused hazards that provide information on the characteristics of the hazards, the extent of their effects; and 4) identify steps that can be taken to prevent human-caused hazards, or at least minimize their impacts. Planning Team. In conducting an EOC Assessment, it will be useful to call on expertise (State and local) in the following areas: Counter- and anti-terrorism (law enforcement and military) Chemical emergency planning Fire protection engineering Force protection Emergency management Electrical engineering Protective/defensive architecture Site planning, urban design, and landscape design Structural engineering, design, and construction C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

28 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 10 Specialized expertise in these fields can be found at a number of sources, including the Florida Division of Emergency Management, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, and Florida Department of Law Enforcement Threat Assessments: Identification and characterization of terrorist threats is the first step in developing and implementing mitigation and force protection measures for your Emergency Operations Center. The purpose of a threat assessment is to gather and analyze information on known domestic threats (similar to the hazards identification for natural hazards). Accordingly, threat assessments need to be closely coordinated with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Florida Homeland Security Council. Once local officials understand the potential threats to the EOCs and other facilities, anti-terrorism and force protection strategies can be developed and implemented. Threat identification involves three components: 1) Aggressors; 2) Tools, weapons, and explosives; and 3) Tactics Aggressors: Aggressors generally perform hostile acts against people, facilities, and equipment. Their objectives include: 1) inflicting injury or death people; 2) destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or resources; 3) stealing equipment, material, or information; and 4) creating publicity for their cause. Aggressors may use the first three objectives to accomplish the fourth Tools, Weapons, and Explosives: To achieve their objectives, aggressors use various tools, weapons, and explosives, as follows: Tools such as forced entry tools, vehicles, and surveillance tools. Weapons, such as incendiary devices, small arms, antitank weapons and mortars, and nuclear, chemical, biological, and nuclear agents, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Explosives, such as homemade bombs, hand grenades, and vehicle bombs Tactics: Tactics refer to the offensive strategies employed by the aggressors, reflecting their capabilities and objectives. Some of the more common tactics include: C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

29 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 11 Moving-vehicle bomb. The moving-vehicle bomb is a suicidal attack where an explosive-laden vehicle is driven into a facility, and detonated. Stationary vehicle bomb. This type of bomb may be detonated by time delay or remote control. Exterior attack. This attack is at close range of a facility or exposed asset. Using improvised incendiary devices or hand-placed bombs, the aggressor attempts to inflict destruction and death. Covert entry. The aggressor attempts to enter the facility covertly using false credentials. The aggressor may attempt to carry weapons or explosives into the facility. Airborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the air supply of a facility or community. Waterborne contamination. The aggressor uses chemical, biological, or radiological agents to contaminate the water supply of a facility or community. Table 3 is intended to provide the EOC Work Groups with a better understanding of the ways in which human-caused hazards can interact with the built environment, including the application mode, duration of the hazard, the dynamic/static characteristics of the hazard (which describes the effects of the hazard, whether it remains confined to the place it occurs such as a bomb explosion or expands or changes direction, as occurs with releases of gases) Event Profiles for Human-Caused Hazards: In identifying hazards and assessing threats to EOCs from natural, technological and civil emergencies, it is important to understand the fundamental differences between these hazards, their impacts, and the steps can be taken to eliminate or minimize their consequences. By profiling human-caused hazards, the EOC Work Groups can begin to assess these impacts, including: contamination (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards), energy (explosives, arson), or failure or denial of service (sabotage, infrastructure breakdown, transportation service disruption). The following sections provide a brief description of two human-caused hazards: blast effects and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents Blast Effects: In the context of other hazards such as earthquakes, winds, or floods, an explosive attack has the following distinguishing features: C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

30 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 12 The intensity of the pressures acting on a targeted building can be several orders of magnitude greater than these other hazards. It is not uncommon for the peak incident pressure to be in excess of 100 psi on a building in an urban setting for a vehicle weapon parked along the curb. At these pressure levels, major damages and failure are expected even for relatively small close-in weapons. Explosive pressures decay extremely rapidly with distance from the source. Therefore, the damages on the side of the building facing the explosion may be significantly more severe than on the opposite side. As a consequence, direct air-blast damages tend to cause more localized damage. In an urban setting, however, reflections off surrounding buildings can increase damages to the opposite side. The duration of the event is very short, measured in thousandths of a second, or milliseconds. This differs from earthquakes and wind gusts, which are measured in seconds, or sustained wind and flood events, which may be measured in hours. Because of this, the mass of the structure has a strong mitigating effect on the response because it takes time to mobilize the mass of the structure. By the time the mass is mobilized, the loading is gone, thus mitigating the response. This is the opposite of earthquakes, whose imparted forces are roughly in the same timeframe as the response of the building mass, causing a resonance effect that can worsen the damage. Table 3. FACILITY HAZARD ASSESSMENT: HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS FLORIDA EOC SELF-ASSESSMENT HAZARD APPLICATION MODE HAZARD DURATION EXTENT OF EFFECTS MITIGATING CONDITIONS/STEPS Conventional Bomb Detonation of explosive device on or near the EOC; delivery via person, vehicle, or projectile Instantaneous; additional secondary devices may be used, lengthening the duration of the hazard until the attack site is determined to be clear. Extent of damage is determined by type and quantity of explosive. Effects generally static other than cascading consequences, incremental structural etc. failure, Restrict and control access to EOC; place barriers and/or shielding (terrain, forestation, structures can provide shielding by absorbing and/or deflecting energy and debris); minimize opportunities for concealment of devices through improved security. Note: Energy from the explosion decreases logarithmically as a function of distance from seat of device. Chemical Agent Liquid/aerosol contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers or other aerosol generators; liquids vaporizing from Chemical agents may pose viable threats for hours to weeks, depending on the agent and the conditions in which it exists. Contamination can be carried out of the initial target area by persons, vehicles, water and wind. Chemicals may be corrosive Train staff in protective actions to take for WMD events, including shielding in the form of sheltering in place to protect people and property from the harmful effects of these agents. Note: Air temperature can affect C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

31 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 13 puddles/containers ; or munitions or otherwise damaging over time if not remedied. evaporation of aerosols. Ground temperature affects evaporation of liquids. Humidity can enlarge aerosol particles, reducing inhalation hazard. Arson/Incendi ary Attack Initiation of fire or explosion on or near the target via direct contact or remotely via projectile. Typically minutes to hours. Extent of damage is determined by type and quantity of device/accelerant and materials present at or near target. Effects are generally static (remains confined in time, as opposed to expanding) Table 3 (con t) FACILITY HAZARD ASSESSMENT: HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS FLORIDA EOC SELF-ASSESSMENT Mitigation factors include built-in fire detection and protection systems and fire resistive4 construction techniques. Inadequate security can allow easy access to the EOC, easy concealment of an incendiary device and undetected initiation of a fire. Non-compliance with fire and building codes as well as failure to maintain existing fire protection systems can substantially increase the effectiveness of a fire weapon. HAZARD APPLICATION MODE HAZARD DURATION EXTENT OF EFFECTS MITIGATING CONDITIONS/STEPS Biological Agent Liquid or solid contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/aerosol generators or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits and moving sprayers. Biological agents may pose viable threats for hou9rs to years, depending on the agent and the conditions in which it exists. Depending on the agent used and the effectiveness with which it is deployed, contamination can be spread via wind and water. Infection can be spread via human or animal vectors. Early detection is critical. Altitude of release above ground can affect dispersion; sunlight is destructive to may bacteria and viruses; light to moderate wind will disperse agents but higher winds can break up aerosol clouds; the micrometeorological effects of buildings and terrain can influence aerosolization and travel of agents. Radiological Agent Radioactive contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers/aerosol generators, or by point or line sources such as munitions, covert deposits and moving sprayers. Contaminants may remain hazardous for seconds to years, depending on the material used. Initial effects will be localized to site of attack; depending on meteorological conditions, subsequent behavior of radioactive contaminants may be dynamic. Early detection is critical. Duration of exposure, distance from source of radiation, and the amount of shielding between source and target determine exposure to radiation. Hazardous Materials Release (fixed facility or transportation) Solid, liquid and/or gaseous contaminants may be released from fixed or mobile containers. Hours to days. Chemicals may be corrosive or otherwise damaging over time. Explosion and/or fire may be subsequent. Contamination may be carried out of the incident area As with chemical weapons, weather conditions will directly affect how the hazard develops. The micrometeorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of the agents. Shield in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and property from harmful effects. Non-compliance with fire and C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

32 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 14 by persons, vehicles, water and wind. building codes as well as failure to maintain existing fire protection containment features can substantially increase the damage from a hazardous materials release. Source: Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, (FEMA 386-7, 2002) Building Damage: The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be predicted with certainty. What is known is that the shock wave is the primary damage mechanism in an explosion. The pressures it exerts on building surfaces may be several orders of magnitude greater than the loads for which the building is designed. The shock wave also acts in directions that the building or EOC may not have been designed for, such as upward on the floor system. In assessing potential damage to an EOC from a blast, the following should be noted: 1) floor failure is common in large-scale vehicle-delivered explosive attacks, because floor slabs typically have a large surface area for t he pressure to act on and a comparably small thickness; 2) glass is often the weakest part of a building, breaking at low pressure compared to other components such as the floors, walls, or columns. Past incidents have shown that glass breakage may extend for miles in large external explosions. High-velocity glass fragments have been shown to be a major contributor to injuries in such incidents Exposure to CBRN Effects: The vulnerability an EOC facility to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and blast hazards is a function of multiple factors, including: site design and layout, vehicular access and circulation, utility systems design and configuration, and the structural integrity of the EOC facility itself. The following is a checklist of key factors that need to be addressed in assessing threat and protective measures for building systems. C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

