Document of The World Bank IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA IDA-3354A) ON A CREDIT

Transcription

1 Pubic Discosure Authorized Pubic Discosure Authorized Pubic Discosure Authorized Pubic Discosure Authorized Document of The Word Bank Report No: ICR IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA IDA-3354A) Water and Urban II Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF 52.2 SDR MILLION (US$95 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR AN URBAN MOBILITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM March 27, 2009

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective March 27, 2009) Currency Unit = FCFA SDR 1.00 = US$1.51 US$1.00 = FCFA 485 FISCAL YEAR January - December ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AATR AFD AFTU AGETIP APL CAS CETUD CR DCA ERR FDTU GIE IDA KPI MECTRANS MTR NDF PAMU PDO PTB SNCS SSATP TA TTL Autonomous Road Work Agency (Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers) French Deveopment Agency (Agence Française de Déveoppement) Urban Transport Financing Group (Association de Financement des Transports Urbains) Pubic Works Executing Agency (Agence pour 'Exécution de Travaux d'intérêt Pubic) Adaptabe Program Loan Country Assistance Strategy Executive Counci for Urban Transport in Dakar (Consei Exécutif des Transports Urbains de Dakar) Mini-bus (Car Rapide) Deveopment Credit Agreement Economic Rate of Return Deveopment Fund for Urban Transport (Fonds de Déveoppement des Transports Urbains) Economic Interest Group (Groupement d'intérêt Economique) Internationa Deveopment Association Key Performance Indicator Mutua Saving and Loan Association for Transport Companies of Dakar (Mutuee d Epargne et de Crédit Des Transporteurs de a Région de Dakar) Mid-Term Review Nordic Deveopment Fund Urban Mobiity Improvement Project (Programme d Améioration de a Mobiité Urbaine à Dakar) Project Deveopment Objective Suburban Train (Petit Train de Banieue) Nationa Rairoad Company (Société Nationae de Chemins de Fer du Sénéga) Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Poicy Program Technica Assistance Task Team Leader Vice President: Obiagei K. Ezekwesei Country Director: Habib Fetini Sector Manager: Eustache Ouayoro Project Team Leader: Christian Diou ICR Team Leader: Christian Diou ICR Primary Author: Joseph W.B. Bredie ii

3 REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL URBAN MOBILITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM Data Sheet A. Basic Information... iv B. Key Dates... iv C. Ratings Summary... iv D. Sector and Theme Codes... v E. Bank Staff... v F. Resuts Framework Anaysis... v G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs... ix H. Restructuring... ix I. Disbursement Profie... x 1. Project Context, Deveopment Objectives and Design Key Factors Affecting Impementation and Outcomes Assessment of Outcomes Assessment of Risk to Deveopment Outcome Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Lessons Learned Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Impementing Agencies/Partners Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Annex 2. Outputs by Component Annex 3. Economic and Financia Anaysis Annex 4. Bank Lending and Impementation Support/Supervision Processes Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Resuts Annex 6. Stakehoder Workshop Report and Resuts Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakehoders Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents MAP IBRD iii

4 A. Basic Information Country: Senega Project Name: URBAN MOBILITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT Project ID: P L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-33540, IDA- 3354A ICR Date: 03/25/2009 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: APL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF SENEGAL Origina Tota Commitment: XDR 52.2M Disbursed Amount: XDR 49.6M Environmenta Category: B Impementing Agencies: CETUD, SNCS (TRANSRAIL) Cofinanciers and Other Externa Partners: French Deveopment Agency (Agence Française de Déveoppement - AFD) Nordic Deveopment Fund (NDF) B. Key Dates Process Date Process Origina Date Revised / Actua Date(s) Concept Review: 02/02/1999 Effectiveness: 05/14/2001 Appraisa: 01/28/2000 Restructuring(s): Approva: 05/25/2000 Mid-term Review: 01/29/2004 Cosing: 12/31/ /30/2008 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Risk to Deveopment Outcome: Bank Performance: Borrower Performance: Moderatey Unsatisfactory Substantia Moderatey Unsatisfactory Moderatey Unsatisfactory C.2 Detaied Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quaity at Entry: Unsatisfactory Government: Unsatisfactory Quaity of Supervision: Moderatey Satisfactory Impementing Agency/Agencies: Moderatey Satisfactory Overa Bank Performance: Moderatey Unsatisfactory Overa Borrower Performance: Moderatey Unsatisfactory iv

5 C.3 Quaity at Entry and Impementation Performance Indicators Impementation QAG Assessments Indicators Performance (if any) Potentia Probem Project Yes at any time (Yes/No): Probem Project at any Yes time (Yes/No): DO rating before Cosing/Inactive status: Moderatey Unsatisfactory Quaity at Entry (QEA): Quaity of Supervision (QSA): None Satisfactory Rating D. Sector and Theme Codes Origina Actua Sector Code (as % of tota Bank financing) Raiways Roads and highways Sub-nationa government administration Theme Code (Primary/Secondary) Access to urban services and housing Primary Primary Municipa governance and institution buiding Secondary Secondary Other urban deveopment Primary Primary Poution management and environmenta heath Secondary Secondary E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approva Vice President: Obiagei Katryn Ezekwesii Caisto E. Madavo Country Director: Habib M. Fetini Mahmood A. Ayub Sector Manager: Eustache Ouayoro Letitia A. Obeng Project Team Leader: Christian Diou Patrick Butynck ICR Team Leader: Christian Diou ICR Primary Author: Joseph W. B. Bredie F. Resuts Framework Anaysis Project Deveopment Objectives (from Project Appraisa Document) The Project Deveopment Objective was to improve the safety, efficiency and environmenta quaity of urban mobiity in the Dakar metropoitan area and road safety in Thiès and Kaoack. Specia attention to improving mobiity for the urban poor by: (i) v

