PRESIDENTIALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICA S HYBRID REGIMES. IPSA/ECPR Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South?

Transcription

1 PRESIDENTIALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN AFRICA S HYBRID REGIMES Paper for the Panel Presidentialism in Developing Countries IPSA/ECPR Conference: Whatever Happened to North-South? Sao Paulo, February 2011 DRAFT, please do not cite without permission of the author Oda van Cranenburgh Leiden University cranen@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 1

2 Introduction In comparing political systems, the institutional choice for a presidential or parliamentary system of government has been a long standing issue. Debates on the merits of each system were rekindled during the so-called Third Wave of democratization, with the article by Juan Linz on The Perils of Presidentialism published in While scholars had initially examined primarily European systems and the United States, during the Third Wave they turned increasingly to Latin America and Eastern Europe. The African and Asian regions were relatively underresearched in terms of such institutional debates, with some notable (recent) exceptions (Elgie & Moestrup 2007, Siaroff 2003). However, the institutional issues are very relevant to assess whether democracy will be instituted and sustained in these regions. The third wave of democratization brought multi-party elections and consequently a degree of vertical accountability of the government to the electorate in these regions. However, considering the prevalence of (varieties of) presidentialism and semi-presidentialism in Africa, my interest is to examine whether these systems also allow some form of horizontal accountability between the institutions of government. Horizontal accountability is an essential addition to vertical accountability, because it operates continuously, during the terms of government (O Donnel 1998). I take as a starting point the logical assumption that the creation of horizontal accountability requires a degree of separation or balance of powers, because where power is concentrated in a single entity, there are no entities with a degree of independence or autonomy to hold the power center accountable. This is why a study on separation of powers is both scientifically and politically relevant. Several factors may explain the low profile of Africa in this institutional debate. Primarily, the debate has been conducted in the context of (more or less established) democratic systems. It needs no elaboration to point out that such systems have been relatively rare in Africa until the early 1990s. Consequently, the choice of democratic institutions and their consequences was low on the research agenda. Only during the period of transfer of power from colonial rulers had such issues been prominent: both the United Kingdom and France were busy during the 1950s and 1960s with an effort to transplant their own systems of government to African and Asian soils, and the effort was very much based on implicit assumptions about the 2

3 inherent qualities of the political system of the mother country. As has been widely discussed in the literature on African politics, the newly planted systems did not take root very well and a process of institutional adaptation followed soon. Notably, African leaders opted for unitary republics with an executive president, also in those cases where a parliamentary system had been installed. In the name of national unity for development, the executive president was granted a wide range of powers (at the same time political opposition was curtailed). As many features of the planted system were retained, the result has been the prevalence of hybrid systems of government. This may constitute a second reason for the low profile of African countries in the institutional debate: the hybrid nature of these regimes presents some inherent difficulties in terms of classification and analysis. When Africa began to install democratic reforms, beginning in Benin, a new round of institutional adaptation followed. As noted by Conac (2007), Francophone countries reinstated forms of semipresidential government, making innovative adjustments in the model in terms of the definition of powers for the president and the premier. The complex and hybrid nature of African regimes continues to present obstacles for any systematic comparison. This paper will examine these hybrid African systems of government in an effort to compare the extent of separation of power between the executive and the legislature. The more specific question pursued in this paper is whether the extent and forms of separation of powers between the executive and legislature is clearly related to regime type and colonial background. As elaborated below, both common sense and the very definition of the presidential regime type suggests that separation of power is present in these regimes, while in semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes we would expect less separation between the branches of government. However, earlier research has already suggested that Africa s hybrid regimes defy such expectations (van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009). The analysis builds on data gathered for previous research and is limited to 30 African countries, of which 15 are former British colonies ( I will use the term Anglophone for this set) and 15 are former French colonies (the Francophone set). The countries do not represent the entire universe of Anglophone and Francophone African countries, excluding countries where the constitution was suspended because of war or state collapse at the time of the research (Chad, Ivory Coast and Sudan). The 3