33 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 15 VULNERABILITY ZONE POPULATION IMPACTED 135,880 33,094 VULNERABILITY ZONE Site of Release Police Station Fire Station Hospital Figure 5. Use of HAZUS-MH and ALOHA to model the exposure of EOCs and other critical facilities to chemical hazards. Figure 6. SLOSH Map for Florida Figure 6 provides an example of a SLOSH map that delineates the boundaries of storm surge for five hurricane scenario events (Categories 1 through 5). SLOSH maps can be used to estimate potential EOC damage and loss of functionality for scenario events (see Table 4 EOC Vulnerability Assessment Checklist Section 1 Storm Surge Inundation). SLOSH maps can be used in conjunction with other tools to answer the following questions: What is the maximum predicted storm surge height at the EOC s site? Which major access roads to the EOC are subject to storm surge from scenario events? Will electric utilities and water supply be inundated in a Cat 2 or greater hurricane event? C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

34 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Vulnerability Assessments: The purpose of an EOC vulnerability assessment is to analyze the effects of natural, technological and civil hazards on EOCs including direct damage and loss of functionality to determine the impacts of these hazards on: 1) Survivability of the EOC (and alternate facilities); 2) Security of the EOC against potential risks from all-hazards; 3) Sustainability of the EOC, including the ability to maintain operations for an extended period of time following a major event (natural, technological, civil); and 4) Interoperability of the EOC. The survivability of an EOC depends to a great extent on the ability to withstand the effects of natural hazards including high winds, flooding and storm surge, and to provide adequate protection from blast effects and the effects from Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) agents. The security of an EOC examined in more detail in Chapter 8 is a function of several factors: siting and design of the EOC, and characteristics of the structural systems, building envelop, and utility and mechanical systems that support the operation of the EOC. The EOC Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Table 4) examines the potential impacts of natural, technological, and civil/human caused hazards that can threaten the survivability of an EOC. These hazards and their impacts are organized into the following categories: Natural Hazards 1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam 3 Lay-Down Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure 5 Wildfire Exposure Technological Hazards 6 Hazmat and Nuclear Plant Considerations (Technological) Civil/Human-Caused Hazards 7 Blast 8 Chemical, Radiological, Biological, Nuclear How to Use the EOC Vulnerability Assessment Form: The EOC Vulnerability Assessment Form is a screening and evaluation tool that is designed for use by state and local officials to assess the vulnerability of their EOCs to natural and technological hazards and civil/terrorist threats. The format and content is patterned after hurricane evacuation shelter surveys, and incorporates evaluation criteria that addresses: 1) EOC survivability, security, sustainability, and interoperability; and 2) potential impacts from civil/terrorist threats, C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

35 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 17 including blast effects, and the effects from the release of chemical, biological, and radiological agents. The checklist has nine sections: 0 EOC Identification and Site Characteristics 1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety 3 Lay Down Hazard Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure 5 Wildfire Exposure 6 Hazardous Materials and Nuclear Facilities 7 Human-Caused Hazards Blast Effects 8 Human Caused Hazards Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Releases Each section contains a set of questions related to the vulnerability of the EOC to each of the hazards/threats outlined above. The assessment uses a modular format that facilitates expansion and modification. The objective is to identify specific potential impacts from these three categories of hazards/threats on the EOC, and to incorporate this information into mitigation actions/protective measures that will improve the functionality, security, interoperability and survivability of the EOC. C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

36 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 18 Table 4 Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Natural, Technological and Civil/Human Caused Hazards Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics 0.1 EOC Facility Name: Building ID #: Street Address: City: State, Zip+4: 0.2 Latitude: Longitude: 0.3 County: 0.4 Facility Type: Primary EOC Alternate EOC Survey Date: 0.5 Contact: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: Alternate 1: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: Alternate 2: Title: Phone: Alt. Phone: 0.6 Name of power company: Surveyor: 0.7 What is the building/structure type? Unreinforced Masonry Steel Concrete Reinforced Masonry Wood Other (specify) C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

37 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 19 Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics REFERENCES & TOOLS: Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January 2002 State of Florida, Model Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection Guidelines, DCA/DEM, October 1997 Site Characteristics Natural Hazard Vulnerability 0.8 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map, is the EOC s site above the 100-year flood plain? Yes No. 0.9 Is the EOC or supporting infrastructure located on a coastal barrier island? Yes No 0.10 According to the appropriate Storm Tide Atlas, is the EOC s site located above any Category 4 storm surge zone? Yes No 0.11 Is the EOC's first floor elevation on an equal or higher elevation than that of the base flood elevation level for site? Yes No 0.12 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map(s), is the Facility s site subject to isolation due to riverine and/or ponding inundation of roadways? 0.13 Is the building that houses the EOC close to or set back from a tree line? Yes No Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 0 Identification & Site Characteristics REFERENCES & TOOLS: EOC Assessment Checklist, Attachment IX, FEMA, 2002 FEMA 426. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings Installation Force Protection Guide, USAF, WDBG, 1997 C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

38 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 20 Site Characteristics Human-Caused Hazards Vulnerability (Security and Blast) 0.20 Is the EOC space dedicated (set aside and configured for EOC use only) or multiuse (not dedicated)? Yes No 0.21 Does the EOC occupy its own building/shelter or does it share a building/shelter with another organization; e.g., State or local police headquarters, emergency medical services facility, National Guard armory, commercial building? 0.22 Is the EOC in a Government owned or leased facility? Yes No 0.23 Is the EOC located in an area where it can quickly be secured? Yes No 0.24 Is the EOC in the proximity of a government center (i.e., city hall, county courthouse, State capitol, etc.)? Yes No 0.25 Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that separates vehicles and structures? Yes No 0.26 Is the EOC designed with security in mind both site specific and with regard to adjacent land uses? Yes No 0.27 Does the EOC have a secure communications room? Is the space adequate to support cleared EOC staff and secure communications requirements? Yes No Is the EOC located near an adequate road network for ease of access? Yes No 0.29 Are perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles? Yes No Site Characteristics Human-Caused Hazards Vulnerability (Security and Blast) 0.30 Is the Alternate EOC located in an area where it can quickly be secured? Yes No 0.31 Is the Alternate EOC located in a facility that has structural integrity? Yes No 0.32 Does the Alternate EOC have a secure communications room? Yes No 0.33 Does the EOC have special structural capabilities that improve its survivability? Yes No 0.34 Does the EOC have a collective protection system for Chemical, Biological, or Radiological agents? C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

39 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 21 Yes No 0.35 Does the terrain surrounding the EOC place the buildings in a depression or low area (that can trap heavy vapors and inhibit natural decontamination by prevailing winds)? Yes No 0.36 In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park unacceptably close to the EOC? Yes No 0.37 Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls in place? And is the4re vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the EOC site? Yes No 0.38 Is there any potential access to the EOC site or facility through utility paths or water runoff? Yes No 0.39 Is there an anti-ram buffer zone stand-off distance from the EOC to unscreened vehicles or parking? Yes No Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 1 Natural Hazards Impacts - Storm Surge Inundation REFERENCES & TOOLS: SLOSH maps, prepared by the U.S Army Corps of Engineers, that illustrate coastal flooding and inundation limits as a result of each hurricane classification from a Category 1 through a Category 5 hurricane. HAZUS-MH, FEMA s multi-hazard loss estimation tool Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January According to the appropriate Storm Tide Atlas, is the EOC s site located above any Category 4 storm surge zone? Yes No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

40 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page What is the site elevation above Mean Sea Level (MSL)? feet above MSL. What is the EOC s ground floor elevation above MSL? Mean Sea Level (MSL)? feet above 1.3 What is the maximum predicted storm surge height at the EOC s site? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 feet MSL 1.4 What is the maximum height of surge expected in the EOC building? Cat. 2 feet MSL Cat. 3 feet MSL Cat. 4/5 feet MSL 1.5 According to the Storm Surge Atlas, is the EOC s site subject to isolation due to storm surge activity? Yes No Storm Surge Inundation (con t) 1.6 According to the Storm Surge Atlas, are the major access roads to the EOC subject to storm surge activity that would impede access to the EOC? Yes No 1.7 According to SLOSH maps and other analysis, will the electric utilities and water supply be inundated in a Cat 2 or greater hurricane event? Yes No 1.8 Summary Assessment (Storm Surge hazard, and impacts on survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of the EOC): Sample: The objective of this section of the EOC assessment is to identify storm surge conditions that would impact the survivability, security and functionality of the EOC. The analysis determined that the EOC is vulnerable to flooding associated with a Category 4 or greater hurricane. The access road to the EOC will be inundated in a Category 3 or greater storm, resulting in potentially limited access for vehicular traffic. According to analysis of SLOSH maps and other references - and experience from previous floods it has been determined that electric utilities and water supply to EOC will be interrupted in a Category 4 or C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

41 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 23 greater storm. Corrective actions: (List) Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 2 Natural Hazards Impacts - Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety REFERENCES & TOOLS: Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 HAZUS-MH Flood Module 2.1 What flood zone is the EOC s site located within? A; B; C; D; X; V; Panel Not Printed; Area Not Surveyed 2.2 Is the EOC s site subject to inundation due to failure of containment of levees, dams and reservoirs following hurricane-related flooding? Yes No 2.3 Is the EOC s site subject to isolation due to failure of containment of dams and reservoirs following hurricane-related flooding? Yes No 2.4 Is there a history of minor flooding/ponding at the facility s site under normal rainfall conditions? (minor flooding is the water level where water actually enters buildings) Yes No 2.5 If the lowest floor of the EOC is below the BFE, are there openings in the walls to allow water to pass through the wall, thus avoiding pressure buildup on foundation and first floor walls? Yes No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

