Regional Cooperation Agenda for Food Security: Operationalisation of SAARC Food Bank

Transcription

1 Policy Dialogue on Regional Cooperation, Connectivity & Inclusive Development in South & South-West Asia New Delhi: November 2013 Organized by United Nations Economic & Social Commission for Asia & the Pacific South & South-West Asia Office Regional Cooperation Agenda for Food Security: Operationalisation of SAARC Food Bank Presentation by Muhammad Al Amin Senior Research Associate, CPD ** This presentation has been prepared on the basis of a CPD study undertaken in cooperation with SAWTEE led by Professor Mustafizur Rahman

2 Outline Background Present State of SAARC Food Bank (SFB) Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Recommendations for the Operationalisation of SFB 2

3 Background Global Hunger Index (GHI) Score for SAARC Countries In 2013, Sri Lanka has the highest rank (43) followed by Nepal (49), Pakistan (57), Bangladesh (58), & India (63) Figure 2: GHI for Selected SAARC Countries Source: IFPRI,

4 Background Impact of Food Price on Poverty in South Asia Figure 3: Number of Poor People due to Food Price (Million) Source: ADB, 2013 ** these people would have been able to escape poverty if food prices remained unchanged 4

5 Background Inception of SAARC Food Bank (SFB) SAARC Food Security Reserve was established in 1988 Due to structural flaws & procedural problems, the reserve could not be operationalised The possible adverse impact of climate change & the need for legally binding commitment to ensure adequate amount of food at affordable price SAARC Food Bank idea started a new journey at the time of 14th SAARC Summit, in

6 Background Inception of SAARC Food Bank Goal To serve as a source of emergency supply of food from a resource of collective national reserves Provisions Specific amount of contributions from the members Specific withdrawal guidelines based on humanitarian considerations Availability of food at a discount price Explicit reasons for support from the bank Instruction for storage Detailed guidelines on quality standards 6

7 Present State of SFB Initially SFB had a total dedicated stock of thousand metric ton (tmt) of foodgrains of which India contributed tmt Bangladesh & Pakistan tmt each Nepal & Sri Lanka 4.00 tmt each Afghanistan 1.42 tmt Maldives 0.20 tmt & Bhutan 0.18 tmt The share of the members was determined on the basis of comparative data on production capacity, per capita consumption & availability 7

8 Present State of SFB In 2009, SAARC Food Bank Board decided to double the reserves to 486 tmt on the ground of growing population overall production growing demand & increased vulnerability due to disaster & climate change 8

9 Present State of SFB SFB is yet to achieve its aim in times of food shortage, high price volatility & natural disaster After signing of the agreement, a number of natural disasters had visited the region including flood in Pakistan, cyclone in Orissa, & floods & cyclones in Bangladesh But the SFB has never been utilised 9

10 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Misleading Trigger Criteria The SFB acts more like an emergency relief bank rather than a food bank Food security concerns such as lack of supply in the international market or high price volatility are not applicable as valid criteria for applying to the SFB 10

11 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Quantum of Foodgrains The amount available from the food bank is inadequate to tackle any large scale food shortage due to national level disaster such as tsunami For example, total quantum of food stock in the food bank is equivalent to only 4.7 % of Bangladesh s total import in an average year 11

12 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Pricing Mechanism In the existing bureaucratic procedures relating to sanctions of food export under government-to-government deals, price fixation remains a key issue A common price for accessing the food stock is difficult to set up because of domestic demand-supply situation, policy specificities, & incentive & support mechanisms in individual countries Arriving at an acceptable, reasonable, humane & concessional price level is a significant challenge 12

13 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Lack of Unified Quality Standard There is a lack of unified quality specification for the SFB Quality standards such as percentage of broken grains, black grains, dead grains & foreign matters vary across countries For example, allowable limits of dead grains in the following countries are Bangladesh 4 % India 10 % Nepal 5 % Sri Lanka 12 % 13

14 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Lack of Information Sharing Availability of reliable food related information & data, & access to the relevant information, remains an important concern in South Asia SAARC Agricultural Centre (SAC) is assigned to assess production patterns of major foodgrains in the region periodically lack of capacity Afghanistan & Bhutan do not produce annual data if a country were to suffer production setback, it would become difficult to transmit early emergency warning due to lack of uniform & usable data & information 14

