International Atomic Energy Agency 16 th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs (UK LWR Activities)

Transcription

1 International Atomic Energy Agency 16 th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs (UK LWR Activities) Alan Palin Manager, Business Development Westinghouse Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA) 1

2 Contents National Status of the UK Programme Applying New Technologies to existing plant Impact of Fukushima Questions 2

3 National Status of the UK Programme An update from July 2010 Sourced Material 3

4 UK Perspective Between now and GW of oil & coal closes as result of Large Combustion Plant Directive 7GW of nuclear closes from end of Magnox and closure of 5 of the 7 AGRs Gap between predicted demand & supply Government Policy now supportive of new nuclear build New approach to licensing Reliant on Utilities to fund investment Utilities pushing for higher carbon prices to support investment in nuclear vs coal Loss of capacity & carbon concerns => UK Government Policy of new nuclear build 4

5 Nominated & approved sites 2011 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. All Rights Reserved. 1.Bradwell, Essex, NDA 2. Hartlepool, Durham, EDF Energy 3. Heysham, Lancashire, EDF Energy 4. Hinkley Point, Somerset, EDF Energy 5. Oldbury, Gloucestershire, Horizon 6. Sellafield, Cumbria, NuGen 7. Sizewell, Suffolk, EDF Energy 8. Wylfa, Anglesey, Horizon Sourced Material 5

6 New Build Plans for UK EDF Energy UK (EDF Energy/Centrica Joint Venture) 2 x 1600 MW EPRs for Hinkley 2 x 1600 MW EPRs for Sizewell 1st operating 2018, 4 by 2025 second tranche to follow Horizon Nuclear Power Ltd (RWE/EoN Joint Venture) 6000 MW operating by 2025 Technology to be decided in 2011 NuGeneration Ltd (Iberdrola/GDF Suez/SSE Joint Venture) Up to 3600MW operating by 2025 Technology to be decided Sourced Material 6

7 Where are we now Update on New Build since July 2010 Justification: Completed October 2010 Electricity Market Reform: Consultation closed 11 th March 2011 National Policy Statements: Granted 18 th July 2011 Fukushima: 11 th March 2011 Weightmen Report: Commissioned in end March 2011 Interim GDA: Conclusions, Expected Dec 2011 Investment approval for first plant: Expected 2012 Sourced Material 7

8 Applying New Technologies to Existing Plant Power Up-rating in the UK comparisons with Europe 8

9 Typical Uprate Work Scope NSSS Scope Fuel Safety Analyses Systems & Components BOP Scope Systems & Components Design Change Packages Installation T/G Scope HP Turbine upgrade/mods Generator Rewind/Replacement Licensing Scope License Amendment Request FSAR, Tech Spec, etc Environmental Impact State, Federal, Local Grid Impact Studies Outage Planning Training, simulator, procedures, etc 9

10 Types of Power Uprates Measurement Uncertainty Recapture (MUR) Power Uprate: 1%<X<2% Taking credit for a way to reduce inaccuracy in feed water flow measurement hence more accurate calculation of power calorimetric MUR COMPLETED 34 Americas PWRs 5 European PWRs 2 Asian PWRs 1 in UK - Sizewell B Stretch Power Uprate (SPU): 2%<X<7% Within the design capacity of the plant; Usually involves changes to instrumentation setpoints but NOT major plant modifications SPU COMPLETED 42 Americas PWRs 2 European PWRs 4 Asian PWRs Extended Power Uprate (EPU): X > 7% EPUs require significant modifications to major BOP equipment (e.g., highpressure turbines, condensate pumps & motors, main generators and/or transformers) EPU COMPLETED 13 Americas PWRs 10 European PWRs 10

11 Uprate Comparison Uprates provide additional generating capacity with relatively low site implementation & licensing risk 11

12 The impact of Fukushima The Weightman Report and its impact on the AP

13 Interim report on Fukushima by the Chief Nuclear Inspector Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Rt. Hon Chris Huhne MP: Safety is and will continue to be our number one priority. I am pleased that today s report confirms that the UK s current safety arrangements are working. Chief Nuclear Inspector, Dr. Mike Weightman: The extreme natural events that preceded the accident at Fukushima the magnitude 9 earthquake and subsequent huge tsunami are not credible in the UK But we are not complacent. No matter what the differences are, and how high the standard of design and subsequent operation of the nuclear facilities here in the UK, the quest for improvement must never stop. Sourced Material 13

14 UK GDA - Weightman Report 2011 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. All Rights Reserved. The Interim Weightman Report outlines 26 recommendations, it groups these recommendations into a number of sub categories including: - General Relevant to the Regulator Relevant to the Nuclear Industry Way Forward Response on interim report requested by 15 June Westinghouse response has been provided commenting on recommendations relevant to nuclear industry Response will be made public, timing likely to align with issuance of final Weightman report 14

15 Major Safety Advancements of AP1000 Event/Threats Response Summary Events /Threats Earthquakes and Floods Earthquakes and Floods Westinghouse AP1000 Seismic Design: AP1000 designed to withstand an earthquake that would happen once in every 10,000 years. Plants are being sited in seismically stable regions Robust: Designed to withstand other natural disasters: flooding, tornados, tsunamis, hurricanes. AP1000 can be safely shut down and maintained during a station blackout for 7 days. The advanced passive safety features rely on natural forces such as gravity, natural circulation, condensation and convection. The ultimate heat sink is the atmosphere. Power Sources Redundant safety-related DC batteries support safe shutdown for 72 hours (3 days). Two redundant 80 kw ancillary diesel generators provide cooling water to the containment shell and spent fuel pool. Ancillary diesels can run for 4 days with no offsite support. Two redundant 4 MW standby diesel generators can power equipment for 7 days with no offsite support (not required to cope with station blackout) Water Sources Passive Containment Cooling Tank provides cooling to the containment shell for 72 hours Ancillary Storage Tank provides cooling to the containment shell and to the spent fuel pool after 72 hours for a period for 4 more days 15

16 Major Safety Advancements of AP1000 Event/Threats Response Summary Events /Threats Containment Integrity Westinghouse AP1000 Containment Design: The 44.5 mm (1¾ ) steel containment is a high integrity steel pressure vessel surrounded by a shield building that protects it from missiles, including aircraft impact. Hydrogen Management: Battery powered hydrogen igniters & passive hydrogen recombiners prevent explosions Spent Fuel Pool Integrity and Cooling Structure: Spent fuel pool features 1+ m (3-5 ) thick, heavily reinforced concrete structures lined with steel Makeup Water: Spent fuel will remain covered with water sources located in the spent fuel building for at least 3 days. Following 3 days, water is provided by the ancillary storage tank. Robust Building: Designed for protection against seismic events, natural disasters and aircraft impact. Control Room Habitability Heavily shielded room with a 72-hour air-pressurization system. Control room dose minimal 16

17 Questions 17