42 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Are the heating, electrical, and other utilities located in a basement or on a slab area that is below the BFE? Yes No 2.7 Are access roads to the building site sufficiently elevated and will not be closed during periods of high water? (Based on local flooding history and/or FIRM panel information.) Yes No 2.8 According to the appropriate Flood Insurance Rate Map, is the EOC s site above the 100-year flood plain? Yes No. 2.9 Is there a history of minor flooding/ponding at the Facility s site under normal rainfall conditions? Yes No 2.10 Summary Assessment ( Rain/Dam Failure hazards, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 3 Natural Hazards Impacts Lay Down Hazard Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS: Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters, FEMA 361, July 2000 Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection, ARC 4496, January Is there a lay-down hazard in close proximity to the EOC? Yes No 3.2 Are there large/tall trees within lay-down range of the EOC? C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

43 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 25 Yes No 3.3 Are there tall structures (e.g., towers, chimneys, steeples, etc.) within lay-down range of the EOC? Yes No 3.4 Are there potential roll-over hazards within 100 feet of the HES building? For example, unanchored relocatable buildings, vehicle parking lot, and unanchored HVAC units Yes No 3.5 Is there at least one access road not tree-lined? Yes No 3.6 Specify quantity and distribution of lay down hazards in relation to the EOC, including utilities, unanchored buildings, tall structures, and other potential hazards that may present a hazard to the EOC. 3.7 Summary Assessment ( Lay Down Hazard Exposure, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 4 Natural Hazards Impacts Wind and Debris Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS: C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

44 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 26 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, ASCE 7-98 HAZUS-MH Hurricane module 4.1 Will the EOC site be exposed to the full force of hurricane winds? Yes No 4.2 Are there unanchored fuel tanks within 300 feet of the EOC? Yes No 4.3 Are there buildings with roof gravel within 300 feet of the EOC? Yes No 4.4 Are there debris generating sources (e.g., lumber yards, nurseries, and junk yards) within 300 feet of the EOC? Yes No Specify: 4.5 Are there portable classroom/trailers, small frame buildings, HVAV units within 100 feet of the EOC? Yes If yes, specify: No 4.6 Are there large light towers and/or antennas within 300 feet of the EOC? Yes If yes, specify No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

45 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Are the access roads to the EOC tree lined? Yes No 4.8 What is the degree of wind exposure for the EOC? Sheltered Exposure Limited Exposure Unsheltered Exposure 4.9 Summary Assessment (Wind and Debris Exposure): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 5 Natural Hazards Impacts Wildfire Exposure REFERENCES & TOOLS: Assessing Fire Risk in Florida Using Integrated GIS and Remote Sensing Applications, Florida Division of Forestry (2000) Fire Risk Assessment System (FRAS), Florida Division of Forestry identifies levels of concern based on wildland fire susceptibility, fire effects, population density, and available measures to manage the fire. 5.1 Has the locality included the wildfire hazard in an all-hazards vulnerability assessment, specifically including an assessment of the vulnerability of the EOC to wildfires? Yes No 5.2 Does the EOC have a fire safe zone of at least 75 feet around your EOC? Yes No Not Applicable 5.3 Have potential fuel loads within a two-mile radius of the EOC been identified? Yes No 5.4 Have state and/or local emergency managers coordinated with Florida Division of Forestry to assess the vulnerability of the community and EOC to wildfires, based on fuel load, land development trends, and topography in your area? C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

46 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 28 Yes No 5.5 Is there a fire suppression plan and procedures in place to effectively suppress an EOC threatening fire, regardless of origin? Yes No Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 6 Hazardous Materials & Nuclear Facilities REFERENCES & TOOLS: Annual Reports, State Emergency Response Council (SERT) for Hazardous Materials Pub No: G-79, Guidelines for Analyzing and Managing the Security Vulnerabilities at Fixed Chemical Sites, 2002, Center for Chemical Process Safety, ISBN No: X Is the Facility s site located within the two-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant? Yes No 6.2 Is there an extremely hazardous material that is processed, stored or transported within ½ mile of the EOC? Yes If yes, specify No 6.3 Is the EOC s site located within the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of a nuclear power plant, but outside the two-mile EPZ? Yes No 6.4 Is there a high efficiency air filtration/cleaning system in place in the EOC that will provide a high level of protection in the EOC against an outdoor release of hazardous materials? Yes No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

47 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Are procedures in place to detect the presence of chemical (or other agent) releases into the atmosphere, and for the staff of the EOC to take appropriate protection actions? Yes No 6.6 Has an assessment been undertaken to determine the potential for airborne contaminants, including vapors, aerosols, gases, to enter the EOC? Yes No 6.7 Are EOC staff trained and equipped to respond to a release of a biological, radiological, or chemical agent including gas, vapor, or aerosol? Yes No 6.8 Does the EOC have a plan, program and training in place to address the potential consequences from an airborne release of chemicals (or other agents), including detection, evacuation, sheltering in place, personal protective equipment, filtering and pressurization options, and procedures for purging chemical/other agents from the EOC? Yes No 6.9 Summary Assessment (Hazardous Materials Release/Nuclear Facility Accident, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 7 Human-Caused Hazards Blast Effects REFERENCES & TOOLS: FEMA 426. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

48 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 30 Occupancy Buildings Building Security Through Design: A Primer for Architects, Design Professionals, and their Clients, November 2001, The American Institute of Architects (book) Physical Security Assessment for Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities Dept. of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, Structural Engineering. Is the EOC s building envelope designed to be blast resistant? Does it provide collective protection against chemical, biological and radiological contaminants? Yes No 7.2 Does the EOC have keep out zones to ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (e.g., a vehicle) and the EOC? Yes No 7.3 Site Perimeter. Is the EOC designed with security in mind, both site specific and with regard to adjacent land uses? Yes No 7.4 Parking Security. Are vehicle access and parking managed in a way that separates vehicles and EOC structures? Yes No Blast Effects (con t) 7.5 Building Envelop. Do EOC officials know the designed or estimated protection levels of the EOC s exterior walls against a postulated explosive threat? Yes No 7.6 Windows. Is the window system on the exterior façade designed to mitigate the hazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosive event? Yes No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

49 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page Utility Systems. Is the source of water for the EOC secure? If not, are there plans and procedures in place to ensure that alternative sources are provided for? Yes No 7.8 Mechanical Engineering. Are utilities and HVAC systems protected from the potential impacts from blast, and/or backed up with redundant systems? Yes No 7.9 Fuel Supply. Is the fuel supply for the EOC secure, or are there provisions for storage of fuel on site to support critical operations? Yes No Blast Effects (con t) 7.10 Gas Storage. Has the EOC staff evaluated the potential vulnerability of gas storage tanks and piping to either a moving vehicle or a bomb blast (either direct or by collateral damage)? Yes No 7.11 Electrical Systems. Are there any transformers or switchgears located outside the EOC or accessible from the building exterior? Yes No 7.12 Critical EOC Components and Blast Protection. Are the following elements of the EOC located at a sufficient distance from main entrances, vehicle circulation or parking or are they sufficiently hardened/protected? EOC operations room Yes No Communications equipment Yes No C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

50 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 32 Water and electric supply Yes No Pit Area or Meeting Room Yes No Fuel System/Storage Yes No HVAC Yes No 7.13 Summary Assessment (Blast Effects, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Vulnerability Assessment Form Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Section 8 Human-Caused Hazards Chemical, Biological, Radiological REFERENCES & TOOLS: Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents, USACE, ETL , February 1999 Centers for Disease Control. Publication No , Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002, Cincinnati, Ohio C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

51 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 33 FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation, September 2002, Planning Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a release. LBNL/PUB-51959, January 10, Site Planning. Is there adequate stand-off distance between the perimeter fence and EOC to minimize the risk from a CBR release or blast? Yes No 8.2 Parking. Is vehicle parking and service areas located away from the EOC to minimize the effects of a blast or release of CBR agent? Yes No 8.3 Physical Barriers. Are there sufficient perimeter barrier elements (fence, planters, stand-off zones) to minimize the potential for intrusion? Yes No CBR Effects (con t) 8.4 Water Supply. Is the source of water protected from potential sabotage or contamination? Is there sufficient storage of backup water? Yes No 8.5 Air Filtration. Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for chemical or biological agents? Yes C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

52 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 34 No 8.6 Air Filtration. Is there collective protection for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination? Yes No 8.7 Redundancies in Air System. Is the air supply to critical areas of the EOC compartmentalized which will permit the localization/restriction of contamination? Yes No 8.8 Summary Assessment (CBR agents, and the specific impacts on the survivability, security, sustainability and interoperability of an EOC): Summary: The Vulnerability Assessment Form is a tool that can be used by state and local officials to identify hazards and assess the vulnerability of EOCs to natural, technological and human-caused hazards. The modular format will facilitate modification and updating as new research is conducted and new tools become available (e.g., HAZUS-MH). The most important part of the assessment is the final section (Summary Assessment) that encourages local officials to summarize and come to conclusions on the potential impacts of each of the eight hazards on the EOC. 1 Storm Surge Inundation 2 Rainfall Flooding/Dam Safety 3 Lay Down Hazard Exposure 4 Wind and Debris Exposure C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

53 Chapter 3 Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment Page 35 5 Wildfire Exposure 6 Hazardous Materials and Nuclear Facilities 7 Human-Caused Hazards Blast Effects 8 Human Caused Hazards Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Releases C:\staging\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913\in\3F5C8EF8-2CBD-18F913.doc