4 set analyzed the constitutions in force in 2007 including relevant constitutional amendments. The following section will illustrate the difficulties in classifying African political systems and present a classification based on dispositional criteria, following the work of Elgie. The next section will look specifically at the extent of institutional separation (or non-separation) of power in these regimes. Institutional separation is here defined as independence in terms of origin or survival for both the executive and the legislature. Thereafter, a section will examine another form of separation, i.e. of offices. Separation of office is here defined as incompatibility of office, i.e. one person may not hold an executive office and a parliamentary office at the same time. A next section will explore briefly the impact of party politics on the independence of the branches of government. The concluding section will discuss the implications of the patterns in separation of powers for the possibilities for horizontal accountability and will argue that Anglophone countries most strongly represent a hybrid form of regime which not only defies easy classification, but also expectations on the extent and forms of separation of powers. Classifying African regimes Most African political systems represent a hybrid regime type, in the sense that they combine elements of presidential and parliamentary systems of government. In some cases the resulting system conforms to the semi-presidential regime type; in other cases the resulting systems presents an institutional anomaly which some authors will classify as a presidential and others as president-parliamentary. Before elaborating on this I emphasize that the hybrid nature of the regimes does not imply that they function or behave partly as parliamentary systems; quite to the contrary, earlier research has shown that in most cases it makes them behave as hyperpresidential systems (van Cranenburgh 2011). In classifying systems I here follow the approach of Robert Elgie (1998 and 2007) which relies on dispositional rather than relational features. The reasons to exclude the necessarily subjective assessment of power relations (between a president 4

5 and a premier primarily) have been sufficient argued by this author. The important variables concern the presence of a head of state (president) and a separate head of government (premier) and for each office the question whether he/she is popularly elected and whether the office has a fixed term (which implies there is independence or separation from the other branch of government). In a parliamentary system all four questions are answered with No. The head of government depends on the legislature for its origin and survival and if there is a head of state, he is not popularly elected (there may be a monarch or an indirectly elected ceremonial head of state). In a presidential system, the head of state is also head of government and he is popularly elected for a fixed term. Consequently, the two branches of government are independent in the sense that the elected executive cannot be voted out of office by the legislature; the population can only vote the executive out of office after completion of the term (leaving aside the possibility of impeachment in constitutionally prescribed and limited circumstances). Most African systems combine these features of parliamentary and presidential regimes, making them notoriously difficult to classify. There is a popularly elected executive president with a fixed term and a cabinet, sometimes but not always headed by a premier, that needs the confidence of the assembly and can be dismissed by the latter. Part of the executive the president - conforms to the presidential model; another part the cabinet - to the parliamentary model. In roughly half the cases the cabinet is headed by a premier (predominantly in Francophone countries), which results in the classification of these systems as semi-presidential in Elgie s system; in the other half cabinet lacks a premier (in the majority of Anglophone countries), and consequently they are classified as presidential in Elgie s scheme. Note that Shugart and Carey (1992) classified the latter systems as president-parliamentary, which they also called the confused system. As noted by Elgie (2005), some authors object to the analytically clear and objective classification system with the argument that many very disparate systems end up in the same category; for example, in one semi-presidential system there may be a balance of power between the president and the premier, while in others there is a clear dominance of one or the other. Elgie excepts this and pointed to the necessity of distinguishing subtypes for comparison. In a similar vein, Siaroff has compared levels 5

6 of presidential power in various regimes type to show that such variation is hardly related to the classical regime types. My work on 30 African systems similarly showed wide ranges of presidential power for each regime type, granted that the general African pattern showed a high level of presidetial power (van Cranenburgh 2008). In this contribution, I will also examine difference across and within regime types, but the focus is not on levels of presidential power, but on the extent of separation of powers in these regimes. Table 1 Applying the regime typology to 30 Anglophone and Francophone Sub- Saharan African political regimes results in the classification of 14 countries as presidential, 13 as semi-presidential and three as parliamentary. The classification is here presented in Table 1. A confusing point is that in two of the parliamentary systems, i.e. South Africa and Botswana, the head of state and government are one and the same office, and while the office is essentially like that of a premier (no popular election and no fixed term), the office is called president. In Elgie s system, the two questions about the Head of State are answered with No, while the questions on the Head of Government are non applicable because there is no separate Head of Government (in Elgie s scheme, this represents a Type 20 out of his 24 possibilities). Another confusing feature concerns the rule that cabinet needs the confidence of the assembly. As noted above, this inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential system is often present in presidential systems as well, creating what may be called an African anomaly. In Anglophone African countries in particular which are classified as presidential (popular election, fixed term and no separate head of government) cabinet needs the confidence of the assembly. Another African anomaly can be found in the systems classified as semi-presidential: the premier often has a dual accountability, i.e. towards the assembly and towards the president. In many countries, the president may dismiss a premier. Shugart and Carey classified the latter systems also as president-parliamentary. When the premier can only be dismissed by the assembly, Shugart and Carey distinguished a sub-type of semi-presidentialism: the premierpresidential system. 6