6 promoting pubic transport services; and (ii) ensuring the safe movement of pedestrians and road users. Revised Project Deveopment Objectives (as approved by origina approving authority) The Project Deveopment Objective remained unchanged throughout the ife of the project. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Vaue quantitative or quaitative Baseine Vaue Origina Target Vaues (from approva documents) Formay Revised Target Vaues Reduction in traffic congestion and trave time for commuters Amount of time ost in traffic on four seected axes: 1, hours /day or 16,851 veh.hour/day: Time ost: - 10% A: 3401 A: 3231 A: 4110 B: 5705 B: 5420 B: 7581 C: 2431 C: 2309 C: 3141 D: 5314 D: 5048 D: 6103 Actua Vaue Achieved at Competion or Target Years Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Comments (inc. % achievement) By these measures commuters ost an average of 30% more hours in traffic in 2008 compared to Athough the target is not met, the situation improved after 2005 when urban road upgrading programs neared competion. Indicator 2 : Increase in market share of pubic transport and percentage of customers satisfied with service Vaue quantitative or quaitative 73.1% +5% Decined to 59.6% in 2008 (-18.5%). Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Target not reached. The market share of pubic transport fe short by 18.5%, Comments (inc. % achievement) compared to the origina target (78.1%). However: (i) market share has remained amost stabe since end-2005, at which time it was 61.9%; and (ii) in absoute terms there is a strong increase of the number of pubic transport trips in the recent years (+12% from 2007 to 2008). Indicator 3 : Reduced eves of air poution Vaue quantitative or quaitative Est. prod. CO: T/year (adjusted) Est. prod. NOx : T/year (adjusted) Est. prod. HC: T/year (adjusted) Est. prod. CO: - 1% Est. prod. NOx : - 1% Est. prod. HC: - 1% Est. prod. CO: T/year (+48%) Est. prod. NOx: T/year (+57%) Est. prod. HC : T/year (+72%) Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Comments (inc. % achievement) Target not reached. Estimates of eves of air poution in 2008 need to take into account the surge in the number of vehices registered in Dakar (from 40,042 in 1997 to 98,243 in 2007 or +145%) and the annua increase in the number of vi

7 Indicator 4 : Vaue quantitative or quaitative kiometers/vehices (+8.5% between 1999 and 2008). Reduced accidents per capita Accidents per 1000 veh: 61,4% (BAC 97) Deaths per 1000 veh: 2.1 (BAC 97) Accidents: - 5% Deaths: - 10% Accidents per 1000 veh: 22,6% (GMAT 08) Death per 1000 veh: 0.56 (GMAT 08) Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Comments (inc. % Target exceeded. Injuries dropped by 40% and deaths by 68%. achievement) Indicator 5 : Cost of externaities Direct and indirect costs of congestion: CFAF108 Cost of CFAF142.9 biion Vaue biion (3.5% of 1998 congestion: - 10% +32% quantitative or GNP) incuding (CFAF97.2 (est. 2.2% of 2008 quaitative environmenta biion) GNP) externaities Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Comments (inc. % achievement) Target not met. Since the methodoogy used to cacuate cost at appraisa was not specified, the use of a different methodoogy from 2004 onwards makes resuts incomparabe. The cost of time ost in congestion aone, measured by a wedefined methodoogy, actuay decined by 10% between 2004 and 2008, refecting a reduction of congestion and a better contro over the sector during the time when works were impemented and going back to 2000 eve. However, the overa resut for the entire period of the project was an increase in direct and indirect costs of congestion by 32%, but with the ICR team unabe to attribute this increase to either the increase in externaities between 2000 and 2004, during which time no works were competed, or to the changed methodoogy. In order to obtain comparabe resuts, the baseine woud have to be adjusted using the methodoogy, but the raw baseine data is not avaiabe to carry out this anaysis. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Indicator Indicator 1 : Vaue (quantitative or quaitative) Baseine Vaue Origina Target Vaues (from approva documents) Formay Revised Target Vaues Actua Vaue Achieved at Competion or Target Years Increased throughput (in terms of passengers) of pubic transport corridors Commercia speed Coective transport: +10% km/h to km/h on seected axes Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /2008 Comments Target not met. Commercia speed decreased by about 30 %. (inc. % Commercia speed Coective transport: 8.18 km/h to 22 km/h on seected axes. vii

8 achievement) Indicator 2 : Vaue (quantitative or quaitative) Strengthened CETUD management capacity None Strengthening of CETUD as a reguatory institution CETUD reguates pubic transport fares, routes and stops, and coordinates poicy and financia aspects of pubic transport with other agencies. Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /16/2009 Comments (inc. % achievement) Target partiay met. CETUD has been strengthened in terms of capacity, staff, and mandate. A panned TA activities were impemented, but further effort is needed in order to consoidate project achievements. Indicator 3 : Improved effectiveness and efficiency of the urban roads Vaue (quantitative or quaitative) None Urban road network and urban transport infrastructure in Dakar rehabiitated, maintained, and redesigned to promote pubic transport and assure pedestrian safety 50 kiometers of urban road network and infrastructure incuding 27 intersections have been rehabiitated, and redesigned. In addition, two vehicuar and 13 pedestrian overpasses have been constructed. Maintenance of the road network in genera and that of traffic ights and signs in particuar is inadequate. Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /16/2009 Comments Target evauated as 95% achieved, compared to the works program aid out at (inc. % appraisa. achievement) Indicator 4 : Urban transport easing scheme Vaue (quantitative or quaitative) None 300 new or 600 second-hand minibuses 505 new mini-buses repacing the same number of od ones. Date achieved 05/04/ /31/ /06/ % achieved, since 505 new mini-buses were provided vs 300 panned.. The Comments indicator was fexibe to aow mini-bus operators to choose between new and (inc. % second-hand mini-buses. Reimbursement rate is 100% for oans to mini-bus achievement) operators. viii