54 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need The spatial needs assessment phase is an important part of the comprehensive planning approach to achieving a new facility. The space needs provides four important elements of the process: Identifies and documents deficiencies of the existing facility. Provides a detailed space-by-space definition of the elements to be included in the new facility, including projections for potential future facility needs. Provides the initial budget analysis and options for identifying the cost of an appropriate facility. Initiates the political process necessary to creating a consensus for a new facility. Essentially, the space need assessment defines the functional needs and the scope of facilities to be designed and construction of a new facility. The space needs assessment must be specific to an individual Emergency Management agency is a direct response to the Emergency Management issues affecting your community while also functionally responding to State and Federal protocols. A properly completed analysis will reflect the specific needs of your agency and define the response philosophy of the community and agency The Process: A properly conducted spatial needs analysis is a process that follows a clear methodology, moving from the very general to the specific. The following are steps that should be followed to assure a valuable study Data Collection: The data collection step assembles all information necessary for a thorough understanding of the agency and area being served. Data collection gathers population and demographic statistics useful projecting future needs. Also helpful in this regard is historical information on size of the agency staff, related response personnel and any other agencies co-sites with the primary E.O.C. Any previous studies should also be provided to the planners. Finally, document the existing facility, including floor plans and maintenance records. If a site selection analysis is part of the study, documentation should be assembled on available sites that include environmental conditions, as noted elsewhere in this publication Questionnaire: A formal questionnaire should be developed, and responded to, by key Department personnel. The questionnaire serves two important objectives. C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

55 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page 2 It documents important information formulated directly by the facility users and, most important, it begins the formal process during which the users begin to think critically about their current facility and what an appropriate facility should be to best serve the department needs On-site Interviews: The questionnaire is the start of critically evaluating the existing facility and the department needs, but is not complete by itself. On-site interviews with the questionnaire respondents are necessary to read between the lines and fill-in the gaps of the respondents observations. The planners will spend quality time working on-site with the agency personnel. They will record in detail what the specific needs for each space and will assist the agency personnel in achieving a deeper understanding of how a modern Emergency Operations facility must function Documentation of Needs and Deficiencies: The planner will follow-up the on-site interviews with meeting notes that document observations that either deviate or are significant additions to the conditions reported by the facility users in the questionnaire response. It is important that any significant misunderstandings about the facility mission are documented prior to moving into the next step of the process. Typical areas of misunderstanding include facility security zones, food services, the need to project emergency response vehicles, etc. Often, these areas can overlap with services of other First Responder Crunch the Numbers : Once a clear understanding is achieved on the scope of services to be provided in the facility, the planners quantify the space need in terms of actual square footage. The planner will list each individual space by division of the agency. The space is listed by current square foot need and at least two subsequent future phases of potentially increased square foot needs. The one constant in all of our lives is change and the ramifications of 9/11, in terms of EOC s is a clear example of how facilities must meet new and emergency technology and function. The planned facility must be able to accommodate change over a minimum 20-year life of the building. The tabulation of space needs should be distributed in draft form to allow a detailed review by the department Prepare the Options Build New, Renovate/Addition, Adaptive Reuse: Once the square foot requirements of the agency have been quantified the planner will begin to develop options to be evaluated for serving the agency deficiencies. Generally, given the potential of 24/7, and the specialized use of an EOC facility, a new building is typically the best option. Realities of life, however, may require that other alternatives, such as adding to an existing facility or the adaptive re-use of an existing building, must be evaluated. The data collection step of the process should C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

56 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page Space Standards: provide the initial documentation about the political realities of a new building versus additions or adaptive re-use. Preparation is the key to success during this step. Although generally not understood, the cost of renovation and adaptive re-use can be greater than a new building. The conclusion of the spatial needs assessment must be to propose a realistic project. In addition to quantifying the needs of the agency, a key element of the study is to determine what the fiscal threshold is in the community to achieve a new facility. Please review chapter 12 for details relative to the various options. Generally, the definition of square foot requirements is a combination of art and science. The artistic element is the careful balance of community resources and the perception of what the agency needs. The scientific aspects is the methodical analysis of the agency, the community and an understanding of the political will to provide a new facility. The community will question what the appropriate size of a recommended space should be as well as its cost. It is important to demonstrate an acceptable standard for recommendation of space size Consistent and Defendable Work Spaces: The planner and the department will be questioned on why a space is recommended to be a given size. Government has been grappling with this issue for years and an experienced planner will have standard layouts that have been reviewed and accepted by government agencies. The planner will provide pictures of the layout, showing furniture and the need for specialized equipment to be located in the space. A secondary benefit is that a systems approach is often implemented for procurement and arrangement of furniture on a City or County-wide facility basis. The systems approach allows economical bulk purchase of furniture and equality with other departments. This approach makes defending your agency space requirements feasible Avoid the Taj Mahal Syndrome : At some point in the process, the motives of the department will likely be questioned. Elected officials are constantly on guard to stifle empire building and creation of opulent facilities. Although creation of a dignified, professional work place is mandatory, the entire planning team must constantly be on-guard to the perception of creating a Taj Mahal. Space standards are important for diffusing this perception. Do not recommend a 500 square foot office for the Director of Emergency Management and, where possible, plan for open space work spaces, limiting private offices but recognizing that break-out spaces are necessary and functionally important. Open-plan work areas are not only C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

57 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page 4 more economical but also allow flexibility for future re-configuration of spaces to accommodate changing needs Impact of ADA Guidelines: A significant evolution in Civil Rights law is the legislation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The objective of the law is simple: provide universal accessibility to all public facilities to physically challenged citizens. The law affects visitors and employees. The law has had a significant impact on the design of the buildings. Barriers to accessibility are to be eliminated. Not only do toilet rooms become larger but the entire path of travel form parking lot through the buildings is evaluated; including width of corridors, size of doorways and door hardware. The net result is an increase in the size of contemporary facilities Multi-Use Opportunities: An effective strategy toward selling the size and spaces of a new facility is to identify areas that have joint or multi-use capability. Generally, Emergency Management facilities are becoming a focus of community activity, therefore a carefully located Training Room can also serve the needs of a community meeting space and make a new facility more acceptable to elected officials. Security is now more than ever a major concern of Governmental facilities, with most communities recognizing the need for an Emergency Operations Center/Emergency Response Facility. Making proper arrangements for telecommunications, survivable construction and important ancillary breakout spaces for meetings, breaks and toilet room facilities can establish a facility as a viable EOC. Joint-use Complexes can also provide valuable multiuse opportunities. At a minimum, a central air conditioning plant can increase operational efficiencies but depending upon the structure of the organizations, other areas are Entry Lobby, Training Facilities, Community Meeting Room, Food Service, etc. The space savings of a joint use approach can achieve up to 15% of the overall facility area equating to valuable construction cost savings. C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

58 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page Involving Your Staff: It may seem abundantly obvious to you that staff involvement in the programming and design of your facility is of paramount importance. We have seen, however, numerous facilities of recent vintage in which it is apparent that there has been little, if any, involvement of Emergency Management personnel. The fault, if it can be characterized as such, is with both parties...the individual assigned to the project and the design professional. To avoid this pitfall, consider the following Assign a Key Person: Everyone in a Emergency Management Department already has a job, a responsibility to accomplish certain functions on a day to day basis and very critical functions during activation for an event. It is of paramount importance, however, for you to assign one of your key staff members to the responsibility of overseeing this project and coordinating activities with the selected professional who will design your facility. This individual would preferably be in your command staff and empowered to make important decisions. There is a great deal of detailed research, information gathering and documentation that will be required. You need a well organized individual, someone with communication skills and someone who is not overburdened by other tasks. They will be critical to the success of your project, so choose carefully Division Leaders: You have typically created a definitive chain-of-command with talented individuals in charge of the various divisions or departments. These individuals need to be briefed as to the mission and made aware of the need to have their input in the process. The more time they have to dedicate toward the understanding of the functions and space needs of the facility, the greater the potential that your Architect will be responsive to their needs. They should be asked to participate in interviews conducted during the space needs phase, and to carefully review the preliminary space assessment. Attention to detail at this early stage pays valuable dividends later in the project. Changes are easily made on paper, such as adding specialized break-out rooms, or increasing a room to accommodate a larger group. Changes made in construction are costly, generate conflict and are not conducive toward the premise of having a successful project. C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

59 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page Staff Involvement: Obviously you cannot have everyone involved in the programming and design process or the result will be chaotic. You can, and should, involve individuals that can measurably contribute their unique understanding of functions. As an example, a communications director knows and understands important functional requirements and wants underflow ducts for flexibility, the ability to control light levels and temperatures separately from the main facility and restrooms, break areas and lockers that are specific to the communications component. In essence, those individuals that provide a unique function have unique information and requirements that must be directly transmitted to your Architect. A failure for this type of information to be transmitted will result in experiencing corrective action in the future. The adage is: The greater the involvement of your staff, the better are your opportunities for a successful project Document Need: Even before you have selected a professional to program and/or design your facility, brief your staff on what you plan. They will appreciate knowing what is ahead, what is expected of them and it will provide the opportunity for them to understand the premise that there is (potentially) light at the end of the tunnel. This is a very important consideration and can have a very positive impact upon staff morale. Staff should be requested to start documenting their needs; creating a file in which they can assemble functional needs, information about specialized equipment and lessons they have learned over their career that would assist in making their physical environment a more efficient work place. This information should be given to your professional, preferably by the person who has assembled it, so that it can be explained and fully understood by both parties A Staff Meeting: An Important Beginning: It is very beneficial when the design professional is provided with the opportunity to discuss the project and the methodology to be utilized, to the entire department at a staff meeting. Recognizing that assembling an entire department at a singular meeting is difficult, it may require multiple presentations at different times to the department. The important premise being that your entire staff hears the same information, and they become informed about what will be required of them. In many respects it is like a team meeting that takes individual knowledge and attempts to focus it toward the ultimate goal of obtaining a new facility. C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

60 Chapter 4 Programming/Establishing Facility Spatial Need Page 7 It is also important to reflect upon the influence that your staff has upon the community. If your emergency response staff is aware of the project, and if they support its goals, then they become important advocates for its success. These individuals, who are generally respected in their community, can assist in building community awareness and support for their project. C:\staging\3F5C8FEE B\in\3F5C8FEE B.doc