15 Issues for the Operationalisation of SFB Political Commitment for the Food Bank CPD study finds that some stakeholders are rather skeptical about the prospects of the SFB because of the lack of political will India s ban on rice export during food price volatility reemphasises the need for greater political commitment to SFB 15

16 Recommendations Policy Initiatives Contribution to SFB Exporting countries could add a certain percentage annually, may be 5% of their total exportable volume to SFB To expand the food reserve base, SFB could include other relatively less perishable goods such as maize, potato etc. 16

17 Recommendations Policy Initiatives Trigger Condition Withdrawal conditions should put more emphasis on food related emergencies rather than on natural calamities Trigger criteria of average production shortfall due to natural & man-made calamities could be brought down to 3 to 5 % from existing 8% Price volatility, lack of food & food availability that directly affect the food security of the poverty-prone people, need to be added to the trigger mechanisms 17

18 Recommendations Policy Initiatives Pricing Policy Access price for foodgrains from the SFB needs to be lower than the price level quoted in the international market Bangladesh had prepared a price determination formula both for exporting & non-exporting countries Further discussion will be needed to finalise the formula 18

19 Recommendations Policy Initiatives SAARC Food Security Plan SAARC should have a long term perspective plan on Development of the agriculture sector How to address food security concerns & emergency response 19

20 Recommendations Policy Initiatives SAARC Food Security Fund May be created to support the operating cost of the food bank Countries with deficit in food production could make cash contribution towards this fund 20

21 Efficient Distribution Mechanism Ensuring Pro-poor Distribution System Recommendations To avoid leakage, corruption & misappropriation, detailed information concerning the distribution system should be made public A more localised survey on prevalence of poverty to understand micro-level poverty situation is essential for targeting of the needy people in times of food crisis 21

22 Efficient Distribution Mechanism Reaching out People in Inaccessible Areas Recommendations After any disaster, many remote areas in Bangladesh are hard to reach because of disruption of infrastructure Cyclone shelters in the coastal areas could be converted into food godowns on a temporary basis SAARC could provide immediate assistance to reestablish infrastructure in the remote areas 22

23 Efficient Distribution Mechanism Lean Period Loan & Repayment Mechanism Recommendations The reserve of SFB can be used as loan during lean period & repayment during harvest season in the form of receive now & return after ; or receive here & return there E.g., Bangladesh could borrow foodgrains from India by receiving it from the western border & return the same via the eastern border which is a relatively less developed region in India 23

24 Recommendations Institutional Mechanism Four Tiers of Decision Making for SFB i. Board of governors ii. Technical Committee on Agriculture & Rural Development iii. SAARC Standing Committee & iv. SAARC Council of Ministers Makes the decision making procedures involving SFB a rather lengthy one 24

25 Recommendations Institutional Mechanism Increase Analytical Capacity of SAARC Agriculture Centre (SAC) Absence of reliable & timely data on agricultural production, prices, food stock, demand, shortage/surplus & import Strengthening capacity of SAARC SAC to generate & use relevant data & information covering national, subregional, regional & local level will be critically important 25

26 Recommendations Infrastructure Development Storage Facilities Existing storage facilities of the SFB are in many cases not equipped to maintain the needed quality & standards of the foodgrains These facilities should be upgraded These facilities should also include a roll over database system to track the losses in the storage system 26

27 Recommendations Infrastructure Development Harmonisation of Quality Ensuring compliance with multiple standards for the foodgrains is costly & delays transaction process There is a need to arrive at a common set of standards which is acceptable to all regional countries This will reduce testing & auditing standards compliance & lower border hassles for quarantine 27

28 Recommendations Infrastructure Development Information Sharing SFB should be supported by a detailed web portal which will keep record of & share national level data on production, price, distribution & import. Such a database will help the assigned body to analyse the price movements in the regions, stock situation & demand supply-gap & allow estimation of the Food Security Vulnerability Index for individual countries 28

29 Political Commitment & Support Recommendations A well functioning SFB will need fullest support at the highest political level Setting a collective development goal Developing an effective institutional mechanism 29

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