9 G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs No. Date ISR Archived DO IP Actua Disbursements (USD miions) 1 06/28/2000 Highy Satisfactory Highy Satisfactory /21/2000 Satisfactory Satisfactory /07/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory /30/2001 Satisfactory Satisfactory /28/2002 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory /30/2002 Satisfactory Unsatisfactory /12/2002 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /30/2003 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /27/2003 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /01/2003 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory /02/2004 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory /24/2004 Unsatisfactory Satisfactory /25/2005 Unsatisfactory Moderatey Satisfactory /30/2005 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /21/2005 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /22/2006 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /22/2006 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /22/2007 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /29/2007 Moderatey Satisfactory Satisfactory /29/2008 Moderatey Satisfactory Moderatey Unsatisfactory /29/2008 Moderatey Unsatisfactory Moderatey Unsatisfactory H. Restructuring Not Appicabe ix

10 I. Disbursement Profie x

11 1. Project Context, Deveopment Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisa 1. Crisis Leve Traffic Congestion, Poution, and Accidents in Dakar. At appraisa in eary 2000, the Greater Dakar transport system was marked by severe traffic congestion and high eves of poution and road accidents. The main causes were ack of investments in road infrastructure in the face of rapid popuation growth (4 percent annuay), very high increase in the number of vehices (21 percent annuay) and informa vendors encroaching on roads, raiways, and sidewaks. Congestion was particuary bad in the narrow Pikine-Guediawaye transit corridor, which connects Dakar city, the port, and the main raiway termina with suburban areas and the rest of the country. 2. It was estimated at appraisa that 16,850 hours per day were ost in traffic on many of the most critica road sections in Dakar and that the commercia speed of pubic transport vehices had been reduced to kiometers per hour. Poution from vehices caused an estimated one third of a air poution in the city and was further exacerbated by the fact that up to 55 percent of vehices were more than 15 years od. The effect on respiratory diseases was evident: Dakar had an annua average of 25,150 cases of respiratory reated sickness (excuding tubercuosis) representing 5.4 percent of the area s tota sickness incidence. Persons iving in congested areas such as bus and taxi stations, markets, schoos, or near heaviy traveed roadways were found at high risk. 3. In 1997, amost 2,500 peope were injured in traffic accidents brought on by the poor state of maintenance of vehices, incuding pubic transport. Moreover, there was no separation between fast and sow moving traffic (incuding aong the suburban raiway through the densey popuated Pikine-Guediawaye transit corridor) and sidewaks were in disrepair or occupied by vendors, who aso often shared the raiway tracks and right-ofway with the trains. 4. At appraisa, these probems substantiay affected the productivity and efficiency of the nationa economy. It was estimated that reducing Dakar s traffic congestion by 10 percent woud resut in an increase of the efficiency of the urban transport system vaued at US$5.4 biion annuay. 5. The Government s Urban Transport Poicy was adopted in September 1996, providing a framework for rehabiitating the urban transport sector through a comprehensive approach, which woud address institutiona, reguatory, financia, manageria, and socia aspects of the crisis. 6. Bank Support for the Urban Transport Poicy. In eary 1997, at the request of the Government of Senega, the Bank agreed to support the Urban Transport Poicy through a Transport Reform and Capacity Buiding Technica Assistance Project. At cosing in 2001, the technica assistance (TA) project had achieved minor improvements in the institutiona and reguatory framework, coordination between nationa and oca 1

12 government and the private sector, invoving stakehoders in decision-making, and deveoping road safety action pans and improving traffic management. However, the scope of the TA was not commensurate with the scae of the probems and the Government and the Bank agreed that the severity of the situation warranted the preparation of a free-standing Urban Mobiity Improvement Program (Programme d Améioration de a Mobiite Urbaine - PAMU). 1.2 Origina Project Deveopment Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 7. The Project Deveopment Objective was to improve the safety, efficiency, and environmenta quaity of urban mobiity in the Dakar metropoitan area and road safety in the Thiès and Kaoack areas. Specia attention was to be paid to improving mobiity for the urban poor by: (i) promoting pubic transport services, and (ii) ensuring the safe movement of pedestrians and road users. 8. The key performance indicators were: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Reduction in traffic congestion and trave time for commuters; Increases in market shares of pubic transport and percentages of customer satisfaction with services; Reduction in reative eve of emissions generated by motorized vehices; Reduction in the number of fataities caused by traffic accidents aong the project s main road corridors; and Decrease in the costs of externaities generated by motorized transport as a percentage of GDP. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by origina approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification The PDO was not revised. 1.4 Main Benefits and Target Popuation 9. Beneficiaries and benefits. The project aimed at improving the safe mobiity and immediate environment of the urban poor, as those most affected by the persistent urban transport crisis in Dakar and mosty reying on coective transport. Increasing accessibiity to pubic transport services to peope iving in remote ocations from downtown Dakar was going to benefit the poor segments of the popuation. 10. Other Project Benefits. The society at arge woud benefit from the economic, socia, and environmenta benefits of the project through: (i) reduced vehice operating costs and trave time; (iii) reduced air poution; (ii) improved pedestrian safety in the Dakar metropoitan area; (iv) improved vaue-for-money for pubic spending on roads; and (v) increased empoyment opportunities in the mass transport industry (mini-buses CR (Car Rapides)). The overa economic productivity and the quaity of ife were expected to improve in the Dakar metropoitan area. 2

