2011, 25(97) pp , 25(97) s

Transcription

1 Scientific Journals Maritime University of Szczecin Zeszyty Naukowe Akademia Morska w Szczecinie 2011, 25(97) pp , 25(97) s Application of the Liquid Cargo Handling and LNG Terminal Simulator made by Transas in the design and verification of documentation required by the ISPS Code Wykorzystanie Symulatora Przewozu Ładunków Płynnych i Terminalu LNG firmy Transas w procesie projektowania i weryfikacji dokumentacji wymaganej Kodeksem ISPS Katarzyna Prill Maritime University of Szczecin, Education and Certification Department Akademia Morska w Szczecinie, Dział Nauczania i Certyfikacji Szczecin, ul. Wały Chrobrego 1 2, k.prill@am.szczecin.pl Key words: safety, threat, port facility, security, assessment Abstract The article briefly describes one of the modules of a Liquid Cargo handling Simulator operated by the Maritime University of Szczecin, designed to simulate the handling of liquid. It addresses shipping security issues in the context of ISPS Code requirements for port facilities and presents the applicability of simulation methods in the security plan development and verification. Słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo, zagrożenie, obiekt portowy, ochrona, ocena Abstrakt Artykuł zawiera krótką charakterystykę modułu Symulatora Przewozu Ładunków Płynnych Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, przeznaczonego do symulacji pracy terminala przeładunku paliw w postaci skroplonej. Ujęto w nim problematykę bezpieczeństwa żeglugi w aspekcie wymagań Kodeksu ISPS w odniesieniu do obiektów portowych oraz zaprezentowano możliwości wykorzystania potencjału metod symulacyjnych w tworzeniu i weryfikacji dokumentacji bezpieczeństwa. Introduction The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) adopted by the International Maritime Organization sets the framework for measures of maritime security enhancement by ships and port facilities that may co-operate in order to detect and deter actions that threaten the safety of maritime transport. There are justified fears of terrorist attacks, sabotage, trafficking and other criminal activities that are mainly aimed to break the transport chain and cause economic standstill in port traffic. For this reason, certain actions had to be taken in reference to ships trading internationally and port facilities located within the territories of the contracting governments. The key role in minimizing risks related to the security of ports and ships operating in them lies in correctly developed and verified Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and Port Facility Security Plans (PFSP). These documents allow to correctly define indispensible security measures that may be applicable when taking action in response to threat. One of the relevant requirements is to identify vulnerable points in the implemented security system and to establish and improve plans with the aim to reduce possible risks of loss of life and assets. Responding to the dynamic development of Polish maritime economy, connected with the need 52 Scientific Journals 25(97)

2 Application of the Liquid Cargo Handling and LNG Terminal Simulator made by Transas in the design and verification... of safe and secure transport of liquid fuels and liquefied gas and the security of the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, the Maritime University of Szczecin (MUS) purchased a Liquid Cargo Handling and LNG Terminal Simulator made by Transas. One essential component of the simulator is a module simulating the operation of liquid cargo terminal based on the model of the terminal located in the Outer Port in Świnoujście. Figure 1 shows a 3D visualization of the simulator at MUS. The module enables training of personnel employed at LNG terminals, dealing with un/loading or storage of LNG, as well as the personnel being trained to respond in emergency situations at the terminal area. The operational screens (Fig. 2) show a general preview of the terminal, compressors, pumps, storage areas, cargo handling pier, vapour and inert gas tanks, reservoirs of fire-fighting and rain water. The simulator functions also include training of berthing procedures for typical LNG and Q-FLEX tankers, connection to the manifolds, transfer of cargo, disconnection of pipes and unberthing procedures [1]. The simulator has an interactive 3D display that may be used, inter alia, in such options as moving around the terminal model, or preview available through closed-circuit TV (CCTV). This function has a variety of options: visual effects of day or Fig. 1. Visualization of liquid cargo handling simulator at the Maritime University of Szczecin [1] Rys. 1. Wizualizacja symulatora przewozu ładunków płynnych w Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie [1] Fig. 2. An example of the division of operational screens at the user station [1] Rys. 2. Przykładowy podział ekranów operacyjnych na stanowisku użytkownika [1] Zeszyty Naukowe 25(97) 53