61 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities: The planning and design of an EOC is a complicated process, one that mandates a thorough understanding of its unique function characteristics. To put it sufficiently when most other buildings have been rendered unusable by a natural or man-made act, an Emergency Operations Center must remain fully functional and operational. Any good design process involves a team endeavor, utilizing the understanding of function provided by Emergency Response personnel and a team of specialized Architects and Engineers with expertise in this highly unique field of the built environment. All EOC s are not equal, with larger population jurisdiction having the financial ability (and functional requirements) to incorporate 21 st century technology as well as a diversity of spaces. The differential between a community of 20,000 inhabitants and one of over 1,000,000 equates to a wide issue. In this report there is an attempt to address basic criteria and to illustrate facilities that vary significantly in size and complexity Architectural Character: Emergency Operation Centers are, in essence, pure function and true proponents of the architectural premise that Form follows Function. They are typically designed to be timeless, a premise that means that a building of this type will typically remain operational far into the future and should not reflect a style of architecture that is dated or inappropriate 10, 20 or 30 years from its construction. Emergency Operations Centers This EOC (left) was designed to meet FEMA requirements, and utilized earth being to achieve additional sheltering capability as a result of its proximity to a nuclear power facility. This EOC facility (below) has a lower level EOC which also incorporates earth as an additional protection factor. The upper level was designed as a non-eoc office area but separated from the EOC by a structural concrete slab. Both facilities incorporate an Architectural character that does not reflect a style or period despite having been designed and constructed several years ago. Architectural Character should also be responsive to the very unique demands made on such a building. The dynamic forces of a category 5 hurricane, as an example, can quickly turn architectural elements into potential hazards. In that respect entry canopies, site features, even site lighting are all subject to forces not normally experienced by most facilities. The challenge is clearly to design these C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

62 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 2 facilities to be functional and aesthetically pleasing and a positive contribution to the area in which they are located. 5.2 Facility Success/The Protective envelope: A truly successful EOC is one that has remained fully operational during and after an event. In order to achieve that important goal it is important to consider that even one inappropriate planning decision can result in an inoperable building. An unprotected fresh air intake, a very small part of a total building envelope, has the ability to transform the facility when exterior winds of 200 miles per hour become interior wind forces in spaces that are not designed to accommodate such an impact. The importance of a protective building envelope in which every surface, and particularly every opening, has been critically examined, cannot be understated. Doors, windows, fresh air vents, exhaust air vents, and service access panels are just a few of the normal penetrations that exist on buildings. In many cases they represent a point of access for systems or code requirements that are mandated for life safety reasons. What is then of paramount importance is to review each and every such opening and to ensure that they are either designed to resist the forces generated by an event, or that protective elements can be easily applied to provide a secured envelope. Nothing should be left to chance in this respect, as the building envelope is only as strong as its weakest element. 5.3 Exterior Wall Protection: The building structure itself must also ensure survivability, including the two primary elements: the walls and the roof. Of these, the wall system is more easily resolvable, being a product of appropriate architectural and structural design that considers both wind loading and the ability to resist the impact of airborne projectiles and acts of terrorism. A street sign post, when airborne and in a horizontal position, can easily penetrate most building wall types that have not been appropriately designed. Thus, the wall construction of the building becomes an important element in survivability. Poured-in-space, high strength and reinforced concrete is the material of choice as it provides a strong and dense surface resistant to most storm and explosive forces. Concrete block or masonry units, when appropriately strengthened with steel reinforcing rods can also provide protection, but to a lesser degree that a monolithic poured-in-place concrete system. It is also of critical importance to insure that the building design provided for lateral support of exterior walls, particularly those of larger spans. In essence, the ability to design appropriate exterior wall systems is also a product of the configuration and location of reinforced walls in the building interior, a factor that must be taken into consideration as the functional characteristics of interior spaces are designed. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

63 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 3 Exterior Wall Protection: This EOC facility was constructed of poured in place concrete walls and roof with limited exterior openings. All penetrations (doors, vents, fresh-air intakes, windows) have closure protection systems. The building, in its entirety was designed as a category 5 facility (200 mph) 5.4 The Roof: The Weakest Link: The roof of a building is, in many respects, the most difficult element of the exterior envelope to design in such a manner as to be able to resist the forces of wind and water. The experiences of recent storms have clearly shown that the point where the roofing material connects with the exterior wall is the area of critical importance and typically, its weakest link. Once this connection fails the roof system begins the process of destruction and inevitability leads to building failure. There are, however, specialized roofing systems which are appropriate for E.O.C. facilities, generally being those that are applied to the roof decking in a series of adhered layers with specialized mechanical fasteners as illustrated in this publication. As the roofing elements approach the point of the roof/wall connection, the magnitude of these fasteners increases to provide additional protection. Our recommendation is to utilize an architectural roofing specialist to design a roof system for the following uplift pressure; based upon a Category 4 storm: Field (general area of roof) 47.8 P.S.F. Perimeter (entire perimeter edge of roof) 69.0 P.S.F. Corners (at each place when a corner is formed with building walls) 86.2 P.S.F. It is also important to note that the design of the sub-roof and roofing insulation must incorporate more restrictive standards for adhesion than is normally provided. The roofing composition must, in essence, be considered as an entire system and not in terms of individual components. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

64 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page Glass: A Part of the Protective Envelope: The premise of having a window to the outside world generally strikes fear in the heart of an E.O.C. director. Historically, glass in either windows or doors has been perceived as a point of building vulnerability, easily destroyed in the event of a storm. Technology has significantly changed in this respect as the industry has made significant advances in response to other needs and circumstances. Prisons, as an example, have evolved their management philosophy to now provide maximum visual access of inmate activity. Glazing systems generally consist of multiple layers of tempered glass, a poly-carbon inner core, and other similar products, which resist impact. These systems can resist a 45-caliber bullet fired at point blank range without piercing the protective layers. It is this technology that is recommended for EOC s. It is, from our experience important to understand and respect the psychological need of people to have work environments that incorporate natural light and that offer the opportunity to see the outside world. 5.6 Facility Illustrations: In this section are a series of photographs of EOC facilities, illustrating specialized areas and equipment utilization. The primary purpose of these illustrations is to emphasize the premise that all aspects of the exterior building envelope are to be protected, an important consideration for both new and existing facilities. Those entities engaged in a self assessment of an operating facility must, most importantly, conduct a detailed evaluation (Chapter 4) of their existing facility with this philosophy in mind. These are the facilities that are most vulnerable as most existing EOC s were constructed prior to the awareness of the need to protect facilities of this type from a wide variety of events. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

65 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 5 FACILITY ENTRY Entry to EOC; note protected environment and glass entrance (right) and secured (left) when facility is activated. The steel closer door is electrically operated with a manual over-ride and is designed to resist category 5 impact forces. Protected Vehicle Element Emergency Response Vehicle protected area with horizontal sliding steel doors. Partially open (right) and closed and secured (left). Additional interior braces are incorporated to support the large door area from Hurricane forces. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

66 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 6 Construction Systems Construction photograph of a category 5 Emergency Operations Center. Photograph on left illustrates forming for a poured-in-place 12 thick concrete wall, utilized for all exterior walls. On right is enhanced steel beam to provide interior lateral bracing. Emergency Generator Criteria Emergency Generator fuel tank (right) in double walled containment environment. The exhaust from emergency generator (left) are protected from impact behind a blast baffle. The exhausts move superheated air, requiring heat hardened concrete at ground level slab. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

67 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 7 Communication Towers and Tie Downs Special steel tie-down (left) for emergency generator fuel tank. Center and right photographs illustrate secondary back-up communications towers, all accessible from upper level exterior access doors. Roof Drainage and Tie Downs Illustration of duplicate roof drains (left) for redundant drainage in excess of code requirements. Photograph (right) of additional steel tower base plates and anchors for enhanced hold-down capability. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

68 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 8 Incident Command Center Views of command response center with CCTV, powerpoint and TV systems. It is important to provide sufficient break-out rooms in adjacent areas for incident response. All individual positions need to be provided with speaker, telephone and laptops capability as well as the ability to easily accommodate emerging and future technology. Press and Rumor Control Spaces Photograph of press room (left) in which presentations and announcements can be accommodated. These spaces require specialized A/C systems on a separate zone, flexibility, CCTV capability and over-sized conduit connections for exterior feeds. Photograph at right is of rumor control room with multi-line telephone capability. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

69 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 9 Food Preparation and Break Areas Food Service and break rooms are important areas that need to be provided in close proximity to the incident command center. Provide sufficient area for long-term food storage and preparation of food. Public Reception The public reception area of an EOC with the command center to the rear, secured by an electronically operated Security vestibule. Activity in the command center can be observed without entering into this critical area. Emergency Generator Area Photograph of dual emergency generators in a protected environment and provided with sufficient clearance areas for access and maintenance. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

70 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page 10 Service Access/Water Supply/Lockers Exterior service door of reinforced steel with triple heavy-duty stainless steel hinges and triple dead bolt locks with extended bolts. Center photograph illustrates redundant water storage tanks located within facility. To the right are staff lockers for use during extended activations. Specialized Elements Exterior fresh air intake (left) with steel closer door to seal building from exterior forces. Center photograph shows CCTV feed located on exterior of building to accommodate feeds to press transmitter vehicles. The exterior of the building (right) illustrates staff entrance of the building in a sheltered alcove. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