13 1.5 Origina Components 11. Part A: Road Infrastructure, Road Safety, and Traffic Management. (i) Rehabiitation and construction of road infrastructure primariy for the deveopment of pubic transport and pedestrian safety in the Dakar metropoitan area; (ii) design and impementation of a road safety action pan for the Dakar, Thiès, and Kaoack areas (incuding management of accident-prone junctions, improvement of user friendiness and safety infrastructure, and impementation of awareness campaigns targeted at transport users and operators); (iii) deveopment and impementation of traffic management strategies to improve key transit points for persons and goods, and preparation of a comprehensive Urban Mobiity Pan for the Dakar area and a pan to increase pubic transport services commercia speed; and (iv) technica and advisory services. 12. Part B: Pedestrians Movement and Traffic Security aong the Suburban Raiway Line. (i) Upgrading of suburban raiway infrastructure by increasing existing capacity, impementing major security works aong the main transport corridors targeted by the project and reocating the freight termina outside downtown Dakar; and (ii) technica and advisory services to the concessioning of the suburban raiway services. 13. Part C: Leasing: (i) Impementation of a easing mechanism to accompany the renovation of mini-buses (CR), incuding inter aia support for strengthening the technica and management capacity of the operators; and (ii) faciitating access to credit for private transit operators to enabe them to renew their feet, and acquisition, with a view to easing, by the Urban Transport Financing Group (Association de Financement des Transports Urbains - AFTU) of vehices that meet safety and emissions standards. 14. Part D: Urban Air Quaity Management. Carrying out of a program of actions aimed at improving air quaity in the Dakar metropoitan area incuding: (i) construction of automobie monitoring centers; (ii) estabishment of an observatory to track urban poution; (iii) support for the introduction and supervision of an urban air quaity action pan; and (iv) instituting awareness campaigns and consutations with road users and the transport industry. 15. Part E: Capacity-Buiding and Institutiona Strengthening. (i) Technica advisory services and training to strengthen sectora capacity with regard to air poution, road safety, inter-moda poicy and promotion of mass transport, urban panning, and toos and techniques for evauating performance; (ii) carrying out ad-hoc studies and assessments consistent with the evoving context, as we as feasibiity studies to prepare the second phase of the program; and (iii) carrying out institutiona reform of the sector and support to the Executive Counci for Urban Transport in Dakar (Consei Exécutif des Transports Urbains de Dakar - CETUD in its capacity as project executing agency and reguatory authority for urban transport. 1.6 Revised Components The components were not revised. 3

14 1.7 Other significant changes 16. Extensions of the Cosing Date. The Credit cosing date was extended three times. At the third extension, approved on November 21, 2007, the origina cosing date of December 31, 2004 was extended to September 30, The extensions were necessary to make up for deays with (i) the engthy process of restructuring of CETUD initiated in 2000; (ii) works on the urban raiway ine and the air quaity component; and (iii) the deivery of vehices under the ease component. 17. Amendment of the Deveopment Credit Agreement. Part B of the project was to be impemented by the Nationa Rairoad Company (Société Nationae des Chemins de Fer du Senega - SNCS). In 2003, the Government decided to privatize the SNCS and the Deveopment Credit Agreement (DCA) was amended in October 2004 to enabe the new operator, TRANSRAIL, to manage this component. 2. Key Factors Affecting Impementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quaity at Entry 18. Surveys and studies carried out under the Urban Transport and Capacity Buiding TA project were used to prepare the PAMU. CETUD, working with stakehoders and the Bank: (i) identified the congestion bottenecks and accident hot-spots; (ii) determined the improvements necessary to integrate the suburban raiway ine with other mass-transit systems; (iii) designed the ease scheme for the renewa of the CR feet; and (iv) prepared the measures to manage traffic and air quaity. These proposas were approved, in principe, by the CETUD assemby (government, oca authorities, private sector) and thus had wide support among stakehoders. The regiona experiences from the sub- Saharan Africa Transport Poicy Program (SSTAP) were used as to seect appropriate technica soutions based on simpe technoogy. 19. The PAMU was designed to address the crisis in the urban transport sector in Dakar in a comprehensive manner. During preparation, the Government and the Bank agreed that, in view of the urgent needs and the incompete technica readiness of some investments, the PAMU shoud be designed as the first phase of a two-phase Adaptabe Program Loan (APL). The indicative cost was US$103 miion, of which the Bank was to finance about 68 percent. The rest woud be financed by the French Deveopment Agency (Agence Française de Déveoppement - AFD), the Nordic Deveopment Fund (NDF), the Government, and others (municipaities and transport operators). The second phase of the APL, estimated to cost US$31.4 miion, was to be impemented if specific triggers reated to satisfactory impementation of activities under the first phase were met. 20. Quaity-at-entry is rated unsatisfactory as preparation was not sufficienty advanced in reation to procurement and financing of maintenance arrangements. The preparation had a number of shortcomings in the anaysis of the roe, capacity, and mandate of CETUD to manage a project of this scae. These issues were not addressed in the design as a resut. This was highighted by the Quaity Assurance Group in the 4