3 Katarzyna Prill night, varied visibility, humidity, fog, flames, smoke, spills etc. The user can make use of any of 32 video cameras monitoring the area of the terminal and cargo handling installations. The essential function the simulator offers the user is designing various models of cargo and to do research on the liquefied gas operations or navigational safety [1]. Documentation of the port facility as required by ISPS Code provisions Port Facility Security Assessment The Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) is an integral part of the development of a port facility security plan and its updating process. The assessment is conducted by administration under whose territorial jurisdiction the port facility is located. The government may authorize a recognized security organization to conduct a security assessment of a specific port facility located within its territory. The Port Facility Security Assessment is principally a risk analysis covering all aspects of port facility activities, performed to determine the part or parts of the port that may be most vulnerable to an attack are or most likely to be a target. Persons performing such assessment have to be properly experienced and have competence to carry out assessment in compliance with ISPS Code guidelines. It should be noted that the Code does not exclude the use of various tools, including simulators, in performing such assessment. The following elements should be taken into account while developing a PFSA: 1. Identification and assessment of major assets and infrastructure that have to be protected to ensure a high level of overall security. 2. Identification of weak points, including the human factor, in the infrastructure, assets, policy and developed procedures. 3. Identification of possible threats to the property, infrastructure and people and the probability of such threats,in order to establish and prioritize protective security measures to be applied. 4. Identification and prioritization of protective security measures and countermeasures and the development of adequate procedures aimed at the determination of their effectiveness (ISPS 15.5A) [2]. The identification and evaluation of important property and infrastructural components is a process leading to the determination the importance of buildings and installations for the functionin of a port facility as a whole. This process is very important as it provides a basis for focusing the security strategy and mitigation of possible consequences on these assets and structures which it is more important to protect from a security incident. The process should take into account loss of life, economic importance, symbolic value and the presence of government installations. It is also essential to consider whether a port facility, structure or installation can continue to function without the asset, and the extent to which it rapid re-establishment of normal operation is possible (ISPS 15.5, 15.6 B). The clear identification of assets and infrastructure and their spatial distribution is of major importance for the assessment of the needs of a port facility in view of security, prioritization of measures and decisions on the allocation of resources to assure the highest possible level of security [2]. The identification of assets and infrastructure of the port facility should particularly concentrate on indicating weaknesses in terms of access to port facilities and ships in them, accompanying structures, existing security measures and procedures in reference to identification systems, radio and telecommunication systems, port and communal services and monitoring of adjacent areas [2]. PFSA identifies specific features of a port facility and potential risks for the safety, necessitating the appointment of a Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) and the preparation of a PFSP. These specific features and other problems related to local and national safety should be considered in developing a PFSP. Besides, appropriate security measures should be established to minimize either the probability of violent act or the consequences of potential risk [2]. Port Facility Security Plan The Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is an integral part of Port Facility Security Assessment. The plan specifies procedures relating to specific activities performed within port-facility/ship interface. The aim of the PFSP is to prevent criminal acts within a facility, and to ensure the safety of personnel and ships operating and berthing at the facility. The scope of this document has to be in accordance with the requirements of Chapter XI-2 SOLAS 1974 and the ISPS Code. The PFSP should indicate operational and physical security measures that a port facility should implement to ensure continuous performance at security level 1. The plan should also point at additional or enhanced security measures that a port facility may take in order to change to and operate at security level 2, if appropriately instructed. Besides, the plan should foresee possible preparatory actions that a port facility can undertake to respond promptly to instructions that 54 Scientific Journals 25(97)