71 Chapter 5 Architectural/Engineering Guidelines for EOC Facilities Page Specialized Facility Construction Details: The development and construction of an EOC mandates the preparation of documents containing specific details that are unique to EOC s and which take into consideration the variety of forces impacting a facility. It has been emphasized in this publication all exterior elements of such a facility must be considered in terms of the theory of The Weakest Link. A roof handrail that provides access to critical equipment, as an example, must be anchored to the building structure in such a manner that it is protected from failure. A steel handrail, if it becomes airborne, is a projectile capable of causing significant damage. The roofing system is, as previously noted, the point of considerable vulnerability and previous experience has shown that a failure of this assembled edge can quickly result in catastrophic failure. Details, relative to this subject, are illustrated on the following pages. It is important to note, however, that these are recommended details and are subject to review and modification by your selected consultant and in particular, the structural engineer. Seldom are facilities constructed in an exactly similar manner and the change in one part of the assembly quickly changes the dynamics of the entire assembly edge. All construction details become important and, in fact, critical to the success of the whole, providing meaning to the premise that...success is in the details. All new facilities, after the basic design concepts have been completed, evolve into the construction documents phase of service by the team of Architects and Engineers. These documents, when completed, are utilized by the General Contractor for construction of the building. Changes made during the construction process are expensive, result in delays in project completion and are points of contention between the team of owner/architect/general Contractor. It is important in that respect, to have construction documents provided to the owner (EOC Administration) at 50 % and 95% completion levels, so that they can be reviewed for appropriateness. Review must be undertaken by those familiar with construction methodologies and if such an individual is not on staff it is important to acquire this expertise. As the adage goes changes on paper are easily accomplished, changes in construction are not. C:\staging\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63\in\3F5CAC77-1E48-209A63.doc

72 Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems The nature of an EOC mandates that it remain operational prior to, during and after an event. In order to achieve this goal it is of critical importance that the facility itself be survivable, including all of its critical facility systems. The failure of any singular system can, and often does, result in an inability for the facility to remain operational. Few, if any jurisdictions, have back-up facilities to which emergency response functions can be transferred in the event of an inability to continue utilization of the primary facility. Redundant Systems: Redundant Systems, defined as those of a highly critical nature are summarized as follows: Power/Emergency Generators Water/Back-up Potable Water Systems Sewer/Waste Water Systems Communications/Back-up or Secondary Systems Air Handling Systems 6.1 Power/Emergency Generators: During an event it is highly probable that standard electrical service to a facility will be adversely affected or disrupted. The various response systems of an EOC are such that power must continue to be provided to the facility and that it generally provide 100% of the electrical demand. It is our belief and recommendation that redundant emergency generators be provided so that the failure of a single emergency generator does not result in the facility becoming inoperable. Dual Emergency Generators, while expensive, provide the capability for a facility to continue to provide service, even if one of the generators fails to operate. It is also important to provide additional plug-in capability, so that a portable emergency generator can be transported to the facility and easily accommodated. Emergency generators must be tested and operated on a regularly scheduled basis in order to be sure that they are in operable condition. Certain fuels for emergency generators have the characteristic of deterioration over a period of time if they are not utilized. The maintenance and testing of these systems must be part of a comprehensive ongoing facility review process, which is recorded in order to ensure compliance. It is recommended, as noted above, that size emergency generators be sized to accommodate 100% of facility electrical needs, including all Mechanical equipment power needs. A/C systems which are not at full capacity, when needed, quickly render a facility un-useable. Moving air, with a fan system, is not sufficient as the outdoor temperatures in Florida, quickly become indoor C:\staging\3F5C FCC\in\3F5C FCC.doc

73 Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems Page 2 temperatures, despite the thermal mass provided by the building. Higher temperatures begin to adversely affect both equipment performance and the ability of individuals to provide acceptable levels of service. 6.2 Water/Redundant Water Systems: Most water systems that service buildings are part of a pumped or pressurized system and as such are contingent upon a continued supply of electrical service to pumping stations. Gravity systems, particularly in Florida, are unusual and can equally be disrupted by the dynamic forces of an event. It is important, in that respect, to anticipate that potable water systems, serving the facility on a day-today basis, will be unavailable during and after an event. Potable water is utilized not only for human consumption but for the other critical functions of food preparation, the cooling of certain mechanical equipment systems, for plumbing systems (flushing of toilets) and basic human sanitation (showers). Many facilities have or should provide water storage facilities, either of a permanent nature (tanks) or inflatable blatters which can be filled just prior to an event, if such can be anticipated. Man-made events generally are not expected, thus the need to have a storage tank system that can be utilized until such time as a redundant system can be activated and in a mode to provide sufficient capacity to allow even limited functions to be provided. The inability to have sufficient water, as an example, to flush toilets can result in the operational failure of a facility within a relatively short time frame as well as providing a health hazard to those within the facility. Secondary well systems, accommodated in protected environments, should be incorporated into the design of an EOC complex. Preferably, well systems would be situated within the EOC in order to provide a secure and protected environment, rather than in a secondary building. Most well systems are utilized in conjunction with pumps and there is a need to maintain, repair and/or replace pumps during and after an event. A well system that cannot be accessed for maintenance or repair, as a result of its location may result in a lack of potable water being available. Some jurisdictions (Health Department) have regulatory guidelines relative to potable water systems as well as to their location. The treatment of the soil below a building slab for termite protection may, as an example, preclude the ability to locate a well system in that environment. It is critically important, in that respect, to review options with local regulatory agencies prior to selecting and locating a potable water system. It is also recommended that provisions be made to accommodate water supplies that may be brought to the site. Transported water should be provided with a receptive building water intake system, without contamination of that system. C:\staging\3F5C FCC\in\3F5C FCC.doc

74 Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems Page Sewer/Waste Water Systems Standard sewer systems are generally of three types: force-fed in which sewage is pumped to a central collection system because of geological conditions (elevation); gravity-fed in which the waste water is also transmitted to a treatment system and as a result of elevation flows to that facility by gravity; the third type of system, generally utilized where sewer/waste water systems are not yet available, are septic tanks. These are collection systems, which utilize bacteria to break-down solids and which are then distributed, below ground, in drain fields. All new and, for that matter, existing EOC facilities should be provided with a redundant sanitary sewer system in order to remain operational. It is recommended that the secondary system for a septic and/or collection/storage complex be provided to ensure that systems remain functional. Large holding tanks can be incorporated into a facility complex and pumped when the opportunity is available. It may be best, in our experience, to incorporate a system that combines both systems; i.e. a septic tank and a holding tank. Some events, such as a hurricane, have the capability of saturating a site with large quantities of water, with an impact upon the ability of septic systems to operate efficiently. Soil testing for such a system is mandated by local regulatory agencies and it is important for those agencies to understand the critical nature of an EOC as well as the importance of remaining fully operational during and after a natural event such as a hurricane. 6.4 Communications/Secondary Systems: EOC s, by their nature, must retain fully operational communications capability on a 24/7 basis. Most facilities utilize a primary communications tower which is subject to the forces of a natural and man-made event. Failure of this system poses significant problems, even with back-up capability. In locating a communications tower on an EOC site it is important to take into consideration the fall-down radius, i.e. does a collapsing tower have the ability to physically damage the Center. If at all possible consider locating your primary tower a sufficient distance from the EOC to ensure that it cannot damage the structure and make it inoperable. Secondary towers should be designed into the facility, using appropriate tie-down and/or fold down capability when an event is anticipated. Communication towers can also be stored within a protected environment and deployed when the situation warrants. The tie-down of a communications tower requires additional structural systems beyond those normally provided (an example of which is illustrated in Chapter 15). It is equally important to locate towers in secure environments that are electronically monitored and covered by a CCTV system, both of which should be alarmed to provide intrusion notification. C:\staging\3F5C FCC\in\3F5C FCC.doc

75 Chapter 6 Criteria for Redundant Facility Systems Page Air Handling Systems: Another critical system for facility survivability is that of the mechanical equipment. This system should be located within the EOC and within the sheltered environment. An out-door cooling tower, as an example is subject to air borne debris (impact) which can quickly result in the failure of the mechanical system. While it may not be economically feasible to provide redundant mechanical systems, it is important to maintain an on-site supply of critical parts, those which experience suggests have the highest potential for failure over a sustained period such as fan belts, lubricants, etc. Maintenance and operational manuals as well as on-site personnel trained in basic systems maintenance are important criteria to consider and to incorporate into your response procedures. There are, as reflected in this chapter, many variables to consider when designing critical emergency management facilities. These redundant systems have a direct relationship to facility construction costs and explain the higher costs associated with EOC s as compared to other governmental facilities. C:\staging\3F5C FCC\in\3F5C FCC.doc

76 Chapter 7 Communications Capability: Communications is an essential function of an EOC that can not effectively function in isolation. The ability to monitor and receive date about the event from many sources is an important operational tool. Communications between the decision-makers both in the EOC and in the field as well as the operational field personnel is essential. A successful EOC will provide an environment in which coordinated, simple, reliable, effective, and efficient communications can be realized at the local, regional, and state wide level. Another very critical communications function is the EOC s ability to effectively communicate with the general public utilizing resources such as the internet and local as well as national media outlets. Most of the communications will take place in the EOC but a communications room may need to be established to achieve many of these goals. Several different agencies will be represented in the communication room at any one time. The EOC facility may also be utilized to house County 911 dispatch center, or an Emergency Medical Dispatch facility, in order to co-site critical functions. This Chapter addresses a variety of communication functions from a stand-alone EOC to a standard dispatch center. The Communications portion of any EOC is a space requiring specialized equipment, unique physical environments and an appropriate response to the psychological affects of individuals responding to emergency events. Discussed in this chapter, in a summary manner, are these and other criteria, considered to be of importance in the design of this portion of an EOC facility. 7.1 EOC Communications consists of 4 functional areas: Internal Communications External Communications Public Communications Environmental Requirements 7.2 Internal Communications: Functional design of the facility to allow for easy face to face or small group communications Breakout rooms or space designated for small or medium size groups Status boards and or monitor/projector displays showing situation reports or other pertinent data Telephone or intercom systems Two-way radio or paging systems and or messaging systems Public address system for larger group gatherings or briefings Copy machines and printers Paper and pen or pencil Internal phone directory GIS systems or other Electronic media. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