15 October 2002 Quaity of Supervision Assessment (QSA5) report. Further, the CR/minibus operators were not ready to participate in the easing scheme. The invovement of severa donors and the resuting compications for project management contributed to increasing the compexity of the project. This issue was aso not sufficienty addressed. As a resut, the project was not ready for impementation at Board approva. 2.2 Impementation 21. Impementation of the PAMU went through three phases. Impementation was very sow from effectiveness to January 2004 at the mid-term review (MTR), due to deays in: estabishment of project management capacity for CETUD, effectiveness of the NDF agreement and fine-tuning the CRs easing scheme. Project impementation improved significanty after the MTR when most of the resuts were achieved. Bank supervision teams, faced with very ow initia disbursement, worked with CETUD to impement road works, get the air quaity component on track, and mobiize CR operators. Unfortunatey, impementation went back to a standsti after 2007 due to ack of counterpart funds which prevented the competion of the remaining civi works incuding the suburban raiway ine. 22. Deays with assuring CETUD s project management capacity. CETUD had ony three technica staff comprising the secretariat when it was made responsibe for impementing the PAMU. The new Government, eected in May 2000, decided to restructure CETUD and this decision deayed the recruitment of project impementation staff. A new President and Director Genera were finay appointed in January 2002, but deays in recruiting the technica and financia staff pushed back the aunching of the road works unti ate 2003 and imited CETUD s roe in its efforts to privatize the nationa raiway and the Dakar bus company (SOTRAC). This in turn deayed upgrading work on the suburban raiway ine. The seection of the Autonomous Road Works Agency (Agence Autonome des Travaux Routiers - AATR) and Pubic Works Executing Agency (Agence pour 'Exécution de Travaux d'intérêt Pubic - AGETIP) to oversee procurement of works and goods under the road component was acceptabe to the Bank, but took unti 2003 to be operationa. 23. Deays with the NDF-financed air quaity activities. Athough the NDF agreement was signed in December 2002, it was not unti January 2004 that the Government produced a ega opinion to enabe effectiveness of this agreement and the aunch of the air quaity activities. Moreover, securing the sites for the automobie monitoring centers took unti 2008 and procurement of equipment for the air quaity aboratory, initiay restricted to Nordic countries, took amost two years to compete. Because of a these deays, it was decided to scae down proposed activities from three monitoring centers to one, and to drop a five air quaity measuring stations and keeping ony the centra aboratory. 24. Deays with the participation of the CR operators in the easing scheme. Meetings to mobiize the independent CR/mini-bus operators started in 1999 under the TA project and continued to take pace in the eary years of PAMU. In addition, the registration of operators into Economic Interest Groups (Groupement d'intérêt 5

16 Economique - GIE) which started eary on in the project took onger than anticipated because of the informa nature of the CR operators and their ack of coatera which hed up procurement of mini-buses since operators were unabe to provide the initia deposits and commercia banks decined to end funds to these operators. These deposits were intended to confirm operators commitment and be part of the financia mechanism to guarantee against operators defauting on their repayments. The easing mechanism took off in November 2003 when the first contract for new mini-buses was signed. The easing mechanism operated at fu speed after May 2005 when the GIEs created their own micro-finance institution. 25. Eventua Acceeration of Activities but Project Cosure with Unfinished Works. Due to tighter supervision and Government engagement, progress with impementation acceerated after the MTR. By competion (September 30, 2008): (i) most of the improvement works in the roads and intersections in Dakar was competed; (ii) 505 new mini-buses were in operation under the easing scheme; (iii) the aboratory for air quaity was appropriatey staffed and had started initia operations; and (iv) 90 percent of the upgrading works on the suburban raiway ine were competed. 2.3 Monitoring and Evauation (M&E) Design, Impementation and Utiization 26. Design. The key performance indicators had been seected with the intent to show progress towards achieving the PDO of improving urban mobiity. Specificay, improvements in the quaity and use of pubic transport woud be measured by: (i) increased commercia speed of pubic transport; (ii) reduction in time ost in traffic; (iii) increase in the number of passengers using pubic transport; (iv) decrease in poutant emissions; and (v) reduction in accidents. Other indicators incuded improvements in the sector s financia capacity and decrease in the costs of externaities. 27. However, the seected indicators did not provide a good indication of achievement of the PDO and they were overy compex and difficut to measure. In addition, the targets were beyond reach. For instance, it was unreaistic to expect that repacement of part of the feet of od CRs and suburban raiway s roing stock woud reduce the emission of poutants by one percent for Dakar as a whoe. Simiary, reductions in timeost-in-traffic, increases in commercia speed of pubic transport vehices and in the ridership on pubic transport, and cost of externaities (the aggregate of the individua indicators), were not ony difficut to measure, but unikey to be achieved in the face of the continuous rapid increase in the number of vehices. 28. Impementation. The indicator targets were based on a static environment and shoud have been updated, since they did not take into account e.g. the increase in tota traffic, which was beyond contro of the project. It was envisaged to change the indicators to make them more reevant to the PDO after the MTR but the operation did not materiaize. Whie outcome indicators of the project coud not be met partiay due to overy optimistic targets, it was cear when visiting Dakar that the project has made strides in improving mobiity in the city athough this coud not be captured by the current indicators. 6