4 Application of the Liquid Cargo Handling and LNG Terminal Simulator made by Transas in the design and verification... may be given by persons acting at security level 3 in response to a security breach incident or threat of such incident (ISPS 1.19A) [2]. In compliance with the ISPS Code requirements (16.8 B), each PFSP should take into account the following assumptions for each security level: 1. The role and structure of the port facility security organization. 2. The links between the port facility security organization and local and national authorities responsible for security issues. 3. The duties, responsibilities and training requirements of all port facility personnel with a security role and the performance measures needed to allow their individual effectiveness to be assessed. 4. The communication systems enabling effective and continuous communication between port facility security personnel, ships in the port and, respective local and national bodies responsible for security. 5. The procedures and safeguards indispensible for maintaining permanent communication at all times. 6. The procedures and practices of security sensitive information protection. 7. The procedures of assessment of continuous effectiveness of security measures, procedures and equipment, including identification of failures or mulfunction. 8. The procedures enabling reporting and assessment of reports on potential breach of security and safety-related problems [2]. The security of port facilities is related with constant risks of new potential threats that may entail the need for further assessments, creation of new procedures and instruction or modification of the existing ones, and including them in the already used PFSPs. An effective PFSP has to be based on detailed evaluation of all port facility related issues, particularly on-site inspection and operational description of a single port facility. Fig. 3. Preview of the CCTV system [1] Rys. 3. Podgląd z systemu telewizji przemysłowej [1] Zeszyty Naukowe 25(97) 55

5 Katarzyna Prill Use of a Liquid Cargo Handling Simulator in the design and verification of documentation required by the ISPS Code As mentioned before, the liquid cargo handling simulator at the Maritime University of Szczecin has capabilities and tools allowing to determine assumptions for the effective creation and verification of the PFSA and PFSP, i.e. in compliance with the ISPS Code provisions. It should be noted that the use of the simulator will be different in case of new port facilities, such as the LNG terminal in Świnoujście, and those in service, as they differ in the aim and scope of actions. In reference to new port facilities, still under construction or just before being put in operation, the basic use of the simulator will be the identification and assessment of individual assets and infrastructure in view of their vulnerability to threats and the identification of these threats. The aim may be reached by making a 3D model of the port facility including all its infrastructural components. Input data for the creation of a 3D port facility model are available in, inter alia, design documentation, construction diagrams and plans. The function of preview of the overall model and 32 CCTV cameras enable observations of a specific facility from various perspectives. Thus, security planners may indentify facilities, structures or areas, whose operational failure may threaten the safety of people and assets. Figure 3 shows one possible use of the CCTV functions for observation of key infrastructural components. With a 3D port facility model at hand, one can verify all areas in terms of access restrictions or no access status, by introducing into the model relevant zones and recommendations on security measures, such as fencing, gates and check points. Planning of restricted access areas is shown in figure 4. A 3D model of the port facility may serve as a basis for simulations aimed at the determination of intentional threats and random incidents. Functions of user s movement around the port facility allow to identify the directions of threats that may come from the water and land side. In emergencies, Fig. 4. Sample of security zones based on [3] Rys. 4. Przykładowe strefy bezpieczeństwa na podstawie [3] 56 Scientific Journals 25(97)