7 This classification shows that although the scheme is analytically and empirically very clear in terms of the position on the president and the premier in Africa s regime types, it does not capture the specific feature we find in many African regimes, i.e. that part of the executive cabinet, often not headed by a premier may be accountable to the assembly. The next section will examine the extent of separation of powers in these regimes. Institutional separation of powers Leaving aside the parliamentary systems, which inherently fuse the executive and legislative powers - both the presidential and the semi-presidential African systems are characterized by substantial fusion of powers between (part of) the executive and the legislature, evident in the possibility of the legislature to censure ministers or the entire cabinet and of the president to dissolve the legislature. At the same time, all these systems are characterized by high levels of presidential power (see van Cranenburgh 2008 and 2009). Such features led Elgie to classify many African semi-presidential systems as presidentialized rather than dual executive systems. Shugart and Carey (1992) also examined levels of presidential power, which they defined as presidential authority over cabinet, operationalized as the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers. While the focus of this paper is not on levels of presidential power, I use the scheme of Shugart and Carey, later refined by Shugart because it also assesses differences in the extent of separation of powers. In this scheme the variables are: First, is the executive independent from the assembly with respect to its survival? Second, is the assembly independent from the executive with respect to its survival? Independence of survival is indicated by a fixed term, in other words one branch of government cannot dismiss the other branch. Shugart s scoring system has been applied to the set of 30 Anglophone and Francophone countries in Tables 2a and 2b. To visualize the combination of high presidential power and partial or low separation of powers I reproduce here a figure presented earlier (van Cranenburgh 2009). While all countries score on the upper side of the figure for presidential authority over cabinet, the countries are scattered across the entire spectrum for the extent of separation of power. 7

8 Figure 1 Table 2 A first pattern which emerges is that a maximum score for separation of powers (8) is present in seven cases, i.e. in three Anglophone countries and four Francophone countries. Zambia is alone is scoring 7. All these countries with high separation of powers are classified as presidential. These systems conform most closely to the ideal typical presidential system based on separation of powers. The Cabinet consists of Ministers who cannot be removed by the assembly; they are solely answerable to the president. Next, we can also discern a pattern of a polar opposite: regimes that score 0 or 1 for separation of powers, in other words countries in which the institutional separation is very low or absent. This is the case in ten countries, which are all classified as semi-presidential and they are all Francophone. This pattern conforms to the expectation that separation of powers is less due to the accountability of the premier to the assembly. The remaining 12 countries all score between 2 and 6 for institutional separation. The majority of Anglophone countries 11 - show such a partial degree of separation (scores between 2 and 6). Only one country in the set is Francophone, and it is a presidential system (Guinea). Six countries with a medium score for separation category are presidential regimes, three are semi-presidential and three are classified as parliamentary regimes. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the extent of separation of powers for three regime types and the Anglophone and Francophone African countries. Mean scores suggest a relation between regime type and extent of separation: On average the presidential regimes score 6.285, thus showing a tendency for presidential regimes to have a higher degree of separation of powers. The semi-presidential regimes score a mean of and show least separation of all regime types. Besides the nonseparation inherent in cabinet subjection to assembly confidence, the president in these regimes can dissolve parliament and thus jeopardize its independence. The parliamentary regimes score a mean of 4. The higher degree of separation is the 8