17 29. Utiization. Continuous measurement of the project indicators was not possibe due to the ack of specification of baseine methodoogy, the eve of data gathering invoved and the cost of monitoring. As a resut, the five indicator measurements carried out (the ast time in May/June 2008, just before the cosing date of the project) did not aow taking the appropriate corrective measures. These issues prevented the use of indicators for project management and operationa purposes. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compiance 30. Safeguard Compiance. The project compied with Bank safeguard poicies. OP4.12 on Invountary Resettement was triggered mosty due to civi works on the suburban raiway component, necessitating the resettement of informa shops and vendors aong the right-of-way of the raiway. Supervision reports confirmed that about 80 peope affected by the road component were resetted in compiance with Bank safeguard poicies. Another resettement operation for the PTB at Thiaroye was adequatey prepared, but was put on hod due to ack of counterpart funds needed to impement the resettement action pan. The project did not have major negative environmenta impacts and environmenta reated causes were systematicay incuded in work contracts. Finay, safeguard poicies concerning Cutura Heritage (OP 4.11) were compied with when the raiway station in Rufisque a cutura monument from the coonia period was rehabiitated. 31. Fiduciary Compiance. The project compied with Bank fiduciary safeguards in spite of probems with the quaity of project management. At appraisa, the financia management, procurement, and reporting capacity of CETUD were in need of strengthening. A six-month action pan was put together to address the deficiencies which remain difficut to correct despite efforts from Bank supervision teams. However, financia management and post procurement reviews did not revea any irreguarities. 2.5 Post-competion Operation/Next Phase 32. Post-competion operation remains at risk. Firsty, municipaities and the Government are responsibe for maintenance and periodic ceaning of roads and sidewaks, but ack the technica capacity and funds to do so. The Road fund which was intended to finance urban road maintenance has not been set up by the Government. Secondy, CETUD s capacity in the area of coordination and sector financing needs to be further reinforced. CETUD has prepared a first version of the Urban Mobiity Pan for the Dakar area and uses the pan to monitor mobiity and identify remaining probems. Thirdy, uncompeted works due to counterpart funding issues, incuding upgrading the suburban raiway, cosing the right-of-way wa, the pedestrian and vehicuar overpasses, and access roads to the freight and road/rai feeder stations need to be competed to deiver the fu project benefits to the popuation and it is not cear if resources wi be made avaiabe considering the current strained fisca situation of the country. 33. The main triggers for the second phase of the APL are not fuy met, since appropriate financing for maintenance is not avaiabe and CETUD s roe as a reguator is not yet firmy estabished. 7

18 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Reevance of Objectives, Design, and Impementation 34. Objective. The objective of the PAMU remains highy reevant in ight of the continued pressure on transport infrastructure in Dakar. Moreover, urban/rura synergies and growth/weath creation piars of the current Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) makes urban mobiity improvement in Dakar more reevant than ever. 35. Project Design. The project was not ready for impementation. PAMU s design was appropriate in that it targeted the major physica and institutiona shortcomings of the urban transport system and aimed to improve air quaity management and institutiona capacity. However, the design did not sufficienty take into account the existing organizationa weaknesses and the need to buid on dedicated soutions to these probems. The risk anaysis was a major shortcoming of the project, the M&E framework was not abe to provide usefu information for project management purposes, and the cient was not fuy committed to the project as proved by the ong deay in the air quaity study and the ack of actions to address weak capacity in CETUD. 36. Impementation. Some of the shortcomings were addressed during impementation, but despite concerted efforts, not a probems coud be overcome. The Government and supervision missions initiay faied to resove the issues with CETUD s management capacity, the deayed air quaity activities, and the easing scheme in a timey manner unti the new TTL took over at the MTR. Lack of counterpart funding ed to the cosure of the project before the competion of works. 3.2 Achievement of Project Deveopment Objectives 37. Achievement of the PDO. The PDO to improve the safety, efficiency, and environmenta quaity of urban mobiity in the Dakar metropoitan area and road safety in the Thiès and Kaoack areas has been partiay achieved. 38. Anaysis of achievement of each of the PDO s major objectives - safety, efficiency, and environmenta quaity indicates that whie safety objectives were met, those for efficiency and environmenta quaity were not fuy reaized. 39. Safety. The PDO indicator reating to safety (reduced accidents) was met. Injuries per 1,000 vehices dropped from 61 in 2000 to 23 in 2008 and that of death from 2.1 to 0.6 per 1,000 vehices. Pedestrian crossings instaed with traffic ights at busy intersections and new overpasses now provide safe crossings for pedestrians. In addition, sidewaks have been constructed, repaired or widened, and road median dividers and speed bumps have been instaed at schoos, hospitas, and other ocations where peope congregate. However, ack of counterpart funds hated work on some of the overpasses which cannot be used and access to severa train stations remains inadequate, unreguated, and unsecured as a resut. 40. Traffic management has improved with the creation of the traffic poice corps (not initiay panned under the PAMU). The 362 agents now empoyed in metropoitan Dakar 8