6 Application of the Liquid Cargo Handling and LNG Terminal Simulator made by Transas in the design and verification... damage to a ship s hull and consequent spillage of fuel into the water, the simulator enables creating spill models and to determine the scale of threat and consequences of a security incident. Output data of simulations for port facility security assessment are assumptions made for risk management at a port facility. Such assumptions include the identification and hierarchization of critical assets and infrastructure located within the port facility. Simulations using a facility model also allow to determine kinds of threat and their effects on the port facility. The outcome of PFSA, after comparison with the reality, should be adopted as input data for the development of a PFSP, particularly part of the plan concerning restricted areas (ISPS B) and monitoring of the port facility (ISPS B). According to the requirements of the ISPS Code, the PFSP should indicate operational and physical security measures that the port facility should implement for permanent operation at security level 1. The plan should also point at additional or enhanced security measures that the port facility may take in order to change to and operate at security level 2, if appropriately instructed. Besides, the plan should foresee possible preparatory actions that the port facility can undertake to respond promptly to instructions that may be given by persons acting at security level 3 in response to a security breach incident or threat of such incident [2]. The document should identify those restricted areas that are established to protect the facility and vessels in its perimeter, the personnel, infrastructure, and security and surveillance / monitoring systems. Using a simulation model of a given port facility, general preview functions and CCTV cameras, we can identify the appropriate zones that may include areas directly adjacent to the ship on the land and water side, areas of cargo handling, sites of dangerous goods storage, security and surveillance control rooms, sites of major radio and telecommunication installations, power and water supply points and others. The function of user s movement in a selected port facility 3D model Fig. 5. Designing foot patrols routes and deployment of CCTV cameras based on [1] Rys. 5. Projektowanie tras patroli pieszych i rozmieszczenie kamer telewizji przemysłowej na podstawie [1] Zeszyty Naukowe 25(97) 57

7 Katarzyna Prill enables accurate deployment of elements of security system for eliminating unauthorized entry to restricted areas. In other words, distribution of check points, barriers and monitoring stations can be simulated. Under Regulation B, the port facility security organization is obliged to have the capability of monitoring the port facility and its nearby approaches, on land and water, at all times, including the night hours and periods of limited visibility, the restricted areas within the port facility, the ships at the port facility and areas surrounding ships. Such monitoring should make use of lighting, security guards, including foot, vehicle and waterborne patrols, and automatic intrusion detection devices and surveillance equipment [2]. The simulator module under consideration enables precise distribution of the equipment for effective surveillance of the port facility (Fig. 5). CCTV cameras and motion sensors can be located in a manner ensuring the widest coverage of a specific area, defining routes for foot, vehicle and waterborne patrols. Providing the security of port facilities in operation, having PFSA and PFSP, is related with constant risks of new potential threats that may entail the need for further evaluation, creation of new procedures and instructions or modification of the existing ones, and including them in the already used PFSPs. In this case the basic objective of using the simulator is the verification of the existing documentation for its compliance with the actual situation. Input data for devising a 3D model of the port facility may be obtained from design documentation, construction diagrams and plans and PFSA guidelines relating to identified threats and a list of assets and infrastructure that are critical for the functioning of the entire facility. The existing PFSP can be used in designing a port facility model, particularly the information on designated restricted areas, procedures for port facility monitoring. Once a model of the port facility concerned is created, the existing assumptions of safety assurance have to be verified. This involves another assessment (PFSA) in which special attention will be paid to possible new threats and consequences from these threats. If new threats are identified, it is necessary to perform relevant risk assessment. Its results should have a form of recommendations for the verified PFSP. Conclusions The Transas-made liquid cargo handling simulator is a most effective tool in evaluating port facility or facilities safety. The feature of creating simulation models of any port facility based on available technical documentation makes this tool useful in reference to the existing port facilities and those under construction. The LNG terminal in Świnoujście may be a good example in this respect. Operational functions enabling the user to move around the 3D port facility model and to create a CCTV network offer a method for developing an effective PFSA, and for identification of security details, development of monitoring procedures etc. One should bear in mind, however, that all results obtained form simulations should be compared with actual conditions to get an optimal outcome. References 1. Załącznik do SIWZ dla projektu budowy Centrum Symulacyjnego Terminalu LNG i Symulatora Ładunkowego do Przewozu Ładunków Ciekłych w Akademii Morskiej w Szczecinie, Materiały wewnętrzne AM w Szczecinie, Szczecin International Port Facility and Ship Security Code, ISPS Code, IMO Materiały promocyjne Transas Liquid Cargo Handling Simulator LCHS 5000: Product Tanker Transas Marine Limited Recenzent: dr hab. inż. Zbigniew Barciu, prof. AM Akademia Morska w Gdyni 58 Scientific Journals 25(97)