9 consequence of the lack of presidential power to dissolve the assembly without losing office himself. However, statistical averages are misleading in the case of several categories: the range in the presidential type is from 3-8, and in the semi-presidential from 0-4. The three countries that are classified as parliamentary also show a divergence of scores in the range of 2 to 6. As for the classification by colonial background, the Francophone countries show a lower average score for separation than the Anglophone groups; but the Francophone group consists of ten countries with very low separation and four countries with very high separation; there is only one country showing a score in between. In the Anglophone set, a partial or median score for separation is more or less the norm. Table 3 The descriptive statistics for separation of powers illustrate the complexity and hybrid nature of African regimes. The classification into regime types does not give us clues as to the extent of separation of powers. The Anglophone set in particular is most illustrative of the African hybrid system conforming neither to the ideal typical presidential system with separation of powers, nor to the semi-presidential model with very low or no separation of powers. At the same time, only the presidential regime type shows the expected pattern of relatively high separation (with a high mean score), but 6 presidential regimes do not conform to this pattern and have only a very partial separation of powers. The semi-presidential and parliamentary regime types do not show the extent of separation suggested by the very definition of the type: in particular, semi-presidential regimes have lower separation than parliamentary regimes. Separation of Offices Another indicator of separation between the executive and legislative branch of government is whether offices are separated in the sense that one person cannot hold offices in both branches. In particular, the question is whether cabinet ministers may 9

10 also hold a seat in the representative assembly (legislative office). This issue has not been subject of systematic comparative research in Africa, expect by Nijzink et al (2006). Usually constitutions define explicitly whether or not there are incompatibilities of office; in other cases it may be inferred from the clauses regulating the appointment of ministers. Table 4 reports on the presence or absence of fusion of offices. Here a divergent pattern between Anglophone and Francophone countries is quite evident. All Francophone countries separate offices, while the majority of Anglophone countries allows the fusion of legislative and executive offices in one person. There are variations in the constitutional requirements: in seven countries, ministers must be MPs; in 4 countries ministers may be MPs; only three Anglophone countries separate offices. Tables 4 and 5 The pattern in Anglophone countries points to a particular way in which the executive is fused with the assembly: the appointment to the cabinet creates a personal union between the part of the executive and the legislature. The phenomenon can reach quite high proportions: the average percentage of MPs holding a position in the government is 30 for these countries, while in Namibia, 60% of MPs serve in some capacity in the cabinet (van Cranenburgh 2009). This Anglophone feature is present in all three regime types: in 5 out of the 14 presidential regimes, 3 out of the 13 semipresidential regimes and in all 3 parliamentary regimes (see table 5). This feature has been noted in the context of the neo-patrimonial character of African politics and represents in essence a cooptation of MPs into the government (see for example van de Walle 2003). The result is, as Barkan noted, that few MPs pursued a legislative career with an eye on policy making for the good of the nation. Rather, becoming a member of the legislature was seem as an avenue for lucrative patronage jobs, a ministerial appointment being the most alluring among them (Barkan, 127-9). These features severely limit the possibility to ensure the independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive. 10

11 While Francophone countries do not constitutionally allow the fusion of legislative and executive offices, the tendency to expand the size of cabinet by appointing many ministers and deputy ministers is also evident. Conac (2007, 89) reports that such measures, as taken in Gabon, serve to increase support for the government. Comparing both groups, Anglophone and Francophone countries clearly differ, with Anglophone fusing executive and legislative offices. This feature creates more obstacles in ensuring independence of the legislature vis à vis the executive. Party-politics and separation of powers Constitutions may create separate institutions and offices, but how does party politics impact on the extent of separation between the executive and legislative branches of government? It is beyond the scope of this contribution to present exhaustive data on party-politics in these 30 African countries. I will report briefly on earlier research and argue that party politics affects separation of powers. Most research on presidential systems has emphasized the importance of the party system for the way presidential systems function. For Latin America, much research examined the consequences of the combination of presidentialism with proportional representation for legislative elections, in particular the extent of fragmentation in the party system and the need for coalitions in these systems. Other research has looked at the timing of elections for each branch of government. The important variable in this regard is concurrent or honeymoon elections versus midterm elections for the assembly. Concurrent or honey moon elections elections very soon after the presidential election - increase the likelihood that the president s party will control a majority in the assembly and are therefore also known as a presidentialist formula (Shugart and Carey 1992). The result may be that the two branches of government, which may be institutionally separated, are controlled by the same party. Table 6 shows that the all Anglophone countries have concurrent or honeymoon elections. Existing research on the composition of parliament in the Anglophone countries shows that the president commands vast majorities in 11