19 to manage traffic have received equipment and training financed under the PAMU. The corps daiy depoyment contributes both to improved safety as we as more efficient fow of traffic. 41. Efficiency. Overa efficiency strongy decreased from 2000 to 2004, with increased traffic congestion and deays in investment, but improved sighty after Three key performance indicators (KPIs) reated to the efficiency of transport incude (see project datasheet for detais): (i) time-ost-in-traffic actuay increased by 30 percent compared to a targeted reduction by 5 percent; (ii) the market share of pubic transport decined by 13.5 percent against a targeted 5 percent increase; and (iii) the cost of externaities shows a 32 percent increase. It is worth mentioning measuring the cost of externaities was difficut to assess accuratey, as the methodoogy used to measure this indicator at appraisa was not avaiabe. As a resut, a new methodoogy was deveoped at the time of the MTR to measure the cost of time ost in traffic as a proxy of congestion. On that basis, the economic anaysis demonstrates that cost of time ost in congestion aone was stabe from CFAF 41.4 biion in 2000 (base 1998) to CFAF biion in The ack of achievement of the first two indicators can be attributed in part to the overa increase in vehice traffic, but the M&E framework does not aow us to attribute specific resuts to the project interventions. 42. The easing scheme has achieved the objective of party renewing the aging feet of CRs, and improving operations and passenger comfort. This scheme - a first in the Africa Region - repaced 505 od CRs with new, more efficient ones (about one-fifth of the mini-bus feet). Acquisition of these new mini-buses has dramaticay changed the face of the urban transport industry in Dakar. CR routes and stops have been formaized and passengers are satisfied with the quaity of transport services (see Annex 5). A study of the easing scheme reports that athough the fares for CRs formay increased by 10 percent in 2005, the services of the new CRs are cheaper for the traveer in actua terms, as the practice of charging higher unofficia fares has stopped. As a resut of the new business mode impemented for the new vehices, revenues for owners have increased whie fare increases have been kept to a minimum through negotiations with CETUD. Studies show that the easing scheme is sustainabe and the reimbursement rate is 100 percent. 43. Environmenta Quaity. The KPI reated to environmenta quaity was not achieved, since air poution increased rather than decined. However, the KPI coud not fuy measure progress made by the project as the end target did not take into account the overa dramatic increase in vehice-kiometers in the city. Initia steps have been taken to arrive at a better management of environmenta quaity with the estabishment and staffing of the air quaity aboratory and depoyment of a mobie measuring vehice. The air quaity management system needs to be deveoped and staff trained in use of equipment. The anticipated reduction in poution from the mines and cement factory through the use of new and seaed TRANSRAIL freight cars has aso not been achieved. Dust and eaks from freight trains poute the air and the tracks used by the suburban raiway. However, CETUD has managed the introduction of uneaded gasoine in 9

20 Senega supported by the Bank s Cean Air Initiative, which has eiminated ead poution from traffic. 3.3 Efficiency 44. Cost-Benefit at appraisa and cosing. The economic anaysis at appraisa examined the cost-benefit of without project and with project for: (i) the road rehabiitation; (ii) the easing scheme; and (iii) the pedestrian and traffic safety aong the suburban raiway. 45. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR). At appraisa, the ERR of the road rehabiitation component was estimated at 37 percent. At cosing, the ERR of the road rehabiitation investments under PAMU (vehice operating cost ony) was equa to, or greater than, 67 percent except in one US$800,000 investment in Petit Mbao where it was ony 9 percent (sma portion with ow traffic but high socia impact). 46. Benefits from reduced accidents. At appraisa, the reduction in deaths and injuries to persons and damage to cars was estimated to have a Net Present Vaue (NPV) of US$7.58 miion. A fu cacuation of NPV was not done for the ICR. However, at cosing, the costs incurred from injuries and deaths between 1997 and 2007 were estimated to have decreased by 26.8 percent, or amost three times the estimate of 10 percent used at appraisa. 47. Benefits from Reduced Congestion. Based on the estimate at appraisa that one miion hours were ost in traffic as a resut of congested roads, the benefits from reducing the average trave time in Dakar by five percent resuted in a NPV of US$39.6 miion. The cost of congestion was estimated at CFAF108 biion in At cosing, a study concuded that the cost of congestion was estimated to CFAF142.9 miion in Athough this represents an increase of 32.3 percent, the resut at cosing cannot be compared to the appraisa estimate as the parameters, especiay for heath and environmenta externaities, were not specified. 48. Leasing Scheme. A study of the easing scheme reports that the services of the new CRs are cheaper than the ones of the od CRs for most journeys as practices of shorttripping and use of unofficia fare stages stopped. In the same time, revenues for owners have increased whie fares have remained affordabe for commuters as a resut of the updated business mode impemented for the new vehices. Studies show that the easing scheme is sustainabe and the reimbursement rate is 100 percent. 49. Efficiency oss from incompete works. Athough the Suburban Train (Petit Train de Banieue PTB) received new trains and ocomotives under PAMU, the incompete work on the third track and the poor condition of the infrastructure means that the train carries ony about a 18,000 passengers a day compared to its potentia of 75,000 passengers daiy. 3.4 Justification of Overa Outcome Rating Rating: Moderatey Unsatisfactory 10