77 Chapter 7 Communications Capability Page External Communications: Two-way radio communications with field personnel both local and mutual aide responders. (interoperable communications systems) Cellular, Nextel, PCS, voice communications Response worker notification system Paging System Facsimile transmission and receive capability. (blast fax) Satellite voice and or data communications, State warning point satellite network Wireless data products, laptops, handheld devices Internet connectivity, land base as well as satellite and or messaging system GIS system or other Electronic media NOAA weather radio Weather and radar data Landline telephone capability, individual numbers to each ESF desk. (conference calls) Calling center, information line Phone directory and phone book RACES or amateur radio. 7.4 Public Communications: Area designated for media representation Local and national TV and radio monitoring capability. (satellite TV) Location to conduct media briefings or interviews Internet web site. 7.5 Environmental requirements: Conditioned (UPS) power Generator power Areas designated and to support battery chargers for the various portable devices Operational guides to all equipment at the ESF desks. 7.6 Location: The location of the Communications portion of the building is based, in part, upon the premise of survivability and security. Generally, communications is located on an upper level (if a multi-story facility), separated from all public access areas, and in an environment which is self contained. The issue of security is paramount, including controlled access, even from other Emergency Management staff. Access that is uncontrolled violates several basic principles and can interrupt functions at a critical time. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

78 Chapter 7 Communications Capability Page Environment Communications Rooms/Dispatch Centers: The ability of communications personnel to respond to critical issues is based, in part, upon their given physical environment; including ergonomic equipment, the ability to control lighting levels, the providing of controls for heating and air conditioning that are separate from the main building system and sufficient space in which to perform requiring services Furniture/Equipment: Communication Centers are, in large measure, about equipment. The ability to service that equipment, and to introduce new technology when such is needed, are criteria that are mandated. Some of the key factors are that of adequacy of space and the need to plan for equipment flexibility. Provide, as an example, sufficient clearances for maintenance, particularly for console s, equipment, and printer rooms. Under-floor duct systems and/or computer flooring that offer full access for below floor services is an important design consideration. This poses, however, somewhat of a complication relative to the selection of flooring materials, equipment and ADA accessibility and the connection of services to other building systems. It is recommended that ergonomic consoles be utilized, as they can readily be adjusted to the physical characteristics of each operator. Both the console surface as well as the chair need to have this important characteristic in order to provide the type of flexibility desired Lighting: The desired lighting level (foot candles) at work surfaces should be capable of being adjusted to that desired by each operator. It should be source lighting with an integral dimmer system and, preferably, incandescent light instead of fluorescent. Each console should be provided with the ability to modify lighting levels in lieu of an overall total room capability. Communications Room A Communications Room with controlled, indirect incandescent lighting. It would be preferable if smaller units would also serve specific positions at consoles for individual control. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

79 Chapter 7 Communications Capability Page Temperature Control: It is important to have a mechanical equipment system, designed to serve the Communications Center, that is controlled separately from the overall building. Typically, temperatures will be cooler in the Communications area than in other parts of an EOC and a uniform, un-zoned system will not appropriately respond to demand. The equipment contained in a Communications Center generates a significant amount of heat, as do lighting systems and the operators themselves. Some facilities augment the A/C system with self contained units serving just the communications area and equipment room. 7.8 Power/Redundancy: Discussed in Chapter 6 is the need to provide redundant capability for systems in an EOC. In addition to providing 70% redundant electrical power for the Communications Center, it is prudent to provide additional back-up capability with plug-in generator units, of a smaller size, specifically for this portion of the EOC. Care must be taken, however, to provide sufficient dedicated exhaust systems that do not permit contamination of the air within the area by fumes from such a system. 7.9 Air Quality: The quality of air is of concern within any facility and a specific issue within a Communications Center. These are generally contained spaces in which the introduction of fresh air must be carefully monitored and controlled. The issue of moisture intrusion is a major factor in the deterioration of air quality as it generally promotes the growth of mold and mildew with a direct impact upon human health. Fresh air, as an example, must first be heated to remove moisture, then cooled to provide the comfort levels desired. Leaks, either from windows, penetrations, the roof or from moisture condensing from non-insulated air conditioning ducts, can introduce unwanted levels of moisture with an adverse impact upon air quality. Any signs of such moisture must be immediately addressed but the principle of an ounce of prevention is the best safeguard and recommended policy Self Containment: Communication Centers are typically designed as self contained areas, incorporating separate restrooms, locker areas offices, training and staff break areas. The ability to incorporate these spaces within the communications envelope insures that critical staff are in proximity when needed to respond to an emergency. All facilities, noted above, are to be designed to be ADA compliant and provide ease of access for those that are physically challenged. This is an issue of particular concern during the design phase as flooring levels should be designed to be uniform, avoiding ramps when ever possible. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

80 Chapter 7 Communications Capability Page 5 Visual Control Illustrated on the far left wall is a system to control visual access into the communications. This is of particular importance when staff is responding to an emergency event. It is equally important to incorporate oversized doors and corridors in order to facilitate the installation and/or replacement of large sized equipment. Communication Centers are technically sophisticated and specialized areas and as such are a point of interest to non-communications staff, and the general public. It is very important, however, to ensure that the security of this self-contained area is not compromised by inappropriate access. It is of merit to consider aspects of visual access that allow the EOC visitor to observe activity and the technology without adversely affecting staff performance. Visual access areas must also be provided with systems that allow this activity to be limited during response to critical events. The premise of being in a fish bowl needs to be understood and addressed by incorporating blinds, curtains or electronic systems that turn transparent glass into opaque surfaces. It is also recommended, if possible, to provide a discreet point of access to an exterior area, permitting staff to have fresh access to air. These areas are generally out of the view of the public for perception issues, and must be secured and made non-accessible to non-communications personnel Psychological Issues: As noted in Chapter 14, there are defined issues associated with the Psychological aspects of environments. This is of particular concern in EOC s and associated Communication Centers. Color can and does play an extremely important role in areas of a facility which deal with emergencies on an on-going, day-to-day basis. Colors should be calming, particularly in break areas in which staff can decompress or wind-down prior to coming on a shift or after completion of a work period. For additional information please review the appendix for research literature relative to this important subject. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

81 Chapter 7 Communications Capability Page Support Assistance: As highly specialized areas it is of importance to utilize the services and assistance of individuals and professional associates with previous experience in the programming and design of facilities. APCO (Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials) is the recognized professional association and provides a monthly publication with information of note. APCO can be contacted as follows: APCO 351 North Williamson Boulevard Daytona Beach, Fl Tel. 88-APCO or Fax Website: There are also numerous Communication Centers that have been constructed within the recent past, with varying degrees of success. It is of benefit to contact and tour newer facilities to have an understanding of lessons learned and to gain the insight of individuals who have recently gone thru the process of obtaining a new or renovated facility. C:\staging\3F5C B \in\3F5C B doc

82 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements: One of the primary objectives in the design and construction (or retrofit) of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is to provide a safe and secure environment that will enable the emergency management staff to effectively carry out their responsibilities and missions. In Chapter 3, discussion centered on the threat assessments, potential objectives of aggressors; the tools, weapons and explosives that have been used; and tactics that have historically been used by terrorists, including: moving vehicle bombs, stationary bombs, exterior attack, airborne contamination, and waterborne contamination. Table 3 (Chapter 3) provides additional details on these hazards, their application modes, the duration and extent of the hazards, and steps to mitigate the effects of the hazard (e.g., e.g, bombs, chemical agents, etc.). This chapter of the guidance document addresses EOC security concepts and requirements. The following sections identify key criteria and issues that need to be examined in assessing the security of an EOC. The information is laid out in a checklist fashion that will allow State and local officials to review the key components of EOC security; to discuss these criteria internally; and to set priorities for the implementation of security measures for the EOC. The following components of EOC security are examined: EOC Site Characteristics Site Selection Site Design Blast Stand-off Zone Parking Site Utilities Control Points and Physical Barriers Vehicular Access and Circulation Building Envelope Signage Space Design 8.1 EOC Site Characteristics: The location of an EOC will have a direct bearing on its vulnerability to any type of hazard, including human-caused hazards. The same applies to the facility site design and layout. This section of the Guide provides the local emergency manager with an overview of the key site and layout design elements of an EOC site that contribute to enhanced force protection; or, conversely, how existing site design and layout can contribute to the vulnerability of an EOC to human-caused hazards. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

83 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page 2 In evaluating an EOC s vulnerability to civil/human-caused hazards, the EOC Working Group should examine the following 1 factors that contribute to enhanced security for an EOC. 8.2 Site Selection: In choosing a site for a new EOC, consider the following: Maximize distance from perimeter fence and EOC facilities Site EOC on higher ground Avoid areas with adjacent high terrain or structures Avoid areas with dense adjacent vegetation 8.3 Site Design: Facility site design encompasses site planning for a specific facility and its site, including the arrangement of the facility footprint, relationship of a building to a specific site, internal circulation, access, parking, landscaping, lighting, and signage. While many different measures can be used to provide force protection for an EOC through facility site design, distance is the most effective and desirable tool because other measures vary in effectiveness, are often costly, and often have unintended consequences (e.g., a blast wall can become the source of fragmentation if an explosion occurs in close proximity to the wall). The first mode of protection for an EOC is to create keep out zones to ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (e.g., from a vehicle) and the EOC. Blast Stand-Off Zones The distance between an asset such as an EOC and a threat is referred to as a blast stand-off distance. There i no ideal stand-off distance; it is determined by the type and level of the threat, the type of construction, and the desired level of protection. The appropriate stand-off distance for a given building component can be determined using data provided in AFJMAN , Volume 1, Appendix C, Blast Resistant Component Selection. This information can be used in assessing or selecting stand-off distances for both conventional (not designed to resist explosives effects) and blast resistant construction. The following factors should be addressed in assessing the vulnerability of an EOC to human caused hazards relative to site and layout design: Vulnerability to Collateral Damage: Identify potential for collateral damage (examine separation distance between facilities in determining collateral damage from blast). 1 The security principles outlined in this section are drawn from FEMA 426, which integrates existing federal security and force protection standards and requirements into a single document to guide decisions on reducing physical damage to buildings and infrastructure from terrorist assaults. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

