Pembina Nisku Oil Project. Three Well Exploration Program

Transcription

1 Pembina Nisku Oil Project Three Well Exploration Program

2 Communication Public Notifications For Each Well: To: A. i. Seasonal residents, owner of vacant residences and residences under construction, vacant shop/residence and vacant serviced lot inside the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) ii. Industrial Operators, Grazing Lease/allotment user, and the cultivation permit user B. Permanent residents and owners of businesses inside the EPZ Notice of Commencement of: Sour Drilling Operations Sour Completions and Testing including a Flaring Notice Sour Workover/Servicing A. One week prior to entering the FIRST sour formation (by mail) One week prior to entering the NISKU formation (by mail) B. Within 96 hours (4 days) prior to entering the FIRST sour formation (by hand) Within 96 hours (4 days) prior to entering the Nisku formation (by hand) Public Communication: At the commencement of Sour Operations, the Acting Public Protection Branch Director will be available daily from 4:30 to 5:30pm at the junction of Range Road 72 and Township Road 500 to provide information about Shelter-In-Place, evacuation, ignition and /or the well.

3 Drilling Safety is our Priority Use of best equipment and qualified personnel. In Accordance with AER Directives & Industry Recommended Practices (IRPs). Critical Drilling of 4 Days per well AER Approved drilling program AER Conducted rig inspections Prior to Drilling out the Intermediate Casing On-site safety equipment plus mobile air monitoring

4 Completion Safety First Well Control Equipment in place at all times In Accordance with AER Directives & IRPs Critical Completion of 4 Days per well Safety equipment on-site plus mobile air monitoring

5 Planned Testing: Planned Testing and Flaring Will follow AER D60 for Flaring and IRP Vol #4 for Testing and Handling of Fluids Flow Test of 72 Hours (3 Days) per well followed by 9 days of shut-in. Using a 30.5 meter (100 ft) Flare Stack Limited to 100x10³m³ (3.5 Mmscf) of Total Gas Volume per well Flaring Notification Radius of 3.0 kms Any exceedances of the AAAQO will result in cessation of testing and flaring operations until dispersion conditions improve.

6 Development Plan Development plan will depend on reservoir and fluid characteristics. Sinopec Crossfire Battery is closest but complex. Pipeline and on-site facility will require separate licencing process and approval.

7 Flare Dispersion Modelling, Pembina Sour Oil Project, Bashaw Oil Corp. David Chadder Senior Project Director/Principal November 16, I CANADA I CHINA I HONG KONG I INDIA I SINGAPORE I UK I USA

8 AER Directive 60 Requirements, Temporary Flaring Purpose of Directive 60 Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) Directive 60 (D60) outlines the strict requirements for sour crude oil wells among other facilities. Aligned with other AB government regulators. Must comply with Alberta Environment and Parks Alberta Ambient Air Quality Objectives and Guidelines (AAAQO) for SO 2. Developed in consultation with the Clean Air Strategic Alliance (CASA); multi-stakeholder group that advises AB government on air quality policies to eliminate or reduce the potential impacts of flaring and address public safety concerns and environmental impacts. Conditions That Require a Temporary Flaring/Incineration Permit Bashaw must obtain temporary flaring permits to flare sour gas (>5 per cent sour gas) from each of the three proposed critical sour wells.

9 AER Directive 60 Requirements, Temporary Flaring Temporary and Well Test Flaring Dispersion Modelling Equipment design and/or the operating procedures, or both, must address all modelled predictions that exceed the AAAQO (0.172 ppm), excluding predicted values that meet the AER risk-based criteria. Flaring safely combusts H 2 S to less hazardous SO 2 Risk-based criteria for temporary events allow limited exclusion of predicted ambient air quality results based on their magnitude and frequency of occurrence. Model predictions up to ppm (900 μg/m 3 ) will be considered by the AER; however, actual measured exceedances of the AAAQO are never permitted.

10 Bashaw Proposed Flaring Plan Total volume to be flared at each well is 100 e 3 m 3 of sour gas Flaring would be conducted for 3 consecutive days per well times 3 wells or 9 days in total Cumulative Effects Multiple well test flaring/incinerating must not occur within 20 km of each other unless a licensee (Bashaw) can demonstrate that cumulative emissions from flaring can meet the AAAQO for SO 2.

11 Air Quality Management System Source Standards Dispersion Modelling Ambient Guidelines Source Monitoring A dispersion model provides a fundamental link between emissions and air quality changes by simulating transport, dispersion and deposition mechanisms. Ambient Monitoring

12 Local wind conditions, wind rose Wind rose plots the originating wind direction, where a greater lobe length indicates more commonly occurring wind direction

13 Predicted SO 2 concentrations for the Bashaw Pembina Project Scenario Maximum Average Low Sour Gas Flow Rate (10 3 m 3 /d) Maximum Predicted Hourly Average SO 2 Concentration in ppm (μg/m 3 ) (974) (935) (397) 99.9 th Percentile Predicted 1-hour SO 2 Concentration in ppm (μg/m 3 ) (562) (536) 0.99 (259) 99 th Percentile Predicted 1-hour SO 2 Concentration in ppm (μg/m 3 ) (421) (398) 0.65 (169) AER Risk-Based Criteria met? YES YES YES The AER flaring model calculates the predicted SO 2 concentrations over 43,800 hours of meteorological conditions and selects the maximum value that occurs once