21 50. The outcome is rated moderatey unsatisfactory, primariy because the project coud not achieve targets for three out of five outcome indicators. Target indicators were not met for air quaity, share of pubic transport and reduction in time ost in traffic, whie the target was met for safety. The indicator reated to the cost of externaities was difficut to assess accuratey due to methodoogica probems. So whie progress has been achieved under the project in resoving part of the severe traffic congestion in greater Dakar, which at the time of appraisa had reached crisis proportions, outcomes are not commensurate with expectations at appraisa. Further, the capacity of CETUD remains probematic and funding for maintenance of roads is not avaiabe, jeopardizing project achievements. This moderatey unsatisfactory rating is further substantiated by the evauation of project reevance and efficiency. Athough the project objective continues to be highy reevant, the unsatisfactory quaity at entry and notaby efficiency osses due to incompete works pu the rating downwards. 3.5 Overarching themes, other outcomes and impacts (a) Poverty impacts, gender aspects, and socia deveopment 51. Better pubic transport for the informa sector. Many rura-urban migrants initiay stake out an economic existence in the rapidy expanding informa markets and shops aong the raiway or near the rai and bus stations. Pubic transport faciitates access to these markets and shops, which provide empoyment to the poor segments of the urban popuation. (b) Institutiona Change/Strengthening 52. Stakehoder participation in urban transport. CETUD s tripartite penary has been instrumenta in heping renew the feet of CR, and has improved coordination among the many agencies active in the transport sector in Dakar incuding DDD, PTB, the municipaities and the mini-buses operators. This arrangement has made it possibe to rationaize bus routes, achieve some eve of integration between rai and road commuter transport, and keep pubic transport affordabe. (c) Other unintended outcomes and impacts (positive or negative) 53. In parae with the PAMU, the Government has financed additiona mobiity improvements, incuding major civi works to rehabiitate and expand the primary road network (North highway, Airport access highway and Corniche) and aunched the construction of the region s first six-ane to highway crossing the narrow Pikine- Guediawaye corridor. The primary network improvements financed by the Government has enhanced the impact of PAMU-funded overpasses and the rai/road feeder stations because these faciities were connected to the six-ane highway. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakehoder Workshops NA 11

22 4. Assessment of Risk to Deveopment Outcome (Rating: Substantia) 54. Financia and Economic Risks. Counterpart funding and financing of maintenance of urban infrastructure, initiay panned through the Deveopment Fund for Urban Transport (Fonds de Déveoppement des Transports Urbains - FDTU) was not avaiabe. The Government s inabiity to pay counterpart funds starting in 2007 and continuing in 2008, as we as the faiure of most municipaities and operators to make their contribution to the FDTU, puts the outcomes of PAMU at a significant risk. The urban infrastructure constructed and or rehabiitated is showing eary signs of degradation in some ocations for ack of maintenance. Lack of repair and maintenance of roads, traffic ights, and protective barriers at pedestrian crossings are essening the recent gains in mobiity and safety. The current eve of financing of the FDTU is insufficient to fund infrastructure maintenance and impementation of the forma agreement to fund urban road maintenance from the second generation road fund has yet to take pace. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quaity at Entry (Rating: Unsatisfactory) 55. Probems with Readiness and QAE. Preparation of the project was not totay ready at the time of appraisa. However, the Bank approved the project in May Procurement was not sufficienty advanced, financia management capacity was inadequatey assessed and mitigation measures were not in pace, and arrangements for the easing scheme and the air quaity management component were not strong enough. There were rea gaps in readiness and as a resut effectiveness was deayed unti May (b) Quaity of Supervision (Rating: Moderatey Satisfactory) 56. Ineffective Initia Supervision. Supervision missions initiay did itte to get impementation going. The missions did not effectivey address CETUD s inadequate project management capacity in the fiduciary and sector coordination areas, nor did they effectivey hep the CR operators find ways to meet the conditions of the proposed easing scheme. The Government s proposas for restructuring CETUD and for financing the new bus company, Dakar Dem Dikk (DDD), ed to discussions to restructure the project in ate 2002, due to concerns with the proposed arrangements. However, this was not done, as no agreement coud be reached with the Government. Whie the road component took off ony after 2003, supervision missions in the first years of project impementation did itte to speed up impementation and the reasons for such ack of proactivity from the Bank remain uncear. 57. Significant improvements in Supervision. Even efforts by management had itte effect unti the repacement of the first TTL and the organization of the we- 12

23 prepared MTR. The new TTL, appointed in November 2003, got the supervision team to address outstanding issues with the easing scheme, the air quaity component, and CETUD s capacity. The buk of impementation took pace after 2004 when fiduciary capacity and compiance improved and supervision missions incuded safeguard speciaists. Supervision was satisfactory from 2004 ti cosing in (c) Justification of Rating for Overa Bank Performance Rating: Moderatey Unsatisfactory 58. Uneven Bank Performance. The Bank did not diigenty appraise the project to ensure it was ready and of satisfactory quaity. Furthermore, the first few years of supervision were argey ineffective in soving impementation probems with the majority of the components. It is worth noting that the appointment of a new Government foowing the 2000 genera eections at the time of effectiveness and severa changes in some of the transport and institutiona poicies were responsibe for impementation deays. The Bank s performance was satisfactory after the MTR when more than 90 percent of the project was impemented. The issue of counterpart funding begun during the second haf of 2007 but became a key structura issue in Considering the fisca position of the country, the Bank decided not to grant another extension requested by the Government to compete the project which cosed in September Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating Unsatisfactory 59. Uneven Borrower Performance. Preparation of the PAMU by the Government was not compete and the capacity of CETUD as the impementing agency was inadequate. Just when the PAMU was approved in 2000, the new Government began formuating its poicies and structuring its institutions in the sector. CETUD underwent too many changes. Deays in recruitment of project management and fiduciary staff subsequenty deayed project impementation. The Government was, however, committed to resoving the urban mobiity crisis in Dakar by financing the construction of a number of major infrastructure works which ed to major improvements in urban mobiity in Dakar. The Ministry of Equipment and Transport was very hepfu to get impementation off the ground and provided assistance to CETUD. However, the Government s inabiity to provide counterpart funds eft PAMU s supported works program incompete at cosing. (b) Impementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderatey Satisfactory 60. CETUD had gained experience with the impementation of the TA project, but was in need of strengthening when it was given the responsibiity of impementing the PAMU. The new Government s insistence on restructuring CETUD was beyond the agency s contro. Deays with staff recruitment was aso mosty beyond CETUD contro. CETUD s management was sow to address the agency s weak fiduciary capacity and it 13