12 parliament and cabinets are one-party cabinets in the great majority of Anglophone countries (van de Walle 2003, Bogaards 2004, Conac 2007, van Cranenburgh 2009). So to the extent that power is institutionally separated (which is only partly the case in Anglophone countries) the party-political situation limits the extent to which both branches can function as independent entities because they are controlled by the same (presidential) party. I therefore argue that in Anglophone countries obstacles to independence for the assembly vis-à-vis the executive are particularly great. In Francophone countries, elections are non-concurrent in 11 out of 15 countries; they are concurrent or honeymoon-style in only four countries. In this group of countries, legislative majorities for the president s party are much smaller, and consequently, coalition cabinets occur more frequently (van Cranenburgh 2009). The party system is more fragmented and consequently it is less easy for the executive to control a legislative majority. In sum, the basic argument is that party politics affects the separation of powers; institutional separation is jeopardized by the control of both branches by the same (presidential) party. The highly majoritarian party politics in Anglophone countries, which leads to unitary and single party government, most strongly affects the possibility for the assembly to act independently of the government, Table 6 Implications for Horizontal Accountability While African countries have strong executive presidents, this feature of the executive is combined with very partial or no separation of powers. Institutional separation is low or absent in the majority of regimes, while offices are not separated in roughly half the regimes examined. What are the implications of the various ways in which powers are not separated, or fused, for horizontal accountability in Africa? Can the legislature, or better the assembly, effectively function as a counterweight to the executive and exercise its function of oversight of the executive? This contribution does not examine such questions empirically by looking at the functioning of institutions in practice, but presents an argument based on these fundamental characteristics of the constitutional design of these African regimes. 12

13 The prevalence of the rule of cabinet needing the confidence of the assembly - an inherent feature of the parliamentary and semi-presidential systems - in most African regimes might at first sight appear to present opportunities for oversight of the executive. This feature appears to express the constitutional and philosophical idea that parliament is sovereign. Cabinet accountability to the legislature implies that the freedom of presidents to appoint ministers is limited by the requirement of confidence, but after the formation of the government it also creates a virtually guaranteed support for the government in the assembly. As pointed out by Lijphart, Budge and others, this aspect of the Westminster parliamentary system tends to create executive dominance, especially when the cabinet is single party. In European parliamentary systems such as the Dutch system, a similar pattern results from the formation of coalition accords to ensure a parliamentary majority for the government. This is often criticized for threatening institutional dualism and creating what is called monism in the executive-legislative relationship. The parliamentary majority is committed to the program of the government, limiting its possibility to control government. It is rather paradoxical to note that in practice the confidence rule limits the possibilities of the legislature to hold the executive accountable. However, one could argue that the damage to the power balance between the institutions of government is smaller in the context of established and consolidated liberal democratic systems, where both political culture and a range of other institutions play a role in ensuring horizontal accountability. In Africa the latter conditions generally do not apply. For African countries, the negative implications for horizontal accountability are exacerbated by the party-political constellation. As noted above, in most African countries the party of the president controls a large majority in the assembly leading to unitary governments and one party cabinets. The political party landscape is highly majoritarian. Thus, the lack of institutional separation is combined with a partypolitical constellation making the legislature an extension of the executive. This pattern is most strong in Anglophone countries which have majoritarian electoral systems for the assembly (First past the Post). However, the pattern is also found in the countries with proportional representation, such as South Africa and Namibia. Besides the legacy of the role governing parties played as liberation movements, this can be linked to the presence of concurrent elections for the president and the legislature; only recently have some (high profile) cases shown an absence of a clear 13

