Implementation challenges of mass transit systems in Latin America. Inter-American Development Bank

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1 Implementation challenges of mass transit systems in Latin America Inter-American Development Bank Carlos H. Mojica Rodrigo Díaz Urban Transport Specialist Transport Consultant World Resources Institute Washington D.C. 6/19/2018

2 SPIRAL MODEL FOR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT Steve McConnell, Rapid Development

3 Reflecting upon the last two decades of mass transit investments in Latin America Key evolving features - Public vs private involvement - New fleet vs existing vehicles - Incumbent vs new operators - Exclusive vs integrated ticketing - Closed vs open route design 2006

4 Are mass transit implementation challenges and innovations sufficiently discussed? PLANNING DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION OPERATION Economic impacts, social benefits, alignment alternatives, political promise, financing, master plans Route design, fleet selection, station separation, universal design, wayfinding, safety standards, comfort, blueprints Negotiations with operators, construction, social impacts, traffic detours, cost overruns, project management, press reports Customer satisfaction, open data, apps, fleet control, fare policy, travel time savings, reduced emissions, ex-post evaluations

5 BRT is widely implemented in Latin America and replicated all over the world 55 cities in Latin America (32% world) 19.5 million passengers per day (62%) 1790 km of busways (36%) Could unforeseen implementation challenges partly explain this decline? Source: BRTData.org

6 The promise of BRT Key assumptions Implementation is feasible to conclude in a single office term (3-5 years) Local transport companies can be part of the operations Implementation costs lower in comparison to rail-based alternatives Fleet renewal and operational costs can be recovered with reasonable fares Automated fare collection will reduce fare evasion Project will sustain political support during implementation Project promoter will achieve cooperation from impacted stakeholders (community, transit industry) City will implement structural changes in public transport provision (firm size, service contracts) Transit agency can assume a larger role in service planning, supervision and enforcement

7 Six Latin American cities faced unique challenges to implement BRT San Salvador Tegucigalpa Cali Bogotá Santiago Asunción Cases prepared based on interviews with project stakeholders and secondary sources

8 Asunción (Paraguay) Project: Metrobús BRT 16.4 km (trunk), 170 articulated buses Metro area population: 2.2 million Daily ridership : passengers (expected) Project management: National Government (MOPC) Operation: Two private concessions Planning Construction Operation

9 Key challenges in Asunción Delay to start construction Congress approved financing package only in 12/2013: Questions about project feasibility and vehicle energy sources Institutional complexities to approve urban infrastructure project delayed start of construction to mid-2016: Project design revised due to negotiations with property owners, new decisions to consolidate other civil works (electricity and drainage). Opposition from impacted stakeholders Land acquisition, commercial parking spots and freight logistics Construction was impacted due to new negotiations Limited experience at MOPC. First BRT project Bureaucratic barriers and delays. High level of rotation at management positions.

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11 Cali (Colombia) Project: MIO BRT 39 km (trunk), 884 buses Metro area population: 2.9 million Daily ridership: passengers Project management: Local Government (Metro Cali) Operation: Four private concessions Planning Construction Operation

12 Key challenges in Cali Concessionaires financial crisis: In 2013 concessionaires owed US$ 267 M to financial sector and were losing US$ 3.2 M per month Delays in construction increased financial costs of vehicle acquisitions Two of four companies entered bankruptcy laws in 2013 and 2016 Financial woes generated service cancellations and lower frequencies Revenue shortfall Some former bus operators were still operating (700+ buses) In 2016, passenger demand was 50% under project expectations Operational revenue depended exclusively on # of passengers Rescue plan ( ) Relief from infrastructure obligations, installment of a stabilization fund, fare increase, recognition of financial impacts, increase contract duration and vehicle lifespan.

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14 San Salvador (El Salvador) Project: SITRAMSS BRT Phase 1: 6.4 km (trunk), 37 buses Metro area population: 1.8 million Daily ridership : passengers (Phase 1) Project management: National Government (MOP & VMT) Operation: One private operator Planning Construction Operation

15 Key challenges in San Salvador Limited experience with public transport concessions Phase 1 operation was awarded to a private company, however not under the framework of concessions Operator was unable to raise enough capital to complete the fleet thus the BRT lane was not at full occupation Segregated lane is challenged by the Courts Supreme Court orders to open segregated busway to mixed traffic Decision reverses legal grounds to allow exclusive use of public infrastructure for commercial purposes (2017) Responds to claims of an outside group of transport companies Operational and financial impacts Mixed traffic in the segregated lane impacted operational efficiency Demand was reduced in 25% ( passengers per day) Operator suspended purchase of new vehicles