84 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page Weapons Concealment: Identify opportunities for concealment of weapons and explosives in landscaping and trash receptacles Clustering of Compatible Facilities with Similar Threat Levels: By clustering compatible facilities with similar threat levels, the perimeter area to be protected is reduced Site Lighting: Ensure adequate site lighting to prevent or minimize intrusion and other potential problems Perimeter Security: Incorporate vehicle barriers such as walls, fences, trenches, ponds/basins, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains into the site planning and design. 8.4 Controlled Access: Controlled Zones: Achieve levels of protection by establishing controlled zones that define minimum distances between assets and potential threats through installation of barriers Stand-Off Zones: Identify the need for exclusive stand-off zones (area that has controlled entry with highly restrictive access) versus non-exclusive stand-off zones (area controlled with less restrictive measures). 8.5 Surveillance: Clear Zones: An additional level of security can be provided for an EOC by providing clear zones, which is an area immediately adjacent to the EOC that is free of all visual obstructions or landscaping that could provide concealment. 8.6 Control Points and Physical Barriers: Barriers: Where physical barriers are required, consider using landscape materials to create barriers that are soft and naturalistic rather than man-made. Consider using a combination of barriers Vehicles: Vehicles can be used as temporary physical barriers by being placed in front of buildings or across access roads Moving Vehicle Bombs: Maintain as much distance as possible between MVB and the EOC. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

85 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page 4 Blast Stand-Off Zone Source: UTD, Inc. 8.7 Parking: Parking restrictions can help to keep potential threats away from the EOC. In urban settings, however, curbside or underground parking is often necessary and sometimes difficult to control. Mitigating the risks associated with parking requires creative design measures, including parking restrictions, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening, and other architectural and engineering solutions. Among the measures that should be considered: Underground parking: If possible, do not allow parking below the EOC. Do not authorize vehicles that have not been inspected to park under a building or within the exclusive zone Interior parking: Parking within the secured perimeter of the EOC should be restricted to employees Surveillance: In select EOCs, assess the need to provide CCTV cameras and adequate lighting capable of displaying and videotaping parking lot activities. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

86 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page Setbacks: Provide appropriate setback from parking on adjacent properties if possible. Structural hardening may be required if the setback is insufficient. 8.8 Site Utilities: Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating staff from the EOC. The following mitigation measures should be considered Vulnerability Assessments: Identify and assess all utility service to the EOC, as well as all utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electric transmission lines and other utilities that may cross the EOC perimeter Utility penetration in EOC interior: Utility penetrations within the perimeter of the EOC (including penetrations in the walls, fences, or other perimeter structures) should be screened or secured to prevent their use as unlawful access to the EOC Communications Systems: Decentralization of the EOCs communications resources and the use of multiple communications networks will strengthen the communication system s ability to withstand the effects of a terrorist attack Other Security Measures for Utilities: Provide protection at culverts, sewers and pipelines Provide and check locks on manhole covers Minimize signs identifying utility systems Use landscape planting to conceal above ground systems Install utilities underground Provide redundant utilities and loop service Provide utility quick connects for portable backup systems Provide fencing at critical utility complexes Use multiple communications systems Conceal and protect network control centers Provide protection at concrete trenches, storm drains, and duct systems 8.9 Entry Control, Vehicular Access and Circulation: If a perimeter barrier is employed, it will be necessary to provide points of access through the perimeter for building users (e.g., employees, visitors, etc.). An entry control point or guard building serves well as the designated point of entry for site access. The following measures will improve entry control, vehicular access and circulation: C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

87 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page Vehicle Checks: Provide pull over lanes at EOC entry gates (if applicable) to check suspect vehicles Road Access to EOC: Design entry road(s) to EOC so they do not provide direct or straight-line vehicular access to high risk resources Collateral Damage from Parking Areas: Locate vehicle parking areas remote from high risk EOC resources to minimize blast effects from potential vehicle bombs Limited Access to Service Vehicles: Provide designated limited entry to EOC for commercial, service and delivery vehicles Limit Signage Identifying High Risk Facilities: Design signage for simplicity and clarity, limiting the identification of high risk facilities Cluster Facilities to Enhance Security: Promote the clustering of most critical facilities and services to minimize control points and limit vehicular access to high risk facilities Delivery Access: Provide separate delivery and service access to the EOC High Risk Facilities: Locate highest risk EOC facilities and critical resources remote from primary roads Gate Security: Provide enhanced protection at entry to the EOC General Comments: In this section we have reviewed some of the potential threats to a facility that are associated with off-site services, such as utilities, air quality, etc. This section attempts to review the more immediate issue of security relative to the building site. Many of these principles have been identified and discussed in CPTED (Crime Prevention Thru Environmental Design) publications that are readily available and which should be considered when designing your EOC. Basically stated it is of significant importance to maintain a zone of nonapproach relative to vehicles or transported elements that can pose a threat. Video monitoring of the site at its perimeter, security fencing and intrusion alarm systems are just a few ways in which to provide levels of C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

88 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page 7 security. Clearly all buildings that accommodate critical functions, such as an EOC, should utilize blast containment systems to defect the dynamic forces of an explosion. Some jurisdictions establish specific distances, such as 100 feet, within which vehicles cannot enter. Other methodologies utilize blast baffles to move blast forces away from buildings, but with a varying degree of potential success Building Envelope: As in all security systems it is important for a facility user to establish what level of security is appropriate and economically feasible Exterior Walls: Design the exterior walls to resist the actual pressures and impulses acting on the exterior wall surfaces from the threats defined for the EOC Clodding and Finishes: Designers should provide blast-resistant walls when a high threat is present; consider reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls to minimize flying debris in a blast; and in general substitute strengthened building elements and systems when stand-off distances cannot be accommodated. Building Envelope Mitigation Measures Less Protection Less Cost Less Effort Greater Protection Greater Cost Greater Effort Ensure that exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. Ensure exit doors only facilitate exiting. Secure roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to building roofs. Restrict access to building operation systems Conduct periodic training of HVAC maintenance and operation staff. Evaluate HVAC control options. Install empty conduits for future security control equipment during initial construction or major renovation. Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior walls. Minimize interior glazing near high-threat areas. Establish emergency plans, policies and procedures. Illuminate building access points. Restrict access to building information. Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms. Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress. Local all utility access openings. Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting rooms. Install an internal public address system. Eliminate hiding places. Install a second and separate telephone service. Use a badge identification system for building access. Install a CCTV surveillance system. Install rapid response and isolation features into VVAC systems. Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security. Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack. Install call buttons of key public contact areas. Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations. Avoid exposed structural elements. Reinforce foyer walls. Install blast resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames. Physically separate unsecured areas from the main EOC facility. Establish ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade. Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a blast event. Source: Adapted from FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks in High Occupancy Buildings C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

89 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page Signage: Signs are an important element of security. They are meant to keep intruders out of restricted areas; however, inadequate signs can create confusion and defeat their primary purpose. Confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site security Sign Preparation: Prepare signs for each entry control building. If possible, comply with local standards. Prepare entry control procedures signs, which explain current entry procedures for drivers and pedestrians High Risk Areas: Minimize the number of signs identifying high risk buildings. A significant number of warning signs should be erected to ensure that possible intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas Physical Security Lighting: Security lighting should be provided for overall site/building illumination and the perimeter to allow security personnel (or EOC staff) to maintain visualassessment during darkness. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain and may reduce the time that EOC personnel need to devote to security. The type of site lighting system used depends on the overall size and requirements of the EOC. Four types of lighting: 1) Continuous lighting (most common, consists of series of fixed lights); 2) Standby lighting (lights the area surrounding with lighting that is manually or automatically turned on); 3) Movable lighting (movable searchlights that may be lit during hours of darkness); and 4) Emergency lighting (uses a backup power system; used in times of power failure) Space Design: The protection of the EOC interior can be accomplished through space design, through: 1) functional layout, and 2) structural layout. Generally speaking, the following security guidelines can be used to mitigate potential impacts from explosive forces: Locate key assets as far into the interior of the EOC as possible. Place areas of high visitor activity away from key assets (e.g., equipment, sensitive information, data management systems, etc.). Locate assets in areas where they are visible to more than one person. Use interior levels to differentiate levels of security within the building. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc

90 Chapter 8 EOC Security Concepts and Requirements Page 9 Provide foyers with reinforced concrete walls, and offset interior and exterior doors. Consider methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to the outside structure. Stairwells that are required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas where blasé events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into lobbies or loading areas Building Security: Typically, EOC facilities have limited points of access, generally a singular public entry and a separate point of staff access into the facility. The public point of entry must be controlled with a variety of systems including, CCTV monitoring, electronic locking devices at doors and voice communication (push-to-call) capability. These systems are generally discrete in that they are non-obtrusive while providing the necessary security functions. Scanning of an individual for weapons, can be accomplished in a manner that is less obtrusive than that utilized as an example, in many judicial facilities. It is important, however, to ensure that any weapons that are detectable are not introduced into the EOC facility. Security Control Center Central location for the visual monitoring of CCTV systems that overview critical exterior and interior areas. Designed for a large facility with specialized access/egress locking devices to control all points of access. Similarly, all items brought into the facility by the visitor should be screened and the technology to accomplish these tasks is readily available. Deliveries of products, supplies and mail pose unique threats to a facility, as recent events have shown. Some entities have elected to locate separate facilities to accommodate these functions in order to protect against total building failure from contaminates such as Anthrax or introduced air borne pathogens. There is also the option of providing these functions as a part of the primary building, but utilizing separate building air supply and exhaust systems to avoid introducing negative elements into overall facility systems. C:\staging\3F5C9A A\in\3F5C9A A.doc