14 Pembina Sentinel Air Monitoring Network Pennwest 592 Pennwest 447 Rocky Rapids Store 486 Bashaw Well Site Bellatrix 448

15 Example of Mobile Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Units for Downwind Surveillance

16 Summary of AER D60 Requirements, Flare Modelling Bashaw must obtain a flaring permit for each of their three proposed wells. Bashaw is able to secure AER flaring permits for temporary and separate well testing on the three wells without an air quality management plan. Four ambient air quality monitoring stations operated by the Pembina Sentinel Air Monitoring Network will continuously measure H 2 S and SO 2 within 5 km of the proposed surface well locations Bashaw will retain a 3rd party contractor to undertake downwind ambient air quality monitoring while they are working in the sour zones. Downwind surveillance will use public roads on both sides of the river, based on measured winds. Any measured 1-hour SO 2 concentrations in excess of the AAAQO will be communicated back to the well-site. Flaring operations will stop for a minimum one hour period until dispersion conditions improve (minimum 30-minutes).

17 Flare Dispersion Modelling, Pembina Sour Oil Project QUESTIONS? (403) ext 6228

18 Maximum predicted 1-hour SO 2 concentration contours based on AERMOD modelling for the maximum flow rate ( m 3 /d)

19 Pseudo-Parameters (flame derived), AER Flare Model Scenario Maximum Average Low Sour Gas Flow Rate (10 3 m 3 /d) H 2 S Content (%) Net Heating Value (MJ/m 3 ) SO 2 Emission Rate (g/s) Stack Height (m) 30.5 Stack Diameter (m) Scenario Maximum Average Low Sour Gas Flow Rate (10 3 m 3 /d) Effective Height (m) Pseudo-Exit Diameter (m) Pseudo-Exit Velocity (m/s) Estimated Exit Temperature (K) 1, , , Assumed Ambient Air Temperature (K)

20 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING ASHAW et al 102 PEMBINA (W5M) BASHAW et al PEMBINA (W5M) BASHAW et al 102 PEMBINA (W5M) SITE-SPECIFIC SUPPLEMENTAL SECTION Drilling, Completions and Testing and Workover/Servicing Operations Russ Brown Bissett Resource Consultants Ltd

21 ALBERTA ENERGY REGULATOR (AER) DIRECTIVE 71 Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) Directive 71 - Emergency Preparedness and Response Requirements for the Petroleum Industry. The purpose of emergency preparedness and response is to establish a decision framework and action plan so that the licensee can quickly and effectively respond to an emergency. (AER - D71, Section 1.5). The AER strongly supports the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) as a means of ensuring consistent command and communication among all parties. (AER - D71, Section 2.1.4). Section 4.3 of D71 recognises that those residing on deadend roads beyond the EPZ where occupants are required to egress through the EPZ must be included in the ERP.

22 ALBERTA ENERGY REGULATOR (AER) DIRECTIVE 71 Section 1.3. Licensees have a responsibility to ensure that they are fully prepared and capable of responding to any level of emergency. Emergency preparedness and response includes all activities done prior to an emergency so that designated personnel are ready and able to respond quickly and appropriately, as well as those activities that take place during the incident. This includes activities such as: identifying hazards, preparing and maintaining ERPs and response procedures, ensuring that the ERPs identify sufficient resources and equipment for use by response personnel during an emergency, and designating response personnel and ensuring that they are suitably equipped to carry out their duties through training, drills, and exercises.

23 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE: An emergency planning zone (EPZ) is a geographical area surrounding a well, pipeline, or facility containing hazardous product that requires specific emergency response planning by the licensee (AER - D71, Section 3.1).

24 INITIAL ISOLATION ZONE: The initial isolation zone (IIZ) defines an area in close proximity to a continuous hazardous release where indoor sheltering may provide temporary protection due to the proximity of the release. For H 2 S releases under poor dispersion conditions, the IIZ is defined and calculated using the ERCBH2S model and is very useful for planning purposes. The IIZ does not have to be drawn on the ERP map; however, IIZ information from the ERCBH2S model should be readily available to aid responders in protecting the public. (AER - D71, Section 3.4).

25 PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES (AER - D71, SECTION 5.2). Sheltering indoors (Shelter-In-Place): is a viable public protection measure in circumstances when: there is insufficient time or warning to safely evacuate the public that may be at risk, residents are waiting for evacuation assistance, the release will be of limited size and/or duration, the location of a release has not been identified, or the public would be at higher risk if evacuated.

26 AER - PUBLIC PROTECTION MEASURES FOR PLANNING AND RESPONSE ZONES DECISION TREE (AER DIRECTIVE 71 SECTION 14.3)

27 QUESTIONS?

28 THANK YOU