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17 Tegucigalpa (Honduras) Project: TRANS km (trunk), 87 buses Metro area population: 1.3 million Daily ridership : passengers (expected) Project management: National and Local Government Operation: One private operator Planning Construction Operation

18 Key challenges in Tegucigalpa Delays and changes in priorities impacted BRT infrastructure Construction was not completed by the end of the original Mayor s term (2014) New leadership sought to integrate a new, infrastructure-heavy, program in parallel to the BRT. BRT construction pace was affected negatively Construction of new underpasses impacted built BRT infrastructure Segregated busway was open to mixed traffic. Traffic barriers removed In the absence of a proactive communication strategy, the project was impacted by a wave of negative media

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20 Bogotá (Colombia) Project: TransMilenio km in 2018, 2,876 buses. 41 km in 2003 Metro area population: 9.3 million Daily ridership : 2.4 million passengers Project management: Local government Operation: 9 private operators in trunk routes, 8 on feeder routes Planning Construction Operation

21 Key challenges in Bogotá Pavement failure and premature deterioration Two years after inauguration, 26% of concrete slabs showed cracks Change of original design specifications presumably to accelerate construction pace Use of untested material for high intensity traffic Omissions and discrepancies in pavement design and construction specifications was not timely pointed by supervision firm City-wide impacts Impact on vehicles: Higher maintenance and fuel costs Impact on users: Slower travel times, unreliable service By 2012, city spent ~USD 33 M to repair concrete slabs in Transmilenio Comptroller s office issued sentences against six public officers and three construction supervision firms

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23 Santiago (Chile) Project: Transantiago Full fare integration, 6,900 buses Metro area population: 7.3 million Daily ridership : 4.2 million passengers Project management: National Government Operation: Seven private operators Planning Implementation Operation

24 Key challenges in Santiago Major implementation issues early onset impacted the system s image Unreliable service, limited amount of buses Fare collection system failure Lack of social awareness in regards to system operation Lack of sufficient points to charge the card Fare evasion became a national headline Around 30% of trips unpaid in Accounting for around 150 million USD lost income per year Fare relatively high (~1 USD). On board payment with no turn-styles Multidimensional reasons for fare evasion. Chronic problem

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26 Key takeaways (1): Don t miss the political window of opportunity. Race against it and design instruments to manage changes Political windows of opportunity are key to start a BRT project. And in some cases (Asunción), the window must be bigger to include consensus with legislators. The project will likely take longer than expected (3 out of the 5 infrastructure projects spanned over more than one government period). Completing the project in a single period might be the exception, rather than the norm Project planning should consider how to manage changes in leadership, what type of dialogue and what instruments can be utilized to ensure support (master plans, decrees, ordinance, law, etc.) from upcoming leaders (Tegucigalpa).

27 Key takeaways (2). Don t underestimate complexity in construction. Strengthen local execution capacity Implementing a BRT will require a transformational effort, in a city with low capacity. In relative terms, a BRT can be thought as a mega-project for a small or poor municipality. Capacity building will be a small expenditure compared to infrastructure costs. It should encompass all project areas therefore the project can respond swiftly during implementation (e.g. Land acquisition in Asunción). Capacity building should also consider developing local instruments and frameworks to avoid any legal risk or threat (San Salvador)

28 Key takeaways (3). Don t rely on fare collection to pay for the bus operations. Instead, ensure financial sustainability Planning for financial sustainability is key to instill confidence in all stakeholders (and investors). This does not mean that the project has to be self-sustainable (devoid of operational subsidies) On integrated systems, fare policies will likely subsidize the cost of transfers. As opposed to designing for self-sustainability, which can be risky (e.g. Cali), it is better to set a formal transit funding policy to ensure resource availability when the system operates Removing or relocating incumbents from routes might be required to achieve financial sustainability (San Salvador, Cali). However that could also be achieved through financial guarantees for BRT operators to cover this uncertainty in their business model.

29 Key takeaways (4). Don t assume compliance in poor service conditions. Fare evasion will exacerbate with bad service and high fares Fare collection should be managed diligently from the very first day of operations, with fare gates being installed and customers being educated beforehand for random checks and penalty fee enforcement. As shown in the case of Transantiago, changing the riders behavior, especially when unsatisfied with the service, requires time, additional investment while potential income is being lost. Fare evasion can be lowered by installing turnstiles in buses, but calls for a broader approach including behavioral economics to increase compliance and update the intention/motivation Seen through behavioral science, some of the main barriers for payment are: the pain of paying, social norms, the motivation to evade/pay, the perception of fairness, the diffusion of responsibilities and habit formation

30 Are these takeaways applicable to other rail-based technologies? THANK