14 legislative majority for the president s party (Kenya and Zimbabwe). In Francophone countries, the party-political constellation is less majoritarian, which reflects the prevalence of non-concurrent elections. Besides the separation of institutions, this paper examined the separation of offices. Anglophone countries stand out for the fusion of executive and legislative offices, creating the strongest form of fusion between the branches, i.e. in one person. This feature further strengthens executive dominance over the legislature. With many MPs serving is some capacity on the government, they will not use their legislative office to hold the government accountable. Given the combination of executive dominance resulting from fusion of powers between the legislature and the cabinet with a directly elected president with substantial executive powers, my argument is that African presidential systems, and most evidently Anglophone African systems, thus combine the power concentrating features of the parliamentary and the presidential systems: parliamentary systems by definition fuse power between the legislature and the executive and thus create a degree of constitutional monism, and presidential systems are inherently majoritarian in the sense that the single-person executive by definition gains power through a majority vote of a winner take all type. Both systems, in their ideal typical, but also in their empirical forms, also possess power sharing or power division potential; parliamentary systems allow power sharing in a collective executive, and presidential systems may divide and separate power between the branches of government. In Africa s hybrid systems, however, neither the power sharing nor the power- dividing potential of the pure types is reflected. In the category of semi-presidential systems, in which (part of) the executive and the legislature are inherently not institutionally separated, the African cases show particularly high levels of presidential power. In Francophone countries, the great majority being semi-presidential, levels of presidential power are highest and they also show least separation of institutions. However, this group shows separation of offices and the party-political context is less majoritarian than in the Anglophone group. Granted the inherent institutional fusion in the semi-presidential systems, the separation of offices and the party political context create some more possibilities for parliament to hold the powerful executive accountable. 14

15 In sum, the general picture shows that the balance of power between the executive and the legislature is strongly in favor of the executive and the systemic features lead to fusion rather than separation of power although this is variably manifested in low institutional separation, lack of separation of office or the consequences of presidentialist electoral formulas. The introduction of multi-party elections was not accompanied by a comprehensive reassessment of such systemic features. The pattern of fusion and concentration of powers is strongest in the Anglophone countries, which combine partial institutional separation, fusion of offices and concurrent elections. The basic design of the executive-legislative relationship inherently limits the independence of parliament vis-à-vis the executive and limits the possibilities to play a significant role in legislation, policy development and oversight of the executive. The analysis showed that the hybridism of African regimes is particularly evident looking at the extent to which powers are separated. The classification in regime types does not give sufficient clues about the extent to which powers are separated. This paper argued that an important prerequisite for the creation of horizontal accountability some degree of separation of powers - is absent or weak in many African countries and most strongly in Anglophone countries and suggests that these issues must be addressed in the effort to achieve democratic reforms. 15

16 References Barkan, J Legislatures on the Rise? Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, no. 2, p Bogaards, M Counting parties and identifying dominant party systems in Africa, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No 2, p Budge, I. Great Britain and Ireland in Political Institutions in Europe, J. Colomer, ed. (London and New Cork: Routledge), p Conac, F Semi-presidentialism in a francophone context in Semipresidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study, R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, eds (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p Cranenburgh, O. van Big Men Rule: presidential power, regime type and democracy in 30 African countries. Democratization, Vol. 15, no 5, p Cranenburgh, O. van Restraining Executive power: horizontal accountability in Africa s hybrid regimes. South African Journal of international Affairs 16, 1, p Cranenburgh, O. van 2011 forthcoming. Democracy Promotion in Africa: the institutional context, Democratization. Duverger, M A new political system model: semi-presidential government, in: European Journal of Political Research Vol. 8, no. 2, p Elgie, R The classification of democratic regime types: conceptual ambiguity and contestable assumptions, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 33, p Elgie, R Variations on a Theme in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, no. 3, p Elgie, R. 2007, What is Semi-presidentialism and where is it found?, in R. Elgie and S. Moestrup, Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study (Oxon, UK: Routledge), p Frame, I. and Murison, K. eds. 2005, Africa South of the Sahara, 34 th Edition (London: Europe Publications). Linz, J The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 p Lijphart, A Constitutional Choices for New Democracies, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 1, p

17 Lijphart, A Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale). Nijzink, L, Mozaffar, S and Azevedo, E Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality of Democracy on the African Continent? An Analysis of Institutional Capacity and Public Perceptions, CSSR Working Paper no. 160, p O Donnell, G Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, Journal of Democracy, 9(3), p Shugart. M. and Carey, J. 1992, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shugart, M Executive-Legislative Relations In Post-Communist Europe, Transition. Vol. 2 (2) No. 24, p Shugart, M. 2005, Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns in French Politics, 2005, No. 3, p Siaroff, A Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semipresidential and parliamentary distinction, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42, p Walle, N. van de Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa s Emerging party Systems, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 41, no. 2, p

18 TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1. Classification of 30 African regimes as of 2007 presidential Head of state is directly elected and with fixed term; no separate head of government Ghana Kenya (until 2007) The Gambia Zimbabwe Seychelles Sierra Leone Malawi Nigeria Zambia Benin Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Guinea parliamentary : Neither the head of state nor the head of government is directly elected or with a fixed term Botswana * Mauritius South Africa * * Based on constitutions in force in Botswana and South Africa are here classified as parliamentary; the difference with Mauritius is that there is no separate head of state; the head of government (no popular election and no fixed term) also serves as head of state. Table 2a. Scoring System Shugart 1996 semi-presidential Head of state directly elected with fixed term; head of government not Namibia Tanzania Uganda Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Rep. Gabon Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo Powers over cabinet Cabinet formation 4 President appoints ministers without need for assembly confirmation 3 President appoints ministers with consent of the Assembly ` 2 President appoints ministers, who need confidence of assembly 1 President nominates Prime Minister, who needs confidence of the Assembly; PM appoints other ministers, possibly with the consent of president Cabinet dismissal 4 President dismisses ministers at will 3 President dismisses ministers with consent of the Assembly 1 President dismisses ministers, but only under certain restrictions 0 Ministers (or the whole cabinet) may be removed only by assembly on vote of censure Separation of survival in office (scored for both assembly and executive) 4 No provisions compromising separation of survival (such as fixed terms) 3 Survival can be attacked, but attacker must stand for re-election 2 Survival can be attacked only in situation of mutual jeopardy 1 Survival can be attacked at specified times 0 Survival can be attacked at any time (unrestricted censure or dissolution) 18

19 Table 2b. Presidential Power and Separation (based on Shugart 2006) Country Presidential Powers over Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet Total Formation Dismissal Separation of Survival for Assembly Cabinet (dissolution) (fixed term) Botswana The Gambia Ghana Kenya Malawi Mauritius Namibia Nigeria Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Total Country Presidential Powers over Cabinet Cabinet Cabinet Total Formation Dismissal Separation of Survival for Assembly Cabinet (dissolution) (fixed term) Benin Burkina Fase Cameroon C.African Rep Comores Congo Braz Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo Total 19

20 Table 3. Extent of separation in three regime types and in Anglophone and Francophone African countries Regimes mean modus median Presidential (14) Semi-presidential (13) Parliamentary (3) Anglophone (15) of 4 4 Francophone (15) Table 4. Fusion of Office Ministers must be MPs Ministers may be MP s Minister may not be MPs Botswana Kenya* Mauritius Namibia* Tanzania* Zambia* Zimbabwe* Ghana (50% + 1) Malawi South Africa** Uganda The Gambia Nigeria Sierra Leone Benin Burkina Faso Comoros Congo Brazzaville Cameroon Central African Rep. Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mali Mauritania Niger Senegal Togo * In Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the Presidents appoint ministers only from members of the Assembly. But, the President has the possibility to appoint twelve (Kenya) six (Namibia), ten (Tanzania), eight (Zambia) or twelve (Zimbabwe) members in the NA. Indirectly this means that the president may appoint these persons as ministers from outside the assembly. ** In South Africa, the President may select two ministers from outside the Assembly Source: The constitutions of all countries listed Table 5. Fusion of Office and Regime Type Regime type Fusion of Office Non-fusion Presidential (14) 5 9 Semi-presidential (13) 3 10 Parliamentary (3) 3-20

21 Table 6 Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections * Concurrent or Honeymoon Elections Ghana Kenya Malawi Nigeria Namibia Sierra Leone Tanzania The Gambia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Central African Republic Mali Niger Senegal Non-concurrent elections Seychelles Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Comoros Congo Brazzaville Djibouti Gabon Guinea Madagascar Mauretania Togo * Based on constitutions in force in 2007, including relevant constitutional amendments. 21

22 Figure 1 Conceptual Map Presidential cabinet authority Sey Car Cam Mli Mad Tan Nam Ug Buf Gab Zim Gam President-Parliamentary Mau SA Gha Gui Bot Ken Presidential Mal Ben Dji Cob Com Nig Zam Former colony of Anglophone Francophone 1 0 Premier-Presidential Parliamentary (with elected head of state) Separation of survival